blob: d0d268135d96d6494949bb5eec702f7365ddc86a [file] [log] [blame]
Thomas Gleixnerd2912cb2019-06-04 10:11:33 +02001// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -07002/*
3 * This implements the various checks for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY*,
4 * which are designed to protect kernel memory from needless exposure
5 * and overwrite under many unintended conditions. This code is based
6 * on PAX_USERCOPY, which is:
7 *
8 * Copyright (C) 2001-2016 PaX Team, Bradley Spengler, Open Source
9 * Security Inc.
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -070010 */
11#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
12
13#include <linux/mm.h>
Kees Cook314eed32019-09-17 11:00:25 -070014#include <linux/highmem.h>
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -070015#include <linux/slab.h>
Ingo Molnar5b825c32017-02-02 17:54:15 +010016#include <linux/sched.h>
Ingo Molnar29930022017-02-08 18:51:36 +010017#include <linux/sched/task.h>
18#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
Sahara96dc4f92017-02-16 18:29:15 +000019#include <linux/thread_info.h>
Chris von Recklinghausenb5cb15d2018-07-03 15:43:08 -040020#include <linux/atomic.h>
21#include <linux/jump_label.h>
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -070022#include <asm/sections.h>
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)0b3eb0912021-10-04 14:45:56 +010023#include "slab.h"
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -070024
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -070025/*
26 * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current
27 * stack frame (if possible).
28 *
29 * Returns:
30 * NOT_STACK: not at all on the stack
31 * GOOD_FRAME: fully within a valid stack frame
32 * GOOD_STACK: fully on the stack (when can't do frame-checking)
33 * BAD_STACK: error condition (invalid stack position or bad stack frame)
34 */
35static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
36{
37 const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current);
38 const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
39 int ret;
40
41 /* Object is not on the stack at all. */
42 if (obj + len <= stack || stackend <= obj)
43 return NOT_STACK;
44
45 /*
46 * Reject: object partially overlaps the stack (passing the
Randy Dunlap5ce1be02020-08-11 18:33:23 -070047 * check above means at least one end is within the stack,
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -070048 * so if this check fails, the other end is outside the stack).
49 */
50 if (obj < stack || stackend < obj + len)
51 return BAD_STACK;
52
53 /* Check if object is safely within a valid frame. */
54 ret = arch_within_stack_frames(stack, stackend, obj, len);
55 if (ret)
56 return ret;
57
58 return GOOD_STACK;
59}
60
Kees Cookb394d462018-01-10 14:22:38 -080061/*
Kees Cookafcc90f82018-01-10 15:17:01 -080062 * If these functions are reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found
63 * an unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call.
Kees Cookb394d462018-01-10 14:22:38 -080064 * There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the
65 * __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never
66 * trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check.
Kees Cookafcc90f82018-01-10 15:17:01 -080067 * For cache objects, it is checking that only the whitelisted range of
68 * bytes for a given cache is being accessed (via the cache's usersize and
69 * useroffset fields). To adjust a cache whitelist, use the usercopy-aware
70 * kmem_cache_create_usercopy() function to create the cache (and
71 * carefully audit the whitelist range).
Kees Cookb394d462018-01-10 14:22:38 -080072 */
Kees Cookafcc90f82018-01-10 15:17:01 -080073void usercopy_warn(const char *name, const char *detail, bool to_user,
74 unsigned long offset, unsigned long len)
75{
76 WARN_ONCE(1, "Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
77 to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
78 to_user ? "from" : "to",
79 name ? : "unknown?!",
80 detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
81 offset, len);
82}
83
Kees Cookb394d462018-01-10 14:22:38 -080084void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
85 bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
86 unsigned long len)
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -070087{
Kees Cookb394d462018-01-10 14:22:38 -080088 pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
89 to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
90 to_user ? "from" : "to",
91 name ? : "unknown?!",
92 detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
93 offset, len);
94
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -070095 /*
96 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
97 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
98 * Oops code, so that is used here instead.
99 */
100 BUG();
101}
102
103/* Returns true if any portion of [ptr,ptr+n) over laps with [low,high). */
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800104static bool overlaps(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
105 unsigned long low, unsigned long high)
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700106{
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800107 const unsigned long check_low = ptr;
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700108 unsigned long check_high = check_low + n;
109
110 /* Does not overlap if entirely above or entirely below. */
Josh Poimboeuf94cd97a2016-08-22 11:53:59 -0500111 if (check_low >= high || check_high <= low)
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700112 return false;
113
114 return true;
115}
116
117/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800118static inline void check_kernel_text_object(const unsigned long ptr,
119 unsigned long n, bool to_user)
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700120{
121 unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
122 unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
123 unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear;
124
125 if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800126 usercopy_abort("kernel text", NULL, to_user, ptr - textlow, n);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700127
128 /*
129 * Some architectures have virtual memory mappings with a secondary
130 * mapping of the kernel text, i.e. there is more than one virtual
131 * kernel address that points to the kernel image. It is usually
132 * when there is a separate linear physical memory mapping, in that
133 * __pa() is not just the reverse of __va(). This can be detected
134 * and checked:
135 */
Laura Abbott46f62362017-01-10 13:35:45 -0800136 textlow_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(textlow);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700137 /* No different mapping: we're done. */
138 if (textlow_linear == textlow)
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800139 return;
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700140
141 /* Check the secondary mapping... */
Laura Abbott46f62362017-01-10 13:35:45 -0800142 texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(texthigh);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700143 if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800144 usercopy_abort("linear kernel text", NULL, to_user,
145 ptr - textlow_linear, n);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700146}
147
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800148static inline void check_bogus_address(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
149 bool to_user)
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700150{
151 /* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
Isaac J. Manjarres95153162019-08-13 15:37:37 -0700152 if (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr)
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800153 usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700154
155 /* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */
156 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(ptr))
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800157 usercopy_abort("null address", NULL, to_user, ptr, n);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700158}
159
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700160/* Checks for allocs that are marked in some way as spanning multiple pages. */
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800161static inline void check_page_span(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
162 struct page *page, bool to_user)
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700163{
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700164#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700165 const void *end = ptr + n - 1;
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700166 struct page *endpage;
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700167 bool is_reserved, is_cma;
168
169 /*
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700170 * Sometimes the kernel data regions are not marked Reserved (see
171 * check below). And sometimes [_sdata,_edata) does not cover
172 * rodata and/or bss, so check each range explicitly.
173 */
174
175 /* Allow reads of kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved). */
176 if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata &&
177 end <= (const void *)__end_rodata) {
178 if (!to_user)
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800179 usercopy_abort("rodata", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
180 return;
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700181 }
182
183 /* Allow kernel data region (if not marked as Reserved). */
184 if (ptr >= (const void *)_sdata && end <= (const void *)_edata)
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800185 return;
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700186
187 /* Allow kernel bss region (if not marked as Reserved). */
188 if (ptr >= (const void *)__bss_start &&
189 end <= (const void *)__bss_stop)
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800190 return;
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700191
192 /* Is the object wholly within one base page? */
193 if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) ==
194 ((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK)))
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800195 return;
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700196
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700197 /* Allow if fully inside the same compound (__GFP_COMP) page. */
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700198 endpage = virt_to_head_page(end);
199 if (likely(endpage == page))
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800200 return;
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700201
202 /*
203 * Reject if range is entirely either Reserved (i.e. special or
204 * device memory), or CMA. Otherwise, reject since the object spans
205 * several independently allocated pages.
206 */
207 is_reserved = PageReserved(page);
208 is_cma = is_migrate_cma_page(page);
209 if (!is_reserved && !is_cma)
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800210 usercopy_abort("spans multiple pages", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700211
212 for (ptr += PAGE_SIZE; ptr <= end; ptr += PAGE_SIZE) {
213 page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
214 if (is_reserved && !PageReserved(page))
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800215 usercopy_abort("spans Reserved and non-Reserved pages",
216 NULL, to_user, 0, n);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700217 if (is_cma && !is_migrate_cma_page(page))
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800218 usercopy_abort("spans CMA and non-CMA pages", NULL,
219 to_user, 0, n);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700220 }
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700221#endif
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700222}
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700223
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800224static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
225 bool to_user)
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700226{
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)0b3eb0912021-10-04 14:45:56 +0100227 struct folio *folio;
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700228
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700229 if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr))
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800230 return;
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700231
Kees Cook314eed32019-09-17 11:00:25 -0700232 /*
233 * When CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y, kmap_to_page() will give either the
234 * highmem page or fallback to virt_to_page(). The following
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)0b3eb0912021-10-04 14:45:56 +0100235 * is effectively a highmem-aware virt_to_slab().
Kees Cook314eed32019-09-17 11:00:25 -0700236 */
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)0b3eb0912021-10-04 14:45:56 +0100237 folio = page_folio(kmap_to_page((void *)ptr));
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700238
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)0b3eb0912021-10-04 14:45:56 +0100239 if (folio_test_slab(folio)) {
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800240 /* Check slab allocator for flags and size. */
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)0b3eb0912021-10-04 14:45:56 +0100241 __check_heap_object(ptr, n, folio_slab(folio), to_user);
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800242 } else {
243 /* Verify object does not incorrectly span multiple pages. */
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)0b3eb0912021-10-04 14:45:56 +0100244 check_page_span(ptr, n, folio_page(folio, 0), to_user);
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800245 }
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700246}
247
Chris von Recklinghausenb5cb15d2018-07-03 15:43:08 -0400248static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(bypass_usercopy_checks);
249
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700250/*
251 * Validates that the given object is:
252 * - not bogus address
Qian Cai7bff3c02019-01-08 15:23:04 -0800253 * - fully contained by stack (or stack frame, when available)
254 * - fully within SLAB object (or object whitelist area, when available)
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700255 * - not in kernel text
256 */
257void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
258{
Chris von Recklinghausenb5cb15d2018-07-03 15:43:08 -0400259 if (static_branch_unlikely(&bypass_usercopy_checks))
260 return;
261
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700262 /* Skip all tests if size is zero. */
263 if (!n)
264 return;
265
266 /* Check for invalid addresses. */
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800267 check_bogus_address((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700268
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700269 /* Check for bad stack object. */
270 switch (check_stack_object(ptr, n)) {
271 case NOT_STACK:
272 /* Object is not touching the current process stack. */
273 break;
274 case GOOD_FRAME:
275 case GOOD_STACK:
276 /*
277 * Object is either in the correct frame (when it
278 * is possible to check) or just generally on the
279 * process stack (when frame checking not available).
280 */
281 return;
282 default:
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800283 usercopy_abort("process stack", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700284 }
285
Qian Cai7bff3c02019-01-08 15:23:04 -0800286 /* Check for bad heap object. */
287 check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user);
288
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700289 /* Check for object in kernel to avoid text exposure. */
Kees Cookf4e6e282018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800290 check_kernel_text_object((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700291}
292EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
Chris von Recklinghausenb5cb15d2018-07-03 15:43:08 -0400293
294static bool enable_checks __initdata = true;
295
296static int __init parse_hardened_usercopy(char *str)
297{
298 return strtobool(str, &enable_checks);
299}
300
301__setup("hardened_usercopy=", parse_hardened_usercopy);
302
303static int __init set_hardened_usercopy(void)
304{
305 if (enable_checks == false)
306 static_branch_enable(&bypass_usercopy_checks);
307 return 1;
308}
309
310late_initcall(set_hardened_usercopy);