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Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07001/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07003 *
4 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
7 *
8 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
9 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
10 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
11 * General Public License for more details.
12 */
13#include <linux/kernel.h>
14#include <linux/types.h>
15#include <linux/slab.h>
16#include <linux/bpf.h>
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +010017#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070018#include <linux/filter.h>
19#include <net/netlink.h>
20#include <linux/file.h>
21#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +020022#include <linux/stringify.h>
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070023
24/* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
25 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
26 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
27 *
28 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG.
29 * It rejects the following programs:
30 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns
31 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge)
32 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
33 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps
34 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
35 * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
Gary Lineba38a92017-03-01 16:25:51 +080036 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070037 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
38 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
39 *
40 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction
41 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics.
42 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is
43 * copied to R1.
44 *
45 * All registers are 64-bit.
46 * R0 - return register
47 * R1-R5 argument passing registers
48 * R6-R9 callee saved registers
49 * R10 - frame pointer read-only
50 *
51 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context
52 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
53 *
54 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case:
55 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
56 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20),
57 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1
58 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize
59 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack.
60 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK
61 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking).
62 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant.
63 *
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +010064 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070065 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer.
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +010066 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type)
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070067 *
68 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +010069 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK. These are three pointer
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070070 * types recognized by check_mem_access() function.
71 *
72 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value'
73 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible.
74 *
75 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against
76 * function argument constraints.
77 *
78 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints.
79 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be
80 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as
81 * 'pointer to map element key'
82 *
83 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem():
84 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,
85 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
86 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
87 *
88 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null'
89 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and
90 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside
91 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key.
92 *
93 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like:
94 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
95 * {
96 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1;
97 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2;
98 * void *value;
99 *
100 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that
101 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on
102 * the stack of eBPF program.
103 * }
104 *
105 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like:
106 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR
107 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK
108 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
109 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
110 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees:
111 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok,
112 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes
113 *
114 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far,
115 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits
116 * and were initialized prior to this call.
117 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
118 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
119 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
120 * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL.
121 *
122 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
123 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
124 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false
125 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op().
126 *
127 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5
128 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
129 */
130
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700131/* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100132struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700133 /* verifer state is 'st'
134 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
135 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
136 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100137 struct bpf_verifier_state st;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700138 int insn_idx;
139 int prev_insn_idx;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100140 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700141};
142
Edward Cree8e17c1b2017-08-07 15:30:30 +0100143#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +0200144#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024
145
Martin KaFai Laufad73a12017-03-22 10:00:32 -0700146#define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)0xeB9F + POISON_POINTER_DELTA)
147
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +0200148struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
149 struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +0200150 bool raw_mode;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200151 bool pkt_access;
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +0200152 int regno;
153 int access_size;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +0200154};
155
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700156/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
157 * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars
158 */
159static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len;
160static char *log_buf;
161
162static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
163
164/* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
165 * verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user
166 * can figure out what's wrong with the program
167 */
Daniel Borkmann1d056d92015-11-03 11:39:20 +0100168static __printf(1, 2) void verbose(const char *fmt, ...)
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700169{
170 va_list args;
171
172 if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1)
173 return;
174
175 va_start(args, fmt);
176 log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args);
177 va_end(args);
178}
179
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700180/* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */
181static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
182 [NOT_INIT] = "?",
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100183 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "inv",
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700184 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx",
185 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr",
186 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value",
187 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null",
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700188 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp",
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700189 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt",
190 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end",
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700191};
192
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +0200193#define __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN(x) [BPF_FUNC_ ## x] = __stringify(bpf_ ## x)
194static const char * const func_id_str[] = {
195 __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(__BPF_FUNC_STR_FN)
196};
197#undef __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN
198
199static const char *func_id_name(int id)
200{
201 BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(func_id_str) != __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID);
202
203 if (id >= 0 && id < __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID && func_id_str[id])
204 return func_id_str[id];
205 else
206 return "unknown";
207}
208
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100209static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700210{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100211 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700212 enum bpf_reg_type t;
213 int i;
214
215 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700216 reg = &state->regs[i];
217 t = reg->type;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700218 if (t == NOT_INIT)
219 continue;
220 verbose(" R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100221 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) &&
222 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
223 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */
224 verbose("%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
225 } else {
226 verbose("(id=%d", reg->id);
227 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE)
228 verbose(",off=%d", reg->off);
229 if (t == PTR_TO_PACKET)
230 verbose(",r=%d", reg->range);
231 else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP ||
232 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
233 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
234 verbose(",ks=%d,vs=%d",
235 reg->map_ptr->key_size,
236 reg->map_ptr->value_size);
Edward Cree7d1238f2017-08-07 15:26:56 +0100237 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
238 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but
239 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big
240 * for reg->off
241 */
242 verbose(",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value);
243 } else {
244 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value &&
245 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN)
246 verbose(",smin_value=%lld",
247 (long long)reg->smin_value);
248 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value &&
249 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX)
250 verbose(",smax_value=%lld",
251 (long long)reg->smax_value);
252 if (reg->umin_value != 0)
253 verbose(",umin_value=%llu",
254 (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value);
255 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX)
256 verbose(",umax_value=%llu",
257 (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value);
258 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
259 char tn_buf[48];
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100260
Edward Cree7d1238f2017-08-07 15:26:56 +0100261 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
262 verbose(",var_off=%s", tn_buf);
263 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100264 }
265 verbose(")");
266 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700267 }
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700268 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700269 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_SPILL)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700270 verbose(" fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i,
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700271 reg_type_str[state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE].type]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700272 }
273 verbose("\n");
274}
275
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700276static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = {
277 [BPF_LD] = "ld",
278 [BPF_LDX] = "ldx",
279 [BPF_ST] = "st",
280 [BPF_STX] = "stx",
281 [BPF_ALU] = "alu",
282 [BPF_JMP] = "jmp",
283 [BPF_RET] = "BUG",
284 [BPF_ALU64] = "alu64",
285};
286
Alexei Starovoitov687f0712015-09-08 13:40:01 -0700287static const char *const bpf_alu_string[16] = {
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700288 [BPF_ADD >> 4] = "+=",
289 [BPF_SUB >> 4] = "-=",
290 [BPF_MUL >> 4] = "*=",
291 [BPF_DIV >> 4] = "/=",
292 [BPF_OR >> 4] = "|=",
293 [BPF_AND >> 4] = "&=",
294 [BPF_LSH >> 4] = "<<=",
295 [BPF_RSH >> 4] = ">>=",
296 [BPF_NEG >> 4] = "neg",
297 [BPF_MOD >> 4] = "%=",
298 [BPF_XOR >> 4] = "^=",
299 [BPF_MOV >> 4] = "=",
300 [BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=",
301 [BPF_END >> 4] = "endian",
302};
303
304static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = {
305 [BPF_W >> 3] = "u32",
306 [BPF_H >> 3] = "u16",
307 [BPF_B >> 3] = "u8",
308 [BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64",
309};
310
Alexei Starovoitov687f0712015-09-08 13:40:01 -0700311static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = {
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700312 [BPF_JA >> 4] = "jmp",
313 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = "==",
314 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = ">",
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +0200315 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = "<",
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700316 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = ">=",
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +0200317 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = "<=",
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700318 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&",
319 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = "!=",
320 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>",
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +0200321 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = "s<",
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700322 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=",
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +0200323 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = "s<=",
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700324 [BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call",
325 [BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit",
326};
327
Daniel Borkmann0d0e5762017-05-08 00:04:09 +0200328static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
329 const struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700330{
331 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
332
333 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
334 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
335 verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
336 insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
337 insn->dst_reg,
338 bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
339 class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
340 insn->src_reg);
341 else
342 verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
343 insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
344 insn->dst_reg,
345 bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
346 class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
347 insn->imm);
348 } else if (class == BPF_STX) {
349 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
350 verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
351 insn->code,
352 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
353 insn->dst_reg,
354 insn->off, insn->src_reg);
355 else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
356 verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
357 insn->code,
358 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
359 insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
360 insn->src_reg);
361 else
362 verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
363 } else if (class == BPF_ST) {
364 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
365 verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
366 return;
367 }
368 verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
369 insn->code,
370 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
371 insn->dst_reg,
372 insn->off, insn->imm);
373 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
374 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
375 verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
376 return;
377 }
378 verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
379 insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
380 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
381 insn->src_reg, insn->off);
382 } else if (class == BPF_LD) {
383 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
384 verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
385 insn->code,
386 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
387 insn->imm);
388 } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
389 verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
390 insn->code,
391 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
392 insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
Daniel Borkmann0d0e5762017-05-08 00:04:09 +0200393 } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM &&
394 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) {
395 /* At this point, we already made sure that the second
396 * part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible.
397 */
398 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
399 bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD;
400
401 if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks)
402 imm = 0;
403
404 verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
405 insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700406 } else {
407 verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
408 return;
409 }
410 } else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
411 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
412
413 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +0200414 verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
415 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700416 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
417 verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
418 insn->code, insn->off);
419 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
420 verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
421 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
422 verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
423 insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
424 bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
425 insn->src_reg, insn->off);
426 } else {
427 verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
428 insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
429 bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
430 insn->imm, insn->off);
431 }
432 } else {
433 verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
434 }
435}
436
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100437static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700438{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100439 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700440 int insn_idx;
441
442 if (env->head == NULL)
443 return -1;
444
445 memcpy(&env->cur_state, &env->head->st, sizeof(env->cur_state));
446 insn_idx = env->head->insn_idx;
447 if (prev_insn_idx)
448 *prev_insn_idx = env->head->prev_insn_idx;
449 elem = env->head->next;
450 kfree(env->head);
451 env->head = elem;
452 env->stack_size--;
453 return insn_idx;
454}
455
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100456static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
457 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700458{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100459 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700460
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100461 elem = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700462 if (!elem)
463 goto err;
464
465 memcpy(&elem->st, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
466 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
467 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
468 elem->next = env->head;
469 env->head = elem;
470 env->stack_size++;
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +0200471 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700472 verbose("BPF program is too complex\n");
473 goto err;
474 }
475 return &elem->st;
476err:
477 /* pop all elements and return */
478 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
479 return NULL;
480}
481
482#define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
483static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
484 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
485};
486
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100487static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
488
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100489/* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as
490 * known to have the value @imm.
491 */
492static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
493{
494 reg->id = 0;
495 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm);
496 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm;
497 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm;
498 reg->umin_value = imm;
499 reg->umax_value = imm;
500}
501
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100502/* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be
503 * used only on registers holding a pointer type.
504 */
505static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
506{
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100507 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100508}
509
510static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
511{
512 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
513 verbose("mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
514 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
515 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
516 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
517 return;
518 }
519 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno);
520}
521
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100522/* Attempts to improve min/max values based on var_off information */
523static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
524{
525 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
526 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value,
527 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN));
528 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
529 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value,
530 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX));
531 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value);
532 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value,
533 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask);
534}
535
536/* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */
537static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
538{
539 /* Learn sign from signed bounds.
540 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
541 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g.
542 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
543 */
544 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) {
545 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
546 reg->umin_value);
547 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
548 reg->umax_value);
549 return;
550 }
551 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign
552 * boundary, so we must be careful.
553 */
554 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) {
555 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax
556 * is positive, hence safe.
557 */
558 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
559 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
560 reg->umax_value);
561 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) {
562 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin
563 * is negative, hence safe.
564 */
565 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
566 reg->umin_value);
567 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
568 }
569}
570
571/* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */
572static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
573{
574 reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off,
575 tnum_range(reg->umin_value,
576 reg->umax_value));
577}
578
579/* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */
580static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
581{
582 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
583 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
584 reg->umin_value = 0;
585 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
586}
587
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100588/* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */
589static void __mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
590{
591 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
592 reg->id = 0;
593 reg->off = 0;
594 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100595 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100596}
597
598static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
599{
600 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
601 verbose("mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno);
602 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
603 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
604 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
605 return;
606 }
607 __mark_reg_unknown(regs + regno);
608}
609
610static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
611{
612 __mark_reg_unknown(reg);
613 reg->type = NOT_INIT;
614}
615
Daniel Borkmanna9789ef2017-05-25 01:05:06 +0200616static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
617{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100618 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
619 verbose("mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno);
620 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
621 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
622 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
623 return;
624 }
625 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
Daniel Borkmanna9789ef2017-05-25 01:05:06 +0200626}
627
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100628static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700629{
630 int i;
631
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100632 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
Daniel Borkmanna9789ef2017-05-25 01:05:06 +0200633 mark_reg_not_init(regs, i);
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100634 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
635 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700636
637 /* frame pointer */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100638 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK;
639 mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_FP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700640
641 /* 1st arg to a function */
642 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100643 mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_1);
Daniel Borkmann6760bf22016-12-18 01:52:59 +0100644}
645
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700646enum reg_arg_type {
647 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */
648 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */
649 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */
650};
651
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100652static void mark_reg_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno)
653{
654 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent = state->parent;
655
Alexei Starovoitov8fe2d6c2017-10-05 16:20:56 -0700656 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP)
657 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
658 return;
659
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100660 while (parent) {
661 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
662 if (state->regs[regno].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
663 break;
664 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */
665 parent->regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
666 state = parent;
667 parent = state->parent;
668 }
669}
670
671static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700672 enum reg_arg_type t)
673{
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100674 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
675
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700676 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
677 verbose("R%d is invalid\n", regno);
678 return -EINVAL;
679 }
680
681 if (t == SRC_OP) {
682 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
683 if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) {
684 verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
685 return -EACCES;
686 }
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100687 mark_reg_read(&env->cur_state, regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700688 } else {
689 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
690 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
691 verbose("frame pointer is read only\n");
692 return -EACCES;
693 }
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100694 regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700695 if (t == DST_OP)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100696 mark_reg_unknown(regs, regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700697 }
698 return 0;
699}
700
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700701static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
702{
703 switch (type) {
704 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
705 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
706 case PTR_TO_STACK:
707 case PTR_TO_CTX:
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700708 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
709 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700710 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
711 return true;
712 default:
713 return false;
714 }
715}
716
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700717/* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
718 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
719 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100720static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
721 int size, int value_regno)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700722{
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100723 int i, spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700724 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
725 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
726 */
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700727
728 if (value_regno >= 0 &&
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700729 is_spillable_regtype(state->regs[value_regno].type)) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700730
731 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700732 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700733 verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
734 return -EACCES;
735 }
736
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700737 /* save register state */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100738 state->spilled_regs[spi] = state->regs[value_regno];
739 state->spilled_regs[spi].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700740
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700741 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
742 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL;
743 } else {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700744 /* regular write of data into stack */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100745 state->spilled_regs[spi] = (struct bpf_reg_state) {};
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700746
747 for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
748 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_MISC;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700749 }
750 return 0;
751}
752
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100753static void mark_stack_slot_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int slot)
754{
755 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent = state->parent;
756
757 while (parent) {
758 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
759 if (state->spilled_regs[slot].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
760 break;
761 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */
762 parent->spilled_regs[slot].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
763 state = parent;
764 parent = state->parent;
765 }
766}
767
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100768static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700769 int value_regno)
770{
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700771 u8 *slot_type;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100772 int i, spi;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700773
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700774 slot_type = &state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off];
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700775
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700776 if (slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
777 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700778 verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
779 return -EACCES;
780 }
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700781 for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
782 if (slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700783 verbose("corrupted spill memory\n");
784 return -EACCES;
785 }
786 }
787
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100788 spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
789
790 if (value_regno >= 0) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700791 /* restore register state from stack */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100792 state->regs[value_regno] = state->spilled_regs[spi];
793 mark_stack_slot_read(state, spi);
794 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700795 return 0;
796 } else {
797 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700798 if (slot_type[i] != STACK_MISC) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700799 verbose("invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
800 off, i, size);
801 return -EACCES;
802 }
803 }
804 if (value_regno >= 0)
805 /* have read misc data from the stack */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100806 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700807 return 0;
808 }
809}
810
811/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100812static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700813 int size)
814{
815 struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr;
816
Gianluca Borello57225692017-01-09 10:19:47 -0800817 if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700818 verbose("invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
819 map->value_size, off, size);
820 return -EACCES;
821 }
822 return 0;
823}
824
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100825/* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */
826static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800827 int off, int size)
828{
829 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
830 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
831 int err;
832
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100833 /* We may have adjusted the register to this map value, so we
834 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
835 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800836 */
837 if (log_level)
838 print_verifier_state(state);
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800839 /* The minimum value is only important with signed
840 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
841 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
842 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
843 * will have a set floor within our range.
844 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100845 if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800846 verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
847 regno);
848 return -EACCES;
849 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100850 err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size);
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800851 if (err) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100852 verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n", regno);
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800853 return err;
854 }
855
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100856 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be
857 * sure we won't do bad things.
858 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too.
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800859 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100860 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800861 verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
862 regno);
863 return -EACCES;
864 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100865 err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100866 if (err)
867 verbose("R%d max value is outside of the array range\n", regno);
868 return err;
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800869}
870
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700871#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
872
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100873static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
Thomas Graf3a0af8f2016-11-30 17:10:10 +0100874 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
875 enum bpf_access_type t)
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -0700876{
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200877 switch (env->prog->type) {
Thomas Graf3a0af8f2016-11-30 17:10:10 +0100878 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
879 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
880 /* dst_input() and dst_output() can't write for now */
881 if (t == BPF_WRITE)
882 return false;
Alexander Alemayhu7e57fbb2017-02-14 00:02:35 +0100883 /* fallthrough */
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200884 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
885 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -0700886 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
Thomas Graf3a0af8f2016-11-30 17:10:10 +0100887 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
John Fastabend8a31db52017-08-15 22:33:09 -0700888 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB:
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200889 if (meta)
890 return meta->pkt_access;
891
892 env->seen_direct_write = true;
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -0700893 return true;
894 default:
895 return false;
896 }
897}
898
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100899static int __check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
900 int off, int size)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700901{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100902 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
903 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700904
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100905 if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || (u64)off + size > reg->range) {
Alexei Starovoitovd91b28e2016-05-19 18:17:13 -0700906 verbose("invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
907 off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700908 return -EACCES;
909 }
910 return 0;
911}
912
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100913static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
914 int size)
915{
916 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
917 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
918 int err;
919
920 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any
921 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed
922 * offset.
923 */
924
925 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough
926 * detail to prove they're safe.
927 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100928 if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100929 verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
930 regno);
931 return -EACCES;
932 }
933 err = __check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
934 if (err) {
935 verbose("R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno);
936 return err;
937 }
938 return err;
939}
940
941/* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -0700942static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size,
Alexei Starovoitov19de99f2016-06-15 18:25:38 -0700943 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700944{
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +0200945 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {
946 .reg_type = *reg_type,
947 };
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -0700948
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +0100949 /* for analyzer ctx accesses are already validated and converted */
950 if (env->analyzer_ops)
951 return 0;
952
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700953 if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access &&
Yonghong Song23994632017-06-22 15:07:39 -0700954 env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info)) {
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +0200955 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a
956 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole
957 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower
958 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size
959 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other
960 * type of narrower access.
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -0700961 */
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +0200962 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size;
Yonghong Song23994632017-06-22 15:07:39 -0700963 *reg_type = info.reg_type;
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -0700964
Alexei Starovoitov32bbe002016-04-06 18:43:28 -0700965 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
966 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
967 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700968 return 0;
Alexei Starovoitov32bbe002016-04-06 18:43:28 -0700969 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700970
971 verbose("invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
972 return -EACCES;
973}
974
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +0200975static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
976 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700977{
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +0200978 if (allow_ptr_leaks)
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700979 return false;
980
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100981 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700982}
983
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +0200984static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
985{
986 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, &env->cur_state.regs[regno]);
987}
988
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +0200989static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -0700990 int off, int size, bool strict)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700991{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100992 struct tnum reg_off;
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -0700993 int ip_align;
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -0700994
995 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
996 if (!strict || size == 1)
997 return 0;
998
David S. Millere4eda882017-05-22 12:27:07 -0400999 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling
1000 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of
1001 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms
1002 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get
1003 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate
1004 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an
1005 * unconditional IP align value of '2'.
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07001006 */
David S. Millere4eda882017-05-22 12:27:07 -04001007 ip_align = 2;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001008
1009 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off));
1010 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
1011 char tn_buf[48];
1012
1013 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
1014 verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n",
1015 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001016 return -EACCES;
1017 }
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001018
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001019 return 0;
1020}
1021
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001022static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
1023 const char *pointer_desc,
1024 int off, int size, bool strict)
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001025{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001026 struct tnum reg_off;
1027
1028 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
1029 if (!strict || size == 1)
1030 return 0;
1031
1032 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off));
1033 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
1034 char tn_buf[48];
1035
1036 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
1037 verbose("misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n",
1038 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001039 return -EACCES;
1040 }
1041
1042 return 0;
1043}
1044
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07001045static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1046 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001047 int off, int size)
1048{
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07001049 bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001050 const char *pointer_desc = "";
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07001051
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001052 switch (reg->type) {
1053 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001054 /* special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN */
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07001055 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size, strict);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001056 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
1057 pointer_desc = "value ";
1058 break;
1059 case PTR_TO_CTX:
1060 pointer_desc = "context ";
1061 break;
1062 case PTR_TO_STACK:
1063 pointer_desc = "stack ";
1064 break;
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001065 default:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001066 break;
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001067 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001068 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(reg, pointer_desc, off, size, strict);
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001069}
1070
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001071/* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
1072 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
1073 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
1074 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
1075 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
1076 */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001077static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, int off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001078 int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
1079 int value_regno)
1080{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001081 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
1082 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001083 int size, err = 0;
1084
1085 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size);
1086 if (size < 0)
1087 return size;
1088
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001089 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07001090 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001091 if (err)
1092 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001093
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001094 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */
1095 off += reg->off;
1096
1097 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001098 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
1099 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
1100 verbose("R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
1101 return -EACCES;
1102 }
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001103
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001104 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001105 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001106 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001107
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07001108 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001109 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
Alexei Starovoitov19de99f2016-06-15 18:25:38 -07001110
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001111 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
1112 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
1113 verbose("R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
1114 return -EACCES;
1115 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001116 /* ctx accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
1117 * determine what type of data were returned.
1118 */
Jakub Kicinski28e33f92017-10-16 11:16:55 -07001119 if (reg->off) {
1120 verbose("dereference of modified ctx ptr R%d off=%d+%d, ctx+const is allowed, ctx+const+const is not\n",
1121 regno, reg->off, off - reg->off);
1122 return -EACCES;
1123 }
1124 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001125 char tn_buf[48];
1126
1127 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
1128 verbose("variable ctx access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
1129 tn_buf, off, size);
1130 return -EACCES;
1131 }
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001132 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, &reg_type);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001133 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001134 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a
1135 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_END]. In the latter case, we know
1136 * the offset is zero.
1137 */
1138 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE)
1139 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
1140 else
1141 mark_reg_known_zero(state->regs, value_regno);
1142 state->regs[value_regno].id = 0;
1143 state->regs[value_regno].off = 0;
1144 state->regs[value_regno].range = 0;
Mickaël Salaün19553512016-09-24 20:01:50 +02001145 state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001146 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001147
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001148 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
1149 /* stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
1150 * determine what type of data were returned.
1151 * See check_stack_read().
1152 */
1153 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
1154 char tn_buf[48];
1155
1156 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
1157 verbose("variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
1158 tn_buf, off, size);
1159 return -EACCES;
1160 }
1161 off += reg->var_off.value;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001162 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
1163 verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
1164 return -EACCES;
1165 }
Alexei Starovoitov87266792017-05-30 13:31:29 -07001166
1167 if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
1168 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
1169
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001170 if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
1171 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
1172 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off] == STACK_SPILL &&
1173 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
1174 verbose("attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
1175 return -EACCES;
1176 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001177 err = check_stack_write(state, off, size, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001178 } else {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001179 err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001180 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001181 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
Thomas Graf3a0af8f2016-11-30 17:10:10 +01001182 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001183 verbose("cannot write into packet\n");
1184 return -EACCES;
1185 }
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -07001186 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
1187 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
1188 verbose("R%d leaks addr into packet\n", value_regno);
1189 return -EACCES;
1190 }
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001191 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
1192 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001193 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001194 } else {
1195 verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n",
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07001196 regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001197 return -EACCES;
1198 }
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001199
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001200 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ &&
1201 state->regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
1202 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */
1203 state->regs[value_regno].var_off = tnum_cast(
1204 state->regs[value_regno].var_off, size);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001205 __update_reg_bounds(&state->regs[value_regno]);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001206 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001207 return err;
1208}
1209
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001210static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001211{
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001212 int err;
1213
1214 if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) ||
1215 insn->imm != 0) {
1216 verbose("BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
1217 return -EINVAL;
1218 }
1219
1220 /* check src1 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001221 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001222 if (err)
1223 return err;
1224
1225 /* check src2 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001226 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001227 if (err)
1228 return err;
1229
Daniel Borkmann6bdf6ab2017-06-29 03:04:59 +02001230 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
1231 verbose("R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
1232 return -EACCES;
1233 }
1234
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001235 /* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001236 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001237 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1);
1238 if (err)
1239 return err;
1240
1241 /* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001242 return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001243 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1);
1244}
1245
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001246/* Does this register contain a constant zero? */
1247static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state reg)
1248{
1249 return reg.type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg.var_off, 0);
1250}
1251
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001252/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
1253 * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001254 * and all elements of stack are initialized.
1255 * Unlike most pointer bounds-checking functions, this one doesn't take an
1256 * 'off' argument, so it has to add in reg->off itself.
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001257 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001258static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001259 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
1260 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001261{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001262 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
1263 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001264 int off, i;
1265
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001266 if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001267 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001268 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001269 register_is_null(regs[regno]))
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001270 return 0;
1271
1272 verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
1273 reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
1274 reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001275 return -EACCES;
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001276 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001277
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001278 /* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
1279 if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
1280 char tn_buf[48];
1281
1282 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
1283 verbose("invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
1284 regno, tn_buf);
1285 }
1286 off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001287 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
1288 access_size <= 0) {
1289 verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
1290 regno, off, access_size);
1291 return -EACCES;
1292 }
1293
Alexei Starovoitov87266792017-05-30 13:31:29 -07001294 if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
1295 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
1296
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001297 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
1298 meta->access_size = access_size;
1299 meta->regno = regno;
1300 return 0;
1301 }
1302
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001303 for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07001304 if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001305 verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
1306 off, i, access_size);
1307 return -EACCES;
1308 }
1309 }
1310 return 0;
1311}
1312
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001313static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
1314 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
1315 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
1316{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001317 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = &regs[regno];
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001318
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001319 switch (reg->type) {
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001320 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001321 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size);
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001322 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001323 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size);
1324 default: /* scalar_value|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001325 return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size,
1326 zero_size_allowed, meta);
1327 }
1328}
1329
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001330static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001331 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
1332 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001333{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001334 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = &regs[regno];
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001335 enum bpf_reg_type expected_type, type = reg->type;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001336 int err = 0;
1337
Daniel Borkmann80f1d682015-03-12 17:21:42 +01001338 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001339 return 0;
1340
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001341 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP);
1342 if (err)
1343 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001344
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001345 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
1346 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
1347 verbose("R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", regno);
1348 return -EACCES;
1349 }
Daniel Borkmann80f1d682015-03-12 17:21:42 +01001350 return 0;
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001351 }
Daniel Borkmann80f1d682015-03-12 17:21:42 +01001352
Thomas Graf3a0af8f2016-11-30 17:10:10 +01001353 if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
1354 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) {
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02001355 verbose("helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001356 return -EACCES;
1357 }
1358
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001359 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001360 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
1361 expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001362 if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
1363 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001364 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
1365 arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001366 expected_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
1367 if (type != expected_type)
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001368 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001369 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
1370 expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001371 if (type != expected_type)
1372 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov608cd712015-03-26 19:53:57 -07001373 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
1374 expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001375 if (type != expected_type)
1376 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001377 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM ||
1378 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) {
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001379 expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
1380 /* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001381 * passed in as argument, it's a SCALAR_VALUE type. Final test
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001382 * happens during stack boundary checking.
1383 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001384 if (register_is_null(*reg))
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001385 /* final test in check_stack_boundary() */;
Gianluca Borello57225692017-01-09 10:19:47 -08001386 else if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001387 type != expected_type)
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001388 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001389 meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001390 } else {
1391 verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type);
1392 return -EFAULT;
1393 }
1394
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001395 if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
1396 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001397 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001398 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
1399 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call:
1400 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within
1401 * stack limits and initialized
1402 */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001403 if (!meta->map_ptr) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001404 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before
1405 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before
1406 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
1407 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
1408 */
1409 verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
1410 return -EACCES;
1411 }
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001412 if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001413 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off,
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001414 meta->map_ptr->key_size);
1415 else
1416 err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
1417 meta->map_ptr->key_size,
1418 false, NULL);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001419 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
1420 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call:
1421 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity
1422 */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001423 if (!meta->map_ptr) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001424 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
1425 verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
1426 return -EACCES;
1427 }
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001428 if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001429 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off,
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001430 meta->map_ptr->value_size);
1431 else
1432 err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
1433 meta->map_ptr->value_size,
1434 false, NULL);
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001435 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
1436 arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
1437 bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001438
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001439 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' bytes
1440 * from stack pointer 'buf'. Check it
1441 * note: regno == len, regno - 1 == buf
1442 */
1443 if (regno == 0) {
1444 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001445 verbose("ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001446 return -EACCES;
1447 }
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001448
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001449 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check
1450 * happens using its boundaries.
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001451 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001452
1453 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001454 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw
1455 * mode so that the program is required to
1456 * initialize all the memory that the helper could
1457 * just partially fill up.
1458 */
1459 meta = NULL;
1460
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001461 if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001462 verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
1463 regno);
1464 return -EACCES;
1465 }
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001466
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001467 if (reg->umin_value == 0) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001468 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
1469 zero_size_allowed,
1470 meta);
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001471 if (err)
1472 return err;
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001473 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001474
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001475 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001476 verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
1477 regno);
1478 return -EACCES;
1479 }
1480 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1,
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001481 reg->umax_value,
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001482 zero_size_allowed, meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001483 }
1484
1485 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001486err_type:
1487 verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
1488 reg_type_str[type], reg_type_str[expected_type]);
1489 return -EACCES;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001490}
1491
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001492static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
1493{
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001494 if (!map)
1495 return 0;
1496
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001497 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
1498 switch (map->map_type) {
1499 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
1500 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
1501 goto error;
1502 break;
1503 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
1504 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
1505 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output)
1506 goto error;
1507 break;
1508 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
1509 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
1510 goto error;
1511 break;
Martin KaFai Lau4ed8ec52016-06-30 10:28:43 -07001512 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
David S. Miller60747ef2016-08-18 01:17:32 -04001513 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
Sargun Dhillon60d20f92016-08-12 08:56:52 -07001514 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
Martin KaFai Lau4a482f32016-06-30 10:28:44 -07001515 goto error;
1516 break;
John Fastabend546ac1f2017-07-17 09:28:56 -07001517 /* devmap returns a pointer to a live net_device ifindex that we cannot
1518 * allow to be modified from bpf side. So do not allow lookup elements
1519 * for now.
1520 */
1521 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
John Fastabend2ddf71e2017-07-17 09:30:02 -07001522 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
John Fastabend546ac1f2017-07-17 09:28:56 -07001523 goto error;
1524 break;
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07001525 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
Martin KaFai Laubcc6b1b2017-03-22 10:00:34 -07001526 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07001527 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
1528 goto error;
Martin KaFai Lau16a43622017-08-17 18:14:43 -07001529 break;
John Fastabend174a79f2017-08-15 22:32:47 -07001530 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
1531 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map &&
1532 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update &&
1533 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem)
1534 goto error;
1535 break;
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001536 default:
1537 break;
1538 }
1539
1540 /* ... and second from the function itself. */
1541 switch (func_id) {
1542 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
1543 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
1544 goto error;
1545 break;
1546 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
1547 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
1548 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
1549 goto error;
1550 break;
1551 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
1552 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
1553 goto error;
1554 break;
Sargun Dhillon60d20f92016-08-12 08:56:52 -07001555 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
Daniel Borkmann747ea552016-08-12 22:17:17 +02001556 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
Martin KaFai Lau4a482f32016-06-30 10:28:44 -07001557 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
1558 goto error;
1559 break;
John Fastabend97f91a72017-07-17 09:29:18 -07001560 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
1561 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP)
1562 goto error;
1563 break;
John Fastabend174a79f2017-08-15 22:32:47 -07001564 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map:
1565 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
1566 goto error;
1567 break;
1568 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update:
1569 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
1570 goto error;
1571 break;
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001572 default:
1573 break;
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001574 }
1575
1576 return 0;
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001577error:
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +02001578 verbose("cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
1579 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001580 return -EINVAL;
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001581}
1582
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001583static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
1584{
1585 int count = 0;
1586
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001587 if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001588 count++;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001589 if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001590 count++;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001591 if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001592 count++;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001593 if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001594 count++;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001595 if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001596 count++;
1597
1598 return count > 1 ? -EINVAL : 0;
1599}
1600
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001601/* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_END] are now invalid,
1602 * so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE.
1603 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001604static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001605{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001606 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
1607 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001608 int i;
1609
1610 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
1611 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
1612 regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001613 mark_reg_unknown(regs, i);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001614
1615 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
1616 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
1617 continue;
1618 reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
1619 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET &&
1620 reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET_END)
1621 continue;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001622 __mark_reg_unknown(reg);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001623 }
1624}
1625
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07001626static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001627{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001628 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001629 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001630 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001631 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001632 bool changes_data;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001633 int i, err;
1634
1635 /* find function prototype */
1636 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +02001637 verbose("invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001638 return -EINVAL;
1639 }
1640
1641 if (env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto)
1642 fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);
1643
1644 if (!fn) {
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +02001645 verbose("unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001646 return -EINVAL;
1647 }
1648
1649 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
Daniel Borkmann24701ec2015-03-01 12:31:47 +01001650 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001651 verbose("cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
1652 return -EINVAL;
1653 }
1654
Martin KaFai Lau17bedab2016-12-07 15:53:11 -08001655 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001656
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001657 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02001658 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001659
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001660 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, which
1661 * is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
1662 */
1663 err = check_raw_mode(fn);
1664 if (err) {
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +02001665 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
1666 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001667 return err;
1668 }
1669
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001670 /* check args */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001671 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001672 if (err)
1673 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001674 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001675 if (err)
1676 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001677 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001678 if (err)
1679 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001680 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001681 if (err)
1682 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001683 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001684 if (err)
1685 return err;
1686
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001687 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
1688 * is inferred from register state.
1689 */
1690 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001691 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001692 if (err)
1693 return err;
1694 }
1695
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001696 /* reset caller saved regs */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001697 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
Daniel Borkmanna9789ef2017-05-25 01:05:06 +02001698 mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]);
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001699 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
1700 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001701
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001702 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001703 if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001704 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
1705 mark_reg_unknown(regs, BPF_REG_0);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001706 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
1707 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
1708 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
Martin KaFai Laufad73a12017-03-22 10:00:32 -07001709 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
1710
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001711 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001712 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
1713 mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_0);
1714 regs[BPF_REG_0].off = 0;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001715 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
1716 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
1717 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
1718 */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001719 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001720 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
1721 return -EINVAL;
1722 }
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001723 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02001724 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
Martin KaFai Laufad73a12017-03-22 10:00:32 -07001725 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
1726 if (!insn_aux->map_ptr)
1727 insn_aux->map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
1728 else if (insn_aux->map_ptr != meta.map_ptr)
1729 insn_aux->map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001730 } else {
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +02001731 verbose("unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
1732 fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001733 return -EINVAL;
1734 }
Alexei Starovoitov04fd61ab2015-05-19 16:59:03 -07001735
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001736 err = check_map_func_compatibility(meta.map_ptr, func_id);
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001737 if (err)
1738 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov04fd61ab2015-05-19 16:59:03 -07001739
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001740 if (changes_data)
1741 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
1742 return 0;
1743}
1744
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001745static void coerce_reg_to_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07001746{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001747 /* clear high 32 bits */
1748 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, 4);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001749 /* Update bounds */
1750 __update_reg_bounds(reg);
1751}
1752
1753static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
1754{
1755 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
1756 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b);
1757
1758 if (b < 0)
1759 return res > a;
1760 return res < a;
1761}
1762
1763static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
1764{
1765 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
1766 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b);
1767
1768 if (b < 0)
1769 return res < a;
1770 return res > a;
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07001771}
1772
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001773/* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001774 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
1775 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
1776 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks.
1777 */
1778static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1779 struct bpf_insn *insn,
1780 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
1781 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001782{
1783 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001784 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001785 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value,
1786 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
1787 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
1788 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001789 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001790 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001791
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001792 dst_reg = &regs[dst];
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001793
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001794 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (smin_val != smax_val))) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001795 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001796 verbose("verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds\n");
1797 return -EINVAL;
1798 }
1799 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (umin_val != umax_val))) {
1800 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
1801 verbose("verifier internal error: known but bad ubounds\n");
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001802 return -EINVAL;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001803 }
1804
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001805 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
1806 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
1807 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1808 verbose("R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
1809 dst);
1810 return -EACCES;
1811 }
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07001812
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001813 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
1814 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1815 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
1816 dst);
1817 return -EACCES;
1818 }
1819 if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
1820 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1821 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
1822 dst);
1823 return -EACCES;
1824 }
1825 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
1826 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1827 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
1828 dst);
1829 return -EACCES;
1830 }
1831
1832 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
1833 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001834 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001835 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
1836 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001837
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001838 switch (opcode) {
1839 case BPF_ADD:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001840 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
1841 * the s32 'off' field
1842 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001843 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val ==
1844 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001845 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001846 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
1847 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
1848 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
1849 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001850 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001851 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001852 dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
1853 break;
1854 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001855 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off
1856 * == 0, since it's a scalar.
1857 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive
1858 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id'
1859 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET.
1860 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets
1861 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset
1862 * from ptr_reg.
1863 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001864 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) ||
1865 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) {
1866 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
1867 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
1868 } else {
1869 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val;
1870 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val;
1871 }
1872 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr ||
1873 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) {
1874 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
1875 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
1876 } else {
1877 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val;
1878 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val;
1879 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001880 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
1881 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
1882 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
1883 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
1884 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
1885 dst_reg->range = 0;
1886 }
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001887 break;
1888 case BPF_SUB:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001889 if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
1890 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
1891 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1892 verbose("R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
1893 dst);
1894 return -EACCES;
1895 }
1896 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
1897 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not
1898 * be able to deal with it.
Edward Cree93057062017-07-21 14:37:34 +01001899 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001900 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
1901 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1902 verbose("R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
1903 dst);
1904 return -EACCES;
1905 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001906 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
1907 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001908 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001909 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
1910 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
1911 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
1912 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001913 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
1914 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001915 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001916 dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
1917 break;
1918 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001919 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known
1920 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good.
1921 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001922 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) ||
1923 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) {
1924 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
1925 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
1926 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
1927 } else {
1928 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val;
1929 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val;
1930 }
1931 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) {
1932 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
1933 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
1934 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
1935 } else {
1936 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
1937 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val;
1938 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val;
1939 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001940 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
1941 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
1942 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
1943 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
1944 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001945 if (smin_val < 0)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001946 dst_reg->range = 0;
1947 }
1948 break;
1949 case BPF_AND:
1950 case BPF_OR:
1951 case BPF_XOR:
1952 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit for now.
1953 * (However, in principle we could allow some cases, e.g.
1954 * ptr &= ~3 which would reduce min_value by 3.)
1955 */
1956 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1957 verbose("R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
1958 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
1959 return -EACCES;
1960 default:
1961 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
1962 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1963 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
1964 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
1965 return -EACCES;
1966 }
1967
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001968 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
1969 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
1970 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001971 return 0;
1972}
1973
1974static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1975 struct bpf_insn *insn,
1976 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
1977 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
1978{
1979 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001980 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
1981 bool src_known, dst_known;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001982 s64 smin_val, smax_val;
1983 u64 umin_val, umax_val;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001984
1985 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
1986 /* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */
1987 coerce_reg_to_32(dst_reg);
1988 coerce_reg_to_32(&src_reg);
1989 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001990 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
1991 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
1992 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
1993 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001994 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
1995 dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
1996
1997 switch (opcode) {
1998 case BPF_ADD:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001999 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
2000 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
2001 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2002 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2003 } else {
2004 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
2005 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
2006 }
2007 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
2008 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
2009 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
2010 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
2011 } else {
2012 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
2013 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
2014 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002015 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
2016 break;
2017 case BPF_SUB:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002018 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
2019 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
2020 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
2021 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2022 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2023 } else {
2024 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
2025 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
2026 }
2027 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
2028 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
2029 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
2030 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
2031 } else {
2032 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
2033 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
2034 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
2035 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002036 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002037 break;
2038 case BPF_MUL:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002039 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
2040 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002041 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002042 __mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
2043 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002044 break;
2045 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002046 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
2047 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002048 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002049 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
2050 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
2051 __mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
2052 /* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
2053 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
2054 break;
2055 }
2056 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
2057 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
2058 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
2059 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
2060 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2061 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2062 } else {
2063 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
2064 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
2065 }
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002066 break;
2067 case BPF_AND:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002068 if (src_known && dst_known) {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002069 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
2070 src_reg.var_off.value);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002071 break;
2072 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002073 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
2074 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05002075 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002076 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002077 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
2078 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
2079 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
2080 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
2081 * ain't nobody got time for that.
2082 */
2083 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2084 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2085 } else {
2086 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
2087 * cast result into s64.
2088 */
2089 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
2090 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
2091 }
2092 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
2093 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002094 break;
2095 case BPF_OR:
2096 if (src_known && dst_known) {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002097 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
2098 src_reg.var_off.value);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002099 break;
2100 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002101 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
2102 * maximum of the operands' minima
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002103 */
2104 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002105 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
2106 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
2107 dst_reg->var_off.mask;
2108 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
2109 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
2110 * ain't nobody got time for that.
2111 */
2112 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2113 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002114 } else {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002115 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
2116 * cast result into s64.
2117 */
2118 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
2119 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002120 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002121 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
2122 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002123 break;
2124 case BPF_LSH:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002125 if (umax_val > 63) {
2126 /* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
2127 * shifts by a negative number.
2128 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002129 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
2130 break;
2131 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002132 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
2133 * up from var_off)
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002134 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002135 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2136 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2137 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
2138 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
2139 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
2140 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07002141 } else {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002142 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
2143 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07002144 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002145 if (src_known)
2146 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
2147 else
2148 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
2149 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
2150 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002151 break;
2152 case BPF_RSH:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002153 if (umax_val > 63) {
2154 /* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
2155 * shifts by a negative number.
2156 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002157 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
2158 break;
2159 }
2160 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002161 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
2162 if (umin_val) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002163 /* Sign bit will be cleared */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002164 dst_reg->smin_value = 0;
2165 } else {
2166 /* Lost sign bit information */
2167 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2168 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2169 }
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07002170 } else {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002171 dst_reg->smin_value =
2172 (u64)(dst_reg->smin_value) >> umax_val;
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07002173 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002174 if (src_known)
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002175 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off,
2176 umin_val);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002177 else
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002178 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
2179 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
2180 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
2181 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
2182 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002183 break;
2184 default:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002185 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002186 break;
2187 }
2188
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002189 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
2190 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002191 return 0;
2192}
2193
2194/* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max
2195 * and var_off.
2196 */
2197static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2198 struct bpf_insn *insn)
2199{
2200 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg;
2201 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
2202 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
2203 int rc;
2204
2205 dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002206 src_reg = NULL;
2207 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
2208 ptr_reg = dst_reg;
2209 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2210 src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002211 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2212 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2213 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields
2214 * an arbitrary scalar.
2215 */
2216 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
2217 verbose("R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
2218 insn->dst_reg,
2219 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
2220 return -EACCES;
2221 }
2222 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
2223 return 0;
2224 } else {
2225 /* scalar += pointer
2226 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our
2227 * src/dest handling in computing the range
2228 */
2229 rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
2230 src_reg, dst_reg);
2231 if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
2232 /* scalar += unknown scalar */
2233 __mark_reg_unknown(&off_reg);
2234 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
2235 env, insn,
2236 dst_reg, off_reg);
2237 }
2238 return rc;
2239 }
2240 } else if (ptr_reg) {
2241 /* pointer += scalar */
2242 rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
2243 dst_reg, src_reg);
2244 if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
2245 /* unknown scalar += scalar */
2246 __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
2247 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
2248 env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
2249 }
2250 return rc;
2251 }
2252 } else {
2253 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only
2254 * need to be able to read from this state.
2255 */
2256 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002257 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002258 src_reg = &off_reg;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002259 if (ptr_reg) { /* pointer += K */
2260 rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
2261 ptr_reg, src_reg);
2262 if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
2263 /* unknown scalar += K */
2264 __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
2265 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
2266 env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg);
2267 }
2268 return rc;
2269 }
2270 }
2271
2272 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
2273 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) {
2274 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
2275 verbose("verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n");
2276 return -EINVAL;
2277 }
2278 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) {
2279 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
2280 verbose("verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
2281 return -EINVAL;
2282 }
2283 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002284}
2285
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002286/* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002287static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002288{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002289 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002290 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
2291 int err;
2292
2293 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
2294 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
2295 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
2296 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
2297 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
2298 verbose("BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
2299 return -EINVAL;
2300 }
2301 } else {
2302 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
Edward Creee67b8a62017-09-15 14:37:38 +01002303 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
2304 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002305 verbose("BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
2306 return -EINVAL;
2307 }
2308 }
2309
2310 /* check src operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002311 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002312 if (err)
2313 return err;
2314
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002315 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
2316 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
2317 insn->dst_reg);
2318 return -EACCES;
2319 }
2320
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002321 /* check dest operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002322 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002323 if (err)
2324 return err;
2325
2326 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
2327
2328 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2329 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
2330 verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
2331 return -EINVAL;
2332 }
2333
2334 /* check src operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002335 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002336 if (err)
2337 return err;
2338 } else {
2339 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
2340 verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
2341 return -EINVAL;
2342 }
2343 }
2344
2345 /* check dest operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002346 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002347 if (err)
2348 return err;
2349
2350 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2351 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
2352 /* case: R1 = R2
2353 * copy register state to dest reg
2354 */
2355 regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
Alexei Starovoitov8fe2d6c2017-10-05 16:20:56 -07002356 regs[insn->dst_reg].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002357 } else {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002358 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002359 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
2360 verbose("R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
2361 insn->src_reg);
2362 return -EACCES;
2363 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002364 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002365 /* high 32 bits are known zero. */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002366 regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast(
2367 regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002368 __update_reg_bounds(&regs[insn->dst_reg]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002369 }
2370 } else {
2371 /* case: R = imm
2372 * remember the value we stored into this reg
2373 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002374 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002375 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002376 }
2377
2378 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
2379 verbose("invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
2380 return -EINVAL;
2381
2382 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
2383
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002384 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2385 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
2386 verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
2387 return -EINVAL;
2388 }
2389 /* check src1 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002390 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002391 if (err)
2392 return err;
2393 } else {
2394 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
2395 verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
2396 return -EINVAL;
2397 }
2398 }
2399
2400 /* check src2 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002401 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002402 if (err)
2403 return err;
2404
2405 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
2406 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
2407 verbose("div by zero\n");
2408 return -EINVAL;
2409 }
2410
Rabin Vincent229394e82016-01-12 20:17:08 +01002411 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
2412 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
2413 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
2414
2415 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
2416 verbose("invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
2417 return -EINVAL;
2418 }
2419 }
2420
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002421 /* check dest operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002422 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002423 if (err)
2424 return err;
2425
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002426 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002427 }
2428
2429 return 0;
2430}
2431
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002432static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002433 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
2434 bool range_right_open)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002435{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002436 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002437 u16 new_range;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002438 int i;
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002439
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002440 if (dst_reg->off < 0 ||
2441 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open))
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002442 /* This doesn't give us any range */
2443 return;
2444
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002445 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF ||
2446 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002447 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less
2448 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt.
2449 */
2450 return;
2451
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002452 new_range = dst_reg->off;
2453 if (range_right_open)
2454 new_range--;
2455
2456 /* Examples for register markings:
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002457 *
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002458 * pkt_data in dst register:
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002459 *
2460 * r2 = r3;
2461 * r2 += 8;
2462 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception>
2463 * <access okay>
2464 *
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002465 * r2 = r3;
2466 * r2 += 8;
2467 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay>
2468 * <handle exception>
2469 *
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002470 * Where:
2471 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg
2472 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
2473 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
2474 *
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002475 * pkt_data in src register:
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002476 *
2477 * r2 = r3;
2478 * r2 += 8;
2479 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay>
2480 * <handle exception>
2481 *
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002482 * r2 = r3;
2483 * r2 += 8;
2484 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception>
2485 * <access okay>
2486 *
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002487 * Where:
2488 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg
2489 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
2490 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
2491 *
2492 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002493 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8)
2494 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on
2495 * the check.
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002496 */
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002497
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002498 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we
2499 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big
2500 * the range won't allow anything.
2501 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16.
2502 */
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002503 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
2504 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id)
Alexei Starovoitovb1977682017-03-24 15:57:33 -07002505 /* keep the maximum range already checked */
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002506 regs[i].range = max(regs[i].range, new_range);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002507
2508 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
2509 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
2510 continue;
2511 reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
2512 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002513 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002514 }
2515}
2516
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002517/* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
2518 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
2519 * simply doing a BPF_K check.
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002520 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values.
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002521 */
2522static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
2523 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
2524 u8 opcode)
2525{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002526 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its
2527 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into
2528 * the same object, but we don't bother with that.
2529 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we
2530 * only need to check one of them for pointerness.
2531 */
2532 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg))
2533 return;
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +02002534
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002535 switch (opcode) {
2536 case BPF_JEQ:
2537 /* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
2538 * true then we know for sure.
2539 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002540 __mark_reg_known(true_reg, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002541 break;
2542 case BPF_JNE:
2543 /* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
2544 * we know the value for sure;
2545 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002546 __mark_reg_known(false_reg, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002547 break;
2548 case BPF_JGT:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002549 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val);
2550 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
2551 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002552 case BPF_JSGT:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002553 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val);
2554 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002555 break;
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002556 case BPF_JLT:
2557 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val);
2558 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
2559 break;
2560 case BPF_JSLT:
2561 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val);
2562 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
2563 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002564 case BPF_JGE:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002565 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
2566 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val);
2567 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002568 case BPF_JSGE:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002569 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
2570 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002571 break;
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002572 case BPF_JLE:
2573 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
2574 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val);
2575 break;
2576 case BPF_JSLE:
2577 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
2578 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val);
2579 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002580 default:
2581 break;
2582 }
2583
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002584 __reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg);
2585 __reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg);
2586 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
2587 __reg_bound_offset(false_reg);
2588 __reg_bound_offset(true_reg);
2589 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
2590 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
2591 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
2592 */
2593 __update_reg_bounds(false_reg);
2594 __update_reg_bounds(true_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002595}
2596
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002597/* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is
2598 * the variable reg.
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002599 */
2600static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
2601 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
2602 u8 opcode)
2603{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002604 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg))
2605 return;
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +02002606
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002607 switch (opcode) {
2608 case BPF_JEQ:
2609 /* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
2610 * true then we know for sure.
2611 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002612 __mark_reg_known(true_reg, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002613 break;
2614 case BPF_JNE:
2615 /* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
2616 * we know the value for sure;
2617 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002618 __mark_reg_known(false_reg, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002619 break;
2620 case BPF_JGT:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002621 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
2622 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val);
2623 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002624 case BPF_JSGT:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002625 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
2626 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002627 break;
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002628 case BPF_JLT:
2629 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
2630 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val);
2631 break;
2632 case BPF_JSLT:
2633 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
2634 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val);
2635 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002636 case BPF_JGE:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002637 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val);
2638 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
2639 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002640 case BPF_JSGE:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002641 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val);
2642 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002643 break;
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002644 case BPF_JLE:
2645 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val);
2646 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
2647 break;
2648 case BPF_JSLE:
2649 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val);
2650 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
2651 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002652 default:
2653 break;
2654 }
2655
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002656 __reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg);
2657 __reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg);
2658 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
2659 __reg_bound_offset(false_reg);
2660 __reg_bound_offset(true_reg);
2661 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
2662 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
2663 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
2664 */
2665 __update_reg_bounds(false_reg);
2666 __update_reg_bounds(true_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002667}
2668
2669/* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */
2670static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
2671 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
2672{
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002673 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value,
2674 dst_reg->umin_value);
2675 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value,
2676 dst_reg->umax_value);
2677 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value,
2678 dst_reg->smin_value);
2679 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value,
2680 dst_reg->smax_value);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002681 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off,
2682 dst_reg->var_off);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002683 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */
2684 __update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
2685 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
2686 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
2687 __reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg);
2688 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
2689 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
2690 __reg_bound_offset(src_reg);
2691 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
2692 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
2693 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
2694 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
2695 */
2696 __update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
2697 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002698}
2699
2700static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src,
2701 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst,
2702 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src,
2703 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst,
2704 u8 opcode)
2705{
2706 switch (opcode) {
2707 case BPF_JEQ:
2708 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst);
2709 break;
2710 case BPF_JNE:
2711 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002712 break;
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +02002713 }
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002714}
2715
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002716static void mark_map_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, u32 id,
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002717 bool is_null)
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002718{
2719 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
2720
2721 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && reg->id == id) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002722 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should
2723 * have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer
2724 * arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL.
2725 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002726 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value ||
2727 !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) ||
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002728 reg->off)) {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002729 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg);
2730 reg->off = 0;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002731 }
2732 if (is_null) {
2733 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07002734 } else if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) {
2735 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
2736 reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta;
2737 } else {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002738 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07002739 }
Daniel Borkmanna08dd0d2016-12-15 01:30:06 +01002740 /* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore, thus we
2741 * should better reset it, so that state pruning has chances
2742 * to take effect.
2743 */
2744 reg->id = 0;
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002745 }
2746}
2747
2748/* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
2749 * be folded together at some point.
2750 */
2751static void mark_map_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno,
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002752 bool is_null)
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002753{
2754 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Daniel Borkmanna08dd0d2016-12-15 01:30:06 +01002755 u32 id = regs[regno].id;
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002756 int i;
2757
2758 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002759 mark_map_reg(regs, i, id, is_null);
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002760
2761 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
2762 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
2763 continue;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002764 mark_map_reg(state->spilled_regs, i / BPF_REG_SIZE, id, is_null);
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002765 }
2766}
2767
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002768static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002769 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
2770{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002771 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch, *this_branch = &env->cur_state;
2772 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->regs, *dst_reg;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002773 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
2774 int err;
2775
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002776 if (opcode > BPF_JSLE) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002777 verbose("invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode);
2778 return -EINVAL;
2779 }
2780
2781 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2782 if (insn->imm != 0) {
2783 verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
2784 return -EINVAL;
2785 }
2786
2787 /* check src1 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002788 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002789 if (err)
2790 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002791
2792 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
2793 verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
2794 insn->src_reg);
2795 return -EACCES;
2796 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002797 } else {
2798 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
2799 verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
2800 return -EINVAL;
2801 }
2802 }
2803
2804 /* check src2 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002805 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002806 if (err)
2807 return err;
2808
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002809 dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
2810
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002811 /* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */
2812 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
2813 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002814 dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
2815 tnum_equals_const(dst_reg->var_off, insn->imm)) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002816 if (opcode == BPF_JEQ) {
2817 /* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off;
2818 * only follow the goto, ignore fall-through
2819 */
2820 *insn_idx += insn->off;
2821 return 0;
2822 } else {
2823 /* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off;
2824 * only follow fall-through branch, since
2825 * that's where the program will go
2826 */
2827 return 0;
2828 }
2829 }
2830
2831 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx);
2832 if (!other_branch)
2833 return -EFAULT;
2834
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002835 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
2836 * our min/max values for our dst register.
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002837 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same
2838 * object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because
2839 * otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't
2840 * comparable.
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002841 */
2842 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002843 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
2844 regs[insn->src_reg].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
2845 if (tnum_is_const(regs[insn->src_reg].var_off))
2846 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
2847 dst_reg, regs[insn->src_reg].var_off.value,
2848 opcode);
2849 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off))
2850 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg],
2851 &regs[insn->src_reg],
2852 dst_reg->var_off.value, opcode);
2853 else if (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)
2854 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */
2855 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg],
2856 &other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
2857 &regs[insn->src_reg],
2858 &regs[insn->dst_reg], opcode);
2859 }
2860 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002861 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
2862 dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
2863 }
2864
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002865 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002866 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002867 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
2868 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002869 /* Mark all identical map registers in each branch as either
2870 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
2871 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002872 mark_map_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, opcode == BPF_JNE);
2873 mark_map_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, opcode == BPF_JEQ);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002874 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT &&
2875 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
2876 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
Daniel Borkmann0fd47592017-10-21 02:34:22 +02002877 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end */
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002878 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, false);
Daniel Borkmann0fd47592017-10-21 02:34:22 +02002879 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT &&
2880 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
2881 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
2882 /* pkt_end > pkt_data' */
2883 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg], true);
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002884 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLT &&
2885 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
2886 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
Daniel Borkmann0fd47592017-10-21 02:34:22 +02002887 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end */
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002888 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, true);
Daniel Borkmann0fd47592017-10-21 02:34:22 +02002889 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLT &&
2890 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
2891 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
2892 /* pkt_end < pkt_data' */
2893 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg], false);
2894 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE &&
2895 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
2896 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
2897 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end */
2898 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, true);
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002899 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE &&
2900 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
2901 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
Daniel Borkmann0fd47592017-10-21 02:34:22 +02002902 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data' */
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002903 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg], false);
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002904 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLE &&
Daniel Borkmann0fd47592017-10-21 02:34:22 +02002905 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
2906 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
2907 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end */
2908 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, false);
2909 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLE &&
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002910 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
2911 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
Daniel Borkmann0fd47592017-10-21 02:34:22 +02002912 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data' */
Daniel Borkmannfb2a3112017-10-21 02:34:21 +02002913 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg], true);
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002914 } else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
2915 verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg);
2916 return -EACCES;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002917 }
2918 if (log_level)
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002919 print_verifier_state(this_branch);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002920 return 0;
2921}
2922
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002923/* return the map pointer stored inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
2924static struct bpf_map *ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(struct bpf_insn *insn)
2925{
2926 u64 imm64 = ((u64) (u32) insn[0].imm) | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32;
2927
2928 return (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) imm64;
2929}
2930
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002931/* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002932static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002933{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002934 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002935 int err;
2936
2937 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
2938 verbose("invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
2939 return -EINVAL;
2940 }
2941 if (insn->off != 0) {
2942 verbose("BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
2943 return -EINVAL;
2944 }
2945
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002946 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002947 if (err)
2948 return err;
2949
Jakub Kicinski6b173872016-09-21 11:43:59 +01002950 if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
Jakub Kicinski6b173872016-09-21 11:43:59 +01002951 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
2952
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002953 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002954 __mark_reg_known(&regs[insn->dst_reg], imm);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002955 return 0;
Jakub Kicinski6b173872016-09-21 11:43:59 +01002956 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002957
2958 /* replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() should have caught bad ld_imm64 */
2959 BUG_ON(insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD);
2960
2961 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
2962 regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(insn);
2963 return 0;
2964}
2965
Daniel Borkmann96be4322015-03-01 12:31:46 +01002966static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)
2967{
2968 switch (type) {
2969 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
2970 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
Daniel Borkmann94caee8c2015-03-20 15:11:11 +01002971 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
Daniel Borkmann96be4322015-03-01 12:31:46 +01002972 return true;
2973 default:
2974 return false;
2975 }
2976}
2977
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002978/* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
2979 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
2980 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
2981 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
2982 *
2983 * Implicit input:
2984 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
2985 *
2986 * Explicit input:
2987 * SRC == any register
2988 * IMM == 32-bit immediate
2989 *
2990 * Output:
2991 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
2992 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002993static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002994{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002995 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002996 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002997 int i, err;
2998
Daniel Borkmann24701ec2015-03-01 12:31:47 +01002999 if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07003000 verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003001 return -EINVAL;
3002 }
3003
3004 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
Alexei Starovoitovd82bccc2016-04-12 10:26:19 -07003005 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003006 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07003007 verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003008 return -EINVAL;
3009 }
3010
3011 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003012 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_6, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003013 if (err)
3014 return err;
3015
3016 if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
3017 verbose("at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
3018 return -EINVAL;
3019 }
3020
3021 if (mode == BPF_IND) {
3022 /* check explicit source operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003023 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003024 if (err)
3025 return err;
3026 }
3027
3028 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003029 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
Daniel Borkmanna9789ef2017-05-25 01:05:06 +02003030 mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]);
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003031 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
3032 }
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003033
3034 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003035 * the value fetched from the packet.
3036 * Already marked as written above.
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003037 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003038 mark_reg_unknown(regs, BPF_REG_0);
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003039 return 0;
3040}
3041
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003042/* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
3043 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
3044 * 2 label v as discovered
3045 * 3 let S be a stack
3046 * 4 S.push(v)
3047 * 5 while S is not empty
3048 * 6 t <- S.pop()
3049 * 7 if t is what we're looking for:
3050 * 8 return t
3051 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do
3052 * 10 if edge e is already labelled
3053 * 11 continue with the next edge
3054 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e)
3055 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored
3056 * 14 label e as tree-edge
3057 * 15 label w as discovered
3058 * 16 S.push(w)
3059 * 17 continue at 5
3060 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered
3061 * 19 label e as back-edge
3062 * 20 else
3063 * 21 // vertex w is explored
3064 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge
3065 * 23 label t as explored
3066 * 24 S.pop()
3067 *
3068 * convention:
3069 * 0x10 - discovered
3070 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled
3071 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled
3072 * 0x20 - explored
3073 */
3074
3075enum {
3076 DISCOVERED = 0x10,
3077 EXPLORED = 0x20,
3078 FALLTHROUGH = 1,
3079 BRANCH = 2,
3080};
3081
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003082#define STATE_LIST_MARK ((struct bpf_verifier_state_list *) -1L)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003083
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003084static int *insn_stack; /* stack of insns to process */
3085static int cur_stack; /* current stack index */
3086static int *insn_state;
3087
3088/* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above:
3089 * t - index of current instruction
3090 * w - next instruction
3091 * e - edge
3092 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003093static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003094{
3095 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
3096 return 0;
3097
3098 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
3099 return 0;
3100
3101 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
3102 verbose("jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
3103 return -EINVAL;
3104 }
3105
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003106 if (e == BRANCH)
3107 /* mark branch target for state pruning */
3108 env->explored_states[w] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
3109
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003110 if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
3111 /* tree-edge */
3112 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
3113 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
3114 if (cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
3115 return -E2BIG;
3116 insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w;
3117 return 1;
3118 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
3119 verbose("back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
3120 return -EINVAL;
3121 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
3122 /* forward- or cross-edge */
3123 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
3124 } else {
3125 verbose("insn state internal bug\n");
3126 return -EFAULT;
3127 }
3128 return 0;
3129}
3130
3131/* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program
3132 * loop == back-edge in directed graph
3133 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003134static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003135{
3136 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
3137 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
3138 int ret = 0;
3139 int i, t;
3140
3141 insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
3142 if (!insn_state)
3143 return -ENOMEM;
3144
3145 insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
3146 if (!insn_stack) {
3147 kfree(insn_state);
3148 return -ENOMEM;
3149 }
3150
3151 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
3152 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
3153 cur_stack = 1;
3154
3155peek_stack:
3156 if (cur_stack == 0)
3157 goto check_state;
3158 t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1];
3159
3160 if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) {
3161 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code);
3162
3163 if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
3164 goto mark_explored;
3165 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
3166 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
3167 if (ret == 1)
3168 goto peek_stack;
3169 else if (ret < 0)
3170 goto err_free;
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +02003171 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
3172 env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003173 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
3174 if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) {
3175 ret = -EINVAL;
3176 goto err_free;
3177 }
3178 /* unconditional jump with single edge */
3179 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1,
3180 FALLTHROUGH, env);
3181 if (ret == 1)
3182 goto peek_stack;
3183 else if (ret < 0)
3184 goto err_free;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003185 /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
3186 * after every call and jump
3187 */
Alexei Starovoitovc3de6312015-04-14 15:57:13 -07003188 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
3189 env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003190 } else {
3191 /* conditional jump with two edges */
Daniel Borkmann3c2ce602017-05-18 03:00:06 +02003192 env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003193 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
3194 if (ret == 1)
3195 goto peek_stack;
3196 else if (ret < 0)
3197 goto err_free;
3198
3199 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env);
3200 if (ret == 1)
3201 goto peek_stack;
3202 else if (ret < 0)
3203 goto err_free;
3204 }
3205 } else {
3206 /* all other non-branch instructions with single
3207 * fall-through edge
3208 */
3209 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
3210 if (ret == 1)
3211 goto peek_stack;
3212 else if (ret < 0)
3213 goto err_free;
3214 }
3215
3216mark_explored:
3217 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
3218 if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
3219 verbose("pop stack internal bug\n");
3220 ret = -EFAULT;
3221 goto err_free;
3222 }
3223 goto peek_stack;
3224
3225check_state:
3226 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
3227 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
3228 verbose("unreachable insn %d\n", i);
3229 ret = -EINVAL;
3230 goto err_free;
3231 }
3232 }
3233 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
3234
3235err_free:
3236 kfree(insn_state);
3237 kfree(insn_stack);
3238 return ret;
3239}
3240
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003241/* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */
3242static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old,
3243 struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07003244{
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01003245 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value &&
3246 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value &&
3247 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value &&
3248 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003249}
3250
3251/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
3252#define ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE)
3253struct idpair {
3254 u32 old;
3255 u32 cur;
3256};
3257
3258/* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have
3259 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from
3260 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids.
3261 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent
3262 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But
3263 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about
3264 * that.
3265 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If
3266 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map.
3267 */
3268static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct idpair *idmap)
3269{
3270 unsigned int i;
3271
3272 for (i = 0; i < ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) {
3273 if (!idmap[i].old) {
3274 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */
3275 idmap[i].old = old_id;
3276 idmap[i].cur = cur_id;
3277 return true;
3278 }
3279 if (idmap[i].old == old_id)
3280 return idmap[i].cur == cur_id;
3281 }
3282 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */
3283 WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
3284 return false;
3285}
3286
3287/* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */
Edward Cree1b688a12017-08-23 15:10:50 +01003288static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
3289 struct idpair *idmap)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003290{
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003291 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
3292 /* explored state didn't use this */
3293 return true;
3294
3295 if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, live)) == 0)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003296 return true;
3297
3298 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
3299 /* explored state can't have used this */
3300 return true;
3301 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07003302 return false;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003303 switch (rold->type) {
3304 case SCALAR_VALUE:
3305 if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
3306 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
3307 return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
3308 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
3309 } else {
3310 /* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not
3311 * equal, because we can't know anything about the
3312 * scalar value of the pointer in the new value.
3313 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01003314 return rold->umin_value == 0 &&
3315 rold->umax_value == U64_MAX &&
3316 rold->smin_value == S64_MIN &&
3317 rold->smax_value == S64_MAX &&
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003318 tnum_is_unknown(rold->var_off);
3319 }
3320 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
Edward Cree1b688a12017-08-23 15:10:50 +01003321 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
3322 * everything else matches, we are OK.
3323 * We don't care about the 'id' value, because nothing
3324 * uses it for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (only for ..._OR_NULL)
3325 */
3326 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
3327 range_within(rold, rcur) &&
3328 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003329 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
3330 /* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a
3331 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map.
3332 * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL-
3333 * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same
3334 * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when
3335 * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
3336 */
3337 if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
3338 return false;
3339 if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)))
3340 return false;
3341 /* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */
3342 return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
3343 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
3344 if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_PACKET)
3345 return false;
3346 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr
3347 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are
3348 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off,
3349 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or
3350 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access.
3351 */
3352 if (rold->range > rcur->range)
3353 return false;
3354 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment;
3355 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range.
3356 */
3357 if (rold->off != rcur->off)
3358 return false;
3359 /* id relations must be preserved */
3360 if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
3361 return false;
3362 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
3363 return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
3364 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
3365 case PTR_TO_CTX:
3366 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
3367 case PTR_TO_STACK:
3368 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
3369 /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
3370 * would have accepted
3371 */
3372 default:
3373 /* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */
3374 return false;
3375 }
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07003376
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003377 /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */
3378 WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07003379 return false;
3380}
3381
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003382/* compare two verifier states
3383 *
3384 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since
3385 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them
3386 *
3387 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of
3388 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has
3389 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution
3390 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already
3391 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish.
3392 *
3393 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative
3394 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one.
3395 * Example:
3396 * explored current
3397 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC)
3398 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC)
3399 *
3400 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more
3401 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means
3402 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too
3403 *
3404 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid
3405 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that
3406 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
3407 */
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04003408static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3409 struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003410 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003411{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003412 struct idpair *idmap;
3413 bool ret = false;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003414 int i;
3415
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003416 idmap = kcalloc(ID_MAP_SIZE, sizeof(struct idpair), GFP_KERNEL);
3417 /* If we failed to allocate the idmap, just say it's not safe */
3418 if (!idmap)
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07003419 return false;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003420
3421 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
Edward Cree1b688a12017-08-23 15:10:50 +01003422 if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap))
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003423 goto out_free;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003424 }
3425
3426 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003427 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID)
3428 continue;
3429 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != cur->stack_slot_type[i])
3430 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
3431 * this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC ->
3432 * this verifier states are not equivalent,
3433 * return false to continue verification of this path
3434 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003435 goto out_free;
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003436 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
3437 continue;
Daniel Borkmannd25da6c2017-06-11 00:50:41 +02003438 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
3439 continue;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003440 if (!regsafe(&old->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
3441 &cur->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
Edward Cree1b688a12017-08-23 15:10:50 +01003442 idmap))
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003443 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing
3444 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003445 * are the same as well.
3446 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003447 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8}
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003448 * but current path has stored:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003449 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16}
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003450 * such verifier states are not equivalent.
3451 * return false to continue verification of this path
3452 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003453 goto out_free;
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003454 else
3455 continue;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003456 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003457 ret = true;
3458out_free:
3459 kfree(idmap);
3460 return ret;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003461}
3462
Edward Cree8e9cd9c2017-08-23 15:11:21 +01003463/* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the
3464 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at a
3465 * jump target (in the first iteration of the propagate_liveness() loop),
3466 * we didn't arrive by the straight-line code, so read marks in state must
3467 * propagate to parent regardless of state's write marks.
3468 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003469static bool do_propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
3470 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent)
3471{
Edward Cree63f45f82017-08-23 15:10:03 +01003472 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003473 bool touched = false; /* any changes made? */
3474 int i;
3475
3476 if (!parent)
3477 return touched;
3478 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */
3479 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG);
3480 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
3481 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
3482 if (parent->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
3483 continue;
Edward Cree63f45f82017-08-23 15:10:03 +01003484 if (writes && (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
3485 continue;
3486 if (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003487 parent->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
3488 touched = true;
3489 }
3490 }
3491 /* ... and stack slots */
3492 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
3493 if (parent->stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL)
3494 continue;
3495 if (state->stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL)
3496 continue;
3497 if (parent->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
3498 continue;
Edward Cree63f45f82017-08-23 15:10:03 +01003499 if (writes && (state->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
3500 continue;
3501 if (state->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
Daniel Borkmann1ab2de22017-08-17 14:59:40 +02003502 parent->spilled_regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003503 touched = true;
3504 }
3505 }
3506 return touched;
3507}
3508
Edward Cree8e9cd9c2017-08-23 15:11:21 +01003509/* "parent" is "a state from which we reach the current state", but initially
3510 * it is not the state->parent (i.e. "the state whose straight-line code leads
3511 * to the current state"), instead it is the state that happened to arrive at
3512 * a (prunable) equivalent of the current state. See comment above
3513 * do_propagate_liveness() for consequences of this.
3514 * This function is just a more efficient way of calling mark_reg_read() or
3515 * mark_stack_slot_read() on each reg in "parent" that is read in "state",
3516 * though it requires that parent != state->parent in the call arguments.
3517 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003518static void propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
3519 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent)
3520{
3521 while (do_propagate_liveness(state, parent)) {
3522 /* Something changed, so we need to feed those changes onward */
3523 state = parent;
3524 parent = state->parent;
3525 }
3526}
3527
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003528static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003529{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003530 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
3531 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003532 int i;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003533
3534 sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
3535 if (!sl)
3536 /* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
3537 * be doing state search here
3538 */
3539 return 0;
3540
3541 while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003542 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, &env->cur_state)) {
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003543 /* reached equivalent register/stack state,
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003544 * prune the search.
3545 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us.
Edward Cree8e9cd9c2017-08-23 15:11:21 +01003546 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they
3547 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation
3548 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our
3549 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but
3550 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning
3551 * this state and will pop a new one.
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003552 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003553 propagate_liveness(&sl->state, &env->cur_state);
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003554 return 1;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003555 }
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003556 sl = sl->next;
3557 }
3558
3559 /* there were no equivalent states, remember current one.
3560 * technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
3561 * but it will either reach bpf_exit (which means it's safe) or
3562 * it will be rejected. Since there are no loops, we won't be
3563 * seeing this 'insn_idx' instruction again on the way to bpf_exit
3564 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003565 new_sl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_USER);
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003566 if (!new_sl)
3567 return -ENOMEM;
3568
3569 /* add new state to the head of linked list */
3570 memcpy(&new_sl->state, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
3571 new_sl->next = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
3572 env->explored_states[insn_idx] = new_sl;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003573 /* connect new state to parentage chain */
3574 env->cur_state.parent = &new_sl->state;
Edward Cree8e9cd9c2017-08-23 15:11:21 +01003575 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes
3576 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us.
3577 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark
3578 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only
3579 * explored_states can get read marks.)
3580 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003581 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
3582 env->cur_state.regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
3583 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
3584 if (env->cur_state.stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_SPILL)
3585 env->cur_state.spilled_regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003586 return 0;
3587}
3588
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01003589static int ext_analyzer_insn_hook(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3590 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
3591{
3592 if (!env->analyzer_ops || !env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook)
3593 return 0;
3594
3595 return env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
3596}
3597
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003598static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003599{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003600 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003601 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003602 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003603 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
3604 int insn_idx, prev_insn_idx = 0;
3605 int insn_processed = 0;
3606 bool do_print_state = false;
3607
3608 init_reg_state(regs);
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003609 state->parent = NULL;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003610 insn_idx = 0;
3611 for (;;) {
3612 struct bpf_insn *insn;
3613 u8 class;
3614 int err;
3615
3616 if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
3617 verbose("invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
3618 insn_idx, insn_cnt);
3619 return -EFAULT;
3620 }
3621
3622 insn = &insns[insn_idx];
3623 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
3624
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +02003625 if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
Colin Ian Kingbc1750f2017-02-23 00:20:53 +00003626 verbose("BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003627 insn_processed);
3628 return -E2BIG;
3629 }
3630
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003631 err = is_state_visited(env, insn_idx);
3632 if (err < 0)
3633 return err;
3634 if (err == 1) {
3635 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
3636 if (log_level) {
3637 if (do_print_state)
3638 verbose("\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
3639 prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
3640 else
3641 verbose("%d: safe\n", insn_idx);
3642 }
3643 goto process_bpf_exit;
3644 }
3645
Daniel Borkmann3c2ce602017-05-18 03:00:06 +02003646 if (need_resched())
3647 cond_resched();
3648
David S. Millerc5fc9692017-05-10 11:25:17 -07003649 if (log_level > 1 || (log_level && do_print_state)) {
3650 if (log_level > 1)
3651 verbose("%d:", insn_idx);
3652 else
3653 verbose("\nfrom %d to %d:",
3654 prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07003655 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003656 do_print_state = false;
3657 }
3658
3659 if (log_level) {
3660 verbose("%d: ", insn_idx);
Daniel Borkmann0d0e5762017-05-08 00:04:09 +02003661 print_bpf_insn(env, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003662 }
3663
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01003664 err = ext_analyzer_insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
3665 if (err)
3666 return err;
3667
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003668 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07003669 err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003670 if (err)
3671 return err;
3672
3673 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003674 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003675
3676 /* check for reserved fields is already done */
3677
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003678 /* check src operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003679 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003680 if (err)
3681 return err;
3682
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003683 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003684 if (err)
3685 return err;
3686
Alexei Starovoitov725f9dc2015-04-15 16:19:33 -07003687 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
3688
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003689 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
3690 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
3691 */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07003692 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003693 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ,
3694 insn->dst_reg);
3695 if (err)
3696 return err;
3697
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003698 prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
3699
3700 if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003701 /* saw a valid insn
3702 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003703 * save type to validate intersecting paths
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003704 */
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003705 *prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003706
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003707 } else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type &&
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003708 (src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003709 *prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003710 /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
3711 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
3712 * with different pointer types:
3713 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and
3714 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
3715 * Reject it.
3716 */
3717 verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
3718 return -EINVAL;
3719 }
3720
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003721 } else if (class == BPF_STX) {
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003722 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003723
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003724 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07003725 err = check_xadd(env, insn_idx, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003726 if (err)
3727 return err;
3728 insn_idx++;
3729 continue;
3730 }
3731
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003732 /* check src1 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003733 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003734 if (err)
3735 return err;
3736 /* check src2 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003737 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003738 if (err)
3739 return err;
3740
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003741 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
3742
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003743 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07003744 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003745 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
3746 insn->src_reg);
3747 if (err)
3748 return err;
3749
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003750 prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
3751
3752 if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
3753 *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
3754 } else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type &&
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003755 (dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003756 *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003757 verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
3758 return -EINVAL;
3759 }
3760
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003761 } else if (class == BPF_ST) {
3762 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
3763 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
3764 verbose("BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
3765 return -EINVAL;
3766 }
3767 /* check src operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003768 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003769 if (err)
3770 return err;
3771
3772 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07003773 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003774 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
3775 -1);
3776 if (err)
3777 return err;
3778
3779 } else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
3780 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
3781
3782 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
3783 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
3784 insn->off != 0 ||
3785 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
3786 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
3787 verbose("BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
3788 return -EINVAL;
3789 }
3790
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07003791 err = check_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003792 if (err)
3793 return err;
3794
3795 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
3796 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
3797 insn->imm != 0 ||
3798 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
3799 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
3800 verbose("BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
3801 return -EINVAL;
3802 }
3803
3804 insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
3805 continue;
3806
3807 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
3808 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
3809 insn->imm != 0 ||
3810 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
3811 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
3812 verbose("BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
3813 return -EINVAL;
3814 }
3815
3816 /* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
3817 * to return the value from eBPF program.
3818 * Make sure that it's readable at this time
3819 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
3820 * something into it earlier
3821 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003822 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003823 if (err)
3824 return err;
3825
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07003826 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
3827 verbose("R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
3828 return -EACCES;
3829 }
3830
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003831process_bpf_exit:
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003832 insn_idx = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx);
3833 if (insn_idx < 0) {
3834 break;
3835 } else {
3836 do_print_state = true;
3837 continue;
3838 }
3839 } else {
3840 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &insn_idx);
3841 if (err)
3842 return err;
3843 }
3844 } else if (class == BPF_LD) {
3845 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
3846
3847 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003848 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
3849 if (err)
3850 return err;
3851
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003852 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
3853 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
3854 if (err)
3855 return err;
3856
3857 insn_idx++;
3858 } else {
3859 verbose("invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
3860 return -EINVAL;
3861 }
3862 } else {
3863 verbose("unknown insn class %d\n", class);
3864 return -EINVAL;
3865 }
3866
3867 insn_idx++;
3868 }
3869
Alexei Starovoitov87266792017-05-30 13:31:29 -07003870 verbose("processed %d insns, stack depth %d\n",
3871 insn_processed, env->prog->aux->stack_depth);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003872 return 0;
3873}
3874
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07003875static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map)
3876{
3877 return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH &&
Martin KaFai Laubcc6b1b2017-03-22 10:00:34 -07003878 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH &&
3879 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) ||
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07003880 !(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC);
3881}
3882
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07003883static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map,
3884 struct bpf_prog *prog)
3885
3886{
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07003887 /* Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use
3888 * preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation
3889 * in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got
3890 * triggered.
3891 */
3892 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) {
3893 if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) {
3894 verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
3895 return -EINVAL;
3896 }
3897 if (map->inner_map_meta &&
3898 !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) {
3899 verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n");
3900 return -EINVAL;
3901 }
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07003902 }
3903 return 0;
3904}
3905
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003906/* look for pseudo eBPF instructions that access map FDs and
3907 * replace them with actual map pointers
3908 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003909static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003910{
3911 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
3912 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07003913 int i, j, err;
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003914
Daniel Borkmannf1f77142017-01-13 23:38:15 +01003915 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog);
Daniel Borkmannaafe6ae2016-12-18 01:52:57 +01003916 if (err)
3917 return err;
3918
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003919 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003920 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003921 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003922 verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
3923 return -EINVAL;
3924 }
3925
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003926 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
3927 ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
3928 BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
3929 verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
3930 return -EINVAL;
3931 }
3932
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003933 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
3934 struct bpf_map *map;
3935 struct fd f;
3936
3937 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
3938 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
3939 insn[1].off != 0) {
3940 verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
3941 return -EINVAL;
3942 }
3943
3944 if (insn->src_reg == 0)
3945 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
3946 goto next_insn;
3947
3948 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
3949 verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
3950 return -EINVAL;
3951 }
3952
3953 f = fdget(insn->imm);
Daniel Borkmannc2101292015-10-29 14:58:07 +01003954 map = __bpf_map_get(f);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003955 if (IS_ERR(map)) {
3956 verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
3957 insn->imm);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003958 return PTR_ERR(map);
3959 }
3960
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07003961 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(map, env->prog);
3962 if (err) {
3963 fdput(f);
3964 return err;
3965 }
3966
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003967 /* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
3968 insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
3969 insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
3970
3971 /* check whether we recorded this map already */
3972 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
3973 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
3974 fdput(f);
3975 goto next_insn;
3976 }
3977
3978 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
3979 fdput(f);
3980 return -E2BIG;
3981 }
3982
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003983 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
3984 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it
3985 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
3986 * and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
3987 */
Alexei Starovoitov92117d82016-04-27 18:56:20 -07003988 map = bpf_map_inc(map, false);
3989 if (IS_ERR(map)) {
3990 fdput(f);
3991 return PTR_ERR(map);
3992 }
3993 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
3994
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003995 fdput(f);
3996next_insn:
3997 insn++;
3998 i++;
3999 }
4000 }
4001
4002 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
4003 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
4004 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
4005 */
4006 return 0;
4007}
4008
4009/* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004010static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004011{
4012 int i;
4013
4014 for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++)
4015 bpf_map_put(env->used_maps[i]);
4016}
4017
4018/* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004019static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004020{
4021 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
4022 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
4023 int i;
4024
4025 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++)
4026 if (insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
4027 insn->src_reg = 0;
4028}
4029
Alexei Starovoitov80419022017-03-15 18:26:41 -07004030/* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range
4031 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying
4032 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero
4033 */
4034static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
4035 u32 off, u32 cnt)
4036{
4037 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
4038
4039 if (cnt == 1)
4040 return 0;
4041 new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len);
4042 if (!new_data)
4043 return -ENOMEM;
4044 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
4045 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
4046 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
4047 env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
4048 vfree(old_data);
4049 return 0;
4050}
4051
4052static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
4053 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
4054{
4055 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
4056
4057 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
4058 if (!new_prog)
4059 return NULL;
4060 if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len))
4061 return NULL;
4062 return new_prog;
4063}
4064
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004065/* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff'
4066 * into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff'
4067 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004068static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004069{
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004070 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->prog->aux->ops;
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004071 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004072 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004073 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004074 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07004075 enum bpf_access_type type;
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004076 bool is_narrower_load;
4077 u32 target_size;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004078
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004079 if (ops->gen_prologue) {
4080 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
4081 env->prog);
4082 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
4083 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
4084 return -EINVAL;
4085 } else if (cnt) {
Alexei Starovoitov80419022017-03-15 18:26:41 -07004086 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004087 if (!new_prog)
4088 return -ENOMEM;
Alexei Starovoitov80419022017-03-15 18:26:41 -07004089
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004090 env->prog = new_prog;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004091 delta += cnt - 1;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004092 }
4093 }
4094
4095 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004096 return 0;
4097
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004098 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004099
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004100 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
Daniel Borkmann62c79892017-01-12 11:51:33 +01004101 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
4102 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
4103 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
Alexei Starovoitovea2e7ce2016-09-01 18:37:21 -07004104 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07004105 type = BPF_READ;
Daniel Borkmann62c79892017-01-12 11:51:33 +01004106 else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
4107 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
4108 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
Alexei Starovoitovea2e7ce2016-09-01 18:37:21 -07004109 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07004110 type = BPF_WRITE;
4111 else
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004112 continue;
4113
Alexei Starovoitov80419022017-03-15 18:26:41 -07004114 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004115 continue;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004116
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004117 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004118 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004119
4120 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
4121 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
4122 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful,
4123 * we will apply proper mask to the result.
4124 */
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004125 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size;
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004126 if (is_narrower_load) {
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004127 u32 off = insn->off;
4128 u8 size_code;
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004129
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004130 if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
4131 verbose("bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
4132 return -EINVAL;
4133 }
4134
4135 size_code = BPF_H;
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004136 if (ctx_field_size == 4)
4137 size_code = BPF_W;
4138 else if (ctx_field_size == 8)
4139 size_code = BPF_DW;
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004140
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004141 insn->off = off & ~(ctx_field_size - 1);
4142 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
4143 }
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004144
4145 target_size = 0;
4146 cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
4147 &target_size);
4148 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
4149 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004150 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
4151 return -EINVAL;
4152 }
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004153
4154 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004155 if (ctx_field_size <= 4)
4156 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004157 (1 << size * 8) - 1);
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004158 else
4159 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004160 (1 << size * 8) - 1);
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004161 }
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004162
Alexei Starovoitov80419022017-03-15 18:26:41 -07004163 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004164 if (!new_prog)
4165 return -ENOMEM;
4166
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004167 delta += cnt - 1;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004168
4169 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
4170 env->prog = new_prog;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004171 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004172 }
4173
4174 return 0;
4175}
4176
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004177/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07004178 * and inline eligible helpers as explicit sequence of BPF instructions
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004179 *
4180 * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
4181 */
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004182static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004183{
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004184 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
4185 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004186 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004187 const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07004188 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
4189 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
4190 struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
4191 int i, cnt, delta = 0;
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004192
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004193 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
4194 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
4195 continue;
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004196
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004197 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
4198 prog->dst_needed = 1;
4199 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
4200 bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004201 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
David S. Miller7b9f6da2017-04-20 10:35:33 -04004202 /* If we tail call into other programs, we
4203 * cannot make any assumptions since they can
4204 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in
4205 * the program array.
4206 */
4207 prog->cb_access = 1;
Alexei Starovoitov80a58d02017-05-30 13:31:30 -07004208 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK;
David S. Miller7b9f6da2017-04-20 10:35:33 -04004209
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004210 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
4211 * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
4212 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
4213 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004214 */
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004215 insn->imm = 0;
Alexei Starovoitov71189fa2017-05-30 13:31:27 -07004216 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL;
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004217 continue;
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004218 }
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004219
Daniel Borkmann89c63072017-08-19 03:12:45 +02004220 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup
4221 * handlers are currently limited to 64 bit only.
4222 */
4223 if (ebpf_jit_enabled() && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
4224 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) {
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07004225 map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr;
Martin KaFai Laufad73a12017-03-22 10:00:32 -07004226 if (map_ptr == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ||
4227 !map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup)
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07004228 goto patch_call_imm;
4229
4230 cnt = map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf);
4231 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
4232 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
4233 return -EINVAL;
4234 }
4235
4236 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf,
4237 cnt);
4238 if (!new_prog)
4239 return -ENOMEM;
4240
4241 delta += cnt - 1;
4242
4243 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
4244 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
4245 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
4246 continue;
4247 }
4248
Daniel Borkmann109980b2017-09-08 00:14:51 +02004249 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) {
Daniel Borkmann7c300132017-09-20 00:44:21 +02004250 /* Note, we cannot use prog directly as imm as subsequent
4251 * rewrites would still change the prog pointer. The only
4252 * stable address we can use is aux, which also works with
4253 * prog clones during blinding.
4254 */
4255 u64 addr = (unsigned long)prog->aux;
Daniel Borkmann109980b2017-09-08 00:14:51 +02004256 struct bpf_insn r4_ld[] = {
4257 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_4, addr),
4258 *insn,
4259 };
4260 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(r4_ld);
4261
4262 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, r4_ld, cnt);
4263 if (!new_prog)
4264 return -ENOMEM;
4265
4266 delta += cnt - 1;
4267 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
4268 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
4269 }
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07004270patch_call_imm:
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004271 fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
4272 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
4273 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
4274 */
4275 if (!fn->func) {
4276 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
4277 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
4278 return -EFAULT;
4279 }
4280 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
4281 }
4282
4283 return 0;
4284}
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004285
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004286static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07004287{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004288 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07004289 int i;
4290
4291 if (!env->explored_states)
4292 return;
4293
4294 for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) {
4295 sl = env->explored_states[i];
4296
4297 if (sl)
4298 while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
4299 sln = sl->next;
4300 kfree(sl);
4301 sl = sln;
4302 }
4303 }
4304
4305 kfree(env->explored_states);
4306}
4307
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004308int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07004309{
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004310 char __user *log_ubuf = NULL;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004311 struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07004312 int ret = -EINVAL;
4313
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004314 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004315 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
4316 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004317 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004318 if (!env)
4319 return -ENOMEM;
4320
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004321 env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
4322 (*prog)->len);
4323 ret = -ENOMEM;
4324 if (!env->insn_aux_data)
4325 goto err_free_env;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004326 env->prog = *prog;
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004327
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004328 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
4329 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
4330
4331 if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
4332 /* user requested verbose verifier output
4333 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
4334 */
4335 log_level = attr->log_level;
4336 log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
4337 log_size = attr->log_size;
4338 log_len = 0;
4339
4340 ret = -EINVAL;
4341 /* log_* values have to be sane */
4342 if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
4343 log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004344 goto err_unlock;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004345
4346 ret = -ENOMEM;
4347 log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
4348 if (!log_buf)
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004349 goto err_unlock;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004350 } else {
4351 log_level = 0;
4352 }
Daniel Borkmann1ad2f582017-05-25 01:05:05 +02004353
4354 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
4355 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07004356 env->strict_alignment = true;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004357
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004358 ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env);
4359 if (ret < 0)
4360 goto skip_full_check;
4361
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004362 env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004363 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07004364 GFP_USER);
4365 ret = -ENOMEM;
4366 if (!env->explored_states)
4367 goto skip_full_check;
4368
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07004369 ret = check_cfg(env);
4370 if (ret < 0)
4371 goto skip_full_check;
4372
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07004373 env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
4374
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07004375 ret = do_check(env);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004376
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004377skip_full_check:
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07004378 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07004379 free_states(env);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004380
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004381 if (ret == 0)
4382 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
4383 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
4384
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004385 if (ret == 0)
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004386 ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004387
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004388 if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
4389 BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
4390 /* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
4391 ret = -ENOSPC;
4392 /* fall through to return what was recorded */
4393 }
4394
4395 /* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */
4396 if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) {
4397 ret = -EFAULT;
4398 goto free_log_buf;
4399 }
4400
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004401 if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) {
4402 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004403 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt,
4404 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]),
4405 GFP_KERNEL);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004406
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004407 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004408 ret = -ENOMEM;
4409 goto free_log_buf;
4410 }
4411
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004412 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004413 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004414 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004415
4416 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
4417 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
4418 */
4419 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
4420 }
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004421
4422free_log_buf:
4423 if (log_level)
4424 vfree(log_buf);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004425 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004426 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
4427 * them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
4428 */
4429 release_maps(env);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004430 *prog = env->prog;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004431err_unlock:
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004432 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004433 vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
4434err_free_env:
4435 kfree(env);
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07004436 return ret;
4437}
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01004438
4439int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
4440 void *priv)
4441{
4442 struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
4443 int ret;
4444
4445 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
4446 if (!env)
4447 return -ENOMEM;
4448
4449 env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
4450 prog->len);
4451 ret = -ENOMEM;
4452 if (!env->insn_aux_data)
4453 goto err_free_env;
4454 env->prog = prog;
4455 env->analyzer_ops = ops;
4456 env->analyzer_priv = priv;
4457
4458 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
4459 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
4460
4461 log_level = 0;
Daniel Borkmann1ad2f582017-05-25 01:05:05 +02004462
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07004463 env->strict_alignment = false;
Daniel Borkmann1ad2f582017-05-25 01:05:05 +02004464 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
4465 env->strict_alignment = true;
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01004466
4467 env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
4468 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
4469 GFP_KERNEL);
4470 ret = -ENOMEM;
4471 if (!env->explored_states)
4472 goto skip_full_check;
4473
4474 ret = check_cfg(env);
4475 if (ret < 0)
4476 goto skip_full_check;
4477
4478 env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
4479
4480 ret = do_check(env);
4481
4482skip_full_check:
4483 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
4484 free_states(env);
4485
4486 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
4487 vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
4488err_free_env:
4489 kfree(env);
4490 return ret;
4491}
4492EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_analyzer);