blob: 8b8d6ba39e238cb5eea09a71260ddc55630faa6f [file] [log] [blame]
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07001/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07003 *
4 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
7 *
8 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
9 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
10 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
11 * General Public License for more details.
12 */
13#include <linux/kernel.h>
14#include <linux/types.h>
15#include <linux/slab.h>
16#include <linux/bpf.h>
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +010017#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070018#include <linux/filter.h>
19#include <net/netlink.h>
20#include <linux/file.h>
21#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +020022#include <linux/stringify.h>
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070023
24/* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
25 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
26 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
27 *
28 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG.
29 * It rejects the following programs:
30 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns
31 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge)
32 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
33 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps
34 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
35 * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
Gary Lineba38a92017-03-01 16:25:51 +080036 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070037 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
38 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
39 *
40 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction
41 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics.
42 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is
43 * copied to R1.
44 *
45 * All registers are 64-bit.
46 * R0 - return register
47 * R1-R5 argument passing registers
48 * R6-R9 callee saved registers
49 * R10 - frame pointer read-only
50 *
51 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context
52 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
53 *
54 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case:
55 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
56 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20),
57 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1
58 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize
59 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack.
60 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK
61 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking).
62 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant.
63 *
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +010064 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070065 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer.
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +010066 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type)
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070067 *
68 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +010069 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK. These are three pointer
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070070 * types recognized by check_mem_access() function.
71 *
72 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value'
73 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible.
74 *
75 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against
76 * function argument constraints.
77 *
78 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints.
79 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be
80 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as
81 * 'pointer to map element key'
82 *
83 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem():
84 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,
85 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
86 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
87 *
88 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null'
89 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and
90 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside
91 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key.
92 *
93 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like:
94 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
95 * {
96 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1;
97 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2;
98 * void *value;
99 *
100 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that
101 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on
102 * the stack of eBPF program.
103 * }
104 *
105 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like:
106 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR
107 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK
108 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
109 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
110 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees:
111 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok,
112 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes
113 *
114 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far,
115 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits
116 * and were initialized prior to this call.
117 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
118 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
119 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
120 * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL.
121 *
122 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
123 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
124 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false
125 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op().
126 *
127 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5
128 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
129 */
130
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700131/* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100132struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700133 /* verifer state is 'st'
134 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
135 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
136 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100137 struct bpf_verifier_state st;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700138 int insn_idx;
139 int prev_insn_idx;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100140 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700141};
142
Edward Cree8e17c1b2017-08-07 15:30:30 +0100143#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +0200144#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024
145
Martin KaFai Laufad73a12017-03-22 10:00:32 -0700146#define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)0xeB9F + POISON_POINTER_DELTA)
147
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +0200148struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
149 struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +0200150 bool raw_mode;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200151 bool pkt_access;
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +0200152 int regno;
153 int access_size;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +0200154};
155
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700156/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
157 * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars
158 */
159static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len;
160static char *log_buf;
161
162static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
163
164/* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
165 * verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user
166 * can figure out what's wrong with the program
167 */
Daniel Borkmann1d056d92015-11-03 11:39:20 +0100168static __printf(1, 2) void verbose(const char *fmt, ...)
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700169{
170 va_list args;
171
172 if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1)
173 return;
174
175 va_start(args, fmt);
176 log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args);
177 va_end(args);
178}
179
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700180/* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */
181static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
182 [NOT_INIT] = "?",
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100183 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "inv",
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700184 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx",
185 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr",
186 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value",
187 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null",
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700188 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp",
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700189 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt",
190 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end",
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700191};
192
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +0200193#define __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN(x) [BPF_FUNC_ ## x] = __stringify(bpf_ ## x)
194static const char * const func_id_str[] = {
195 __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(__BPF_FUNC_STR_FN)
196};
197#undef __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN
198
199static const char *func_id_name(int id)
200{
201 BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(func_id_str) != __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID);
202
203 if (id >= 0 && id < __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID && func_id_str[id])
204 return func_id_str[id];
205 else
206 return "unknown";
207}
208
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100209static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700210{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100211 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700212 enum bpf_reg_type t;
213 int i;
214
215 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700216 reg = &state->regs[i];
217 t = reg->type;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700218 if (t == NOT_INIT)
219 continue;
220 verbose(" R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100221 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) &&
222 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
223 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */
224 verbose("%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
225 } else {
226 verbose("(id=%d", reg->id);
227 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE)
228 verbose(",off=%d", reg->off);
229 if (t == PTR_TO_PACKET)
230 verbose(",r=%d", reg->range);
231 else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP ||
232 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
233 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
234 verbose(",ks=%d,vs=%d",
235 reg->map_ptr->key_size,
236 reg->map_ptr->value_size);
Edward Cree7d1238f2017-08-07 15:26:56 +0100237 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
238 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but
239 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big
240 * for reg->off
241 */
242 verbose(",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value);
243 } else {
244 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value &&
245 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN)
246 verbose(",smin_value=%lld",
247 (long long)reg->smin_value);
248 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value &&
249 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX)
250 verbose(",smax_value=%lld",
251 (long long)reg->smax_value);
252 if (reg->umin_value != 0)
253 verbose(",umin_value=%llu",
254 (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value);
255 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX)
256 verbose(",umax_value=%llu",
257 (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value);
258 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
259 char tn_buf[48];
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100260
Edward Cree7d1238f2017-08-07 15:26:56 +0100261 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
262 verbose(",var_off=%s", tn_buf);
263 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100264 }
265 verbose(")");
266 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700267 }
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700268 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700269 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_SPILL)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700270 verbose(" fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i,
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700271 reg_type_str[state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE].type]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700272 }
273 verbose("\n");
274}
275
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700276static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = {
277 [BPF_LD] = "ld",
278 [BPF_LDX] = "ldx",
279 [BPF_ST] = "st",
280 [BPF_STX] = "stx",
281 [BPF_ALU] = "alu",
282 [BPF_JMP] = "jmp",
283 [BPF_RET] = "BUG",
284 [BPF_ALU64] = "alu64",
285};
286
Alexei Starovoitov687f0712015-09-08 13:40:01 -0700287static const char *const bpf_alu_string[16] = {
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700288 [BPF_ADD >> 4] = "+=",
289 [BPF_SUB >> 4] = "-=",
290 [BPF_MUL >> 4] = "*=",
291 [BPF_DIV >> 4] = "/=",
292 [BPF_OR >> 4] = "|=",
293 [BPF_AND >> 4] = "&=",
294 [BPF_LSH >> 4] = "<<=",
295 [BPF_RSH >> 4] = ">>=",
296 [BPF_NEG >> 4] = "neg",
297 [BPF_MOD >> 4] = "%=",
298 [BPF_XOR >> 4] = "^=",
299 [BPF_MOV >> 4] = "=",
300 [BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=",
301 [BPF_END >> 4] = "endian",
302};
303
304static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = {
305 [BPF_W >> 3] = "u32",
306 [BPF_H >> 3] = "u16",
307 [BPF_B >> 3] = "u8",
308 [BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64",
309};
310
Alexei Starovoitov687f0712015-09-08 13:40:01 -0700311static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = {
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700312 [BPF_JA >> 4] = "jmp",
313 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = "==",
314 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = ">",
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +0200315 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = "<",
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700316 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = ">=",
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +0200317 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = "<=",
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700318 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&",
319 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = "!=",
320 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>",
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +0200321 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = "s<",
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700322 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=",
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +0200323 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = "s<=",
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700324 [BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call",
325 [BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit",
326};
327
Daniel Borkmann0d0e5762017-05-08 00:04:09 +0200328static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
329 const struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700330{
331 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
332
333 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
334 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
335 verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
336 insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
337 insn->dst_reg,
338 bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
339 class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
340 insn->src_reg);
341 else
342 verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
343 insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
344 insn->dst_reg,
345 bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
346 class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
347 insn->imm);
348 } else if (class == BPF_STX) {
349 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
350 verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
351 insn->code,
352 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
353 insn->dst_reg,
354 insn->off, insn->src_reg);
355 else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
356 verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
357 insn->code,
358 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
359 insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
360 insn->src_reg);
361 else
362 verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
363 } else if (class == BPF_ST) {
364 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
365 verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
366 return;
367 }
368 verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
369 insn->code,
370 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
371 insn->dst_reg,
372 insn->off, insn->imm);
373 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
374 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
375 verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
376 return;
377 }
378 verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
379 insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
380 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
381 insn->src_reg, insn->off);
382 } else if (class == BPF_LD) {
383 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
384 verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
385 insn->code,
386 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
387 insn->imm);
388 } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
389 verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
390 insn->code,
391 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
392 insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
Daniel Borkmann0d0e5762017-05-08 00:04:09 +0200393 } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM &&
394 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) {
395 /* At this point, we already made sure that the second
396 * part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible.
397 */
398 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
399 bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD;
400
401 if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks)
402 imm = 0;
403
404 verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
405 insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700406 } else {
407 verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
408 return;
409 }
410 } else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
411 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
412
413 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +0200414 verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
415 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700416 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
417 verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
418 insn->code, insn->off);
419 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
420 verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
421 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
422 verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
423 insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
424 bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
425 insn->src_reg, insn->off);
426 } else {
427 verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
428 insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
429 bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
430 insn->imm, insn->off);
431 }
432 } else {
433 verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
434 }
435}
436
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100437static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700438{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100439 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700440 int insn_idx;
441
442 if (env->head == NULL)
443 return -1;
444
445 memcpy(&env->cur_state, &env->head->st, sizeof(env->cur_state));
446 insn_idx = env->head->insn_idx;
447 if (prev_insn_idx)
448 *prev_insn_idx = env->head->prev_insn_idx;
449 elem = env->head->next;
450 kfree(env->head);
451 env->head = elem;
452 env->stack_size--;
453 return insn_idx;
454}
455
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100456static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
457 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700458{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100459 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700460
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100461 elem = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700462 if (!elem)
463 goto err;
464
465 memcpy(&elem->st, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
466 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
467 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
468 elem->next = env->head;
469 env->head = elem;
470 env->stack_size++;
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +0200471 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700472 verbose("BPF program is too complex\n");
473 goto err;
474 }
475 return &elem->st;
476err:
477 /* pop all elements and return */
478 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
479 return NULL;
480}
481
482#define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
483static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
484 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
485};
486
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100487static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
488
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100489/* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as
490 * known to have the value @imm.
491 */
492static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
493{
494 reg->id = 0;
495 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm);
496 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm;
497 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm;
498 reg->umin_value = imm;
499 reg->umax_value = imm;
500}
501
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100502/* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be
503 * used only on registers holding a pointer type.
504 */
505static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
506{
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100507 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100508}
509
510static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
511{
512 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
513 verbose("mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
514 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
515 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
516 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
517 return;
518 }
519 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno);
520}
521
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100522/* Attempts to improve min/max values based on var_off information */
523static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
524{
525 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
526 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value,
527 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN));
528 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
529 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value,
530 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX));
531 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value);
532 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value,
533 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask);
534}
535
536/* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */
537static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
538{
539 /* Learn sign from signed bounds.
540 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
541 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g.
542 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
543 */
544 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) {
545 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
546 reg->umin_value);
547 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
548 reg->umax_value);
549 return;
550 }
551 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign
552 * boundary, so we must be careful.
553 */
554 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) {
555 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax
556 * is positive, hence safe.
557 */
558 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
559 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
560 reg->umax_value);
561 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) {
562 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin
563 * is negative, hence safe.
564 */
565 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
566 reg->umin_value);
567 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
568 }
569}
570
571/* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */
572static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
573{
574 reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off,
575 tnum_range(reg->umin_value,
576 reg->umax_value));
577}
578
579/* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */
580static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
581{
582 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
583 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
584 reg->umin_value = 0;
585 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
586}
587
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100588/* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */
589static void __mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
590{
591 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
592 reg->id = 0;
593 reg->off = 0;
594 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100595 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100596}
597
598static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
599{
600 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
601 verbose("mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno);
602 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
603 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
604 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
605 return;
606 }
607 __mark_reg_unknown(regs + regno);
608}
609
610static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
611{
612 __mark_reg_unknown(reg);
613 reg->type = NOT_INIT;
614}
615
Daniel Borkmanna9789ef2017-05-25 01:05:06 +0200616static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
617{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100618 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
619 verbose("mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno);
620 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
621 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
622 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
623 return;
624 }
625 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
Daniel Borkmanna9789ef2017-05-25 01:05:06 +0200626}
627
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100628static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700629{
630 int i;
631
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100632 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
Daniel Borkmanna9789ef2017-05-25 01:05:06 +0200633 mark_reg_not_init(regs, i);
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100634 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
635 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700636
637 /* frame pointer */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100638 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK;
639 mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_FP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700640
641 /* 1st arg to a function */
642 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100643 mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_1);
Daniel Borkmann6760bf22016-12-18 01:52:59 +0100644}
645
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700646enum reg_arg_type {
647 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */
648 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */
649 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */
650};
651
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100652static void mark_reg_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno)
653{
654 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent = state->parent;
655
Alexei Starovoitov8fe2d6c2017-10-05 16:20:56 -0700656 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP)
657 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
658 return;
659
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100660 while (parent) {
661 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
662 if (state->regs[regno].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
663 break;
664 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */
665 parent->regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
666 state = parent;
667 parent = state->parent;
668 }
669}
670
671static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700672 enum reg_arg_type t)
673{
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100674 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
675
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700676 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
677 verbose("R%d is invalid\n", regno);
678 return -EINVAL;
679 }
680
681 if (t == SRC_OP) {
682 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
683 if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) {
684 verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
685 return -EACCES;
686 }
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100687 mark_reg_read(&env->cur_state, regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700688 } else {
689 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
690 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
691 verbose("frame pointer is read only\n");
692 return -EACCES;
693 }
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100694 regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700695 if (t == DST_OP)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100696 mark_reg_unknown(regs, regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700697 }
698 return 0;
699}
700
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700701static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
702{
703 switch (type) {
704 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
705 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
706 case PTR_TO_STACK:
707 case PTR_TO_CTX:
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700708 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
709 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700710 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
711 return true;
712 default:
713 return false;
714 }
715}
716
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700717/* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
718 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
719 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100720static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
721 int size, int value_regno)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700722{
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100723 int i, spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700724 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
725 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
726 */
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700727
728 if (value_regno >= 0 &&
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700729 is_spillable_regtype(state->regs[value_regno].type)) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700730
731 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700732 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700733 verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
734 return -EACCES;
735 }
736
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700737 /* save register state */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100738 state->spilled_regs[spi] = state->regs[value_regno];
739 state->spilled_regs[spi].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700740
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700741 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
742 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL;
743 } else {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700744 /* regular write of data into stack */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100745 state->spilled_regs[spi] = (struct bpf_reg_state) {};
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700746
747 for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
748 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_MISC;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700749 }
750 return 0;
751}
752
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100753static void mark_stack_slot_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int slot)
754{
755 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent = state->parent;
756
757 while (parent) {
758 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
759 if (state->spilled_regs[slot].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
760 break;
761 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */
762 parent->spilled_regs[slot].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
763 state = parent;
764 parent = state->parent;
765 }
766}
767
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100768static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700769 int value_regno)
770{
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700771 u8 *slot_type;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100772 int i, spi;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700773
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700774 slot_type = &state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off];
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700775
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700776 if (slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
777 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700778 verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
779 return -EACCES;
780 }
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700781 for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
782 if (slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700783 verbose("corrupted spill memory\n");
784 return -EACCES;
785 }
786 }
787
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100788 spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
789
790 if (value_regno >= 0) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700791 /* restore register state from stack */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100792 state->regs[value_regno] = state->spilled_regs[spi];
793 mark_stack_slot_read(state, spi);
794 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700795 return 0;
796 } else {
797 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700798 if (slot_type[i] != STACK_MISC) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700799 verbose("invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
800 off, i, size);
801 return -EACCES;
802 }
803 }
804 if (value_regno >= 0)
805 /* have read misc data from the stack */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100806 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700807 return 0;
808 }
809}
810
811/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100812static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700813 int size)
814{
815 struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr;
816
Gianluca Borello57225692017-01-09 10:19:47 -0800817 if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700818 verbose("invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
819 map->value_size, off, size);
820 return -EACCES;
821 }
822 return 0;
823}
824
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100825/* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */
826static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800827 int off, int size)
828{
829 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
830 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
831 int err;
832
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100833 /* We may have adjusted the register to this map value, so we
834 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
835 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800836 */
837 if (log_level)
838 print_verifier_state(state);
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800839 /* The minimum value is only important with signed
840 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
841 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
842 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
843 * will have a set floor within our range.
844 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100845 if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800846 verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
847 regno);
848 return -EACCES;
849 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100850 err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size);
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800851 if (err) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100852 verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n", regno);
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800853 return err;
854 }
855
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100856 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be
857 * sure we won't do bad things.
858 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too.
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800859 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100860 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800861 verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
862 regno);
863 return -EACCES;
864 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100865 err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100866 if (err)
867 verbose("R%d max value is outside of the array range\n", regno);
868 return err;
Gianluca Borellodbcfe5f2017-01-09 10:19:46 -0800869}
870
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700871#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
872
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100873static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
Thomas Graf3a0af8f2016-11-30 17:10:10 +0100874 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
875 enum bpf_access_type t)
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -0700876{
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200877 switch (env->prog->type) {
Thomas Graf3a0af8f2016-11-30 17:10:10 +0100878 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
879 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
880 /* dst_input() and dst_output() can't write for now */
881 if (t == BPF_WRITE)
882 return false;
Alexander Alemayhu7e57fbb2017-02-14 00:02:35 +0100883 /* fallthrough */
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200884 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
885 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -0700886 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
Thomas Graf3a0af8f2016-11-30 17:10:10 +0100887 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
John Fastabend8a31db52017-08-15 22:33:09 -0700888 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB:
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200889 if (meta)
890 return meta->pkt_access;
891
892 env->seen_direct_write = true;
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -0700893 return true;
894 default:
895 return false;
896 }
897}
898
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100899static int __check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
900 int off, int size)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700901{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100902 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
903 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700904
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100905 if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || (u64)off + size > reg->range) {
Alexei Starovoitovd91b28e2016-05-19 18:17:13 -0700906 verbose("invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
907 off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700908 return -EACCES;
909 }
910 return 0;
911}
912
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100913static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
914 int size)
915{
916 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
917 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
918 int err;
919
920 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any
921 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed
922 * offset.
923 */
924
925 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough
926 * detail to prove they're safe.
927 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100928 if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100929 verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
930 regno);
931 return -EACCES;
932 }
933 err = __check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
934 if (err) {
935 verbose("R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno);
936 return err;
937 }
938 return err;
939}
940
941/* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -0700942static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size,
Alexei Starovoitov19de99f2016-06-15 18:25:38 -0700943 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700944{
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +0200945 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {
946 .reg_type = *reg_type,
947 };
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -0700948
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +0100949 /* for analyzer ctx accesses are already validated and converted */
950 if (env->analyzer_ops)
951 return 0;
952
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700953 if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access &&
Yonghong Song23994632017-06-22 15:07:39 -0700954 env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info)) {
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +0200955 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a
956 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole
957 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower
958 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size
959 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other
960 * type of narrower access.
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -0700961 */
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +0200962 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size;
Yonghong Song23994632017-06-22 15:07:39 -0700963 *reg_type = info.reg_type;
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -0700964
Alexei Starovoitov32bbe002016-04-06 18:43:28 -0700965 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
966 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
967 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700968 return 0;
Alexei Starovoitov32bbe002016-04-06 18:43:28 -0700969 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700970
971 verbose("invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
972 return -EACCES;
973}
974
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +0200975static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
976 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700977{
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +0200978 if (allow_ptr_leaks)
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700979 return false;
980
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100981 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700982}
983
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +0200984static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
985{
986 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, &env->cur_state.regs[regno]);
987}
988
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +0200989static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -0700990 int off, int size, bool strict)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700991{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100992 struct tnum reg_off;
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -0700993 int ip_align;
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -0700994
995 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
996 if (!strict || size == 1)
997 return 0;
998
David S. Millere4eda882017-05-22 12:27:07 -0400999 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling
1000 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of
1001 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms
1002 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get
1003 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate
1004 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an
1005 * unconditional IP align value of '2'.
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07001006 */
David S. Millere4eda882017-05-22 12:27:07 -04001007 ip_align = 2;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001008
1009 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off));
1010 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
1011 char tn_buf[48];
1012
1013 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
1014 verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n",
1015 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001016 return -EACCES;
1017 }
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001018
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001019 return 0;
1020}
1021
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001022static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
1023 const char *pointer_desc,
1024 int off, int size, bool strict)
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001025{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001026 struct tnum reg_off;
1027
1028 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
1029 if (!strict || size == 1)
1030 return 0;
1031
1032 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off));
1033 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
1034 char tn_buf[48];
1035
1036 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
1037 verbose("misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n",
1038 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001039 return -EACCES;
1040 }
1041
1042 return 0;
1043}
1044
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07001045static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1046 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001047 int off, int size)
1048{
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07001049 bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001050 const char *pointer_desc = "";
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07001051
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001052 switch (reg->type) {
1053 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001054 /* special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN */
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07001055 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size, strict);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001056 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
1057 pointer_desc = "value ";
1058 break;
1059 case PTR_TO_CTX:
1060 pointer_desc = "context ";
1061 break;
1062 case PTR_TO_STACK:
1063 pointer_desc = "stack ";
1064 break;
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001065 default:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001066 break;
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001067 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001068 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(reg, pointer_desc, off, size, strict);
Daniel Borkmann79adffc2017-03-31 02:24:03 +02001069}
1070
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001071/* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
1072 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
1073 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
1074 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
1075 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
1076 */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001077static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, int off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001078 int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
1079 int value_regno)
1080{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001081 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
1082 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001083 int size, err = 0;
1084
1085 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size);
1086 if (size < 0)
1087 return size;
1088
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001089 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07001090 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001091 if (err)
1092 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001093
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001094 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */
1095 off += reg->off;
1096
1097 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001098 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
1099 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
1100 verbose("R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
1101 return -EACCES;
1102 }
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001103
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001104 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001105 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001106 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001107
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07001108 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001109 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
Alexei Starovoitov19de99f2016-06-15 18:25:38 -07001110
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001111 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
1112 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
1113 verbose("R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
1114 return -EACCES;
1115 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001116 /* ctx accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
1117 * determine what type of data were returned.
1118 */
1119 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
1120 char tn_buf[48];
1121
1122 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
1123 verbose("variable ctx access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
1124 tn_buf, off, size);
1125 return -EACCES;
1126 }
1127 off += reg->var_off.value;
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001128 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, &reg_type);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001129 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001130 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a
1131 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_END]. In the latter case, we know
1132 * the offset is zero.
1133 */
1134 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE)
1135 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
1136 else
1137 mark_reg_known_zero(state->regs, value_regno);
1138 state->regs[value_regno].id = 0;
1139 state->regs[value_regno].off = 0;
1140 state->regs[value_regno].range = 0;
Mickaël Salaün19553512016-09-24 20:01:50 +02001141 state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001142 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001143
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001144 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
1145 /* stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
1146 * determine what type of data were returned.
1147 * See check_stack_read().
1148 */
1149 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
1150 char tn_buf[48];
1151
1152 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
1153 verbose("variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
1154 tn_buf, off, size);
1155 return -EACCES;
1156 }
1157 off += reg->var_off.value;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001158 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
1159 verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
1160 return -EACCES;
1161 }
Alexei Starovoitov87266792017-05-30 13:31:29 -07001162
1163 if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
1164 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
1165
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001166 if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
1167 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
1168 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off] == STACK_SPILL &&
1169 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
1170 verbose("attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
1171 return -EACCES;
1172 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001173 err = check_stack_write(state, off, size, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001174 } else {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001175 err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001176 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001177 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
Thomas Graf3a0af8f2016-11-30 17:10:10 +01001178 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001179 verbose("cannot write into packet\n");
1180 return -EACCES;
1181 }
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -07001182 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
1183 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
1184 verbose("R%d leaks addr into packet\n", value_regno);
1185 return -EACCES;
1186 }
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001187 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
1188 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001189 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001190 } else {
1191 verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n",
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07001192 regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001193 return -EACCES;
1194 }
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001195
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001196 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ &&
1197 state->regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
1198 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */
1199 state->regs[value_regno].var_off = tnum_cast(
1200 state->regs[value_regno].var_off, size);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001201 __update_reg_bounds(&state->regs[value_regno]);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001202 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001203 return err;
1204}
1205
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001206static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001207{
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001208 int err;
1209
1210 if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) ||
1211 insn->imm != 0) {
1212 verbose("BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
1213 return -EINVAL;
1214 }
1215
1216 /* check src1 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001217 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001218 if (err)
1219 return err;
1220
1221 /* check src2 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001222 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001223 if (err)
1224 return err;
1225
Daniel Borkmann6bdf6ab2017-06-29 03:04:59 +02001226 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
1227 verbose("R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
1228 return -EACCES;
1229 }
1230
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001231 /* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001232 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001233 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1);
1234 if (err)
1235 return err;
1236
1237 /* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001238 return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001239 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1);
1240}
1241
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001242/* Does this register contain a constant zero? */
1243static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state reg)
1244{
1245 return reg.type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg.var_off, 0);
1246}
1247
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001248/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
1249 * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001250 * and all elements of stack are initialized.
1251 * Unlike most pointer bounds-checking functions, this one doesn't take an
1252 * 'off' argument, so it has to add in reg->off itself.
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001253 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001254static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001255 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
1256 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001257{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001258 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
1259 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001260 int off, i;
1261
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001262 if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001263 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001264 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001265 register_is_null(regs[regno]))
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001266 return 0;
1267
1268 verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
1269 reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
1270 reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001271 return -EACCES;
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001272 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001273
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001274 /* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
1275 if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
1276 char tn_buf[48];
1277
1278 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
1279 verbose("invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
1280 regno, tn_buf);
1281 }
1282 off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001283 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
1284 access_size <= 0) {
1285 verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
1286 regno, off, access_size);
1287 return -EACCES;
1288 }
1289
Alexei Starovoitov87266792017-05-30 13:31:29 -07001290 if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
1291 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
1292
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001293 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
1294 meta->access_size = access_size;
1295 meta->regno = regno;
1296 return 0;
1297 }
1298
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001299 for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07001300 if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001301 verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
1302 off, i, access_size);
1303 return -EACCES;
1304 }
1305 }
1306 return 0;
1307}
1308
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001309static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
1310 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
1311 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
1312{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001313 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = &regs[regno];
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001314
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001315 switch (reg->type) {
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001316 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001317 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size);
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001318 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001319 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size);
1320 default: /* scalar_value|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001321 return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size,
1322 zero_size_allowed, meta);
1323 }
1324}
1325
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001326static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001327 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
1328 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001329{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001330 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = &regs[regno];
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001331 enum bpf_reg_type expected_type, type = reg->type;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001332 int err = 0;
1333
Daniel Borkmann80f1d682015-03-12 17:21:42 +01001334 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001335 return 0;
1336
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001337 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP);
1338 if (err)
1339 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001340
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001341 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
1342 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
1343 verbose("R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", regno);
1344 return -EACCES;
1345 }
Daniel Borkmann80f1d682015-03-12 17:21:42 +01001346 return 0;
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001347 }
Daniel Borkmann80f1d682015-03-12 17:21:42 +01001348
Thomas Graf3a0af8f2016-11-30 17:10:10 +01001349 if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
1350 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) {
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02001351 verbose("helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001352 return -EACCES;
1353 }
1354
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001355 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001356 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
1357 expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001358 if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
1359 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001360 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
1361 arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001362 expected_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
1363 if (type != expected_type)
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001364 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001365 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
1366 expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001367 if (type != expected_type)
1368 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov608cd712015-03-26 19:53:57 -07001369 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
1370 expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001371 if (type != expected_type)
1372 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001373 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM ||
1374 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) {
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001375 expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
1376 /* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001377 * passed in as argument, it's a SCALAR_VALUE type. Final test
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001378 * happens during stack boundary checking.
1379 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001380 if (register_is_null(*reg))
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001381 /* final test in check_stack_boundary() */;
Gianluca Borello57225692017-01-09 10:19:47 -08001382 else if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001383 type != expected_type)
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001384 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001385 meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001386 } else {
1387 verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type);
1388 return -EFAULT;
1389 }
1390
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001391 if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
1392 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001393 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001394 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
1395 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call:
1396 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within
1397 * stack limits and initialized
1398 */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001399 if (!meta->map_ptr) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001400 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before
1401 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before
1402 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
1403 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
1404 */
1405 verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
1406 return -EACCES;
1407 }
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001408 if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001409 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off,
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001410 meta->map_ptr->key_size);
1411 else
1412 err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
1413 meta->map_ptr->key_size,
1414 false, NULL);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001415 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
1416 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call:
1417 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity
1418 */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001419 if (!meta->map_ptr) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001420 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
1421 verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
1422 return -EACCES;
1423 }
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001424 if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001425 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off,
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001426 meta->map_ptr->value_size);
1427 else
1428 err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
1429 meta->map_ptr->value_size,
1430 false, NULL);
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001431 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
1432 arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
1433 bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001434
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001435 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' bytes
1436 * from stack pointer 'buf'. Check it
1437 * note: regno == len, regno - 1 == buf
1438 */
1439 if (regno == 0) {
1440 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001441 verbose("ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001442 return -EACCES;
1443 }
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001444
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001445 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check
1446 * happens using its boundaries.
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001447 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001448
1449 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001450 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw
1451 * mode so that the program is required to
1452 * initialize all the memory that the helper could
1453 * just partially fill up.
1454 */
1455 meta = NULL;
1456
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001457 if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001458 verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
1459 regno);
1460 return -EACCES;
1461 }
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001462
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001463 if (reg->umin_value == 0) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001464 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
1465 zero_size_allowed,
1466 meta);
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001467 if (err)
1468 return err;
Gianluca Borello06c1c042017-01-09 10:19:49 -08001469 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001470
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001471 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001472 verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
1473 regno);
1474 return -EACCES;
1475 }
1476 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1,
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001477 reg->umax_value,
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001478 zero_size_allowed, meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001479 }
1480
1481 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001482err_type:
1483 verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
1484 reg_type_str[type], reg_type_str[expected_type]);
1485 return -EACCES;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001486}
1487
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001488static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
1489{
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001490 if (!map)
1491 return 0;
1492
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001493 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
1494 switch (map->map_type) {
1495 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
1496 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
1497 goto error;
1498 break;
1499 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
1500 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
1501 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output)
1502 goto error;
1503 break;
1504 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
1505 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
1506 goto error;
1507 break;
Martin KaFai Lau4ed8ec52016-06-30 10:28:43 -07001508 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
David S. Miller60747ef2016-08-18 01:17:32 -04001509 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
Sargun Dhillon60d20f92016-08-12 08:56:52 -07001510 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
Martin KaFai Lau4a482f32016-06-30 10:28:44 -07001511 goto error;
1512 break;
John Fastabend546ac1f2017-07-17 09:28:56 -07001513 /* devmap returns a pointer to a live net_device ifindex that we cannot
1514 * allow to be modified from bpf side. So do not allow lookup elements
1515 * for now.
1516 */
1517 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
John Fastabend2ddf71e2017-07-17 09:30:02 -07001518 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
John Fastabend546ac1f2017-07-17 09:28:56 -07001519 goto error;
1520 break;
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07001521 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
Martin KaFai Laubcc6b1b2017-03-22 10:00:34 -07001522 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07001523 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
1524 goto error;
Martin KaFai Lau16a43622017-08-17 18:14:43 -07001525 break;
John Fastabend174a79f2017-08-15 22:32:47 -07001526 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
1527 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map &&
1528 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update &&
1529 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem)
1530 goto error;
1531 break;
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001532 default:
1533 break;
1534 }
1535
1536 /* ... and second from the function itself. */
1537 switch (func_id) {
1538 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
1539 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
1540 goto error;
1541 break;
1542 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
1543 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
1544 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
1545 goto error;
1546 break;
1547 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
1548 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
1549 goto error;
1550 break;
Sargun Dhillon60d20f92016-08-12 08:56:52 -07001551 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
Daniel Borkmann747ea552016-08-12 22:17:17 +02001552 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
Martin KaFai Lau4a482f32016-06-30 10:28:44 -07001553 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
1554 goto error;
1555 break;
John Fastabend97f91a72017-07-17 09:29:18 -07001556 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
1557 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP)
1558 goto error;
1559 break;
John Fastabend174a79f2017-08-15 22:32:47 -07001560 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map:
1561 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
1562 goto error;
1563 break;
1564 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update:
1565 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
1566 goto error;
1567 break;
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001568 default:
1569 break;
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001570 }
1571
1572 return 0;
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001573error:
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +02001574 verbose("cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
1575 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001576 return -EINVAL;
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001577}
1578
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001579static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
1580{
1581 int count = 0;
1582
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001583 if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001584 count++;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001585 if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001586 count++;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001587 if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001588 count++;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001589 if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001590 count++;
Alexei Starovoitov39f19ebb2017-01-09 10:19:50 -08001591 if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001592 count++;
1593
1594 return count > 1 ? -EINVAL : 0;
1595}
1596
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001597/* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_END] are now invalid,
1598 * so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE.
1599 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001600static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001601{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001602 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
1603 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001604 int i;
1605
1606 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
1607 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
1608 regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001609 mark_reg_unknown(regs, i);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001610
1611 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
1612 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
1613 continue;
1614 reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
1615 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET &&
1616 reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET_END)
1617 continue;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001618 __mark_reg_unknown(reg);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001619 }
1620}
1621
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07001622static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001623{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001624 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001625 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001626 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001627 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001628 bool changes_data;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001629 int i, err;
1630
1631 /* find function prototype */
1632 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +02001633 verbose("invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001634 return -EINVAL;
1635 }
1636
1637 if (env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto)
1638 fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);
1639
1640 if (!fn) {
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +02001641 verbose("unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001642 return -EINVAL;
1643 }
1644
1645 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
Daniel Borkmann24701ec2015-03-01 12:31:47 +01001646 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001647 verbose("cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
1648 return -EINVAL;
1649 }
1650
Martin KaFai Lau17bedab2016-12-07 15:53:11 -08001651 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001652
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001653 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02001654 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001655
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001656 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, which
1657 * is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
1658 */
1659 err = check_raw_mode(fn);
1660 if (err) {
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +02001661 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
1662 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001663 return err;
1664 }
1665
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001666 /* check args */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001667 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001668 if (err)
1669 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001670 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001671 if (err)
1672 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001673 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001674 if (err)
1675 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001676 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001677 if (err)
1678 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001679 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001680 if (err)
1681 return err;
1682
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001683 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
1684 * is inferred from register state.
1685 */
1686 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07001687 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001688 if (err)
1689 return err;
1690 }
1691
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001692 /* reset caller saved regs */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001693 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
Daniel Borkmanna9789ef2017-05-25 01:05:06 +02001694 mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]);
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001695 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
1696 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001697
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01001698 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001699 if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001700 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
1701 mark_reg_unknown(regs, BPF_REG_0);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001702 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
1703 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
1704 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
Martin KaFai Laufad73a12017-03-22 10:00:32 -07001705 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
1706
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001707 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001708 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
1709 mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_0);
1710 regs[BPF_REG_0].off = 0;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001711 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
1712 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
1713 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
1714 */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001715 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001716 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
1717 return -EINVAL;
1718 }
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001719 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02001720 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
Martin KaFai Laufad73a12017-03-22 10:00:32 -07001721 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
1722 if (!insn_aux->map_ptr)
1723 insn_aux->map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
1724 else if (insn_aux->map_ptr != meta.map_ptr)
1725 insn_aux->map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001726 } else {
Thomas Grafebb676d2016-10-27 11:23:51 +02001727 verbose("unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
1728 fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001729 return -EINVAL;
1730 }
Alexei Starovoitov04fd61ab2015-05-19 16:59:03 -07001731
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001732 err = check_map_func_compatibility(meta.map_ptr, func_id);
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001733 if (err)
1734 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov04fd61ab2015-05-19 16:59:03 -07001735
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001736 if (changes_data)
1737 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
1738 return 0;
1739}
1740
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001741static void coerce_reg_to_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07001742{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001743 /* clear high 32 bits */
1744 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, 4);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001745 /* Update bounds */
1746 __update_reg_bounds(reg);
1747}
1748
1749static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
1750{
1751 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
1752 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b);
1753
1754 if (b < 0)
1755 return res > a;
1756 return res < a;
1757}
1758
1759static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
1760{
1761 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
1762 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b);
1763
1764 if (b < 0)
1765 return res < a;
1766 return res > a;
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07001767}
1768
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001769/* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001770 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
1771 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
1772 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks.
1773 */
1774static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1775 struct bpf_insn *insn,
1776 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
1777 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001778{
1779 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001780 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001781 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value,
1782 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
1783 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
1784 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001785 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001786 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001787
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001788 dst_reg = &regs[dst];
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001789
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001790 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (smin_val != smax_val))) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001791 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001792 verbose("verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds\n");
1793 return -EINVAL;
1794 }
1795 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (umin_val != umax_val))) {
1796 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
1797 verbose("verifier internal error: known but bad ubounds\n");
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001798 return -EINVAL;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001799 }
1800
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001801 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
1802 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
1803 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1804 verbose("R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
1805 dst);
1806 return -EACCES;
1807 }
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07001808
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001809 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
1810 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1811 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
1812 dst);
1813 return -EACCES;
1814 }
1815 if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
1816 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1817 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
1818 dst);
1819 return -EACCES;
1820 }
1821 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
1822 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1823 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
1824 dst);
1825 return -EACCES;
1826 }
1827
1828 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
1829 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001830 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001831 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
1832 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001833
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001834 switch (opcode) {
1835 case BPF_ADD:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001836 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
1837 * the s32 'off' field
1838 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001839 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val ==
1840 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001841 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001842 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
1843 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
1844 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
1845 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001846 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001847 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001848 dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
1849 break;
1850 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001851 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off
1852 * == 0, since it's a scalar.
1853 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive
1854 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id'
1855 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET.
1856 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets
1857 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset
1858 * from ptr_reg.
1859 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001860 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) ||
1861 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) {
1862 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
1863 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
1864 } else {
1865 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val;
1866 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val;
1867 }
1868 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr ||
1869 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) {
1870 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
1871 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
1872 } else {
1873 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val;
1874 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val;
1875 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001876 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
1877 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
1878 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
1879 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
1880 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
1881 dst_reg->range = 0;
1882 }
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001883 break;
1884 case BPF_SUB:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001885 if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
1886 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
1887 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1888 verbose("R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
1889 dst);
1890 return -EACCES;
1891 }
1892 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
1893 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not
1894 * be able to deal with it.
Edward Cree93057062017-07-21 14:37:34 +01001895 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001896 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
1897 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1898 verbose("R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
1899 dst);
1900 return -EACCES;
1901 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001902 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
1903 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001904 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001905 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
1906 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
1907 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
1908 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001909 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
1910 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001911 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001912 dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
1913 break;
1914 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001915 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known
1916 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good.
1917 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001918 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) ||
1919 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) {
1920 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
1921 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
1922 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
1923 } else {
1924 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val;
1925 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val;
1926 }
1927 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) {
1928 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
1929 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
1930 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
1931 } else {
1932 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
1933 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val;
1934 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val;
1935 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001936 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
1937 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
1938 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
1939 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
1940 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001941 if (smin_val < 0)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001942 dst_reg->range = 0;
1943 }
1944 break;
1945 case BPF_AND:
1946 case BPF_OR:
1947 case BPF_XOR:
1948 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit for now.
1949 * (However, in principle we could allow some cases, e.g.
1950 * ptr &= ~3 which would reduce min_value by 3.)
1951 */
1952 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1953 verbose("R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
1954 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
1955 return -EACCES;
1956 default:
1957 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
1958 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1959 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
1960 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
1961 return -EACCES;
1962 }
1963
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001964 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
1965 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
1966 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001967 return 0;
1968}
1969
1970static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1971 struct bpf_insn *insn,
1972 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
1973 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
1974{
1975 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001976 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
1977 bool src_known, dst_known;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001978 s64 smin_val, smax_val;
1979 u64 umin_val, umax_val;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001980
1981 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
1982 /* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */
1983 coerce_reg_to_32(dst_reg);
1984 coerce_reg_to_32(&src_reg);
1985 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001986 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
1987 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
1988 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
1989 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01001990 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
1991 dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
1992
1993 switch (opcode) {
1994 case BPF_ADD:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01001995 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
1996 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
1997 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
1998 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
1999 } else {
2000 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
2001 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
2002 }
2003 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
2004 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
2005 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
2006 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
2007 } else {
2008 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
2009 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
2010 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002011 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
2012 break;
2013 case BPF_SUB:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002014 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
2015 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
2016 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
2017 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2018 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2019 } else {
2020 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
2021 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
2022 }
2023 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
2024 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
2025 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
2026 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
2027 } else {
2028 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
2029 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
2030 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
2031 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002032 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002033 break;
2034 case BPF_MUL:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002035 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
2036 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002037 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002038 __mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
2039 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002040 break;
2041 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002042 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
2043 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002044 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002045 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
2046 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
2047 __mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
2048 /* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
2049 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
2050 break;
2051 }
2052 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
2053 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
2054 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
2055 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
2056 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2057 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2058 } else {
2059 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
2060 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
2061 }
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002062 break;
2063 case BPF_AND:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002064 if (src_known && dst_known) {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002065 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
2066 src_reg.var_off.value);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002067 break;
2068 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002069 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
2070 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05002071 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002072 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002073 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
2074 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
2075 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
2076 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
2077 * ain't nobody got time for that.
2078 */
2079 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2080 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2081 } else {
2082 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
2083 * cast result into s64.
2084 */
2085 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
2086 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
2087 }
2088 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
2089 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002090 break;
2091 case BPF_OR:
2092 if (src_known && dst_known) {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002093 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
2094 src_reg.var_off.value);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002095 break;
2096 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002097 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
2098 * maximum of the operands' minima
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002099 */
2100 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002101 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
2102 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
2103 dst_reg->var_off.mask;
2104 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
2105 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
2106 * ain't nobody got time for that.
2107 */
2108 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2109 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002110 } else {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002111 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
2112 * cast result into s64.
2113 */
2114 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
2115 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002116 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002117 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
2118 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002119 break;
2120 case BPF_LSH:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002121 if (umax_val > 63) {
2122 /* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
2123 * shifts by a negative number.
2124 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002125 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
2126 break;
2127 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002128 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
2129 * up from var_off)
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002130 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002131 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2132 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2133 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
2134 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
2135 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
2136 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07002137 } else {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002138 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
2139 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07002140 }
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002141 if (src_known)
2142 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
2143 else
2144 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
2145 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
2146 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002147 break;
2148 case BPF_RSH:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002149 if (umax_val > 63) {
2150 /* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
2151 * shifts by a negative number.
2152 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002153 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
2154 break;
2155 }
2156 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002157 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
2158 if (umin_val) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002159 /* Sign bit will be cleared */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002160 dst_reg->smin_value = 0;
2161 } else {
2162 /* Lost sign bit information */
2163 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2164 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2165 }
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07002166 } else {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002167 dst_reg->smin_value =
2168 (u64)(dst_reg->smin_value) >> umax_val;
David S. Millerd1174412017-05-10 11:22:52 -07002169 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002170 if (src_known)
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002171 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off,
2172 umin_val);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002173 else
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002174 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
2175 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
2176 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
2177 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
2178 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002179 break;
2180 default:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002181 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002182 break;
2183 }
2184
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002185 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
2186 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002187 return 0;
2188}
2189
2190/* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max
2191 * and var_off.
2192 */
2193static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2194 struct bpf_insn *insn)
2195{
2196 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg;
2197 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
2198 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
2199 int rc;
2200
2201 dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002202 src_reg = NULL;
2203 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
2204 ptr_reg = dst_reg;
2205 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2206 src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002207 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2208 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2209 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields
2210 * an arbitrary scalar.
2211 */
2212 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
2213 verbose("R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
2214 insn->dst_reg,
2215 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
2216 return -EACCES;
2217 }
2218 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
2219 return 0;
2220 } else {
2221 /* scalar += pointer
2222 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our
2223 * src/dest handling in computing the range
2224 */
2225 rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
2226 src_reg, dst_reg);
2227 if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
2228 /* scalar += unknown scalar */
2229 __mark_reg_unknown(&off_reg);
2230 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
2231 env, insn,
2232 dst_reg, off_reg);
2233 }
2234 return rc;
2235 }
2236 } else if (ptr_reg) {
2237 /* pointer += scalar */
2238 rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
2239 dst_reg, src_reg);
2240 if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
2241 /* unknown scalar += scalar */
2242 __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
2243 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
2244 env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
2245 }
2246 return rc;
2247 }
2248 } else {
2249 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only
2250 * need to be able to read from this state.
2251 */
2252 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002253 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002254 src_reg = &off_reg;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002255 if (ptr_reg) { /* pointer += K */
2256 rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
2257 ptr_reg, src_reg);
2258 if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
2259 /* unknown scalar += K */
2260 __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
2261 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
2262 env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg);
2263 }
2264 return rc;
2265 }
2266 }
2267
2268 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
2269 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) {
2270 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
2271 verbose("verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n");
2272 return -EINVAL;
2273 }
2274 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) {
2275 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
2276 verbose("verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
2277 return -EINVAL;
2278 }
2279 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002280}
2281
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002282/* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002283static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002284{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002285 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002286 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
2287 int err;
2288
2289 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
2290 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
2291 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
2292 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
2293 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
2294 verbose("BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
2295 return -EINVAL;
2296 }
2297 } else {
2298 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
Edward Creee67b8a62017-09-15 14:37:38 +01002299 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
2300 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002301 verbose("BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
2302 return -EINVAL;
2303 }
2304 }
2305
2306 /* check src operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002307 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002308 if (err)
2309 return err;
2310
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002311 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
2312 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
2313 insn->dst_reg);
2314 return -EACCES;
2315 }
2316
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002317 /* check dest operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002318 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002319 if (err)
2320 return err;
2321
2322 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
2323
2324 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2325 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
2326 verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
2327 return -EINVAL;
2328 }
2329
2330 /* check src operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002331 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002332 if (err)
2333 return err;
2334 } else {
2335 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
2336 verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
2337 return -EINVAL;
2338 }
2339 }
2340
2341 /* check dest operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002342 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002343 if (err)
2344 return err;
2345
2346 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2347 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
2348 /* case: R1 = R2
2349 * copy register state to dest reg
2350 */
2351 regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
Alexei Starovoitov8fe2d6c2017-10-05 16:20:56 -07002352 regs[insn->dst_reg].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002353 } else {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002354 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002355 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
2356 verbose("R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
2357 insn->src_reg);
2358 return -EACCES;
2359 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002360 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002361 /* high 32 bits are known zero. */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002362 regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast(
2363 regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002364 __update_reg_bounds(&regs[insn->dst_reg]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002365 }
2366 } else {
2367 /* case: R = imm
2368 * remember the value we stored into this reg
2369 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002370 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002371 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002372 }
2373
2374 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
2375 verbose("invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
2376 return -EINVAL;
2377
2378 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
2379
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002380 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2381 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
2382 verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
2383 return -EINVAL;
2384 }
2385 /* check src1 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002386 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002387 if (err)
2388 return err;
2389 } else {
2390 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
2391 verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
2392 return -EINVAL;
2393 }
2394 }
2395
2396 /* check src2 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002397 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002398 if (err)
2399 return err;
2400
2401 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
2402 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
2403 verbose("div by zero\n");
2404 return -EINVAL;
2405 }
2406
Rabin Vincent229394e82016-01-12 20:17:08 +01002407 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
2408 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
2409 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
2410
2411 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
2412 verbose("invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
2413 return -EINVAL;
2414 }
2415 }
2416
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002417 /* check dest operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002418 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002419 if (err)
2420 return err;
2421
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002422 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002423 }
2424
2425 return 0;
2426}
2427
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002428static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
2429 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002430{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002431 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002432 int i;
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002433
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002434 if (dst_reg->off < 0)
2435 /* This doesn't give us any range */
2436 return;
2437
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002438 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF ||
2439 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002440 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less
2441 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt.
2442 */
2443 return;
2444
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002445 /* LLVM can generate four kind of checks:
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002446 *
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002447 * Type 1/2:
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002448 *
2449 * r2 = r3;
2450 * r2 += 8;
2451 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception>
2452 * <access okay>
2453 *
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002454 * r2 = r3;
2455 * r2 += 8;
2456 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay>
2457 * <handle exception>
2458 *
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002459 * Where:
2460 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg
2461 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
2462 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
2463 *
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002464 * Type 3/4:
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002465 *
2466 * r2 = r3;
2467 * r2 += 8;
2468 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay>
2469 * <handle exception>
2470 *
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002471 * r2 = r3;
2472 * r2 += 8;
2473 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception>
2474 * <access okay>
2475 *
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002476 * Where:
2477 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg
2478 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
2479 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
2480 *
2481 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
2482 * so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) is safe to access.
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002483 */
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002484
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002485 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we
2486 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big
2487 * the range won't allow anything.
2488 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16.
2489 */
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002490 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
2491 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id)
Alexei Starovoitovb1977682017-03-24 15:57:33 -07002492 /* keep the maximum range already checked */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002493 regs[i].range = max_t(u16, regs[i].range, dst_reg->off);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002494
2495 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
2496 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
2497 continue;
2498 reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
2499 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002500 reg->range = max_t(u16, reg->range, dst_reg->off);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002501 }
2502}
2503
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002504/* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
2505 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
2506 * simply doing a BPF_K check.
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002507 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values.
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002508 */
2509static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
2510 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
2511 u8 opcode)
2512{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002513 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its
2514 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into
2515 * the same object, but we don't bother with that.
2516 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we
2517 * only need to check one of them for pointerness.
2518 */
2519 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg))
2520 return;
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +02002521
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002522 switch (opcode) {
2523 case BPF_JEQ:
2524 /* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
2525 * true then we know for sure.
2526 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002527 __mark_reg_known(true_reg, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002528 break;
2529 case BPF_JNE:
2530 /* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
2531 * we know the value for sure;
2532 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002533 __mark_reg_known(false_reg, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002534 break;
2535 case BPF_JGT:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002536 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val);
2537 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
2538 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002539 case BPF_JSGT:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002540 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val);
2541 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002542 break;
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002543 case BPF_JLT:
2544 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val);
2545 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
2546 break;
2547 case BPF_JSLT:
2548 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val);
2549 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
2550 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002551 case BPF_JGE:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002552 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
2553 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val);
2554 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002555 case BPF_JSGE:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002556 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
2557 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002558 break;
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002559 case BPF_JLE:
2560 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
2561 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val);
2562 break;
2563 case BPF_JSLE:
2564 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
2565 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val);
2566 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002567 default:
2568 break;
2569 }
2570
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002571 __reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg);
2572 __reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg);
2573 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
2574 __reg_bound_offset(false_reg);
2575 __reg_bound_offset(true_reg);
2576 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
2577 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
2578 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
2579 */
2580 __update_reg_bounds(false_reg);
2581 __update_reg_bounds(true_reg);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002582}
2583
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002584/* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is
2585 * the variable reg.
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002586 */
2587static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
2588 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
2589 u8 opcode)
2590{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002591 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg))
2592 return;
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +02002593
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002594 switch (opcode) {
2595 case BPF_JEQ:
2596 /* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
2597 * true then we know for sure.
2598 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002599 __mark_reg_known(true_reg, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002600 break;
2601 case BPF_JNE:
2602 /* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
2603 * we know the value for sure;
2604 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002605 __mark_reg_known(false_reg, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002606 break;
2607 case BPF_JGT:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002608 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
2609 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val);
2610 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002611 case BPF_JSGT:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002612 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
2613 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002614 break;
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002615 case BPF_JLT:
2616 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
2617 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val);
2618 break;
2619 case BPF_JSLT:
2620 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
2621 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val);
2622 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002623 case BPF_JGE:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002624 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val);
2625 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
2626 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002627 case BPF_JSGE:
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002628 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val);
2629 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002630 break;
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002631 case BPF_JLE:
2632 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val);
2633 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
2634 break;
2635 case BPF_JSLE:
2636 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val);
2637 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
2638 break;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002639 default:
2640 break;
2641 }
2642
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002643 __reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg);
2644 __reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg);
2645 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
2646 __reg_bound_offset(false_reg);
2647 __reg_bound_offset(true_reg);
2648 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
2649 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
2650 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
2651 */
2652 __update_reg_bounds(false_reg);
2653 __update_reg_bounds(true_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002654}
2655
2656/* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */
2657static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
2658 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
2659{
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002660 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value,
2661 dst_reg->umin_value);
2662 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value,
2663 dst_reg->umax_value);
2664 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value,
2665 dst_reg->smin_value);
2666 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value,
2667 dst_reg->smax_value);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002668 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off,
2669 dst_reg->var_off);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002670 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */
2671 __update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
2672 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
2673 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
2674 __reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg);
2675 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
2676 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
2677 __reg_bound_offset(src_reg);
2678 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
2679 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
2680 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
2681 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
2682 */
2683 __update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
2684 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002685}
2686
2687static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src,
2688 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst,
2689 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src,
2690 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst,
2691 u8 opcode)
2692{
2693 switch (opcode) {
2694 case BPF_JEQ:
2695 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst);
2696 break;
2697 case BPF_JNE:
2698 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst);
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002699 break;
Daniel Borkmann4cabc5b2017-07-21 00:00:21 +02002700 }
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002701}
2702
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002703static void mark_map_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, u32 id,
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002704 bool is_null)
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002705{
2706 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
2707
2708 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && reg->id == id) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002709 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should
2710 * have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer
2711 * arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL.
2712 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002713 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value ||
2714 !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) ||
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002715 reg->off)) {
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002716 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg);
2717 reg->off = 0;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002718 }
2719 if (is_null) {
2720 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07002721 } else if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) {
2722 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
2723 reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta;
2724 } else {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002725 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07002726 }
Daniel Borkmanna08dd0d2016-12-15 01:30:06 +01002727 /* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore, thus we
2728 * should better reset it, so that state pruning has chances
2729 * to take effect.
2730 */
2731 reg->id = 0;
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002732 }
2733}
2734
2735/* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
2736 * be folded together at some point.
2737 */
2738static void mark_map_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno,
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002739 bool is_null)
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002740{
2741 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Daniel Borkmanna08dd0d2016-12-15 01:30:06 +01002742 u32 id = regs[regno].id;
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002743 int i;
2744
2745 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002746 mark_map_reg(regs, i, id, is_null);
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002747
2748 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
2749 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
2750 continue;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002751 mark_map_reg(state->spilled_regs, i / BPF_REG_SIZE, id, is_null);
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002752 }
2753}
2754
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002755static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002756 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
2757{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002758 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch, *this_branch = &env->cur_state;
2759 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->regs, *dst_reg;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002760 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
2761 int err;
2762
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002763 if (opcode > BPF_JSLE) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002764 verbose("invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode);
2765 return -EINVAL;
2766 }
2767
2768 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2769 if (insn->imm != 0) {
2770 verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
2771 return -EINVAL;
2772 }
2773
2774 /* check src1 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002775 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002776 if (err)
2777 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002778
2779 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
2780 verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
2781 insn->src_reg);
2782 return -EACCES;
2783 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002784 } else {
2785 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
2786 verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
2787 return -EINVAL;
2788 }
2789 }
2790
2791 /* check src2 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002792 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002793 if (err)
2794 return err;
2795
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002796 dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
2797
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002798 /* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */
2799 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
2800 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002801 dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
2802 tnum_equals_const(dst_reg->var_off, insn->imm)) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002803 if (opcode == BPF_JEQ) {
2804 /* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off;
2805 * only follow the goto, ignore fall-through
2806 */
2807 *insn_idx += insn->off;
2808 return 0;
2809 } else {
2810 /* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off;
2811 * only follow fall-through branch, since
2812 * that's where the program will go
2813 */
2814 return 0;
2815 }
2816 }
2817
2818 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx);
2819 if (!other_branch)
2820 return -EFAULT;
2821
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002822 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
2823 * our min/max values for our dst register.
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002824 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same
2825 * object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because
2826 * otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't
2827 * comparable.
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002828 */
2829 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002830 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
2831 regs[insn->src_reg].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
2832 if (tnum_is_const(regs[insn->src_reg].var_off))
2833 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
2834 dst_reg, regs[insn->src_reg].var_off.value,
2835 opcode);
2836 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off))
2837 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg],
2838 &regs[insn->src_reg],
2839 dst_reg->var_off.value, opcode);
2840 else if (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)
2841 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */
2842 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg],
2843 &other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
2844 &regs[insn->src_reg],
2845 &regs[insn->dst_reg], opcode);
2846 }
2847 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002848 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
2849 dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
2850 }
2851
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002852 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002853 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002854 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
2855 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
Thomas Graf57a09bf2016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002856 /* Mark all identical map registers in each branch as either
2857 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
2858 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002859 mark_map_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, opcode == BPF_JNE);
2860 mark_map_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, opcode == BPF_JEQ);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002861 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT &&
2862 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
2863 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002864 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg);
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002865 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLT &&
2866 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
2867 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
2868 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg);
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002869 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE &&
2870 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
2871 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
2872 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg]);
Daniel Borkmannb4e432f2017-08-10 01:40:02 +02002873 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLE &&
2874 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
2875 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
2876 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg]);
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002877 } else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
2878 verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg);
2879 return -EACCES;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002880 }
2881 if (log_level)
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002882 print_verifier_state(this_branch);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002883 return 0;
2884}
2885
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002886/* return the map pointer stored inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
2887static struct bpf_map *ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(struct bpf_insn *insn)
2888{
2889 u64 imm64 = ((u64) (u32) insn[0].imm) | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32;
2890
2891 return (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) imm64;
2892}
2893
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002894/* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002895static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002896{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002897 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002898 int err;
2899
2900 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
2901 verbose("invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
2902 return -EINVAL;
2903 }
2904 if (insn->off != 0) {
2905 verbose("BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
2906 return -EINVAL;
2907 }
2908
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002909 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002910 if (err)
2911 return err;
2912
Jakub Kicinski6b173872016-09-21 11:43:59 +01002913 if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
Jakub Kicinski6b173872016-09-21 11:43:59 +01002914 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
2915
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01002916 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01002917 __mark_reg_known(&regs[insn->dst_reg], imm);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002918 return 0;
Jakub Kicinski6b173872016-09-21 11:43:59 +01002919 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002920
2921 /* replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() should have caught bad ld_imm64 */
2922 BUG_ON(insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD);
2923
2924 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
2925 regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(insn);
2926 return 0;
2927}
2928
Daniel Borkmann96be4322015-03-01 12:31:46 +01002929static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)
2930{
2931 switch (type) {
2932 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
2933 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
Daniel Borkmann94caee8c2015-03-20 15:11:11 +01002934 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
Daniel Borkmann96be4322015-03-01 12:31:46 +01002935 return true;
2936 default:
2937 return false;
2938 }
2939}
2940
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002941/* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
2942 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
2943 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
2944 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
2945 *
2946 * Implicit input:
2947 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
2948 *
2949 * Explicit input:
2950 * SRC == any register
2951 * IMM == 32-bit immediate
2952 *
2953 * Output:
2954 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
2955 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002956static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002957{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002958 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002959 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002960 int i, err;
2961
Daniel Borkmann24701ec2015-03-01 12:31:47 +01002962 if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002963 verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002964 return -EINVAL;
2965 }
2966
2967 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
Alexei Starovoitovd82bccc2016-04-12 10:26:19 -07002968 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002969 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002970 verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002971 return -EINVAL;
2972 }
2973
2974 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002975 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_6, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002976 if (err)
2977 return err;
2978
2979 if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
2980 verbose("at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
2981 return -EINVAL;
2982 }
2983
2984 if (mode == BPF_IND) {
2985 /* check explicit source operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002986 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002987 if (err)
2988 return err;
2989 }
2990
2991 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002992 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
Daniel Borkmanna9789ef2017-05-25 01:05:06 +02002993 mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]);
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002994 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
2995 }
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002996
2997 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01002998 * the value fetched from the packet.
2999 * Already marked as written above.
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003000 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003001 mark_reg_unknown(regs, BPF_REG_0);
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003002 return 0;
3003}
3004
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003005/* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
3006 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
3007 * 2 label v as discovered
3008 * 3 let S be a stack
3009 * 4 S.push(v)
3010 * 5 while S is not empty
3011 * 6 t <- S.pop()
3012 * 7 if t is what we're looking for:
3013 * 8 return t
3014 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do
3015 * 10 if edge e is already labelled
3016 * 11 continue with the next edge
3017 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e)
3018 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored
3019 * 14 label e as tree-edge
3020 * 15 label w as discovered
3021 * 16 S.push(w)
3022 * 17 continue at 5
3023 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered
3024 * 19 label e as back-edge
3025 * 20 else
3026 * 21 // vertex w is explored
3027 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge
3028 * 23 label t as explored
3029 * 24 S.pop()
3030 *
3031 * convention:
3032 * 0x10 - discovered
3033 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled
3034 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled
3035 * 0x20 - explored
3036 */
3037
3038enum {
3039 DISCOVERED = 0x10,
3040 EXPLORED = 0x20,
3041 FALLTHROUGH = 1,
3042 BRANCH = 2,
3043};
3044
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003045#define STATE_LIST_MARK ((struct bpf_verifier_state_list *) -1L)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003046
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003047static int *insn_stack; /* stack of insns to process */
3048static int cur_stack; /* current stack index */
3049static int *insn_state;
3050
3051/* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above:
3052 * t - index of current instruction
3053 * w - next instruction
3054 * e - edge
3055 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003056static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003057{
3058 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
3059 return 0;
3060
3061 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
3062 return 0;
3063
3064 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
3065 verbose("jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
3066 return -EINVAL;
3067 }
3068
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003069 if (e == BRANCH)
3070 /* mark branch target for state pruning */
3071 env->explored_states[w] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
3072
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003073 if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
3074 /* tree-edge */
3075 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
3076 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
3077 if (cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
3078 return -E2BIG;
3079 insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w;
3080 return 1;
3081 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
3082 verbose("back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
3083 return -EINVAL;
3084 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
3085 /* forward- or cross-edge */
3086 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
3087 } else {
3088 verbose("insn state internal bug\n");
3089 return -EFAULT;
3090 }
3091 return 0;
3092}
3093
3094/* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program
3095 * loop == back-edge in directed graph
3096 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003097static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003098{
3099 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
3100 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
3101 int ret = 0;
3102 int i, t;
3103
3104 insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
3105 if (!insn_state)
3106 return -ENOMEM;
3107
3108 insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
3109 if (!insn_stack) {
3110 kfree(insn_state);
3111 return -ENOMEM;
3112 }
3113
3114 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
3115 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
3116 cur_stack = 1;
3117
3118peek_stack:
3119 if (cur_stack == 0)
3120 goto check_state;
3121 t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1];
3122
3123 if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) {
3124 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code);
3125
3126 if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
3127 goto mark_explored;
3128 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
3129 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
3130 if (ret == 1)
3131 goto peek_stack;
3132 else if (ret < 0)
3133 goto err_free;
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +02003134 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
3135 env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003136 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
3137 if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) {
3138 ret = -EINVAL;
3139 goto err_free;
3140 }
3141 /* unconditional jump with single edge */
3142 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1,
3143 FALLTHROUGH, env);
3144 if (ret == 1)
3145 goto peek_stack;
3146 else if (ret < 0)
3147 goto err_free;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003148 /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
3149 * after every call and jump
3150 */
Alexei Starovoitovc3de6312015-04-14 15:57:13 -07003151 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
3152 env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003153 } else {
3154 /* conditional jump with two edges */
Daniel Borkmann3c2ce602017-05-18 03:00:06 +02003155 env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003156 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
3157 if (ret == 1)
3158 goto peek_stack;
3159 else if (ret < 0)
3160 goto err_free;
3161
3162 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env);
3163 if (ret == 1)
3164 goto peek_stack;
3165 else if (ret < 0)
3166 goto err_free;
3167 }
3168 } else {
3169 /* all other non-branch instructions with single
3170 * fall-through edge
3171 */
3172 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
3173 if (ret == 1)
3174 goto peek_stack;
3175 else if (ret < 0)
3176 goto err_free;
3177 }
3178
3179mark_explored:
3180 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
3181 if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
3182 verbose("pop stack internal bug\n");
3183 ret = -EFAULT;
3184 goto err_free;
3185 }
3186 goto peek_stack;
3187
3188check_state:
3189 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
3190 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
3191 verbose("unreachable insn %d\n", i);
3192 ret = -EINVAL;
3193 goto err_free;
3194 }
3195 }
3196 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
3197
3198err_free:
3199 kfree(insn_state);
3200 kfree(insn_stack);
3201 return ret;
3202}
3203
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003204/* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */
3205static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old,
3206 struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07003207{
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01003208 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value &&
3209 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value &&
3210 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value &&
3211 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003212}
3213
3214/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
3215#define ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE)
3216struct idpair {
3217 u32 old;
3218 u32 cur;
3219};
3220
3221/* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have
3222 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from
3223 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids.
3224 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent
3225 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But
3226 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about
3227 * that.
3228 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If
3229 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map.
3230 */
3231static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct idpair *idmap)
3232{
3233 unsigned int i;
3234
3235 for (i = 0; i < ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) {
3236 if (!idmap[i].old) {
3237 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */
3238 idmap[i].old = old_id;
3239 idmap[i].cur = cur_id;
3240 return true;
3241 }
3242 if (idmap[i].old == old_id)
3243 return idmap[i].cur == cur_id;
3244 }
3245 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */
3246 WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
3247 return false;
3248}
3249
3250/* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */
Edward Cree1b688a12017-08-23 15:10:50 +01003251static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
3252 struct idpair *idmap)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003253{
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003254 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
3255 /* explored state didn't use this */
3256 return true;
3257
3258 if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, live)) == 0)
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003259 return true;
3260
3261 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
3262 /* explored state can't have used this */
3263 return true;
3264 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07003265 return false;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003266 switch (rold->type) {
3267 case SCALAR_VALUE:
3268 if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
3269 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
3270 return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
3271 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
3272 } else {
3273 /* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not
3274 * equal, because we can't know anything about the
3275 * scalar value of the pointer in the new value.
3276 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +01003277 return rold->umin_value == 0 &&
3278 rold->umax_value == U64_MAX &&
3279 rold->smin_value == S64_MIN &&
3280 rold->smax_value == S64_MAX &&
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003281 tnum_is_unknown(rold->var_off);
3282 }
3283 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
Edward Cree1b688a12017-08-23 15:10:50 +01003284 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
3285 * everything else matches, we are OK.
3286 * We don't care about the 'id' value, because nothing
3287 * uses it for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (only for ..._OR_NULL)
3288 */
3289 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
3290 range_within(rold, rcur) &&
3291 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003292 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
3293 /* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a
3294 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map.
3295 * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL-
3296 * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same
3297 * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when
3298 * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
3299 */
3300 if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
3301 return false;
3302 if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)))
3303 return false;
3304 /* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */
3305 return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
3306 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
3307 if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_PACKET)
3308 return false;
3309 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr
3310 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are
3311 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off,
3312 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or
3313 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access.
3314 */
3315 if (rold->range > rcur->range)
3316 return false;
3317 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment;
3318 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range.
3319 */
3320 if (rold->off != rcur->off)
3321 return false;
3322 /* id relations must be preserved */
3323 if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
3324 return false;
3325 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
3326 return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
3327 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
3328 case PTR_TO_CTX:
3329 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
3330 case PTR_TO_STACK:
3331 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
3332 /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
3333 * would have accepted
3334 */
3335 default:
3336 /* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */
3337 return false;
3338 }
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07003339
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003340 /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */
3341 WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07003342 return false;
3343}
3344
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003345/* compare two verifier states
3346 *
3347 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since
3348 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them
3349 *
3350 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of
3351 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has
3352 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution
3353 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already
3354 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish.
3355 *
3356 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative
3357 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one.
3358 * Example:
3359 * explored current
3360 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC)
3361 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC)
3362 *
3363 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more
3364 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means
3365 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too
3366 *
3367 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid
3368 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that
3369 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
3370 */
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04003371static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3372 struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003373 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003374{
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003375 struct idpair *idmap;
3376 bool ret = false;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003377 int i;
3378
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003379 idmap = kcalloc(ID_MAP_SIZE, sizeof(struct idpair), GFP_KERNEL);
3380 /* If we failed to allocate the idmap, just say it's not safe */
3381 if (!idmap)
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07003382 return false;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003383
3384 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
Edward Cree1b688a12017-08-23 15:10:50 +01003385 if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap))
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003386 goto out_free;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003387 }
3388
3389 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003390 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID)
3391 continue;
3392 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != cur->stack_slot_type[i])
3393 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
3394 * this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC ->
3395 * this verifier states are not equivalent,
3396 * return false to continue verification of this path
3397 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003398 goto out_free;
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003399 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
3400 continue;
Daniel Borkmannd25da6c2017-06-11 00:50:41 +02003401 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
3402 continue;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003403 if (!regsafe(&old->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
3404 &cur->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
Edward Cree1b688a12017-08-23 15:10:50 +01003405 idmap))
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003406 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing
3407 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003408 * are the same as well.
3409 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003410 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8}
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003411 * but current path has stored:
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003412 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16}
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003413 * such verifier states are not equivalent.
3414 * return false to continue verification of this path
3415 */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003416 goto out_free;
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07003417 else
3418 continue;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003419 }
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01003420 ret = true;
3421out_free:
3422 kfree(idmap);
3423 return ret;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003424}
3425
Edward Cree8e9cd9c2017-08-23 15:11:21 +01003426/* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the
3427 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at a
3428 * jump target (in the first iteration of the propagate_liveness() loop),
3429 * we didn't arrive by the straight-line code, so read marks in state must
3430 * propagate to parent regardless of state's write marks.
3431 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003432static bool do_propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
3433 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent)
3434{
Edward Cree63f45f82017-08-23 15:10:03 +01003435 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003436 bool touched = false; /* any changes made? */
3437 int i;
3438
3439 if (!parent)
3440 return touched;
3441 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */
3442 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG);
3443 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
3444 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
3445 if (parent->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
3446 continue;
Edward Cree63f45f82017-08-23 15:10:03 +01003447 if (writes && (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
3448 continue;
3449 if (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003450 parent->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
3451 touched = true;
3452 }
3453 }
3454 /* ... and stack slots */
3455 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
3456 if (parent->stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL)
3457 continue;
3458 if (state->stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL)
3459 continue;
3460 if (parent->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
3461 continue;
Edward Cree63f45f82017-08-23 15:10:03 +01003462 if (writes && (state->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
3463 continue;
3464 if (state->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
Daniel Borkmann1ab2de22017-08-17 14:59:40 +02003465 parent->spilled_regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003466 touched = true;
3467 }
3468 }
3469 return touched;
3470}
3471
Edward Cree8e9cd9c2017-08-23 15:11:21 +01003472/* "parent" is "a state from which we reach the current state", but initially
3473 * it is not the state->parent (i.e. "the state whose straight-line code leads
3474 * to the current state"), instead it is the state that happened to arrive at
3475 * a (prunable) equivalent of the current state. See comment above
3476 * do_propagate_liveness() for consequences of this.
3477 * This function is just a more efficient way of calling mark_reg_read() or
3478 * mark_stack_slot_read() on each reg in "parent" that is read in "state",
3479 * though it requires that parent != state->parent in the call arguments.
3480 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003481static void propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
3482 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent)
3483{
3484 while (do_propagate_liveness(state, parent)) {
3485 /* Something changed, so we need to feed those changes onward */
3486 state = parent;
3487 parent = state->parent;
3488 }
3489}
3490
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003491static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003492{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003493 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
3494 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003495 int i;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003496
3497 sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
3498 if (!sl)
3499 /* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
3500 * be doing state search here
3501 */
3502 return 0;
3503
3504 while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003505 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, &env->cur_state)) {
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003506 /* reached equivalent register/stack state,
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003507 * prune the search.
3508 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us.
Edward Cree8e9cd9c2017-08-23 15:11:21 +01003509 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they
3510 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation
3511 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our
3512 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but
3513 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning
3514 * this state and will pop a new one.
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003515 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003516 propagate_liveness(&sl->state, &env->cur_state);
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003517 return 1;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003518 }
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003519 sl = sl->next;
3520 }
3521
3522 /* there were no equivalent states, remember current one.
3523 * technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
3524 * but it will either reach bpf_exit (which means it's safe) or
3525 * it will be rejected. Since there are no loops, we won't be
3526 * seeing this 'insn_idx' instruction again on the way to bpf_exit
3527 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003528 new_sl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_USER);
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003529 if (!new_sl)
3530 return -ENOMEM;
3531
3532 /* add new state to the head of linked list */
3533 memcpy(&new_sl->state, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
3534 new_sl->next = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
3535 env->explored_states[insn_idx] = new_sl;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003536 /* connect new state to parentage chain */
3537 env->cur_state.parent = &new_sl->state;
Edward Cree8e9cd9c2017-08-23 15:11:21 +01003538 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes
3539 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us.
3540 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark
3541 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only
3542 * explored_states can get read marks.)
3543 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003544 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
3545 env->cur_state.regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
3546 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
3547 if (env->cur_state.stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_SPILL)
3548 env->cur_state.spilled_regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003549 return 0;
3550}
3551
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01003552static int ext_analyzer_insn_hook(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3553 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
3554{
3555 if (!env->analyzer_ops || !env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook)
3556 return 0;
3557
3558 return env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
3559}
3560
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003561static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003562{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003563 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003564 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003565 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003566 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
3567 int insn_idx, prev_insn_idx = 0;
3568 int insn_processed = 0;
3569 bool do_print_state = false;
3570
3571 init_reg_state(regs);
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003572 state->parent = NULL;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003573 insn_idx = 0;
3574 for (;;) {
3575 struct bpf_insn *insn;
3576 u8 class;
3577 int err;
3578
3579 if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
3580 verbose("invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
3581 insn_idx, insn_cnt);
3582 return -EFAULT;
3583 }
3584
3585 insn = &insns[insn_idx];
3586 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
3587
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +02003588 if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
Colin Ian Kingbc1750f2017-02-23 00:20:53 +00003589 verbose("BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003590 insn_processed);
3591 return -E2BIG;
3592 }
3593
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003594 err = is_state_visited(env, insn_idx);
3595 if (err < 0)
3596 return err;
3597 if (err == 1) {
3598 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
3599 if (log_level) {
3600 if (do_print_state)
3601 verbose("\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
3602 prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
3603 else
3604 verbose("%d: safe\n", insn_idx);
3605 }
3606 goto process_bpf_exit;
3607 }
3608
Daniel Borkmann3c2ce602017-05-18 03:00:06 +02003609 if (need_resched())
3610 cond_resched();
3611
David S. Millerc5fc9692017-05-10 11:25:17 -07003612 if (log_level > 1 || (log_level && do_print_state)) {
3613 if (log_level > 1)
3614 verbose("%d:", insn_idx);
3615 else
3616 verbose("\nfrom %d to %d:",
3617 prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07003618 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003619 do_print_state = false;
3620 }
3621
3622 if (log_level) {
3623 verbose("%d: ", insn_idx);
Daniel Borkmann0d0e5762017-05-08 00:04:09 +02003624 print_bpf_insn(env, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003625 }
3626
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01003627 err = ext_analyzer_insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
3628 if (err)
3629 return err;
3630
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003631 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07003632 err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003633 if (err)
3634 return err;
3635
3636 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003637 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003638
3639 /* check for reserved fields is already done */
3640
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003641 /* check src operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003642 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003643 if (err)
3644 return err;
3645
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003646 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003647 if (err)
3648 return err;
3649
Alexei Starovoitov725f9dc2015-04-15 16:19:33 -07003650 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
3651
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003652 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
3653 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
3654 */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07003655 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003656 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ,
3657 insn->dst_reg);
3658 if (err)
3659 return err;
3660
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003661 prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
3662
3663 if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003664 /* saw a valid insn
3665 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003666 * save type to validate intersecting paths
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003667 */
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003668 *prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003669
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003670 } else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type &&
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003671 (src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003672 *prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003673 /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
3674 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
3675 * with different pointer types:
3676 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and
3677 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
3678 * Reject it.
3679 */
3680 verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
3681 return -EINVAL;
3682 }
3683
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003684 } else if (class == BPF_STX) {
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003685 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003686
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003687 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07003688 err = check_xadd(env, insn_idx, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003689 if (err)
3690 return err;
3691 insn_idx++;
3692 continue;
3693 }
3694
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003695 /* check src1 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003696 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003697 if (err)
3698 return err;
3699 /* check src2 operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003700 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003701 if (err)
3702 return err;
3703
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003704 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
3705
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003706 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07003707 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003708 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
3709 insn->src_reg);
3710 if (err)
3711 return err;
3712
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003713 prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
3714
3715 if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
3716 *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
3717 } else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type &&
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003718 (dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003719 *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003720 verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
3721 return -EINVAL;
3722 }
3723
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003724 } else if (class == BPF_ST) {
3725 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
3726 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
3727 verbose("BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
3728 return -EINVAL;
3729 }
3730 /* check src operand */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003731 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003732 if (err)
3733 return err;
3734
3735 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07003736 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003737 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
3738 -1);
3739 if (err)
3740 return err;
3741
3742 } else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
3743 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
3744
3745 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
3746 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
3747 insn->off != 0 ||
3748 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
3749 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
3750 verbose("BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
3751 return -EINVAL;
3752 }
3753
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07003754 err = check_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003755 if (err)
3756 return err;
3757
3758 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
3759 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
3760 insn->imm != 0 ||
3761 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
3762 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
3763 verbose("BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
3764 return -EINVAL;
3765 }
3766
3767 insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
3768 continue;
3769
3770 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
3771 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
3772 insn->imm != 0 ||
3773 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
3774 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
3775 verbose("BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
3776 return -EINVAL;
3777 }
3778
3779 /* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
3780 * to return the value from eBPF program.
3781 * Make sure that it's readable at this time
3782 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
3783 * something into it earlier
3784 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +01003785 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003786 if (err)
3787 return err;
3788
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07003789 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
3790 verbose("R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
3791 return -EACCES;
3792 }
3793
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003794process_bpf_exit:
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003795 insn_idx = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx);
3796 if (insn_idx < 0) {
3797 break;
3798 } else {
3799 do_print_state = true;
3800 continue;
3801 }
3802 } else {
3803 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &insn_idx);
3804 if (err)
3805 return err;
3806 }
3807 } else if (class == BPF_LD) {
3808 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
3809
3810 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08003811 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
3812 if (err)
3813 return err;
3814
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003815 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
3816 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
3817 if (err)
3818 return err;
3819
3820 insn_idx++;
3821 } else {
3822 verbose("invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
3823 return -EINVAL;
3824 }
3825 } else {
3826 verbose("unknown insn class %d\n", class);
3827 return -EINVAL;
3828 }
3829
3830 insn_idx++;
3831 }
3832
Alexei Starovoitov87266792017-05-30 13:31:29 -07003833 verbose("processed %d insns, stack depth %d\n",
3834 insn_processed, env->prog->aux->stack_depth);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003835 return 0;
3836}
3837
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07003838static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map)
3839{
3840 return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH &&
Martin KaFai Laubcc6b1b2017-03-22 10:00:34 -07003841 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH &&
3842 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) ||
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07003843 !(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC);
3844}
3845
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07003846static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map,
3847 struct bpf_prog *prog)
3848
3849{
Martin KaFai Lau56f668d2017-03-22 10:00:33 -07003850 /* Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use
3851 * preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation
3852 * in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got
3853 * triggered.
3854 */
3855 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) {
3856 if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) {
3857 verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
3858 return -EINVAL;
3859 }
3860 if (map->inner_map_meta &&
3861 !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) {
3862 verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n");
3863 return -EINVAL;
3864 }
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07003865 }
3866 return 0;
3867}
3868
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003869/* look for pseudo eBPF instructions that access map FDs and
3870 * replace them with actual map pointers
3871 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003872static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003873{
3874 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
3875 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07003876 int i, j, err;
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003877
Daniel Borkmannf1f77142017-01-13 23:38:15 +01003878 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog);
Daniel Borkmannaafe6ae2016-12-18 01:52:57 +01003879 if (err)
3880 return err;
3881
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003882 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003883 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003884 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003885 verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
3886 return -EINVAL;
3887 }
3888
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003889 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
3890 ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
3891 BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
3892 verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
3893 return -EINVAL;
3894 }
3895
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003896 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
3897 struct bpf_map *map;
3898 struct fd f;
3899
3900 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
3901 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
3902 insn[1].off != 0) {
3903 verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
3904 return -EINVAL;
3905 }
3906
3907 if (insn->src_reg == 0)
3908 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
3909 goto next_insn;
3910
3911 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
3912 verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
3913 return -EINVAL;
3914 }
3915
3916 f = fdget(insn->imm);
Daniel Borkmannc2101292015-10-29 14:58:07 +01003917 map = __bpf_map_get(f);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003918 if (IS_ERR(map)) {
3919 verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
3920 insn->imm);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003921 return PTR_ERR(map);
3922 }
3923
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07003924 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(map, env->prog);
3925 if (err) {
3926 fdput(f);
3927 return err;
3928 }
3929
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003930 /* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
3931 insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
3932 insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
3933
3934 /* check whether we recorded this map already */
3935 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
3936 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
3937 fdput(f);
3938 goto next_insn;
3939 }
3940
3941 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
3942 fdput(f);
3943 return -E2BIG;
3944 }
3945
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003946 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
3947 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it
3948 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
3949 * and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
3950 */
Alexei Starovoitov92117d82016-04-27 18:56:20 -07003951 map = bpf_map_inc(map, false);
3952 if (IS_ERR(map)) {
3953 fdput(f);
3954 return PTR_ERR(map);
3955 }
3956 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
3957
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003958 fdput(f);
3959next_insn:
3960 insn++;
3961 i++;
3962 }
3963 }
3964
3965 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
3966 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
3967 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
3968 */
3969 return 0;
3970}
3971
3972/* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003973static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003974{
3975 int i;
3976
3977 for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++)
3978 bpf_map_put(env->used_maps[i]);
3979}
3980
3981/* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003982static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003983{
3984 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
3985 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
3986 int i;
3987
3988 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++)
3989 if (insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
3990 insn->src_reg = 0;
3991}
3992
Alexei Starovoitov80419022017-03-15 18:26:41 -07003993/* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range
3994 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying
3995 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero
3996 */
3997static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
3998 u32 off, u32 cnt)
3999{
4000 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
4001
4002 if (cnt == 1)
4003 return 0;
4004 new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len);
4005 if (!new_data)
4006 return -ENOMEM;
4007 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
4008 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
4009 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
4010 env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
4011 vfree(old_data);
4012 return 0;
4013}
4014
4015static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
4016 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
4017{
4018 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
4019
4020 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
4021 if (!new_prog)
4022 return NULL;
4023 if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len))
4024 return NULL;
4025 return new_prog;
4026}
4027
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004028/* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff'
4029 * into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff'
4030 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004031static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004032{
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004033 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->prog->aux->ops;
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004034 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004035 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004036 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004037 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07004038 enum bpf_access_type type;
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004039 bool is_narrower_load;
4040 u32 target_size;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004041
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004042 if (ops->gen_prologue) {
4043 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
4044 env->prog);
4045 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
4046 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
4047 return -EINVAL;
4048 } else if (cnt) {
Alexei Starovoitov80419022017-03-15 18:26:41 -07004049 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004050 if (!new_prog)
4051 return -ENOMEM;
Alexei Starovoitov80419022017-03-15 18:26:41 -07004052
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004053 env->prog = new_prog;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004054 delta += cnt - 1;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004055 }
4056 }
4057
4058 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004059 return 0;
4060
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004061 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02004062
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004063 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
Daniel Borkmann62c79892017-01-12 11:51:33 +01004064 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
4065 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
4066 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
Alexei Starovoitovea2e7ce2016-09-01 18:37:21 -07004067 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07004068 type = BPF_READ;
Daniel Borkmann62c79892017-01-12 11:51:33 +01004069 else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
4070 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
4071 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
Alexei Starovoitovea2e7ce2016-09-01 18:37:21 -07004072 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07004073 type = BPF_WRITE;
4074 else
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004075 continue;
4076
Alexei Starovoitov80419022017-03-15 18:26:41 -07004077 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004078 continue;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004079
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004080 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004081 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004082
4083 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
4084 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
4085 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful,
4086 * we will apply proper mask to the result.
4087 */
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004088 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size;
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004089 if (is_narrower_load) {
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004090 u32 off = insn->off;
4091 u8 size_code;
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004092
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004093 if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
4094 verbose("bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
4095 return -EINVAL;
4096 }
4097
4098 size_code = BPF_H;
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004099 if (ctx_field_size == 4)
4100 size_code = BPF_W;
4101 else if (ctx_field_size == 8)
4102 size_code = BPF_DW;
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004103
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004104 insn->off = off & ~(ctx_field_size - 1);
4105 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
4106 }
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004107
4108 target_size = 0;
4109 cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
4110 &target_size);
4111 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
4112 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004113 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
4114 return -EINVAL;
4115 }
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004116
4117 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004118 if (ctx_field_size <= 4)
4119 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004120 (1 << size * 8) - 1);
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004121 else
4122 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
Daniel Borkmannf96da092017-07-02 02:13:27 +02004123 (1 << size * 8) - 1);
Yonghong Song31fd8582017-06-13 15:52:13 -07004124 }
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004125
Alexei Starovoitov80419022017-03-15 18:26:41 -07004126 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004127 if (!new_prog)
4128 return -ENOMEM;
4129
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004130 delta += cnt - 1;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004131
4132 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
4133 env->prog = new_prog;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004134 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004135 }
4136
4137 return 0;
4138}
4139
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004140/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07004141 * and inline eligible helpers as explicit sequence of BPF instructions
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004142 *
4143 * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
4144 */
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004145static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004146{
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004147 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
4148 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004149 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004150 const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07004151 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
4152 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
4153 struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
4154 int i, cnt, delta = 0;
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004155
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004156 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
4157 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
4158 continue;
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004159
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004160 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
4161 prog->dst_needed = 1;
4162 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
4163 bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004164 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
David S. Miller7b9f6da2017-04-20 10:35:33 -04004165 /* If we tail call into other programs, we
4166 * cannot make any assumptions since they can
4167 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in
4168 * the program array.
4169 */
4170 prog->cb_access = 1;
Alexei Starovoitov80a58d02017-05-30 13:31:30 -07004171 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK;
David S. Miller7b9f6da2017-04-20 10:35:33 -04004172
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004173 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
4174 * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
4175 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
4176 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004177 */
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004178 insn->imm = 0;
Alexei Starovoitov71189fa2017-05-30 13:31:27 -07004179 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL;
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004180 continue;
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004181 }
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004182
Daniel Borkmann89c63072017-08-19 03:12:45 +02004183 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup
4184 * handlers are currently limited to 64 bit only.
4185 */
4186 if (ebpf_jit_enabled() && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
4187 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) {
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07004188 map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr;
Martin KaFai Laufad73a12017-03-22 10:00:32 -07004189 if (map_ptr == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ||
4190 !map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup)
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07004191 goto patch_call_imm;
4192
4193 cnt = map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf);
4194 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
4195 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
4196 return -EINVAL;
4197 }
4198
4199 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf,
4200 cnt);
4201 if (!new_prog)
4202 return -ENOMEM;
4203
4204 delta += cnt - 1;
4205
4206 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
4207 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
4208 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
4209 continue;
4210 }
4211
Daniel Borkmann109980b2017-09-08 00:14:51 +02004212 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) {
Daniel Borkmann7c300132017-09-20 00:44:21 +02004213 /* Note, we cannot use prog directly as imm as subsequent
4214 * rewrites would still change the prog pointer. The only
4215 * stable address we can use is aux, which also works with
4216 * prog clones during blinding.
4217 */
4218 u64 addr = (unsigned long)prog->aux;
Daniel Borkmann109980b2017-09-08 00:14:51 +02004219 struct bpf_insn r4_ld[] = {
4220 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_4, addr),
4221 *insn,
4222 };
4223 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(r4_ld);
4224
4225 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, r4_ld, cnt);
4226 if (!new_prog)
4227 return -ENOMEM;
4228
4229 delta += cnt - 1;
4230 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
4231 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
4232 }
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -07004233patch_call_imm:
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004234 fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
4235 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
4236 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
4237 */
4238 if (!fn->func) {
4239 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
4240 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
4241 return -EFAULT;
4242 }
4243 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
4244 }
4245
4246 return 0;
4247}
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004248
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004249static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07004250{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004251 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07004252 int i;
4253
4254 if (!env->explored_states)
4255 return;
4256
4257 for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) {
4258 sl = env->explored_states[i];
4259
4260 if (sl)
4261 while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
4262 sln = sl->next;
4263 kfree(sl);
4264 sl = sln;
4265 }
4266 }
4267
4268 kfree(env->explored_states);
4269}
4270
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004271int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07004272{
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004273 char __user *log_ubuf = NULL;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004274 struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07004275 int ret = -EINVAL;
4276
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004277 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004278 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
4279 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004280 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004281 if (!env)
4282 return -ENOMEM;
4283
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004284 env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
4285 (*prog)->len);
4286 ret = -ENOMEM;
4287 if (!env->insn_aux_data)
4288 goto err_free_env;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004289 env->prog = *prog;
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004290
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004291 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
4292 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
4293
4294 if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
4295 /* user requested verbose verifier output
4296 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
4297 */
4298 log_level = attr->log_level;
4299 log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
4300 log_size = attr->log_size;
4301 log_len = 0;
4302
4303 ret = -EINVAL;
4304 /* log_* values have to be sane */
4305 if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
4306 log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004307 goto err_unlock;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004308
4309 ret = -ENOMEM;
4310 log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
4311 if (!log_buf)
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004312 goto err_unlock;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004313 } else {
4314 log_level = 0;
4315 }
Daniel Borkmann1ad2f582017-05-25 01:05:05 +02004316
4317 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
4318 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07004319 env->strict_alignment = true;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004320
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004321 ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env);
4322 if (ret < 0)
4323 goto skip_full_check;
4324
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004325 env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01004326 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07004327 GFP_USER);
4328 ret = -ENOMEM;
4329 if (!env->explored_states)
4330 goto skip_full_check;
4331
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07004332 ret = check_cfg(env);
4333 if (ret < 0)
4334 goto skip_full_check;
4335
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07004336 env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
4337
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07004338 ret = do_check(env);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004339
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004340skip_full_check:
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07004341 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07004342 free_states(env);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004343
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004344 if (ret == 0)
4345 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
4346 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
4347
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004348 if (ret == 0)
Alexei Starovoitov79741b32017-03-15 18:26:40 -07004349 ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
Alexei Starovoitove245c5c62017-03-15 18:26:39 -07004350
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004351 if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
4352 BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
4353 /* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
4354 ret = -ENOSPC;
4355 /* fall through to return what was recorded */
4356 }
4357
4358 /* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */
4359 if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) {
4360 ret = -EFAULT;
4361 goto free_log_buf;
4362 }
4363
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004364 if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) {
4365 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004366 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt,
4367 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]),
4368 GFP_KERNEL);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004369
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004370 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004371 ret = -ENOMEM;
4372 goto free_log_buf;
4373 }
4374
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004375 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004376 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004377 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004378
4379 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
4380 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
4381 */
4382 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
4383 }
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004384
4385free_log_buf:
4386 if (log_level)
4387 vfree(log_buf);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004388 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07004389 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
4390 * them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
4391 */
4392 release_maps(env);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07004393 *prog = env->prog;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004394err_unlock:
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07004395 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01004396 vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
4397err_free_env:
4398 kfree(env);
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07004399 return ret;
4400}
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01004401
4402int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
4403 void *priv)
4404{
4405 struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
4406 int ret;
4407
4408 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
4409 if (!env)
4410 return -ENOMEM;
4411
4412 env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
4413 prog->len);
4414 ret = -ENOMEM;
4415 if (!env->insn_aux_data)
4416 goto err_free_env;
4417 env->prog = prog;
4418 env->analyzer_ops = ops;
4419 env->analyzer_priv = priv;
4420
4421 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
4422 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
4423
4424 log_level = 0;
Daniel Borkmann1ad2f582017-05-25 01:05:05 +02004425
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -07004426 env->strict_alignment = false;
Daniel Borkmann1ad2f582017-05-25 01:05:05 +02004427 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
4428 env->strict_alignment = true;
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01004429
4430 env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
4431 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
4432 GFP_KERNEL);
4433 ret = -ENOMEM;
4434 if (!env->explored_states)
4435 goto skip_full_check;
4436
4437 ret = check_cfg(env);
4438 if (ret < 0)
4439 goto skip_full_check;
4440
4441 env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
4442
4443 ret = do_check(env);
4444
4445skip_full_check:
4446 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
4447 free_states(env);
4448
4449 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
4450 vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
4451err_free_env:
4452 kfree(env);
4453 return ret;
4454}
4455EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_analyzer);