blob: 14ebd21965691d17ea763e5f62494cf780946cae [file] [log] [blame]
Thomas Gleixner27d6b4d2020-07-23 00:00:04 +02001/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
2#ifndef _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H
3#define _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H
4
Kees Cookfe950f62021-04-01 16:23:45 -07005#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
Thomas Gleixner167fd212020-07-23 00:00:05 +02006#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
7
8#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
9#include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
10#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
11
Thomas Gleixner27d6b4d2020-07-23 00:00:04 +020012/* Check that the stack and regs on entry from user mode are sane. */
13static __always_inline void arch_check_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
14{
15 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY)) {
16 /*
17 * Make sure that the entry code gave us a sensible EFLAGS
18 * register. Native because we want to check the actual CPU
19 * state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen.
20 */
21 unsigned long flags = native_save_fl();
Peter Zijlstra662a0222020-09-02 15:25:50 +020022 unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
23
24 /*
25 * For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry.
26 */
27 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) ||
28 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64_BIT) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)))
29 mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC;
30
31 WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & mask);
Thomas Gleixner27d6b4d2020-07-23 00:00:04 +020032
33 /* We think we came from user mode. Make sure pt_regs agrees. */
34 WARN_ON_ONCE(!user_mode(regs));
35
36 /*
37 * All entries from user mode (except #DF) should be on the
38 * normal thread stack and should have user pt_regs in the
39 * correct location.
40 */
41 WARN_ON_ONCE(!on_thread_stack());
42 WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != task_pt_regs(current));
43 }
44}
45#define arch_check_user_regs arch_check_user_regs
46
Thomas Gleixner167fd212020-07-23 00:00:05 +020047static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
48 unsigned long ti_work)
49{
50 if (ti_work & _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
51 fire_user_return_notifiers();
52
53 if (unlikely(ti_work & _TIF_IO_BITMAP))
54 tss_update_io_bitmap();
55
56 fpregs_assert_state_consistent();
57 if (unlikely(ti_work & _TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
58 switch_fpu_return();
59
60#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
61 /*
62 * Compat syscalls set TS_COMPAT. Make sure we clear it before
63 * returning to user mode. We need to clear it *after* signal
64 * handling, because syscall restart has a fixup for compat
65 * syscalls. The fixup is exercised by the ptrace_syscall_32
66 * selftest.
67 *
68 * We also need to clear TS_REGS_POKED_I386: the 32-bit tracer
69 * special case only applies after poking regs and before the
70 * very next return to user mode.
71 */
72 current_thread_info()->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT | TS_I386_REGS_POKED);
73#endif
Kees Cookfe950f62021-04-01 16:23:45 -070074
75 /*
76 * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
77 * but not enough for x86 stack utilization comfort. To keep
78 * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 8 bits.
79 *
80 * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
81 * applying stack alignment constraints (see cc_stack_align4/8 in
82 * arch/x86/Makefile), which will remove the 3 (x86_64) or 2 (ia32)
83 * low bits from any entropy chosen here.
84 *
85 * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 5 (x86_64) or
86 * 6 (ia32) bits.
87 */
88 choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF);
Thomas Gleixner167fd212020-07-23 00:00:05 +020089}
90#define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare
91
92static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void)
93{
94 mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
95}
96#define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode
97
Thomas Gleixner27d6b4d2020-07-23 00:00:04 +020098#endif