Marco Elver | 49f72d5 | 2021-06-07 14:56:51 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ |
| 2 | /* |
| 3 | * Special rules for ignoring entire classes of data-racy memory accesses. None |
| 4 | * of the rules here imply that such data races are generally safe! |
| 5 | * |
| 6 | * All rules in this file can be configured via CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE. Keep |
| 7 | * them separate from core code to make it easier to audit. |
| 8 | * |
| 9 | * Copyright (C) 2019, Google LLC. |
| 10 | */ |
| 11 | |
| 12 | #ifndef _KERNEL_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE_H |
| 13 | #define _KERNEL_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE_H |
| 14 | |
Marco Elver | d8fd74d | 2021-06-07 14:56:53 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 15 | #include <linux/bitops.h> |
| 16 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
Marco Elver | 49f72d5 | 2021-06-07 14:56:51 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 17 | #include <linux/types.h> |
| 18 | |
| 19 | /* |
| 20 | * Access ignore rules based on address. |
| 21 | */ |
| 22 | static __always_inline bool kcsan_ignore_address(const volatile void *ptr) |
| 23 | { |
| 24 | if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE)) |
| 25 | return false; |
| 26 | |
Marco Elver | d8fd74d | 2021-06-07 14:56:53 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 27 | /* |
| 28 | * Data-racy bitops on current->flags are too common, ignore completely |
| 29 | * for now. |
| 30 | */ |
| 31 | return ptr == ¤t->flags; |
Marco Elver | 49f72d5 | 2021-06-07 14:56:51 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 32 | } |
| 33 | |
| 34 | /* |
| 35 | * Data race ignore rules based on access type and value change patterns. |
| 36 | */ |
| 37 | static bool |
| 38 | kcsan_ignore_data_race(size_t size, int type, u64 old, u64 new, u64 diff) |
| 39 | { |
| 40 | if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE)) |
| 41 | return false; |
| 42 | |
| 43 | /* |
| 44 | * Rules here are only for plain read accesses, so that we still report |
| 45 | * data races between plain read-write accesses. |
| 46 | */ |
| 47 | if (type || size > sizeof(long)) |
| 48 | return false; |
| 49 | |
Marco Elver | d8fd74d | 2021-06-07 14:56:53 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 50 | /* |
| 51 | * A common pattern is checking/setting just 1 bit in a variable; for |
| 52 | * example: |
| 53 | * |
| 54 | * if (flags & SOME_FLAG) { ... } |
| 55 | * |
| 56 | * and elsewhere flags is updated concurrently: |
| 57 | * |
| 58 | * flags |= SOME_OTHER_FLAG; // just 1 bit |
| 59 | * |
| 60 | * While it is still recommended that such accesses be marked |
| 61 | * appropriately, in many cases these types of data races are so common |
| 62 | * that marking them all is often unrealistic and left to maintainer |
| 63 | * preference. |
| 64 | * |
| 65 | * The assumption in all cases is that with all known compiler |
| 66 | * optimizations (including those that tear accesses), because no more |
| 67 | * than 1 bit changed, the plain accesses are safe despite the presence |
| 68 | * of data races. |
| 69 | * |
| 70 | * The rules here will ignore the data races if we observe no more than |
| 71 | * 1 bit changed. |
| 72 | * |
| 73 | * Of course many operations can effecively change just 1 bit, but the |
| 74 | * general assuption that data races involving 1-bit changes can be |
| 75 | * tolerated still applies. |
| 76 | * |
| 77 | * And in case a true bug is missed, the bug likely manifests as a |
| 78 | * reportable data race elsewhere. |
| 79 | */ |
| 80 | if (hweight64(diff) == 1) { |
| 81 | /* |
| 82 | * Exception: Report data races where the values look like |
| 83 | * ordinary booleans (one of them was 0 and the 0th bit was |
| 84 | * changed) More often than not, they come with interesting |
| 85 | * memory ordering requirements, so let's report them. |
| 86 | */ |
| 87 | if (!((!old || !new) && diff == 1)) |
| 88 | return true; |
| 89 | } |
| 90 | |
Marco Elver | 49f72d5 | 2021-06-07 14:56:51 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 91 | return false; |
| 92 | } |
| 93 | |
| 94 | #endif /* _KERNEL_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE_H */ |