Alexander Popov | afaef01 | 2018-08-17 01:16:58 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| 2 | /* |
| 3 | * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value |
| 4 | * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature |
| 5 | * ported from grsecurity/PaX. |
| 6 | * |
| 7 | * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> |
| 8 | * |
| 9 | * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can |
| 10 | * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks. |
| 11 | */ |
| 12 | |
| 13 | #include <linux/stackleak.h> |
Alexander Popov | ef1a840 | 2018-11-13 00:08:48 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 14 | #include <linux/kprobes.h> |
Alexander Popov | afaef01 | 2018-08-17 01:16:58 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 15 | |
Alexander Popov | 964c9df | 2018-08-17 01:17:03 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 16 | #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE |
| 17 | #include <linux/jump_label.h> |
| 18 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
| 19 | |
| 20 | static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass); |
| 21 | |
| 22 | int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write, |
Tobias Klauser | 4773ef3 | 2020-09-18 21:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 23 | void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) |
Alexander Popov | 964c9df | 2018-08-17 01:17:03 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 24 | { |
| 25 | int ret = 0; |
| 26 | int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass); |
| 27 | int prev_state = state; |
| 28 | |
| 29 | table->data = &state; |
| 30 | table->maxlen = sizeof(int); |
| 31 | ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); |
| 32 | state = !!state; |
| 33 | if (ret || !write || state == prev_state) |
| 34 | return ret; |
| 35 | |
| 36 | if (state) |
| 37 | static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass); |
| 38 | else |
| 39 | static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass); |
| 40 | |
| 41 | pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n", |
| 42 | state ? "enabled" : "disabled"); |
| 43 | return ret; |
| 44 | } |
| 45 | |
| 46 | #define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass) |
| 47 | #else |
| 48 | #define skip_erasing() false |
| 49 | #endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */ |
| 50 | |
Alexander Popov | ef1a840 | 2018-11-13 00:08:48 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 51 | asmlinkage void notrace stackleak_erase(void) |
Alexander Popov | afaef01 | 2018-08-17 01:16:58 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 52 | { |
| 53 | /* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */ |
| 54 | unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack; |
| 55 | unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current); |
| 56 | unsigned int poison_count = 0; |
| 57 | const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long); |
| 58 | |
Alexander Popov | 964c9df | 2018-08-17 01:17:03 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 59 | if (skip_erasing()) |
| 60 | return; |
| 61 | |
Alexander Popov | afaef01 | 2018-08-17 01:16:58 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 62 | /* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */ |
| 63 | if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE)) |
| 64 | kstack_ptr = boundary; |
| 65 | |
| 66 | /* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */ |
| 67 | while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) { |
| 68 | if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON) |
| 69 | poison_count++; |
| 70 | else |
| 71 | poison_count = 0; |
| 72 | |
| 73 | kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long); |
| 74 | } |
| 75 | |
| 76 | /* |
| 77 | * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and |
| 78 | * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y). |
| 79 | */ |
| 80 | if (kstack_ptr == boundary) |
| 81 | kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long); |
| 82 | |
Alexander Popov | c8d1262 | 2018-08-17 01:17:01 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 83 | #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS |
| 84 | current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr; |
| 85 | #endif |
| 86 | |
Alexander Popov | afaef01 | 2018-08-17 01:16:58 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 87 | /* |
| 88 | * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from |
| 89 | * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that |
| 90 | * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison. |
| 91 | */ |
| 92 | if (on_thread_stack()) |
| 93 | boundary = current_stack_pointer; |
| 94 | else |
| 95 | boundary = current_top_of_stack(); |
| 96 | |
| 97 | while (kstack_ptr < boundary) { |
| 98 | *(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON; |
| 99 | kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long); |
| 100 | } |
| 101 | |
| 102 | /* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */ |
| 103 | current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64; |
| 104 | } |
Alexander Popov | ef1a840 | 2018-11-13 00:08:48 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 105 | NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(stackleak_erase); |
Alexander Popov | afaef01 | 2018-08-17 01:16:58 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 106 | |
Alexander Popov | feee1b8 | 2020-06-24 15:33:29 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 107 | void __used __no_caller_saved_registers notrace stackleak_track_stack(void) |
Alexander Popov | 10e9ae9 | 2018-08-17 01:16:59 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 108 | { |
Alexander Popov | feee1b8 | 2020-06-24 15:33:29 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 109 | unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer; |
Alexander Popov | 10e9ae9 | 2018-08-17 01:16:59 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 110 | |
| 111 | /* |
| 112 | * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than |
| 113 | * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in |
| 114 | * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that. |
| 115 | */ |
| 116 | BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH); |
| 117 | |
Alexander Popov | feee1b8 | 2020-06-24 15:33:29 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 118 | /* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */ |
| 119 | sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long)); |
Alexander Popov | 10e9ae9 | 2018-08-17 01:16:59 +0300 | [diff] [blame] | 120 | if (sp < current->lowest_stack && |
| 121 | sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) + |
| 122 | sizeof(unsigned long)) { |
| 123 | current->lowest_stack = sp; |
| 124 | } |
| 125 | } |
| 126 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack); |