| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
| /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com |
| * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook |
| * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io |
| */ |
| #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| #include <linux/types.h> |
| #include <linux/slab.h> |
| #include <linux/bpf.h> |
| #include <linux/btf.h> |
| #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> |
| #include <linux/filter.h> |
| #include <net/netlink.h> |
| #include <linux/file.h> |
| #include <linux/vmalloc.h> |
| #include <linux/stringify.h> |
| #include <linux/bsearch.h> |
| #include <linux/sort.h> |
| #include <linux/perf_event.h> |
| #include <linux/ctype.h> |
| #include <linux/error-injection.h> |
| #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> |
| #include <linux/btf_ids.h> |
| |
| #include "disasm.h" |
| |
| static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { |
| #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ |
| [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, |
| #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) |
| #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) |
| #include <linux/bpf_types.h> |
| #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE |
| #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE |
| #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE |
| }; |
| |
| /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program |
| * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. |
| * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. |
| * |
| * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. |
| * It rejects the following programs: |
| * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns |
| * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) |
| * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) |
| * - out of bounds or malformed jumps |
| * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. |
| * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the |
| * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of |
| * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. |
| * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k |
| * |
| * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction |
| * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. |
| * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is |
| * copied to R1. |
| * |
| * All registers are 64-bit. |
| * R0 - return register |
| * R1-R5 argument passing registers |
| * R6-R9 callee saved registers |
| * R10 - frame pointer read-only |
| * |
| * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context |
| * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. |
| * |
| * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: |
| * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), |
| * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), |
| * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 |
| * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize |
| * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. |
| * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK |
| * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). |
| * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. |
| * |
| * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which |
| * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. |
| * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) |
| * |
| * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register |
| * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are |
| * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. |
| * |
| * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' |
| * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. |
| * |
| * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against |
| * function argument constraints. |
| * |
| * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. |
| * It means that the register type passed to this function must be |
| * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as |
| * 'pointer to map element key' |
| * |
| * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): |
| * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, |
| * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, |
| * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, |
| * |
| * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' |
| * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and |
| * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside |
| * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. |
| * |
| * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: |
| * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) |
| * { |
| * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; |
| * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; |
| * void *value; |
| * |
| * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that |
| * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on |
| * the stack of eBPF program. |
| * } |
| * |
| * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: |
| * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR |
| * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK |
| * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP |
| * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), |
| * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: |
| * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, |
| * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes |
| * |
| * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, |
| * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits |
| * and were initialized prior to this call. |
| * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at |
| * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets |
| * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function |
| * returns either pointer to map value or NULL. |
| * |
| * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' |
| * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to |
| * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false |
| * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). |
| * |
| * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 |
| * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. |
| * |
| * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel |
| * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by |
| * the BPF program: |
| * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET |
| * |
| * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a |
| * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. |
| * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into |
| * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type |
| * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is |
| * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. |
| * |
| * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as |
| * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as |
| * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, |
| * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased |
| * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. |
| */ |
| |
| /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ |
| struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { |
| /* verifer state is 'st' |
| * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' |
| * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' |
| */ |
| struct bpf_verifier_state st; |
| int insn_idx; |
| int prev_insn_idx; |
| struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; |
| /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ |
| u32 log_pos; |
| }; |
| |
| #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 |
| #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 |
| |
| #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) |
| #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) |
| |
| #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL |
| #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ |
| POISON_POINTER_DELTA)) |
| #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X) ((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV)) |
| |
| static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) |
| { |
| return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; |
| } |
| |
| static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) |
| { |
| return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV; |
| } |
| |
| static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, |
| const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv) |
| { |
| BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV); |
| unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); |
| aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map | |
| (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL); |
| } |
| |
| static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) |
| { |
| return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; |
| } |
| |
| static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) |
| { |
| return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); |
| } |
| |
| static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) |
| { |
| return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); |
| } |
| |
| static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) |
| { |
| bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); |
| |
| aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | |
| (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); |
| } |
| |
| static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && |
| insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; |
| } |
| |
| static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && |
| insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL; |
| } |
| |
| static bool bpf_pseudo_func(const struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) && |
| insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC; |
| } |
| |
| struct bpf_call_arg_meta { |
| struct bpf_map *map_ptr; |
| bool raw_mode; |
| bool pkt_access; |
| int regno; |
| int access_size; |
| int mem_size; |
| u64 msize_max_value; |
| int ref_obj_id; |
| int func_id; |
| struct btf *btf; |
| u32 btf_id; |
| struct btf *ret_btf; |
| u32 ret_btf_id; |
| u32 subprogno; |
| }; |
| |
| struct btf *btf_vmlinux; |
| |
| static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); |
| |
| static const struct bpf_line_info * |
| find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; |
| const struct bpf_prog *prog; |
| u32 i, nr_linfo; |
| |
| prog = env->prog; |
| nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; |
| |
| if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| linfo = prog->aux->linfo; |
| for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++) |
| if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off) |
| break; |
| |
| return &linfo[i - 1]; |
| } |
| |
| void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt, |
| va_list args) |
| { |
| unsigned int n; |
| |
| n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args); |
| |
| WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1, |
| "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n"); |
| |
| n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n); |
| log->kbuf[n] = '\0'; |
| |
| if (log->level == BPF_LOG_KERNEL) { |
| pr_err("BPF:%s\n", log->kbuf); |
| return; |
| } |
| if (!copy_to_user(log->ubuf + log->len_used, log->kbuf, n + 1)) |
| log->len_used += n; |
| else |
| log->ubuf = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 new_pos) |
| { |
| char zero = 0; |
| |
| if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) |
| return; |
| |
| log->len_used = new_pos; |
| if (put_user(zero, log->ubuf + new_pos)) |
| log->ubuf = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. |
| * bpf_verifier_log_write() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, |
| * so the user can figure out what's wrong with the program |
| */ |
| __printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const char *fmt, ...) |
| { |
| va_list args; |
| |
| if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) |
| return; |
| |
| va_start(args, fmt); |
| bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); |
| va_end(args); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_verifier_log_write); |
| |
| __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; |
| va_list args; |
| |
| if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) |
| return; |
| |
| va_start(args, fmt); |
| bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); |
| va_end(args); |
| } |
| |
| __printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, |
| const char *fmt, ...) |
| { |
| va_list args; |
| |
| if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) |
| return; |
| |
| va_start(args, fmt); |
| bpf_verifier_vlog(log, fmt, args); |
| va_end(args); |
| } |
| |
| static const char *ltrim(const char *s) |
| { |
| while (isspace(*s)) |
| s++; |
| |
| return s; |
| } |
| |
| __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| u32 insn_off, |
| const char *prefix_fmt, ...) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; |
| |
| if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) |
| return; |
| |
| linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off); |
| if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo) |
| return; |
| |
| if (prefix_fmt) { |
| va_list args; |
| |
| va_start(args, prefix_fmt); |
| bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args); |
| va_end(args); |
| } |
| |
| verbose(env, "%s\n", |
| ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf, |
| linfo->line_off))); |
| |
| env->prev_linfo = linfo; |
| } |
| |
| static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| struct tnum *range, const char *ctx, |
| const char *reg_name) |
| { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name); |
| if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); |
| } else { |
| verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); |
| } |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range); |
| verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); |
| } |
| |
| static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || |
| type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; |
| } |
| |
| static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || |
| type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || |
| type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || |
| type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; |
| } |
| |
| static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || |
| type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || |
| type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || |
| type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || |
| type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; |
| } |
| |
| static bool reg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || |
| type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || |
| type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL || |
| type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL || |
| type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || |
| type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || |
| type == PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL || |
| type == PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| return reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && |
| map_value_has_spin_lock(reg->map_ptr); |
| } |
| |
| static bool reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || |
| type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || |
| type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || |
| type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL || |
| type == PTR_TO_MEM || |
| type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static bool arg_type_may_be_refcounted(enum bpf_arg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; |
| } |
| |
| static bool arg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_arg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || |
| type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || |
| type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX_OR_NULL || |
| type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || |
| type == ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL || |
| type == ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Determine whether the function releases some resources allocated by another |
| * function call. The first reference type argument will be assumed to be |
| * released by release_reference(). |
| */ |
| static bool is_release_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) |
| { |
| return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_release || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard; |
| } |
| |
| static bool may_be_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) |
| { |
| return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve; |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, |
| const struct bpf_map *map) |
| { |
| enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; |
| |
| if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && |
| (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || |
| map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) |
| return true; |
| |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) |
| { |
| return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && |
| BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && |
| insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG; |
| } |
| |
| /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */ |
| static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { |
| [NOT_INIT] = "?", |
| [SCALAR_VALUE] = "inv", |
| [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", |
| [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", |
| [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", |
| [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null", |
| [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", |
| [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", |
| [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", |
| [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", |
| [PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys", |
| [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock", |
| [PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL] = "sock_or_null", |
| [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common", |
| [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL] = "sock_common_or_null", |
| [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", |
| [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL] = "tcp_sock_or_null", |
| [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", |
| [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", |
| [PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_", |
| [PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL] = "ptr_or_null_", |
| [PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = "percpu_ptr_", |
| [PTR_TO_MEM] = "mem", |
| [PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL] = "mem_or_null", |
| [PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF] = "rdonly_buf", |
| [PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL] = "rdonly_buf_or_null", |
| [PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF] = "rdwr_buf", |
| [PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL] = "rdwr_buf_or_null", |
| [PTR_TO_FUNC] = "func", |
| [PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = "map_key", |
| }; |
| |
| static char slot_type_char[] = { |
| [STACK_INVALID] = '?', |
| [STACK_SPILL] = 'r', |
| [STACK_MISC] = 'm', |
| [STACK_ZERO] = '0', |
| }; |
| |
| static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| enum bpf_reg_liveness live) |
| { |
| if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE)) |
| verbose(env, "_"); |
| if (live & REG_LIVE_READ) |
| verbose(env, "r"); |
| if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) |
| verbose(env, "w"); |
| if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE) |
| verbose(env, "D"); |
| } |
| |
| static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; |
| |
| return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; |
| } |
| |
| static const char *kernel_type_name(const struct btf* btf, u32 id) |
| { |
| return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off); |
| } |
| |
| static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_func_state *state) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg; |
| enum bpf_reg_type t; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (state->frameno) |
| verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno); |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { |
| reg = &state->regs[i]; |
| t = reg->type; |
| if (t == NOT_INIT) |
| continue; |
| verbose(env, " R%d", i); |
| print_liveness(env, reg->live); |
| verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]); |
| if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) |
| verbose(env, "P"); |
| if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && |
| tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
| /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ |
| verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); |
| } else { |
| if (t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || |
| t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || |
| t == PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID) |
| verbose(env, "%s", kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id)); |
| verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id); |
| if (reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(t)) |
| verbose(env, ",ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id); |
| if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) |
| verbose(env, ",off=%d", reg->off); |
| if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) |
| verbose(env, ",r=%d", reg->range); |
| else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || |
| t == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || |
| t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || |
| t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) |
| verbose(env, ",ks=%d,vs=%d", |
| reg->map_ptr->key_size, |
| reg->map_ptr->value_size); |
| if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
| /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but |
| * could be a pointer whose offset is too big |
| * for reg->off |
| */ |
| verbose(env, ",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); |
| } else { |
| if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && |
| reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) |
| verbose(env, ",smin_value=%lld", |
| (long long)reg->smin_value); |
| if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && |
| reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) |
| verbose(env, ",smax_value=%lld", |
| (long long)reg->smax_value); |
| if (reg->umin_value != 0) |
| verbose(env, ",umin_value=%llu", |
| (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); |
| if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) |
| verbose(env, ",umax_value=%llu", |
| (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); |
| if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, ",var_off=%s", tn_buf); |
| } |
| if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value && |
| reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN) |
| verbose(env, ",s32_min_value=%d", |
| (int)(reg->s32_min_value)); |
| if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value && |
| reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX) |
| verbose(env, ",s32_max_value=%d", |
| (int)(reg->s32_max_value)); |
| if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value && |
| reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN) |
| verbose(env, ",u32_min_value=%d", |
| (int)(reg->u32_min_value)); |
| if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value && |
| reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX) |
| verbose(env, ",u32_max_value=%d", |
| (int)(reg->u32_max_value)); |
| } |
| verbose(env, ")"); |
| } |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { |
| char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1]; |
| bool valid = false; |
| int j; |
| |
| for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { |
| if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID) |
| valid = true; |
| types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[ |
| state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; |
| } |
| types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; |
| if (!valid) |
| continue; |
| verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); |
| print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live); |
| if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) { |
| reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; |
| t = reg->type; |
| verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]); |
| if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) |
| verbose(env, "P"); |
| if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) |
| verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); |
| } else { |
| verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf); |
| } |
| } |
| if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) { |
| verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id); |
| for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) |
| if (state->refs[i].id) |
| verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id); |
| } |
| verbose(env, "\n"); |
| } |
| |
| /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too |
| * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve |
| * the contents of dst. |
| * |
| * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could |
| * not be allocated. |
| */ |
| static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) |
| { |
| size_t bytes; |
| |
| if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes))) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (ksize(dst) < bytes) { |
| kfree(dst); |
| dst = kmalloc_track_caller(bytes, flags); |
| if (!dst) |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(dst, src, bytes); |
| out: |
| return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; |
| } |
| |
| /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too |
| * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows. |
| * |
| * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero. |
| */ |
| static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size) |
| { |
| if (!new_n || old_n == new_n) |
| goto out; |
| |
| arr = krealloc_array(arr, new_n, size, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!arr) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (new_n > old_n) |
| memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size); |
| |
| out: |
| return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; |
| } |
| |
| static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) |
| { |
| dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs, |
| sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!dst->refs) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) |
| { |
| size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; |
| |
| dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), |
| GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!dst->stack) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, size_t n) |
| { |
| state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n, |
| sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state)); |
| if (!state->refs) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| state->acquired_refs = n; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size) |
| { |
| size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE; |
| |
| if (old_n >= n) |
| return 0; |
| |
| state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state)); |
| if (!state->stack) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| state->allocated_stack = size; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include |
| * this new pointer reference. |
| * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register |
| * On failure, returns a negative errno. |
| */ |
| static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); |
| int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; |
| int id, err; |
| |
| err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| id = ++env->id_gen; |
| state->refs[new_ofs].id = id; |
| state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; |
| |
| return id; |
| } |
| |
| /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */ |
| static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id) |
| { |
| int i, last_idx; |
| |
| last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; |
| for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { |
| if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) { |
| if (last_idx && i != last_idx) |
| memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx], |
| sizeof(*state->refs)); |
| memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); |
| state->acquired_refs--; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) |
| { |
| if (!state) |
| return; |
| kfree(state->refs); |
| kfree(state->stack); |
| kfree(state); |
| } |
| |
| static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) |
| { |
| kfree(state->jmp_history); |
| state->jmp_history = NULL; |
| state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, |
| bool free_self) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { |
| free_func_state(state->frame[i]); |
| state->frame[i] = NULL; |
| } |
| clear_jmp_history(state); |
| if (free_self) |
| kfree(state); |
| } |
| |
| /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space |
| * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack |
| */ |
| static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, |
| const struct bpf_func_state *src) |
| { |
| int err; |
| |
| memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs)); |
| err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| return copy_stack_state(dst, src); |
| } |
| |
| static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, |
| const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) |
| { |
| struct bpf_func_state *dst; |
| int i, err; |
| |
| dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, |
| src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair), |
| GFP_USER); |
| if (!dst_state->jmp_history) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; |
| |
| /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ |
| for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { |
| free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); |
| dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; |
| } |
| dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; |
| dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; |
| dst_state->active_spin_lock = src->active_spin_lock; |
| dst_state->branches = src->branches; |
| dst_state->parent = src->parent; |
| dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; |
| dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; |
| for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { |
| dst = dst_state->frame[i]; |
| if (!dst) { |
| dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!dst) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| dst_state->frame[i] = dst; |
| } |
| err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) |
| { |
| while (st) { |
| u32 br = --st->branches; |
| |
| /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, |
| * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: |
| */ |
| WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, |
| "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", |
| br); |
| if (br) |
| break; |
| st = st->parent; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, |
| int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (env->head == NULL) |
| return -ENOENT; |
| |
| if (cur) { |
| err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| if (pop_log) |
| bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); |
| if (insn_idx) |
| *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; |
| if (prev_insn_idx) |
| *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; |
| elem = head->next; |
| free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); |
| kfree(head); |
| env->head = elem; |
| env->stack_size--; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, |
| bool speculative) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; |
| int err; |
| |
| elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!elem) |
| goto err; |
| |
| elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; |
| elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; |
| elem->next = env->head; |
| elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used; |
| env->head = elem; |
| env->stack_size++; |
| err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); |
| if (err) |
| goto err; |
| elem->st.speculative |= speculative; |
| if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { |
| verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", |
| env->stack_size); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (elem->st.parent) { |
| ++elem->st.parent->branches; |
| /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, |
| * but |
| * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch |
| * instructions |
| * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create |
| * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current |
| * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state |
| * which might have large 'branches' count. |
| */ |
| } |
| return &elem->st; |
| err: |
| free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); |
| env->cur_state = NULL; |
| /* pop all elements and return */ |
| while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 |
| static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { |
| BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 |
| }; |
| |
| static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg); |
| |
| /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ |
| static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) |
| { |
| reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); |
| reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; |
| reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; |
| reg->umin_value = imm; |
| reg->umax_value = imm; |
| |
| reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; |
| reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; |
| reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; |
| reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; |
| } |
| |
| /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as |
| * known to have the value @imm. |
| */ |
| static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) |
| { |
| /* Clear id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) */ |
| memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, |
| offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); |
| ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); |
| } |
| |
| static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) |
| { |
| reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); |
| reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; |
| reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; |
| reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; |
| reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; |
| } |
| |
| /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be |
| * used only on registers holding a pointer type. |
| */ |
| static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); |
| } |
| |
| static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); |
| reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
| } |
| |
| static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) |
| { |
| if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { |
| verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); |
| /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ |
| for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) |
| __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); |
| return; |
| } |
| __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); |
| } |
| |
| static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| switch (reg->type) { |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: { |
| const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; |
| |
| if (map->inner_map_meta) { |
| reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; |
| reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; |
| } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { |
| reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; |
| } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || |
| map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { |
| reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; |
| } else { |
| reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: |
| reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: |
| reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: |
| reg->type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL: |
| reg->type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL: |
| reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL: |
| reg->type = PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL: |
| reg->type = PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF; |
| break; |
| default: |
| WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown nullable register type"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); |
| } |
| |
| static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || |
| reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; |
| } |
| |
| /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ |
| static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| enum bpf_reg_type which) |
| { |
| /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. |
| * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its |
| * origin. |
| */ |
| return reg->type == which && |
| reg->id == 0 && |
| reg->off == 0 && |
| tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ |
| static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| reg->umin_value = 0; |
| reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; |
| |
| reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; |
| reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; |
| reg->u32_min_value = 0; |
| reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; |
| } |
| |
| static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| reg->umin_value = 0; |
| reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; |
| } |
| |
| static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; |
| reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; |
| reg->u32_min_value = 0; |
| reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; |
| } |
| |
| static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); |
| |
| /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ |
| reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, |
| var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); |
| /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ |
| reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, |
| var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); |
| reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); |
| reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, |
| (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); |
| } |
| |
| static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ |
| reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, |
| reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); |
| /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ |
| reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, |
| reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); |
| reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); |
| reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, |
| reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); |
| } |
| |
| static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| __update_reg32_bounds(reg); |
| __update_reg64_bounds(reg); |
| } |
| |
| /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ |
| static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| /* Learn sign from signed bounds. |
| * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds |
| * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. |
| * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. |
| */ |
| if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) { |
| reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = |
| max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); |
| reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = |
| min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); |
| return; |
| } |
| /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign |
| * boundary, so we must be careful. |
| */ |
| if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) { |
| /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax |
| * is positive, hence safe. |
| */ |
| reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value; |
| reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = |
| min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); |
| } else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) { |
| /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin |
| * is negative, hence safe. |
| */ |
| reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = |
| max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); |
| reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| /* Learn sign from signed bounds. |
| * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds |
| * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. |
| * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. |
| */ |
| if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { |
| reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, |
| reg->umin_value); |
| reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, |
| reg->umax_value); |
| return; |
| } |
| /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign |
| * boundary, so we must be careful. |
| */ |
| if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { |
| /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax |
| * is positive, hence safe. |
| */ |
| reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; |
| reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, |
| reg->umax_value); |
| } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { |
| /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin |
| * is negative, hence safe. |
| */ |
| reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, |
| reg->umin_value); |
| reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); |
| __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); |
| } |
| |
| /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ |
| static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, |
| tnum_range(reg->umin_value, |
| reg->umax_value)); |
| struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg->var_off), |
| tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, |
| reg->u32_max_value)); |
| |
| reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); |
| } |
| |
| static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; |
| reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; |
| /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds |
| * but must be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds |
| * and refine later from tnum. |
| */ |
| if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && reg->s32_max_value >= 0) |
| reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; |
| else |
| reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; |
| if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0) |
| reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; |
| else |
| reg->smin_value = 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| /* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register |
| * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence |
| * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly, |
| */ |
| if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) { |
| __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); |
| } else { |
| /* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and |
| * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic) |
| * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum |
| * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are |
| * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown |
| * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation. |
| */ |
| __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg); |
| __update_reg_bounds(reg); |
| } |
| |
| /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds |
| * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), |
| * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. |
| */ |
| __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); |
| __reg_bound_offset(reg); |
| __update_reg_bounds(reg); |
| } |
| |
| static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a) |
| { |
| return a > S32_MIN && a < S32_MAX; |
| } |
| |
| static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a) |
| { |
| return a > U32_MIN && a < U32_MAX; |
| } |
| |
| static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); |
| |
| if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) { |
| reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value; |
| reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value; |
| } |
| if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value) && __reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) { |
| reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value; |
| reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value; |
| } |
| |
| /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds |
| * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), |
| * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. |
| */ |
| __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); |
| __reg_bound_offset(reg); |
| __update_reg_bounds(reg); |
| } |
| |
| /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ |
| static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Clear type, id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and |
| * padding between 'type' and union |
| */ |
| memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); |
| reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
| reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; |
| reg->frameno = 0; |
| reg->precise = env->subprog_cnt > 1 || !env->bpf_capable; |
| __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); |
| } |
| |
| static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) |
| { |
| if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { |
| verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); |
| /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ |
| for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) |
| __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); |
| return; |
| } |
| __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); |
| } |
| |
| static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); |
| reg->type = NOT_INIT; |
| } |
| |
| static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) |
| { |
| if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { |
| verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); |
| /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ |
| for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) |
| __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); |
| return; |
| } |
| __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); |
| } |
| |
| static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, |
| enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, |
| struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id) |
| { |
| if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); |
| return; |
| } |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); |
| regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; |
| regs[regno].btf = btf; |
| regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; |
| } |
| |
| #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) |
| static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_func_state *state) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { |
| mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); |
| regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; |
| regs[i].parent = NULL; |
| regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; |
| } |
| |
| /* frame pointer */ |
| regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); |
| regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; |
| } |
| |
| #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) |
| static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_func_state *state, |
| int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) |
| { |
| state->callsite = callsite; |
| state->frameno = frameno; |
| state->subprogno = subprogno; |
| init_reg_state(env, state); |
| } |
| |
| enum reg_arg_type { |
| SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ |
| DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ |
| DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ |
| }; |
| |
| static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) |
| { |
| return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - |
| ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; |
| } |
| |
| static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) |
| { |
| struct bpf_subprog_info *p; |
| |
| p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, |
| sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs); |
| if (!p) |
| return -ENOENT; |
| return p - env->subprog_info; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) |
| { |
| int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { |
| verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| ret = find_subprog(env, off); |
| if (ret >= 0) |
| return ret; |
| if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { |
| verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); |
| return -E2BIG; |
| } |
| /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ |
| env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; |
| sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, |
| sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); |
| return env->subprog_cnt - 1; |
| } |
| |
| struct bpf_kfunc_desc { |
| struct btf_func_model func_model; |
| u32 func_id; |
| s32 imm; |
| }; |
| |
| #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256 |
| struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab { |
| struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS]; |
| u32 nr_descs; |
| }; |
| |
| static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id(const void *a, const void *b) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; |
| const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; |
| |
| /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */ |
| return d0->func_id - d1->func_id; |
| } |
| |
| static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc * |
| find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id) |
| { |
| struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { |
| .func_id = func_id, |
| }; |
| struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; |
| |
| tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; |
| return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, |
| sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id); |
| } |
| |
| static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id) |
| { |
| const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; |
| struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; |
| struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux; |
| struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; |
| const char *func_name; |
| unsigned long addr; |
| int err; |
| |
| prog_aux = env->prog->aux; |
| tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab; |
| if (!tab) { |
| if (!btf_vmlinux) { |
| verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| } |
| |
| if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { |
| verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n"); |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| } |
| |
| if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) { |
| verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n"); |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| } |
| |
| if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) { |
| verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!tab) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; |
| } |
| |
| if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) { |
| verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n"); |
| return -E2BIG; |
| } |
| |
| func = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func_id); |
| if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) { |
| verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n", |
| func_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func->type); |
| if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) { |
| verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n", |
| func_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| func_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, func->name_off); |
| addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name); |
| if (!addr) { |
| verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", |
| func_name); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; |
| desc->func_id = func_id; |
| desc->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(addr) - __bpf_call_base; |
| err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, btf_vmlinux, |
| func_proto, func_name, |
| &desc->func_model); |
| if (!err) |
| sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), |
| kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id, NULL); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm(const void *a, const void *b) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; |
| const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; |
| |
| if (d0->imm > d1->imm) |
| return 1; |
| else if (d0->imm < d1->imm) |
| return -1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(struct bpf_prog *prog) |
| { |
| struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; |
| |
| tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; |
| if (!tab) |
| return; |
| |
| sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), |
| kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog) |
| { |
| return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab; |
| } |
| |
| const struct btf_func_model * |
| bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog, |
| const struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { |
| .imm = insn->imm, |
| }; |
| const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res; |
| struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; |
| |
| tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; |
| res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, |
| sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm); |
| |
| return res ? &res->func_model : NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
| int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| |
| /* Add entry function. */ |
| ret = add_subprog(env, 0); |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { |
| if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) && |
| !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (!env->bpf_capable) { |
| verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); |
| return -EPERM; |
| } |
| |
| if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { |
| ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); |
| if (ret >= 0) |
| /* remember subprog */ |
| insn[1].imm = ret; |
| } else if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) { |
| ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); |
| } else { |
| ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm); |
| } |
| |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration |
| * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. |
| */ |
| subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; |
| |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) |
| for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) |
| verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; |
| struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
| int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| |
| /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ |
| subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; |
| subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { |
| u8 code = insn[i].code; |
| |
| if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && |
| insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call && |
| insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) |
| subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; |
| if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && |
| (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) |
| subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; |
| if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) |
| goto next; |
| if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) |
| goto next; |
| off = i + insn[i].off + 1; |
| if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { |
| verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| next: |
| if (i == subprog_end - 1) { |
| /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another |
| * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit |
| * or unconditional jump back |
| */ |
| if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && |
| code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { |
| verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| subprog_start = subprog_end; |
| cur_subprog++; |
| if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) |
| subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all |
| * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc. |
| */ |
| static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *state, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag) |
| { |
| bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ |
| int cnt = 0; |
| |
| while (parent) { |
| /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ |
| if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) |
| break; |
| if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { |
| verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n", |
| reg_type_str[parent->type], |
| parent->var_off.value, parent->off); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| /* The first condition is more likely to be true than the |
| * second, checked it first. |
| */ |
| if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag || |
| parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64) |
| /* The parentage chain never changes and |
| * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ. |
| * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and |
| * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ. |
| * This case happens when the same register is read |
| * multiple times without writes into it in-between. |
| * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set, |
| * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32. |
| */ |
| break; |
| /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ |
| parent->live |= flag; |
| /* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */ |
| if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64) |
| parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32; |
| state = parent; |
| parent = state->parent; |
| writes = true; |
| cnt++; |
| } |
| |
| if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt) |
| env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization |
| * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates |
| * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. |
| */ |
| static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) |
| { |
| u8 code, class, op; |
| |
| code = insn->code; |
| class = BPF_CLASS(code); |
| op = BPF_OP(code); |
| if (class == BPF_JMP) { |
| /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE |
| * conservatively. |
| */ |
| if (op == BPF_EXIT) |
| return true; |
| if (op == BPF_CALL) { |
| /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking |
| * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we |
| * don't care the register def because they are anyway |
| * marked as NOT_INIT already. |
| */ |
| if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) |
| return false; |
| /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type |
| * check, conservatively return TRUE. |
| */ |
| if (t == SRC_OP) |
| return true; |
| |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || |
| /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */ |
| (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (class == BPF_LDX) { |
| if (t != SRC_OP) |
| return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; |
| /* LDX source must be ptr. */ |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| if (class == BPF_STX) { |
| /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source |
| * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is |
| * asking about it. |
| */ |
| if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) |
| return true; |
| return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; |
| } |
| |
| if (class == BPF_LD) { |
| u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); |
| |
| /* LD_IMM64 */ |
| if (mode == BPF_IMM) |
| return true; |
| |
| /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ |
| if (t != SRC_OP) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ |
| if (regno == BPF_REG_6) |
| return true; |
| |
| /* Explicit source could be any width. */ |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| if (class == BPF_ST) |
| /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ |
| return true; |
| |
| /* Conservatively return true at default. */ |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */ |
| static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) { |
| case BPF_JMP: |
| case BPF_JMP32: |
| case BPF_ST: |
| return -1; |
| case BPF_STX: |
| if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && |
| (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) { |
| if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) |
| return BPF_REG_0; |
| else |
| return insn->src_reg; |
| } else { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| default: |
| return insn->dst_reg; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ |
| static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn); |
| |
| if (dst_reg == -1) |
| return false; |
| |
| return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); |
| } |
| |
| static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; |
| |
| if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) |
| return; |
| |
| env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; |
| /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ |
| reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, |
| enum reg_arg_type t) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs; |
| bool rw64; |
| |
| if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| reg = ®s[regno]; |
| rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t); |
| if (t == SRC_OP) { |
| /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ |
| if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ |
| if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (rw64) |
| mark_insn_zext(env, reg); |
| |
| return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, |
| rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32); |
| } else { |
| /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ |
| if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { |
| verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
| reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; |
| if (t == DST_OP) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ |
| static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) |
| { |
| u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; |
| struct bpf_idx_pair *p; |
| |
| cnt++; |
| p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, cnt * sizeof(*p), GFP_USER); |
| if (!p) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; |
| p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; |
| cur->jmp_history = p; |
| cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded |
| * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. |
| */ |
| static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, |
| u32 *history) |
| { |
| u32 cnt = *history; |
| |
| if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { |
| i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; |
| (*history)--; |
| } else { |
| i--; |
| } |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| const struct btf_type *func; |
| |
| if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| func = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, insn->imm); |
| return btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, func->name_off); |
| } |
| |
| /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to |
| * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and |
| * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. |
| */ |
| static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, |
| u32 *reg_mask, u64 *stack_mask) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { |
| .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, |
| .cb_print = verbose, |
| .private_data = env, |
| }; |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; |
| u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); |
| u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
| u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); |
| u32 dreg = 1u << insn->dst_reg; |
| u32 sreg = 1u << insn->src_reg; |
| u32 spi; |
| |
| if (insn->code == 0) |
| return 0; |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { |
| verbose(env, "regs=%x stack=%llx before ", *reg_mask, *stack_mask); |
| verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); |
| print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); |
| } |
| |
| if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { |
| if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) |
| return 0; |
| if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
| /* dreg = sreg |
| * dreg needs precision after this insn |
| * sreg needs precision before this insn |
| */ |
| *reg_mask &= ~dreg; |
| *reg_mask |= sreg; |
| } else { |
| /* dreg = K |
| * dreg needs precision after this insn. |
| * Corresponding register is already marked |
| * as precise=true in this verifier state. |
| * No further markings in parent are necessary |
| */ |
| *reg_mask &= ~dreg; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
| /* dreg += sreg |
| * both dreg and sreg need precision |
| * before this insn |
| */ |
| *reg_mask |= sreg; |
| } /* else dreg += K |
| * dreg still needs precision before this insn |
| */ |
| } |
| } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { |
| if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) |
| return 0; |
| *reg_mask &= ~dreg; |
| |
| /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. |
| * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. |
| * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated |
| * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. |
| * No further tracking necessary. |
| */ |
| if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) |
| return 0; |
| if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. |
| * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be |
| * tracked with precision |
| */ |
| spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; |
| if (spi >= 64) { |
| verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); |
| WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| *stack_mask |= 1ull << spi; |
| } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { |
| if (*reg_mask & dreg) |
| /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg |
| * to access memory. It means backtracking |
| * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. |
| */ |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ |
| if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) |
| return 0; |
| if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) |
| return 0; |
| spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; |
| if (spi >= 64) { |
| verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); |
| WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| if (!(*stack_mask & (1ull << spi))) |
| return 0; |
| *stack_mask &= ~(1ull << spi); |
| if (class == BPF_STX) |
| *reg_mask |= sreg; |
| } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { |
| if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { |
| if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| /* regular helper call sets R0 */ |
| *reg_mask &= ~1; |
| if (*reg_mask & 0x3f) { |
| /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 |
| * they should have been found already. |
| */ |
| verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", *reg_mask); |
| WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| } |
| } else if (class == BPF_LD) { |
| if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) |
| return 0; |
| *reg_mask &= ~dreg; |
| /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. |
| * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision |
| * into parent is necessary |
| */ |
| if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) |
| /* to be analyzed */ |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: |
| * . at the start all registers have precise=false. |
| * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. |
| * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: |
| * . ptr + scalar alu |
| * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) |
| * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected |
| * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and |
| * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers |
| * should be precise. |
| * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) |
| * are equivalent if both are not precise. |
| * |
| * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, |
| * since many different registers and stack slots could have been |
| * used to compute single precise scalar. |
| * |
| * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then |
| * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects |
| * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper |
| * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. |
| * |
| * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. |
| * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. |
| * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. |
| * |
| * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: |
| * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) |
| * r9 -= r8 |
| * r5 = r9 |
| * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 |
| * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) |
| * r5 += 1 |
| * ... |
| * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 |
| * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO |
| * |
| * and this case: |
| * r6 = 1 |
| * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 |
| * r0 += r6 |
| * if r0 == 0 goto |
| * |
| * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. |
| * |
| * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, |
| * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees |
| * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to |
| * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") |
| * |
| * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. |
| */ |
| static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *st) |
| { |
| struct bpf_func_state *func; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg; |
| int i, j; |
| |
| /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. |
| * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. |
| */ |
| for (; st; st = st->parent) |
| for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { |
| func = st->frame[i]; |
| for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { |
| reg = &func->regs[j]; |
| if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) |
| continue; |
| reg->precise = true; |
| } |
| for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { |
| if (func->stack[j].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) |
| continue; |
| reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; |
| if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) |
| continue; |
| reg->precise = true; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, |
| int spi) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; |
| int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; |
| int last_idx = env->insn_idx; |
| struct bpf_func_state *func; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg; |
| u32 reg_mask = regno >= 0 ? 1u << regno : 0; |
| u64 stack_mask = spi >= 0 ? 1ull << spi : 0; |
| bool skip_first = true; |
| bool new_marks = false; |
| int i, err; |
| |
| if (!env->bpf_capable) |
| return 0; |
| |
| func = st->frame[st->curframe]; |
| if (regno >= 0) { |
| reg = &func->regs[regno]; |
| if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| if (!reg->precise) |
| new_marks = true; |
| else |
| reg_mask = 0; |
| reg->precise = true; |
| } |
| |
| while (spi >= 0) { |
| if (func->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) { |
| stack_mask = 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| reg = &func->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; |
| if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| stack_mask = 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (!reg->precise) |
| new_marks = true; |
| else |
| stack_mask = 0; |
| reg->precise = true; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (!new_marks) |
| return 0; |
| if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) |
| return 0; |
| for (;;) { |
| DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); |
| u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; |
| |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) |
| verbose(env, "last_idx %d first_idx %d\n", last_idx, first_idx); |
| for (i = last_idx;;) { |
| if (skip_first) { |
| err = 0; |
| skip_first = false; |
| } else { |
| err = backtrack_insn(env, i, ®_mask, &stack_mask); |
| } |
| if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { |
| mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); |
| return 0; |
| } else if (err) { |
| return err; |
| } |
| if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) |
| /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. |
| * Since this state is already marked, just return. |
| * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. |
| */ |
| return 0; |
| if (i == first_idx) |
| break; |
| i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); |
| if (i >= env->prog->len) { |
| /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 |
| * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask |
| * to backtrack. |
| * It means the backtracking missed the spot where |
| * particular register was initialized with a constant. |
| */ |
| verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i); |
| WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| } |
| st = st->parent; |
| if (!st) |
| break; |
| |
| new_marks = false; |
| func = st->frame[st->curframe]; |
| bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); |
| for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { |
| reg = &func->regs[i]; |
| if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (!reg->precise) |
| new_marks = true; |
| reg->precise = true; |
| } |
| |
| bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); |
| for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { |
| if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { |
| /* the sequence of instructions: |
| * 2: (bf) r3 = r10 |
| * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0 |
| * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) |
| * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked |
| * as a single block. |
| * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as |
| * stack access, so at the end of backtracking |
| * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask. |
| * However the parent state may not have accessed |
| * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. |
| * In such case fallback to conservative. |
| */ |
| mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (func->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) { |
| stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); |
| continue; |
| } |
| reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; |
| if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (!reg->precise) |
| new_marks = true; |
| reg->precise = true; |
| } |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { |
| print_verifier_state(env, func); |
| verbose(env, "parent %s regs=%x stack=%llx marks\n", |
| new_marks ? "didn't have" : "already had", |
| reg_mask, stack_mask); |
| } |
| |
| if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) |
| break; |
| if (!new_marks) |
| break; |
| |
| last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; |
| first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) |
| { |
| return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno, -1); |
| } |
| |
| static int mark_chain_precision_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int spi) |
| { |
| return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1, spi); |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) |
| { |
| switch (type) { |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_STACK: |
| case PTR_TO_CTX: |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET: |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: |
| case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: |
| case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: |
| case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: |
| case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF: |
| case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF: |
| case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: |
| case PTR_TO_MEM: |
| case PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_FUNC: |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: |
| return true; |
| default: |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ |
| static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); |
| } |
| |
| static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); |
| } |
| |
| static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) && |
| reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX && |
| reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX && |
| reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX && |
| reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX; |
| } |
| |
| static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg); |
| } |
| |
| static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| if (allow_ptr_leaks) |
| return false; |
| |
| return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; |
| } |
| |
| static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, |
| int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg; |
| state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) |
| state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL; |
| } |
| |
| /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, |
| * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() |
| */ |
| static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| /* stack frame we're writing to */ |
| struct bpf_func_state *state, |
| int off, int size, int value_regno, |
| int insn_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ |
| int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; |
| u32 dst_reg = env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx].dst_reg; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; |
| |
| err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE)); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, |
| * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits |
| */ |
| if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && |
| state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && |
| size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { |
| verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; |
| if (value_regno >= 0) |
| reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; |
| |
| if (reg && size == BPF_REG_SIZE && register_is_bounded(reg) && |
| !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { |
| if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { |
| /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit |
| * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of |
| * scalar via different register has to be conservative. |
| * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise |
| * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. |
| */ |
| err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| save_register_state(state, spi, reg); |
| } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { |
| /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ |
| if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { |
| verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); |
| verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { |
| verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { |
| bool sanitize = false; |
| |
| if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && |
| register_is_const(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr)) |
| sanitize = true; |
| for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) |
| if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) { |
| sanitize = true; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (sanitize) { |
| int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off; |
| int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE; |
| |
| /* detected reuse of integer stack slot with a pointer |
| * which means either llvm is reusing stack slot or |
| * an attacker is trying to exploit CVE-2018-3639 |
| * (speculative store bypass) |
| * Have to sanitize that slot with preemptive |
| * store of zero. |
| */ |
| if (*poff && *poff != soff) { |
| /* disallow programs where single insn stores |
| * into two different stack slots, since verifier |
| * cannot sanitize them |
| */ |
| verbose(env, |
| "insn %d cannot access two stack slots fp%d and fp%d", |
| insn_idx, *poff, soff); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| *poff = soff; |
| } |
| } |
| save_register_state(state, spi, reg); |
| } else { |
| u8 type = STACK_MISC; |
| |
| /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ |
| state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; |
| /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */ |
| if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) |
| for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) |
| state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_MISC; |
| |
| /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written |
| * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon |
| * when stack slots are partially written. |
| * This heuristic means that read propagation will be |
| * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks |
| * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs |
| * writes+reads less than 8 bytes |
| */ |
| if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) |
| state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
| |
| /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ |
| if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) { |
| /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ |
| err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| type = STACK_ZERO; |
| } |
| |
| /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ |
| for (i = 0; i < size; i++) |
| state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = |
| type; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is |
| * known to contain a variable offset. |
| * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively |
| * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the |
| * dynamic range is potentially written to. |
| * |
| * 'off' includes 'regno->off'. |
| * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to |
| * the stack. |
| * |
| * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know |
| * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for |
| * future reads cannot be terminated by this write. |
| * |
| * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered |
| * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets |
| * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to |
| * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets. |
| */ |
| static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| /* func where register points to */ |
| struct bpf_func_state *state, |
| int ptr_regno, int off, int size, |
| int value_regno, int insn_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ |
| int min_off, max_off; |
| int i, err; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL; |
| bool writing_zero = false; |
| /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any |
| * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO |
| */ |
| bool zero_used = false; |
| |
| cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; |
| ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; |
| min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; |
| max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size; |
| if (value_regno >= 0) |
| value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; |
| if (value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) |
| writing_zero = true; |
| |
| err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE)); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| |
| /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */ |
| for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { |
| u8 new_type, *stype; |
| int slot, spi; |
| |
| slot = -i - 1; |
| spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; |
| stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; |
| |
| if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks |
| && *stype != NOT_INIT |
| && *stype != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| /* Reject the write if there's are spilled pointers in |
| * range. If we didn't reject here, the ptr status |
| * would be erased below (even though not all slots are |
| * actually overwritten), possibly opening the door to |
| * leaks. |
| */ |
| verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", |
| insn_idx, i); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Erase all spilled pointers. */ |
| state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; |
| |
| /* Update the slot type. */ |
| new_type = STACK_MISC; |
| if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) { |
| new_type = STACK_ZERO; |
| zero_used = true; |
| } |
| /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to |
| * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot |
| * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as |
| * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory. |
| * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots |
| * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject |
| * them, the error would be too confusing. |
| */ |
| if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { |
| verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d", |
| insn_idx, i); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| *stype = new_type; |
| } |
| if (zero_used) { |
| /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ |
| err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, |
| * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the |
| * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then |
| * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be |
| * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must |
| * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as |
| * read. |
| */ |
| static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| /* func where src register points to */ |
| struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state, |
| int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
| int i, slot, spi; |
| u8 *stype; |
| int zeros = 0; |
| |
| for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { |
| slot = -i - 1; |
| spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; |
| stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type; |
| if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO) |
| break; |
| zeros++; |
| } |
| if (zeros == max_off - min_off) { |
| /* any access_size read into register is zero extended, |
| * so the whole register == const_zero |
| */ |
| __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]); |
| /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet, |
| * so mark it precise here, so that later |
| * backtracking can stop here. |
| * Backtracking may not need this if this register |
| * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment. |
| * Forward propagation of precise flag is not |
| * necessary either. This mark is only to stop |
| * backtracking. Any register that contributed |
| * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. |
| */ |
| state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true; |
| } else { |
| /* have read misc data from the stack */ |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); |
| } |
| state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
| } |
| |
| /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by |
| * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a |
| * spilled reg. |
| * |
| * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a |
| * register. |
| * |
| * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds. |
| */ |
| static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| /* func where src register points to */ |
| struct bpf_func_state *reg_state, |
| int off, int size, int dst_regno) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
| int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg; |
| u8 *stype; |
| |
| stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; |
| reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; |
| |
| if (stype[0] == STACK_SPILL) { |
| if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { |
| if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); |
| verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| if (dst_regno >= 0) { |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); |
| state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
| } |
| mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { |
| if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) { |
| verbose(env, "corrupted spill memory\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (dst_regno >= 0) { |
| /* restore register state from stack */ |
| state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg; |
| /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely |
| * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() |
| * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions |
| */ |
| state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
| } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { |
| /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether |
| * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE |
| * (e.g. for XADD). |
| * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that |
| * with spilled pointers. |
| */ |
| verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", |
| off); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); |
| } else { |
| u8 type; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { |
| type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; |
| if (type == STACK_MISC) |
| continue; |
| if (type == STACK_ZERO) |
| continue; |
| verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", |
| off, i, size); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); |
| if (dst_regno >= 0) |
| mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| enum stack_access_src { |
| ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */ |
| ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ |
| }; |
| |
| static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| int regno, int off, int access_size, |
| bool zero_size_allowed, |
| enum stack_access_src type, |
| struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); |
| |
| static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) |
| { |
| return cur_regs(env) + regno; |
| } |
| |
| /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register |
| * 'dst_regno'. |
| * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'), |
| * but not its variable offset. |
| * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned. |
| * |
| * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with |
| * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when |
| * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing |
| * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable |
| * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used |
| * instead. |
| */ |
| static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno) |
| { |
| /* The state of the source register. */ |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); |
| struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg); |
| int err; |
| int min_off, max_off; |
| |
| /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. |
| */ |
| err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size, |
| false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| min_off = reg->smin_value + off; |
| max_off = reg->smax_value + off; |
| mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or |
| * check_stack_read_var_off. |
| * |
| * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack |
| * bounds. |
| * |
| * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It |
| * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. |
| */ |
| static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| int ptr_regno, int off, int size, |
| int dst_regno) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); |
| int err; |
| /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */ |
| bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); |
| |
| /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a |
| * register, in order to not leak pointers (see |
| * check_stack_read_fixed_off). |
| */ |
| if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", |
| tn_buf, off, size); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity |
| * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack |
| * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). |
| */ |
| if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", |
| ptr_regno, tn_buf); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (!var_off) { |
| off += reg->var_off.value; |
| err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, |
| dst_regno); |
| } else { |
| /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling |
| * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this |
| * branch. |
| */ |
| err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size, |
| dst_regno); |
| } |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or |
| * check_stack_write_var_off. |
| * |
| * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack. |
| * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any). |
| * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can |
| * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register. |
| * |
| * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. |
| */ |
| static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| int ptr_regno, int off, int size, |
| int value_regno, int insn_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); |
| int err; |
| |
| if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
| off += reg->var_off.value; |
| err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, |
| value_regno, insn_idx); |
| } else { |
| /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling |
| * than fixed offset ones. |
| */ |
| err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state, |
| ptr_regno, off, size, |
| value_regno, insn_idx); |
| } |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, |
| int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
| struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; |
| u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); |
| |
| if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { |
| verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", |
| map->value_size, off, size); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { |
| verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", |
| map->value_size, off, size); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ |
| static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, |
| int off, int size, u32 mem_size, |
| bool zero_size_allowed) |
| { |
| bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg; |
| |
| if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) |
| return 0; |
| |
| reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; |
| switch (reg->type) { |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: |
| verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", |
| mem_size, off, size); |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: |
| verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", |
| mem_size, off, size); |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET: |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: |
| verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", |
| off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_MEM: |
| default: |
| verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", |
| mem_size, off, size); |
| } |
| |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ |
| static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, |
| int off, int size, u32 mem_size, |
| bool zero_size_allowed) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; |
| int err; |
| |
| /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we |
| * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off |
| * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. |
| */ |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) |
| print_verifier_state(env, state); |
| |
| /* The minimum value is only important with signed |
| * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a |
| * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our |
| * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use |
| * will have a set floor within our range. |
| */ |
| if (reg->smin_value < 0 && |
| (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || |
| (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || |
| reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", |
| regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, |
| mem_size, zero_size_allowed); |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", |
| regno); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be |
| * sure we won't do bad things. |
| * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. |
| */ |
| if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", |
| regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, |
| mem_size, zero_size_allowed); |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", |
| regno); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ |
| static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, |
| int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; |
| struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; |
| int err; |
| |
| err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size, |
| zero_size_allowed); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { |
| u32 lock = map->spin_lock_off; |
| |
| /* if any part of struct bpf_spin_lock can be touched by |
| * load/store reject this program. |
| * To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2) |
| * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. |
| */ |
| if (reg->smin_value + off < lock + sizeof(struct bpf_spin_lock) && |
| lock < reg->umax_value + off + size) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| } |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff |
| |
| static enum bpf_prog_type resolve_prog_type(struct bpf_prog *prog) |
| { |
| return prog->aux->dst_prog ? prog->aux->dst_prog->type : prog->type; |
| } |
| |
| static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, |
| enum bpf_access_type t) |
| { |
| enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); |
| |
| switch (prog_type) { |
| /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE) |
| return false; |
| fallthrough; |
| |
| /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: |
| if (meta) |
| return meta->pkt_access; |
| |
| env->seen_direct_write = true; |
| return true; |
| |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE) |
| env->seen_direct_write = true; |
| |
| return true; |
| |
| default: |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, |
| int size, bool zero_size_allowed) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; |
| int err; |
| |
| /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any |
| * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed |
| * offset. |
| */ |
| |
| /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough |
| * detail to prove they're safe. |
| */ |
| if (reg->smin_value < 0) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", |
| regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL : |
| __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, |
| zero_size_allowed); |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. |
| * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, |
| * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info |
| * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. |
| * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. |
| */ |
| env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = |
| max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, |
| off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); |
| |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ |
| static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, |
| enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, |
| struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { |
| .reg_type = *reg_type, |
| .log = &env->log, |
| }; |
| |
| if (env->ops->is_valid_access && |
| env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) { |
| /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a |
| * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole |
| * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower |
| * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size |
| * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other |
| * type of narrower access. |
| */ |
| *reg_type = info.reg_type; |
| |
| if (*reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || *reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) { |
| *btf = info.btf; |
| *btf_id = info.btf_id; |
| } else { |
| env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; |
| } |
| /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ |
| if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) |
| env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, |
| int size) |
| { |
| if (size < 0 || off < 0 || |
| (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", |
| off, size); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, |
| u32 regno, int off, int size, |
| enum bpf_access_type t) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; |
| struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; |
| bool valid; |
| |
| if (reg->smin_value < 0) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", |
| regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| switch (reg->type) { |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: |
| valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET: |
| valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: |
| valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: |
| valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); |
| break; |
| default: |
| valid = false; |
| } |
| |
| |
| if (valid) { |
| env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = |
| info.ctx_field_size; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", |
| regno, reg_type_str[reg->type], off, size); |
| |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) |
| { |
| return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); |
| |
| return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); |
| |
| return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); |
| |
| return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); |
| |
| /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ |
| return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| int off, int size, bool strict) |
| { |
| struct tnum reg_off; |
| int ip_align; |
| |
| /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ |
| if (!strict || size == 1) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling |
| * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of |
| * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms |
| * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get |
| * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate |
| * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an |
| * unconditional IP align value of '2'. |
| */ |
| ip_align = 2; |
| |
| reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); |
| if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, |
| "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", |
| ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| const char *pointer_desc, |
| int off, int size, bool strict) |
| { |
| struct tnum reg_off; |
| |
| /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ |
| if (!strict || size == 1) |
| return 0; |
| |
| reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); |
| if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", |
| pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, |
| int size, bool strict_alignment_once) |
| { |
| bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; |
| const char *pointer_desc = ""; |
| |
| switch (reg->type) { |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET: |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: |
| /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits |
| * right in front, treat it the very same way. |
| */ |
| return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); |
| case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: |
| pointer_desc = "flow keys "; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: |
| pointer_desc = "key "; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: |
| pointer_desc = "value "; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_CTX: |
| pointer_desc = "context "; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_STACK: |
| pointer_desc = "stack "; |
| /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off() |
| * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being |
| * aligned. |
| */ |
| strict = true; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET: |
| pointer_desc = "sock "; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: |
| pointer_desc = "sock_common "; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: |
| pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: |
| pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, |
| strict); |
| } |
| |
| static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_func_state *func, |
| int off) |
| { |
| u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth; |
| |
| if (stack >= -off) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* update known max for given subprogram */ |
| env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function |
| * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. |
| * Ignore jump and exit insns. |
| * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm |
| * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites |
| */ |
| static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end; |
| struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
| bool tail_call_reachable = false; |
| int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; |
| int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; |
| int j; |
| |
| process_func: |
| /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when |
| * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack |
| * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario |
| * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = |
| * 8k). |
| * |
| * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: |
| * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 |
| * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 |
| * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 |
| * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) |
| * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 |
| * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 |
| * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 |
| * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) |
| * |
| * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid |
| * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. |
| */ |
| if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", |
| depth); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity |
| * of interpreter stack size |
| */ |
| depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); |
| if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { |
| verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", |
| frame + 1, depth); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| continue_func: |
| subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; |
| for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { |
| if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) |
| continue; |
| /* remember insn and function to return to */ |
| ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; |
| ret_prog[frame] = idx; |
| |
| /* find the callee */ |
| i = i + insn[i].imm + 1; |
| idx = find_subprog(env, i); |
| if (idx < 0) { |
| WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", |
| i); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| |
| if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) |
| tail_call_reachable = true; |
| |
| frame++; |
| if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { |
| verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", |
| frame); |
| return -E2BIG; |
| } |
| goto process_func; |
| } |
| /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the |
| * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; |
| * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the |
| * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls |
| */ |
| if (tail_call_reachable) |
| for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) |
| subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; |
| if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable) |
| env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true; |
| |
| /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' |
| * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT |
| */ |
| if (frame == 0) |
| return 0; |
| depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); |
| frame--; |
| i = ret_insn[frame]; |
| idx = ret_prog[frame]; |
| goto continue_func; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON |
| static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) |
| { |
| int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; |
| |
| subprog = find_subprog(env, start); |
| if (subprog < 0) { |
| WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", |
| start); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| int check_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) |
| { |
| /* Access to ctx or passing it to a helper is only allowed in |
| * its original, unmodified form. |
| */ |
| |
| if (reg->off) { |
| verbose(env, "dereference of modified ctx ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", |
| regno, reg->off); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, "variable ctx access var_off=%s disallowed\n", tn_buf); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const char *buf_info, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| int regno, int off, int size) |
| { |
| if (off < 0) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", |
| regno, buf_info, off, size); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, |
| "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", |
| regno, off, tn_buf); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| int regno, int off, int size) |
| { |
| int err; |
| |
| err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) |
| env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| int regno, int off, int size, |
| bool zero_size_allowed, |
| const char *buf_info, |
| u32 *max_access) |
| { |
| int err; |
| |
| err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (off + size > *max_access) |
| *max_access = off + size; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ |
| static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
| { |
| reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); |
| __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); |
| } |
| |
| /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) |
| * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE |
| */ |
| static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) |
| { |
| u64 mask; |
| |
| /* clear high bits in bit representation */ |
| reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); |
| |
| /* fix arithmetic bounds */ |
| mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; |
| if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { |
| reg->umin_value &= mask; |
| reg->umax_value &= mask; |
| } else { |
| reg->umin_value = 0; |
| reg->umax_value = mask; |
| } |
| reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; |
| reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; |
| |
| /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register |
| * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into |
| * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. |
| */ |
| if (size >= 4) |
| return; |
| __reg_combine_64_into_32(reg); |
| } |
| |
| static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) |
| { |
| return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && map->frozen; |
| } |
| |
| static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val) |
| { |
| void *ptr; |
| u64 addr; |
| int err; |
| |
| err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; |
| |
| switch (size) { |
| case sizeof(u8): |
| *val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; |
| break; |
| case sizeof(u16): |
| *val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; |
| break; |
| case sizeof(u32): |
| *val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; |
| break; |
| case sizeof(u64): |
| *val = *(u64 *)ptr; |
| break; |
| default: |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs, |
| int regno, int off, int size, |
| enum bpf_access_type atype, |
| int value_regno) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; |
| const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); |
| const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off); |
| u32 btf_id; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (off < 0) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", |
| regno, tname, off); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, |
| "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", |
| regno, tname, off, tn_buf); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (env->ops->btf_struct_access) { |
| ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg->btf, t, |
| off, size, atype, &btf_id); |
| } else { |
| if (atype != BPF_READ) { |
| verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg->btf, t, off, size, |
| atype, &btf_id); |
| } |
| |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return ret; |
| |
| if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) |
| mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs, |
| int regno, int off, int size, |
| enum bpf_access_type atype, |
| int value_regno) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; |
| struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; |
| const struct btf_type *t; |
| const char *tname; |
| u32 btf_id; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (!btf_vmlinux) { |
| verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| } |
| |
| if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { |
| verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", |
| map->map_type); |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| } |
| |
| t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); |
| tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); |
| |
| if (!env->allow_ptr_to_map_access) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "%s access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", |
| tname); |
| return -EPERM; |
| } |
| |
| if (off < 0) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", |
| regno, tname, off); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (atype != BPF_READ) { |
| verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, btf_vmlinux, t, off, size, atype, &btf_id); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return ret; |
| |
| if (value_regno >= 0) |
| mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The |
| * maximum valid offset is -1. |
| * |
| * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and |
| * -state->allocated_stack for reads. |
| */ |
| static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off, |
| struct bpf_func_state *state, |
| enum bpf_access_type t) |
| { |
| int min_valid_off; |
| |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE) |
| min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK; |
| else |
| min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack; |
| |
| if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1) |
| return -EACCES; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack |
| * bounds. |
| * |
| * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). |
| */ |
| static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( |
| struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| int regno, int off, int access_size, |
| enum stack_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); |
| int min_off, max_off; |
| int err; |
| char *err_extra; |
| |
| if (src == ACCESS_HELPER) |
| /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */ |
| err_extra = " indirect access to"; |
| else if (type == BPF_READ) |
| err_extra = " read from"; |
| else |
| err_extra = " write to"; |
| |
| if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
| min_off = reg->var_off.value + off; |
| if (access_size > 0) |
| max_off = min_off + access_size - 1; |
| else |
| max_off = min_off; |
| } else { |
| if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || |
| reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n", |
| err_extra, regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| min_off = reg->smin_value + off; |
| if (access_size > 0) |
| max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1; |
| else |
| max_off = min_off; |
| } |
| |
| err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type); |
| if (!err) |
| err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type); |
| |
| if (err) { |
| if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n", |
| err_extra, regno, off, access_size); |
| } else { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n", |
| err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size); |
| } |
| } |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) |
| * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory |
| * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory |
| * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory |
| * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory |
| */ |
| static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, |
| int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, |
| int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state; |
| int size, err = 0; |
| |
| size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); |
| if (size < 0) |
| return size; |
| |
| /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ |
| err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ |
| off += reg->off; |
| |
| if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE) { |
| verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, |
| reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| if (value_regno >= 0) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
| } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && |
| is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false); |
| if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { |
| struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; |
| |
| /* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */ |
| if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && |
| bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && |
| map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { |
| int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; |
| u64 val = 0; |
| |
| err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, |
| &val); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
| __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); |
| } else { |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
| } |
| } |
| } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MEM) { |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && |
| is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, |
| reg->mem_size, false); |
| if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
| } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { |
| enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
| struct btf *btf = NULL; |
| u32 btf_id = 0; |
| |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && |
| is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| |
| err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, &btf, &btf_id); |
| if (err) |
| verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); |
| if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { |
| /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a |
| * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter |
| * case, we know the offset is zero. |
| */ |
| if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
| } else { |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, |
| value_regno); |
| if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg_type)) |
| regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; |
| /* A load of ctx field could have different |
| * actual load size with the one encoded in the |
| * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not |
| * a sub-register. |
| */ |
| regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; |
| if (reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || |
| reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) { |
| regs[value_regno].btf = btf; |
| regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id; |
| } |
| } |
| regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; |
| } |
| |
| } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { |
| /* Basic bounds checks. */ |
| err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| state = func(env, reg); |
| err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (t == BPF_READ) |
| err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size, |
| value_regno); |
| else |
| err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size, |
| value_regno, insn_idx); |
| } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { |
| verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && |
| is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", |
| value_regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); |
| if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
| } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && |
| is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", |
| value_regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); |
| if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
| } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", |
| regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); |
| if (!err && value_regno >= 0) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
| } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { |
| err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); |
| if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
| } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { |
| err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, |
| value_regno); |
| } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { |
| err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, |
| value_regno); |
| } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF) { |
| if (t == BPF_WRITE) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", |
| regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, |
| "rdonly", |
| &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access); |
| if (!err && value_regno >= 0) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
| } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF) { |
| err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, |
| "rdwr", |
| &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access); |
| if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
| } else { |
| verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, |
| reg_type_str[reg->type]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && |
| regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ |
| coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); |
| } |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| int load_reg; |
| int err; |
| |
| switch (insn->imm) { |
| case BPF_ADD: |
| case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH: |
| case BPF_AND: |
| case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH: |
| case BPF_OR: |
| case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH: |
| case BPF_XOR: |
| case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH: |
| case BPF_XCHG: |
| case BPF_CMPXCHG: |
| break; |
| default: |
| verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* check src1 operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| /* check src2 operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) { |
| /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || |
| is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || |
| is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || |
| is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", |
| insn->dst_reg, |
| reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) { |
| if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) |
| load_reg = BPF_REG_0; |
| else |
| load_reg = insn->src_reg; |
| |
| /* check and record load of old value */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } else { |
| /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't |
| * actually load it into a register. |
| */ |
| load_reg = -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* check whether we can read the memory */ |
| err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, |
| BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, true); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| /* check whether we can write into the same memory */ |
| err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, |
| BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through |
| * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending |
| * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized. |
| * |
| * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any). |
| * |
| * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the |
| * read offsets are marked as read. |
| */ |
| static int check_stack_range_initialized( |
| struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off, |
| int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, |
| enum stack_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); |
| int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; |
| char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : ""; |
| enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type; |
| /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are |
| * read-only. |
| */ |
| bool clobber = false; |
| |
| if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) { |
| /* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for |
| * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra |
| * checks below. |
| */ |
| bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE; |
| clobber = true; |
| } else { |
| bounds_check_type = BPF_READ; |
| } |
| err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, |
| type, bounds_check_type); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| |
| if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
| min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off; |
| } else { |
| /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for |
| * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in |
| * Spectre masking for stack ALU. |
| * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). |
| */ |
| if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", |
| regno, err_extra, tn_buf); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed |
| * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to |
| * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on |
| * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may |
| * cause uninitialized stack leaking. |
| */ |
| if (meta && meta->raw_mode) |
| meta = NULL; |
| |
| min_off = reg->smin_value + off; |
| max_off = reg->smax_value + off; |
| } |
| |
| if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { |
| meta->access_size = access_size; |
| meta->regno = regno; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { |
| u8 *stype; |
| |
| slot = -i - 1; |
| spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; |
| if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) |
| goto err; |
| stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; |
| if (*stype == STACK_MISC) |
| goto mark; |
| if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) { |
| if (clobber) { |
| /* helper can write anything into the stack */ |
| *stype = STACK_MISC; |
| } |
| goto mark; |
| } |
| |
| if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && |
| state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) |
| goto mark; |
| |
| if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && |
| (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || |
| env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { |
| if (clobber) { |
| __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); |
| for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) |
| state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC; |
| } |
| goto mark; |
| } |
| |
| err: |
| if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n", |
| err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size); |
| } else { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n", |
| err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); |
| } |
| return -EACCES; |
| mark: |
| /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause |
| * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' |
| */ |
| mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, |
| state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, |
| REG_LIVE_READ64); |
| } |
| return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off); |
| } |
| |
| static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, |
| int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, |
| struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; |
| |
| switch (reg->type) { |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET: |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: |
| return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, |
| zero_size_allowed); |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: |
| return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, |
| reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: |
| if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, |
| meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : |
| BPF_READ)) |
| return -EACCES; |
| return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, |
| zero_size_allowed); |
| case PTR_TO_MEM: |
| return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, |
| access_size, reg->mem_size, |
| zero_size_allowed); |
| case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF: |
| if (meta && meta->raw_mode) |
| return -EACCES; |
| return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, |
| access_size, zero_size_allowed, |
| "rdonly", |
| &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access); |
| case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF: |
| return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, |
| access_size, zero_size_allowed, |
| "rdwr", |
| &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access); |
| case PTR_TO_STACK: |
| return check_stack_range_initialized( |
| env, |
| regno, reg->off, access_size, |
| zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta); |
| default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ |
| /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ |
| if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && |
| register_is_null(reg)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, |
| reg_type_str[reg->type], |
| reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| u32 regno, u32 mem_size) |
| { |
| if (register_is_null(reg)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { |
| /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory |
| * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as |
| * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. |
| */ |
| const struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg = *reg; |
| int rv; |
| |
| mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); |
| rv = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, NULL); |
| *reg = saved_reg; |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| return check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* Implementation details: |
| * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL |
| * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. |
| * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE the verifier clears reg->id after |
| * value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only cares about |
| * the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care about actual |
| * address of the map element. |
| * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps |
| * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so |
| * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that |
| * point to different bpf_spin_locks. |
| * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid |
| * dead-locks. |
| * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than |
| * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only |
| * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. |
| * cur_state->active_spin_lock remembers which map value element got locked |
| * and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. |
| */ |
| static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, |
| bool is_lock) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; |
| bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); |
| struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; |
| u64 val = reg->var_off.value; |
| |
| if (!is_const) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", |
| regno); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (!map->btf) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n", |
| map->name); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (!map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { |
| if (map->spin_lock_off == -E2BIG) |
| verbose(env, |
| "map '%s' has more than one 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", |
| map->name); |
| else if (map->spin_lock_off == -ENOENT) |
| verbose(env, |
| "map '%s' doesn't have 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", |
| map->name); |
| else |
| verbose(env, |
| "map '%s' is not a struct type or bpf_spin_lock is mangled\n", |
| map->name); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (map->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { |
| verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", |
| val + reg->off); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (is_lock) { |
| if (cur->active_spin_lock) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| cur->active_spin_lock = reg->id; |
| } else { |
| if (!cur->active_spin_lock) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (cur->active_spin_lock != reg->id) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| cur->active_spin_lock = 0; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static bool arg_type_is_mem_ptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || |
| type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || |
| type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM; |
| } |
| |
| static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || |
| type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; |
| } |
| |
| static bool arg_type_is_alloc_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO; |
| } |
| |
| static bool arg_type_is_int_ptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) |
| { |
| return type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT || |
| type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG; |
| } |
| |
| static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) |
| { |
| if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT) |
| return sizeof(u32); |
| else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG) |
| return sizeof(u64); |
| |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, |
| enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) |
| { |
| if (!meta->map_ptr) { |
| /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ |
| verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: |
| if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { |
| *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; |
| } else { |
| verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| struct bpf_reg_types { |
| const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; |
| u32 *btf_id; |
| }; |
| |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types map_key_value_types = { |
| .types = { |
| PTR_TO_STACK, |
| PTR_TO_PACKET, |
| PTR_TO_PACKET_META, |
| PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, |
| PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, |
| }, |
| }; |
| |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { |
| .types = { |
| PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, |
| PTR_TO_SOCKET, |
| PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, |
| PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, |
| }, |
| }; |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_NET |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { |
| .types = { |
| PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, |
| PTR_TO_SOCKET, |
| PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, |
| PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, |
| PTR_TO_BTF_ID, |
| }, |
| .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], |
| }; |
| #endif |
| |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { |
| .types = { |
| PTR_TO_STACK, |
| PTR_TO_PACKET, |
| PTR_TO_PACKET_META, |
| PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, |
| PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, |
| PTR_TO_MEM, |
| PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF, |
| PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF, |
| }, |
| }; |
| |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = { |
| .types = { |
| PTR_TO_STACK, |
| PTR_TO_PACKET, |
| PTR_TO_PACKET_META, |
| PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, |
| PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, |
| }, |
| }; |
| |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types alloc_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM } }; |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_BTF_ID } }; |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID } }; |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; |
| |
| static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &map_key_value_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &map_key_value_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE] = &map_key_value_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = &map_key_value_types, |
| [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, |
| [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, |
| [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, |
| [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX_OR_NULL] = &context_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, |
| #ifdef CONFIG_NET |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, |
| #endif |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL] = &fullsock_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL] = &mem_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM] = &mem_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM] = &alloc_mem_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL] = &alloc_mem_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_INT] = &int_ptr_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_LONG] = &int_ptr_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL] = &stack_ptr_types, |
| [ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR] = &const_str_ptr_types, |
| }; |
| |
| static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, |
| enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, |
| const u32 *arg_btf_id) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; |
| enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; |
| const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; |
| int i, j; |
| |
| compatible = compatible_reg_types[arg_type]; |
| if (!compatible) { |
| verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { |
| expected = compatible->types[i]; |
| if (expected == NOT_INIT) |
| break; |
| |
| if (type == expected) |
| goto found; |
| } |
| |
| verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str[type]); |
| for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) |
| verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str[compatible->types[j]]); |
| verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str[compatible->types[j]]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| |
| found: |
| if (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { |
| if (!arg_btf_id) { |
| if (!compatible->btf_id) { |
| verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; |
| } |
| |
| if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, |
| btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", |
| regno, kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), |
| kernel_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d is a pointer to in-kernel struct with non-zero offset\n", |
| regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, |
| struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, |
| const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) |
| { |
| u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; |
| enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; |
| enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; |
| int err = 0; |
| |
| if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) |
| return 0; |
| |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { |
| if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", |
| regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && |
| !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { |
| verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || |
| arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE || |
| arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { |
| err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| if (register_is_null(reg) && arg_type_may_be_null(arg_type)) |
| /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip |
| * type checking. |
| */ |
| goto skip_type_check; |
| |
| err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, fn->arg_btf_id[arg]); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (type == PTR_TO_CTX) { |
| err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| skip_type_check: |
| if (reg->ref_obj_id) { |
| if (meta->ref_obj_id) { |
| verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", |
| regno, reg->ref_obj_id, |
| meta->ref_obj_id); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; |
| } |
| |
| if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) { |
| /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ |
| meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; |
| } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { |
| /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: |
| * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within |
| * stack limits and initialized |
| */ |
| if (!meta->map_ptr) { |
| /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before |
| * map_key, so that it's verified and known before |
| * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means |
| * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier |
| */ |
| verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, |
| meta->map_ptr->key_size, false, |
| NULL); |
| } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || |
| (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && |
| !register_is_null(reg)) || |
| arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE) { |
| /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: |
| * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity |
| */ |
| if (!meta->map_ptr) { |
| /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ |
| verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| meta->raw_mode = (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE); |
| err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, |
| meta->map_ptr->value_size, false, |
| meta); |
| } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID) { |
| if (!reg->btf_id) { |
| verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| meta->ret_btf = reg->btf; |
| meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; |
| } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) { |
| if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { |
| if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, true)) |
| return -EACCES; |
| } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { |
| if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, false)) |
| return -EACCES; |
| } else { |
| verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC) { |
| meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; |
| } else if (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_type)) { |
| /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the |
| * next is_mem_size argument below. |
| */ |
| meta->raw_mode = (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM); |
| } else if (arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_type)) { |
| bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO); |
| |
| /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers |
| * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. |
| * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine |
| * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register |
| * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors |
| * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an |
| * int type and negative retvals are allowed. |
| */ |
| meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; |
| |
| /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check |
| * happens using its boundaries. |
| */ |
| if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) |
| /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw |
| * mode so that the program is required to |
| * initialize all the memory that the helper could |
| * just partially fill up. |
| */ |
| meta = NULL; |
| |
| if (reg->smin_value < 0) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", |
| regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (reg->umin_value == 0) { |
| err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0, |
| zero_size_allowed, |
| meta); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", |
| regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, |
| reg->umax_value, |
| zero_size_allowed, meta); |
| if (!err) |
| err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); |
| } else if (arg_type_is_alloc_size(arg_type)) { |
| if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n", |
| regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; |
| } else if (arg_type_is_int_ptr(arg_type)) { |
| int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type); |
| |
| err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true); |
| } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR) { |
| struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; |
| int map_off; |
| u64 map_addr; |
| char *str_ptr; |
| |
| if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { |
| verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, |
| map->value_size - reg->off, false); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; |
| err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off); |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n"); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr); |
| if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) { |
| verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) |
| { |
| enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; |
| enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); |
| |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these |
| * contexts, so updating is safe. |
| */ |
| switch (type) { |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: |
| if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) |
| return true; |
| break; |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: |
| return true; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| return env->prog->jit_requested && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64); |
| } |
| |
| static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) |
| { |
| if (!map) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ |
| switch (map->map_type) { |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases |
| * appear. |
| */ |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && |
| !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && |
| !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* ... and second from the function itself. */ |
| switch (func_id) { |
| case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) |
| goto error; |
| if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { |
| verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: |
| case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: |
| case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: |
| case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: |
| case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: |
| case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && |
| map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && |
| map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && |
| map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: |
| case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: |
| case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: |
| case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: |
| case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && |
| map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && |
| map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && |
| map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: |
| case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: |
| case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && |
| map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: |
| case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: |
| case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: |
| case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: |
| if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) |
| goto error; |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| error: |
| verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", |
| map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) |
| { |
| int count = 0; |
| |
| if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) |
| count++; |
| if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) |
| count++; |
| if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) |
| count++; |
| if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) |
| count++; |
| if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) |
| count++; |
| |
| /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, |
| * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have |
| * right now. |
| */ |
| return count <= 1; |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_args_pair_invalid(enum bpf_arg_type arg_curr, |
| enum bpf_arg_type arg_next) |
| { |
| return (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_curr) && |
| !arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_next)) || |
| (!arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_curr) && |
| arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_next)); |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) |
| { |
| /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' |
| * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need |
| * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy |
| * helper function specification. |
| */ |
| if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || |
| arg_type_is_mem_ptr(fn->arg5_type) || |
| check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg1_type, fn->arg2_type) || |
| check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg2_type, fn->arg3_type) || |
| check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg3_type, fn->arg4_type) || |
| check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg4_type, fn->arg5_type)) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_refcount_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) |
| { |
| int count = 0; |
| |
| if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg1_type)) |
| count++; |
| if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg2_type)) |
| count++; |
| if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg3_type)) |
| count++; |
| if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg4_type)) |
| count++; |
| if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg5_type)) |
| count++; |
| |
| /* A reference acquiring function cannot acquire |
| * another refcounted ptr. |
| */ |
| if (may_be_acquire_function(func_id) && count) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* We only support one arg being unreferenced at the moment, |
| * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now. |
| */ |
| return count <= 1; |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { |
| if (fn->arg_type[i] == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && !fn->arg_btf_id[i]) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (fn->arg_type[i] != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i]) |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) |
| { |
| return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && |
| check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && |
| check_btf_id_ok(fn) && |
| check_refcount_ok(fn, func_id) ? 0 : -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] |
| * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. |
| */ |
| static void __clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_func_state *state) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) |
| if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(®s[i])) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); |
| |
| bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { |
| if (!reg) |
| continue; |
| if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg)) |
| __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) |
| __clear_all_pkt_pointers(env, vstate->frame[i]); |
| } |
| |
| enum { |
| AT_PKT_END = -1, |
| BEYOND_PKT_END = -2, |
| }; |
| |
| static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open) |
| { |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn]; |
| |
| if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET) |
| /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */ |
| return; |
| |
| /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end. |
| * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown. |
| * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end |
| * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end |
| * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end |
| */ |
| if (range_open) |
| reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END; |
| else |
| reg->range = AT_PKT_END; |
| } |
| |
| static void release_reg_references(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_func_state *state, |
| int ref_obj_id) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) |
| if (regs[i].ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); |
| |
| bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { |
| if (!reg) |
| continue; |
| if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) |
| __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel |
| * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. |
| */ |
| static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| int ref_obj_id) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| int err; |
| int i; |
| |
| err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) |
| release_reg_references(env, vstate->frame[i], ref_obj_id); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ |
| for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { |
| mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); |
| check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_func_state *caller, |
| struct bpf_func_state *callee, |
| int insn_idx); |
| |
| static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| int *insn_idx, int subprog, |
| set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_func_info_aux *func_info_aux; |
| struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; |
| int err; |
| bool is_global = false; |
| |
| if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { |
| verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", |
| state->curframe + 2); |
| return -E2BIG; |
| } |
| |
| caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; |
| if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { |
| verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", |
| state->curframe + 1); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| |
| func_info_aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; |
| if (func_info_aux) |
| is_global = func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; |
| err = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, caller->regs); |
| if (err == -EFAULT) |
| return err; |
| if (is_global) { |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", |
| subprog); |
| return err; |
| } else { |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) |
| verbose(env, |
| "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", |
| subprog); |
| clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); |
| |
| /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; |
| |
| /* continue with next insn after call */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!callee) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; |
| |
| /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write |
| * into its own stack before reading from it. |
| * callee can read/write into caller's stack |
| */ |
| init_func_state(env, callee, |
| /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ |
| *insn_idx /* callsite */, |
| state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, |
| subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); |
| |
| /* Transfer references to the callee */ |
| err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); |
| |
| /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ |
| state->curframe++; |
| |
| /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ |
| *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; |
| |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { |
| verbose(env, "caller:\n"); |
| print_verifier_state(env, caller); |
| verbose(env, "callee:\n"); |
| print_verifier_state(env, callee); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_func_state *caller, |
| struct bpf_func_state *callee) |
| { |
| /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, |
| * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); |
| * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, |
| * void *callback_ctx); |
| */ |
| callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; |
| |
| callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; |
| __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); |
| callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; |
| |
| callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; |
| __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); |
| callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; |
| |
| /* pointer to stack or null */ |
| callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; |
| |
| /* unused */ |
| __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_func_state *caller, |
| struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent |
| * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain |
| */ |
| for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) |
| callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| int *insn_idx) |
| { |
| int subprog, target_insn; |
| |
| target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; |
| subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); |
| if (subprog < 0) { |
| verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", |
| target_insn); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| |
| return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state); |
| } |
| |
| static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_func_state *caller, |
| struct bpf_func_state *callee, |
| int insn_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; |
| struct bpf_map *map; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) { |
| verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state); |
| if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || |
| !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { |
| verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| } |
| |
| err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| callee->in_callback_fn = true; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *r0; |
| int err; |
| |
| callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; |
| r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; |
| if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { |
| /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer |
| * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, |
| * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack |
| * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, |
| * but let's be conservative |
| */ |
| verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| state->curframe--; |
| caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; |
| if (callee->in_callback_fn) { |
| /* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */ |
| struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); |
| |
| if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) { |
| verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ |
| caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Transfer references to the caller */ |
| err = copy_reference_state(caller, callee); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { |
| verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); |
| print_verifier_state(env, callee); |
| verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); |
| print_verifier_state(env, caller); |
| } |
| /* clear everything in the callee */ |
| free_func_state(callee); |
| state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, |
| int func_id, |
| struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; |
| |
| if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || |
| (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str)) |
| return; |
| |
| ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; |
| ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; |
| ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO; |
| ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO; |
| __reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg); |
| __reg_bound_offset(ret_reg); |
| __update_reg_bounds(ret_reg); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, |
| int func_id, int insn_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; |
| struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; |
| |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem && |
| func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (map == NULL) { |
| verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions |
| * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the |
| * state of the map from program side. |
| */ |
| if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && |
| (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { |
| verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state)) |
| bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, |
| !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); |
| else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr) |
| bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, |
| !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, |
| int func_id, int insn_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; |
| struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; |
| struct tnum range; |
| u64 val; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) |
| return 0; |
| if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { |
| verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| range = tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1); |
| reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; |
| |
| if (!register_is_const(reg) || !tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { |
| bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| val = reg->var_off.value; |
| if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) |
| bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); |
| else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && |
| bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) |
| bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { |
| verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", |
| state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); |
| } |
| return state->acquired_refs ? -EINVAL : 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5]; |
| struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr; |
| int err, fmt_map_off, num_args; |
| u64 fmt_addr; |
| char *fmt; |
| |
| /* data must be an array of u64 */ |
| if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8; |
| |
| /* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const |
| * and map_direct_value_addr is set. |
| */ |
| fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value; |
| err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr, |
| fmt_map_off); |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "verifier bug\n"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off; |
| |
| /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we |
| * can focus on validating the format specifiers. |
| */ |
| err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, NULL, num_args); |
| if (err < 0) |
| verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n"); |
| |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| int *insn_idx_p) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs; |
| struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; |
| int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; |
| bool changes_data; |
| int i, err, func_id; |
| |
| /* find function prototype */ |
| func_id = insn->imm; |
| if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), |
| func_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (env->ops->get_func_proto) |
| fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); |
| if (!fn) { |
| verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), |
| func_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ |
| if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { |
| verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { |
| verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ |
| changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); |
| if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { |
| verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", |
| func_id_name(func_id), func_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); |
| meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; |
| |
| err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", |
| func_id_name(func_id), func_id); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| meta.func_id = func_id; |
| /* check args */ |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { |
| err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset |
| * is inferred from register state. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { |
| err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, |
| BPF_WRITE, -1, false); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { |
| err = check_reference_leak(env); |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n"); |
| return err; |
| } |
| } else if (is_release_function(func_id)) { |
| err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", |
| func_id_name(func_id), func_id); |
| return err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| regs = cur_regs(env); |
| |
| /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, |
| * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. |
| */ |
| if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage && |
| !register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { |
| verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem) { |
| err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, |
| set_map_elem_callback_state); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_snprintf) { |
| err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* reset caller saved regs */ |
| for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { |
| mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); |
| check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); |
| } |
| |
| /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; |
| |
| /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ |
| if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) { |
| /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) { |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; |
| } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || |
| fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { |
| /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() |
| * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access |
| * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() |
| */ |
| if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; |
| if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; |
| if (map_value_has_spin_lock(meta.map_ptr)) |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; |
| } else { |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL; |
| } |
| } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) { |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL; |
| } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL) { |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL; |
| } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) { |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL; |
| } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL) { |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL; |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; |
| } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || |
| fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID) { |
| const struct btf_type *t; |
| |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); |
| if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { |
| u32 tsize; |
| const struct btf_type *ret; |
| const char *tname; |
| |
| /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ |
| ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize); |
| if (IS_ERR(ret)) { |
| tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off); |
| verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", |
| tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = |
| fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID ? |
| PTR_TO_MEM : PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL; |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; |
| } else { |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = |
| fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID ? |
| PTR_TO_BTF_ID : PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL; |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf; |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; |
| } |
| } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || |
| fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { |
| int ret_btf_id; |
| |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID ? |
| PTR_TO_BTF_ID : |
| PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL; |
| ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; |
| if (ret_btf_id == 0) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid return type %d of func %s#%d\n", |
| fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| /* current BPF helper definitions are only coming from |
| * built-in code with type IDs from vmlinux BTF |
| */ |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = btf_vmlinux; |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; |
| } else { |
| verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n", |
| fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (reg_type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; |
| |
| if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) { |
| /* For release_reference() */ |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; |
| } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { |
| int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); |
| |
| if (id < 0) |
| return id; |
| /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; |
| /* For release_reference() */ |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; |
| } |
| |
| do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); |
| |
| err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || |
| func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && |
| !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { |
| const char *err_str; |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS |
| err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); |
| err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; |
| #else |
| err = -ENOTSUPP; |
| err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; |
| #endif |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; |
| } |
| |
| if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) |
| env->prog->call_get_stack = true; |
| |
| if (changes_data) |
| clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by |
| * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument. |
| */ |
| static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, |
| size_t reg_size) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; |
| |
| if (regno == BPF_REG_0) { |
| /* Function return value */ |
| reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
| reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ? |
| DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; |
| } else { |
| /* Function argument */ |
| if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) { |
| mark_insn_zext(env, reg); |
| mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); |
| } else { |
| mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| const struct btf_type *t, *func, *func_proto, *ptr_type; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
| const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name; |
| u32 i, nargs, func_id, ptr_type_id; |
| const struct btf_param *args; |
| int err; |
| |
| func_id = insn->imm; |
| func = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func_id); |
| func_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, func->name_off); |
| func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func->type); |
| |
| if (!env->ops->check_kfunc_call || |
| !env->ops->check_kfunc_call(func_id)) { |
| verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", |
| func_name); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check the arguments */ |
| err = btf_check_kfunc_arg_match(env, btf_vmlinux, func_id, regs); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) |
| mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); |
| |
| /* Check return type */ |
| t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, func_proto->type, NULL); |
| if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size); |
| } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { |
| ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, t->type, |
| &ptr_type_id); |
| if (!btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) { |
| ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, |
| ptr_type->name_off); |
| verbose(env, "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", |
| func_name, btf_type_str(ptr_type), |
| ptr_type_name); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = btf_vmlinux; |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id; |
| mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *)); |
| } /* else { add_kfunc_call() ensures it is btf_type_is_void(t) } */ |
| |
| nargs = btf_type_vlen(func_proto); |
| args = (const struct btf_param *)(func_proto + 1); |
| for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { |
| u32 regno = i + 1; |
| |
| t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, args[i].type, NULL); |
| if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) |
| mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *)); |
| else |
| /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */ |
| mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) |
| { |
| /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ |
| s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); |
| |
| if (b < 0) |
| return res > a; |
| return res < a; |
| } |
| |
| static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) |
| { |
| /* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ |
| s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b); |
| |
| if (b < 0) |
| return res > a; |
| return res < a; |
| } |
| |
| static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) |
| { |
| /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ |
| s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); |
| |
| if (b < 0) |
| return res < a; |
| return res > a; |
| } |
| |
| static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) |
| { |
| /* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ |
| s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b); |
| |
| if (b < 0) |
| return res < a; |
| return res > a; |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| enum bpf_reg_type type) |
| { |
| bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); |
| s64 val = reg->var_off.value; |
| s64 smin = reg->smin_value; |
| |
| if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { |
| verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", |
| reg_type_str[type], val); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { |
| verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", |
| reg_type_str[type], reg->off); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (smin == S64_MIN) { |
| verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", |
| reg_type_str[type]); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { |
| verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", |
| smin, reg_type_str[type]); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; |
| } |
| |
| enum { |
| REASON_BOUNDS = -1, |
| REASON_TYPE = -2, |
| REASON_PATHS = -3, |
| REASON_LIMIT = -4, |
| REASON_STACK = -5, |
| }; |
| |
| static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, |
| u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left) |
| { |
| u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; |
| |
| switch (ptr_reg->type) { |
| case PTR_TO_STACK: |
| /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the |
| * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar |
| * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is |
| * currently prohibited for unprivileged. |
| */ |
| max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; |
| ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: |
| max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; |
| ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? |
| ptr_reg->smin_value : |
| ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; |
| break; |
| default: |
| return REASON_TYPE; |
| } |
| |
| if (ptr_limit >= max) |
| return REASON_LIMIT; |
| *alu_limit = ptr_limit; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; |
| } |
| |
| static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, |
| u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) |
| { |
| /* If we arrived here from different branches with different |
| * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. |
| */ |
| if (aux->alu_state && |
| (aux->alu_state != alu_state || |
| aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) |
| return REASON_PATHS; |
| |
| /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */ |
| aux->alu_state = alu_state; |
| aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); |
| |
| if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); |
| } |
| |
| static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode) |
| { |
| return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB; |
| } |
| |
| struct bpf_sanitize_info { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux; |
| bool mask_to_left; |
| }; |
| |
| static struct bpf_verifier_state * |
| sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs; |
| |
| branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true); |
| if (branch && insn) { |
| regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
| } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg); |
| } |
| } |
| return branch; |
| } |
| |
| static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_sanitize_info *info, |
| const bool commit_window) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux; |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); |
| bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; |
| bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; |
| u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
| u32 alu_state, alu_limit; |
| struct bpf_reg_state tmp; |
| bool ret; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative |
| * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care |
| * to explore bad access from here. |
| */ |
| if (vstate->speculative) |
| goto do_sim; |
| |
| if (!commit_window) { |
| if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && |
| (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) |
| return REASON_BOUNDS; |
| |
| info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || |
| (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); |
| } |
| |
| err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (commit_window) { |
| /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on |
| * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. |
| */ |
| alu_state = info->aux.alu_state; |
| alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit); |
| } else { |
| alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; |
| alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0; |
| alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? |
| BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; |
| } |
| |
| err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| do_sim: |
| /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already |
| * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification |
| * stack. |
| * |
| * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based |
| * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as |
| * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either). |
| */ |
| if (commit_window || off_is_imm) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under |
| * speculative execution from truncation as a result of |
| * masking when off was not within expected range. If off |
| * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there |
| * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, |
| * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction |
| * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore |
| * bad access. |
| */ |
| if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { |
| tmp = *dst_reg; |
| *dst_reg = *ptr_reg; |
| } |
| ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1, |
| env->insn_idx); |
| if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret) |
| *dst_reg = tmp; |
| return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| |
| /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the |
| * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in |
| * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still |
| * rewrite/sanitize them. |
| */ |
| if (!vstate->speculative) |
| env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; |
| } |
| |
| static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) |
| { |
| static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root"; |
| const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub"; |
| u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; |
| |
| switch (reason) { |
| case REASON_BOUNDS: |
| verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n", |
| off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err); |
| break; |
| case REASON_TYPE: |
| verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n", |
| off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err); |
| break; |
| case REASON_PATHS: |
| verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n", |
| dst, op, err); |
| break; |
| case REASON_LIMIT: |
| verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n", |
| dst, op, err); |
| break; |
| case REASON_STACK: |
| verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n", |
| dst, err); |
| break; |
| default: |
| verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n", |
| reason); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't |
| * have a variable offset. |
| * |
| * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it |
| * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also |
| * retrieve_ptr_limit(). |
| * |
| * |
| * 'off' includes 'reg->off'. |
| */ |
| static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( |
| struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| int regno, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| int off) |
| { |
| if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
| char tn_buf[48]; |
| |
| tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
| verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n", |
| regno, tn_buf, off); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " |
| "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) |
| { |
| u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; |
| |
| /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds |
| * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. |
| */ |
| if (env->bypass_spec_v1) |
| return 0; |
| |
| switch (dst_reg->type) { |
| case PTR_TO_STACK: |
| if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, |
| dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) |
| return -EACCES; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: |
| if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " |
| "prohibited for !root\n", dst); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. |
| * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. |
| * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a |
| * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. |
| */ |
| static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, |
| const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; |
| bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); |
| s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, |
| smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; |
| u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, |
| umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; |
| struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; |
| u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
| u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; |
| int ret; |
| |
| dst_reg = ®s[dst]; |
| |
| if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || |
| smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { |
| /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from |
| * e.g. dead branches. |
| */ |
| __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { |
| /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ |
| if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { |
| __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| verbose(env, |
| "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", |
| dst); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| switch (ptr_reg->type) { |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: |
| verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", |
| dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: |
| /* smin_val represents the known value */ |
| if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) |
| break; |
| fallthrough; |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: |
| verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", |
| dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. |
| * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; |
| dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; |
| |
| if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || |
| !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ |
| __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); |
| |
| if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { |
| ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, |
| &info, false); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| switch (opcode) { |
| case BPF_ADD: |
| /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow |
| * the s32 'off' field |
| */ |
| if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == |
| (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { |
| /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; |
| dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; |
| dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; |
| dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; |
| dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; |
| break; |
| } |
| /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off |
| * == 0, since it's a scalar. |
| * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive |
| * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' |
| * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. |
| * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets |
| * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset |
| * from ptr_reg. |
| */ |
| if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || |
| signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { |
| dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; |
| } |
| if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || |
| umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { |
| dst_reg->umin_value = 0; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; |
| } |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); |
| dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; |
| dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; |
| if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { |
| dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; |
| /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ |
| memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); |
| } |
| break; |
| case BPF_SUB: |
| if (dst_reg == off_reg) { |
| /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ |
| verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", |
| dst); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to |
| * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not |
| * be able to deal with it. |
| */ |
| if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", |
| dst); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == |
| (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { |
| /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; |
| dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; |
| dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; |
| dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; |
| dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; |
| dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; |
| break; |
| } |
| /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known |
| * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. |
| */ |
| if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || |
| signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { |
| /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; |
| } |
| if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { |
| /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ |
| dst_reg->umin_value = 0; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ |
| dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; |
| } |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); |
| dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; |
| dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; |
| if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { |
| dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; |
| /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ |
| if (smin_val < 0) |
| memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); |
| } |
| break; |
| case BPF_AND: |
| case BPF_OR: |
| case BPF_XOR: |
| /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ |
| verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", |
| dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| default: |
| /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ |
| verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", |
| dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
| __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); |
| __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); |
| |
| if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) |
| return -EACCES; |
| if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { |
| ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, |
| &info, true); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; |
| s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; |
| u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; |
| u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; |
| |
| if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) || |
| signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) { |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val; |
| } |
| if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val || |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) { |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; |
| s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; |
| u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; |
| u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; |
| |
| if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || |
| signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { |
| dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; |
| dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; |
| } |
| if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || |
| dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { |
| dst_reg->umin_value = 0; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; |
| dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; |
| s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; |
| u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; |
| u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; |
| |
| if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) || |
| signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) { |
| /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val; |
| } |
| if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) { |
| /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; |
| } else { |
| /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; |
| s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; |
| u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; |
| u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; |
| |
| if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || |
| signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { |
| /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; |
| dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; |
| } |
| if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { |
| /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ |
| dst_reg->umin_value = 0; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ |
| dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; |
| dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; |
| u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; |
| u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; |
| |
| if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) { |
| /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ |
| __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); |
| return; |
| } |
| /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and |
| * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX). |
| */ |
| if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) { |
| /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ |
| __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); |
| return; |
| } |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val; |
| if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) { |
| /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; |
| u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; |
| u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; |
| |
| if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { |
| /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ |
| __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); |
| return; |
| } |
| /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and |
| * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). |
| */ |
| if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { |
| /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ |
| __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); |
| return; |
| } |
| dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; |
| dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; |
| if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { |
| /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); |
| bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); |
| struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); |
| s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; |
| u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; |
| |
| if (src_known && dst_known) { |
| __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently |
| * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); |
| if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { |
| /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, |
| * ain't nobody got time for that. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; |
| } else { |
| /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to |
| * cast result into s64. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); |
| bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); |
| s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; |
| u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; |
| |
| if (src_known && dst_known) { |
| __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently |
| * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); |
| if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { |
| /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, |
| * ain't nobody got time for that. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to |
| * cast result into s64. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; |
| } |
| /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ |
| __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); |
| bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); |
| struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); |
| s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; |
| u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; |
| |
| if (src_known && dst_known) { |
| __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the |
| * maximum of the operands' minima |
| */ |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; |
| if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { |
| /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, |
| * ain't nobody got time for that. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; |
| } else { |
| /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to |
| * cast result into s64. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); |
| bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); |
| s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; |
| u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; |
| |
| if (src_known && dst_known) { |
| __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the |
| * maximum of the operands' minima |
| */ |
| dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); |
| dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; |
| if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { |
| /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, |
| * ain't nobody got time for that. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to |
| * cast result into s64. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; |
| } |
| /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ |
| __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); |
| bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); |
| struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); |
| s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; |
| |
| if (src_known && dst_known) { |
| __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; |
| |
| if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { |
| /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, |
| * so safe to cast u32 result into s32. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); |
| bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); |
| s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; |
| |
| if (src_known && dst_known) { |
| /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ |
| __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ |
| dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; |
| |
| if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { |
| /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, |
| * so safe to cast u64 result into s64. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| } |
| |
| __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) |
| { |
| /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick |
| * up from var_off) |
| */ |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; |
| /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ |
| if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; |
| u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; |
| /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ |
| struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); |
| |
| __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); |
| /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so |
| * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and |
| * if some path skips this step we are still safe. |
| */ |
| __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); |
| __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) |
| { |
| /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign |
| * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are |
| * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track |
| * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except |
| * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this |
| * later to shifts of any length. |
| */ |
| if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0) |
| dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; |
| else |
| dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| |
| if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0) |
| dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; |
| else |
| dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| |
| /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ |
| if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { |
| dst_reg->umin_value = 0; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; |
| } else { |
| dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; |
| dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; |
| u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; |
| |
| /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ |
| __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); |
| __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); |
| |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); |
| /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ |
| __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); |
| u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; |
| u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; |
| |
| /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might |
| * be negative, then either: |
| * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is |
| * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds |
| * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the |
| * signed bounds |
| * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing |
| * about the result |
| * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the |
| * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. |
| * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds |
| * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and |
| * var_off of the result. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; |
| |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; |
| |
| __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); |
| __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; |
| u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; |
| |
| /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might |
| * be negative, then either: |
| * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is |
| * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds |
| * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the |
| * signed bounds |
| * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing |
| * about the result |
| * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the |
| * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. |
| * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds |
| * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and |
| * var_off of the result. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
| dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); |
| dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; |
| dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; |
| |
| /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends |
| * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded |
| * so we can recalculate later from tnum. |
| */ |
| __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); |
| __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; |
| |
| /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and |
| * umax_val is equal to umin_val. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); |
| dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); |
| |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); |
| |
| /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on |
| * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; |
| dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; |
| |
| __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); |
| __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) |
| { |
| u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; |
| |
| /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal |
| * to umin_val. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; |
| dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; |
| |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); |
| |
| /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on |
| * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. |
| */ |
| dst_reg->umin_value = 0; |
| dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; |
| |
| /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends |
| * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out |
| * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. |
| */ |
| __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); |
| __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual |
| * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts |
| * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. |
| */ |
| static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
| u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
| bool src_known; |
| s64 smin_val, smax_val; |
| u64 umin_val, umax_val; |
| s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val; |
| u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val; |
| u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; |
| bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); |
| int ret; |
| |
| smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; |
| smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; |
| umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; |
| umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; |
| |
| s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value; |
| s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value; |
| u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value; |
| u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value; |
| |
| if (alu32) { |
| src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off); |
| if ((src_known && |
| (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) || |
| s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) { |
| /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds |
| * derived from e.g. dead branches. |
| */ |
| __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); |
| if ((src_known && |
| (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || |
| smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { |
| /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds |
| * derived from e.g. dead branches. |
| */ |
| __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!src_known && |
| opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { |
| __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { |
| ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. |
| * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both |
| * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the |
| * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 |
| * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, |
| * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to |
| * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. |
| * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of |
| * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy |
| * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may |
| * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark |
| * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting |
| * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. |
| */ |
| switch (opcode) { |
| case BPF_ADD: |
| scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); |
| break; |
| case BPF_SUB: |
| scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); |
| break; |
| case BPF_MUL: |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); |
| scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| break; |
| case BPF_AND: |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); |
| scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| break; |
| case BPF_OR: |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); |
| scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| break; |
| case BPF_XOR: |
| dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); |
| scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| break; |
| case BPF_LSH: |
| if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { |
| /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. |
| * This includes shifts by a negative number. |
| */ |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
| break; |
| } |
| if (alu32) |
| scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| else |
| scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| break; |
| case BPF_RSH: |
| if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { |
| /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. |
| * This includes shifts by a negative number. |
| */ |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
| break; |
| } |
| if (alu32) |
| scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| else |
| scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| break; |
| case BPF_ARSH: |
| if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { |
| /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. |
| * This includes shifts by a negative number. |
| */ |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
| break; |
| } |
| if (alu32) |
| scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| else |
| scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); |
| break; |
| default: |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ |
| if (alu32) |
| zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); |
| |
| __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
| __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); |
| __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max |
| * and var_off. |
| */ |
| static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; |
| u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
| int err; |
| |
| dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; |
| src_reg = NULL; |
| if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) |
| ptr_reg = dst_reg; |
| else |
| /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be |
| * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars() |
| */ |
| dst_reg->id = 0; |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
| src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; |
| if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields |
| * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except |
| * pointer subtraction |
| */ |
| if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", |
| insn->dst_reg, |
| bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } else { |
| /* scalar += pointer |
| * This is legal, but we have to reverse our |
| * src/dest handling in computing the range |
| */ |
| err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, |
| src_reg, dst_reg); |
| } |
| } else if (ptr_reg) { |
| /* pointer += scalar */ |
| err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, |
| dst_reg, src_reg); |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only |
| * need to be able to read from this state. |
| */ |
| off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
| __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); |
| src_reg = &off_reg; |
| if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ |
| return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, |
| ptr_reg, src_reg); |
| } |
| |
| /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ |
| if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { |
| print_verifier_state(env, state); |
| verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { |
| print_verifier_state(env, state); |
| verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); |
| } |
| |
| /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ |
| static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
| u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
| int err; |
| |
| if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { |
| if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 || |
| insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || |
| insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || |
| (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || |
| BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* check src operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", |
| insn->dst_reg); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| /* check dest operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { |
| |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
| if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* check src operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } else { |
| if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; |
| |
| if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { |
| /* case: R1 = R2 |
| * copy register state to dest reg |
| */ |
| if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id) |
| /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID |
| * that will be used by find_equal_scalars() |
| * to propagate min/max range. |
| */ |
| src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; |
| *dst_reg = *src_reg; |
| dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
| dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; |
| } else { |
| /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ |
| if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", |
| insn->src_reg); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| *dst_reg = *src_reg; |
| /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise |
| * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly |
| * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars() |
| */ |
| dst_reg->id = 0; |
| dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
| dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; |
| } else { |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, |
| insn->dst_reg); |
| } |
| zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* case: R = imm |
| * remember the value we stored into this reg |
| */ |
| /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
| regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
| if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { |
| __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, |
| insn->imm); |
| } else { |
| __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, |
| (u32)insn->imm); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ |
| |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
| if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| /* check src1 operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } else { |
| if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* check src2 operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && |
| BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { |
| verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || |
| opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { |
| int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; |
| |
| if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* check dest operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void __find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_func_state *state, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| enum bpf_reg_type type, int new_range) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { |
| reg = &state->regs[i]; |
| if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) |
| /* keep the maximum range already checked */ |
| reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); |
| } |
| |
| bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { |
| if (!reg) |
| continue; |
| if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) |
| reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| enum bpf_reg_type type, |
| bool range_right_open) |
| { |
| int new_range, i; |
| |
| if (dst_reg->off < 0 || |
| (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) |
| /* This doesn't give us any range */ |
| return; |
| |
| if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || |
| dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) |
| /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less |
| * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. |
| */ |
| return; |
| |
| new_range = dst_reg->off; |
| if (range_right_open) |
| new_range--; |
| |
| /* Examples for register markings: |
| * |
| * pkt_data in dst register: |
| * |
| * r2 = r3; |
| * r2 += 8; |
| * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> |
| * <access okay> |
| * |
| * r2 = r3; |
| * r2 += 8; |
| * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> |
| * <handle exception> |
| * |
| * Where: |
| * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg |
| * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) |
| * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) |
| * |
| * pkt_data in src register: |
| * |
| * r2 = r3; |
| * r2 += 8; |
| * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> |
| * <handle exception> |
| * |
| * r2 = r3; |
| * r2 += 8; |
| * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> |
| * <access okay> |
| * |
| * Where: |
| * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg |
| * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) |
| * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) |
| * |
| * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) |
| * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) |
| * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on |
| * the check. |
| */ |
| |
| /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we |
| * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big |
| * the range won't allow anything. |
| * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) |
| __find_good_pkt_pointers(vstate->frame[i], dst_reg, type, |
| new_range); |
| } |
| |
| static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode) |
| { |
| struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); |
| s32 sval = (s32)val; |
| |
| switch (opcode) { |
| case BPF_JEQ: |
| if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) |
| return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); |
| break; |
| case BPF_JNE: |
| if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) |
| return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); |
| break; |
| case BPF_JSET: |
| if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val) |
| return 1; |
| if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JGT: |
| if (reg->u32_min_value > val) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JSGT: |
| if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JLT: |
| if (reg->u32_max_value < val) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JSLT: |
| if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JGE: |
| if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->u32_max_value < val) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JSGE: |
| if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JLE: |
| if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->u32_min_value > val) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JSLE: |
| if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode) |
| { |
| s64 sval = (s64)val; |
| |
| switch (opcode) { |
| case BPF_JEQ: |
| if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) |
| return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); |
| break; |
| case BPF_JNE: |
| if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) |
| return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); |
| break; |
| case BPF_JSET: |
| if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val) |
| return 1; |
| if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JGT: |
| if (reg->umin_value > val) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->umax_value <= val) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JSGT: |
| if (reg->smin_value > sval) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->smax_value <= sval) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JLT: |
| if (reg->umax_value < val) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->umin_value >= val) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JSLT: |
| if (reg->smax_value < sval) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->smin_value >= sval) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JGE: |
| if (reg->umin_value >= val) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->umax_value < val) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JSGE: |
| if (reg->smin_value >= sval) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->smax_value < sval) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JLE: |
| if (reg->umax_value <= val) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->umin_value > val) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JSLE: |
| if (reg->smax_value <= sval) |
| return 1; |
| else if (reg->smin_value > sval) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;" |
| * and return: |
| * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed |
| * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn |
| * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value |
| * range [0,10] |
| */ |
| static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode, |
| bool is_jmp32) |
| { |
| if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) { |
| if (!reg_type_not_null(reg->type)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can |
| * use this to direct branch taken. |
| */ |
| if (val != 0) |
| return -1; |
| |
| switch (opcode) { |
| case BPF_JEQ: |
| return 0; |
| case BPF_JNE: |
| return 1; |
| default: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (is_jmp32) |
| return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode); |
| return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode); |
| } |
| |
| static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode) |
| { |
| /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ |
| static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { |
| /* these stay the same */ |
| [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, |
| [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, |
| [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, |
| /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ |
| [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, |
| [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, |
| [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, |
| [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, |
| [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, |
| [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, |
| [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, |
| [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT |
| }; |
| return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; |
| } |
| |
| static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, |
| u8 opcode) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *pkt; |
| |
| if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { |
| pkt = dst_reg; |
| } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { |
| pkt = src_reg; |
| opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); |
| } else { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (pkt->range >= 0) |
| return -1; |
| |
| switch (opcode) { |
| case BPF_JLE: |
| /* pkt <= pkt_end */ |
| fallthrough; |
| case BPF_JGT: |
| /* pkt > pkt_end */ |
| if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END) |
| /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */ |
| return opcode == BPF_JGT; |
| break; |
| case BPF_JLT: |
| /* pkt < pkt_end */ |
| fallthrough; |
| case BPF_JGE: |
| /* pkt >= pkt_end */ |
| if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END) |
| return opcode == BPF_JGE; |
| break; |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the |
| * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're |
| * simply doing a BPF_K check. |
| * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. |
| */ |
| static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, |
| u64 val, u32 val32, |
| u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) |
| { |
| struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); |
| struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off; |
| struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); |
| struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off; |
| s64 sval = (s64)val; |
| s32 sval32 = (s32)val32; |
| |
| /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its |
| * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into |
| * the same object, but we don't bother with that. |
| * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we |
| * only need to check one of them for pointerness. |
| */ |
| if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) |
| return; |
| |
| switch (opcode) { |
| case BPF_JEQ: |
| case BPF_JNE: |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg = |
| opcode == BPF_JEQ ? true_reg : false_reg; |
| |
| /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence. |
| * r1 = r2; |
| * if (r1 == 42) goto label; |
| * ... |
| * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42. |
| * |
| * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID. |
| */ |
| if (is_jmp32) |
| __mark_reg32_known(reg, val32); |
| else |
| ___mark_reg_known(reg, val); |
| break; |
| } |
| case BPF_JSET: |
| if (is_jmp32) { |
| false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32)); |
| if (is_power_of_2(val32)) |
| true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off, |
| tnum_const(val32)); |
| } else { |
| false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val)); |
| if (is_power_of_2(val)) |
| true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off, |
| tnum_const(val)); |
| } |
| break; |
| case BPF_JGE: |
| case BPF_JGT: |
| { |
| if (is_jmp32) { |
| u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 : val32 - 1; |
| u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32; |
| |
| false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value, |
| false_umax); |
| true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value, |
| true_umin); |
| } else { |
| u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val : val - 1; |
| u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val; |
| |
| false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax); |
| true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin); |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| case BPF_JSGE: |
| case BPF_JSGT: |
| { |
| if (is_jmp32) { |
| s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 : sval32 - 1; |
| s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32; |
| |
| false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax); |
| true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin); |
| } else { |
| s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval : sval - 1; |
| s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval; |
| |
| false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax); |
| true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin); |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| case BPF_JLE: |
| case BPF_JLT: |
| { |
| if (is_jmp32) { |
| u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 : val32 + 1; |
| u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32; |
| |
| false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value, |
| false_umin); |
| true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value, |
| true_umax); |
| } else { |
| u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val : val + 1; |
| u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val; |
| |
| false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin); |
| true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax); |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| case BPF_JSLE: |
| case BPF_JSLT: |
| { |
| if (is_jmp32) { |
| s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 : sval32 + 1; |
| s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32; |
| |
| false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin); |
| true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax); |
| } else { |
| s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval : sval + 1; |
| s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval; |
| |
| false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin); |
| true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax); |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| default: |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (is_jmp32) { |
| false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off), |
| tnum_subreg(false_32off)); |
| true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off), |
| tnum_subreg(true_32off)); |
| __reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg); |
| __reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg); |
| } else { |
| false_reg->var_off = false_64off; |
| true_reg->var_off = true_64off; |
| __reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg); |
| __reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is |
| * the variable reg. |
| */ |
| static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, |
| u64 val, u32 val32, |
| u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) |
| { |
| opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); |
| /* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode, |
| * BPF_JA, can't get here. |
| */ |
| if (opcode) |
| reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32); |
| } |
| |
| /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ |
| static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) |
| { |
| src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, |
| dst_reg->umin_value); |
| src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, |
| dst_reg->umax_value); |
| src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, |
| dst_reg->smin_value); |
| src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, |
| dst_reg->smax_value); |
| src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, |
| dst_reg->var_off); |
| /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ |
| __update_reg_bounds(src_reg); |
| __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
| /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ |
| __reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg); |
| __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); |
| /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ |
| __reg_bound_offset(src_reg); |
| __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); |
| /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds |
| * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), |
| * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. |
| */ |
| __update_reg_bounds(src_reg); |
| __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
| } |
| |
| static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, |
| u8 opcode) |
| { |
| switch (opcode) { |
| case BPF_JEQ: |
| __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); |
| break; |
| case BPF_JNE: |
| __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, |
| bool is_null) |
| { |
| if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && |
| !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id)) { |
| /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should |
| * have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer |
| * arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL. |
| */ |
| if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || |
| !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) || |
| reg->off)) { |
| __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); |
| reg->off = 0; |
| } |
| if (is_null) { |
| reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
| /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point |
| * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, |
| * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. |
| */ |
| reg->id = 0; |
| reg->ref_obj_id = 0; |
| |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); |
| |
| if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { |
| /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset |
| * in release_reg_references(). |
| * |
| * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other |
| * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. |
| */ |
| reg->id = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void __mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_func_state *state, u32 id, |
| bool is_null) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) |
| mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, &state->regs[i], id, is_null); |
| |
| bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { |
| if (!reg) |
| continue; |
| mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually |
| * be folded together at some point. |
| */ |
| static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, |
| bool is_null) |
| { |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; |
| u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; |
| u32 id = regs[regno].id; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) |
| /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. |
| * No one could have freed the reference state before |
| * doing the NULL check. |
| */ |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id)); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) |
| __mark_ptr_or_null_regs(vstate->frame[i], id, is_null); |
| } |
| |
| static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) |
| { |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ |
| if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) |
| return false; |
| |
| switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { |
| case BPF_JGT: |
| if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || |
| (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && |
| reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { |
| /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ |
| find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, |
| dst_reg->type, false); |
| mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); |
| } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || |
| (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { |
| /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ |
| find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, |
| src_reg->type, true); |
| mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false); |
| } else { |
| return false; |
| } |
| break; |
| case BPF_JLT: |
| if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || |
| (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && |
| reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { |
| /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ |
| find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, |
| dst_reg->type, true); |
| mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); |
| } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || |
| (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { |
| /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ |
| find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, |
| src_reg->type, false); |
| mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true); |
| } else { |
| return false; |
| } |
| break; |
| case BPF_JGE: |
| if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || |
| (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && |
| reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { |
| /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ |
| find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, |
| dst_reg->type, true); |
| mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); |
| } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || |
| (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { |
| /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ |
| find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, |
| src_reg->type, false); |
| mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true); |
| } else { |
| return false; |
| } |
| break; |
| case BPF_JLE: |
| if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || |
| (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && |
| reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { |
| /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ |
| find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, |
| dst_reg->type, false); |
| mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); |
| } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || |
| (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && |
| src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { |
| /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ |
| find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, |
| src_reg->type, true); |
| mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false); |
| } else { |
| return false; |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg) |
| { |
| struct bpf_func_state *state; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg; |
| int i, j; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) { |
| state = vstate->frame[i]; |
| for (j = 0; j < MAX_BPF_REG; j++) { |
| reg = &state->regs[j]; |
| if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) |
| *reg = *known_reg; |
| } |
| |
| bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(j, state, reg) { |
| if (!reg) |
| continue; |
| if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) |
| *reg = *known_reg; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; |
| u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
| bool is_jmp32; |
| int pred = -1; |
| int err; |
| |
| /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ |
| if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
| if (insn->imm != 0) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* check src1 operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", |
| insn->src_reg); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; |
| } else { |
| if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* check src2 operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; |
| is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; |
| |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { |
| pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32); |
| } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && |
| is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) { |
| pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, |
| tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, |
| opcode, |
| is_jmp32); |
| } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && |
| !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) { |
| pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, |
| src_reg->var_off.value, |
| opcode, |
| is_jmp32); |
| } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && |
| reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) && |
| !is_jmp32) { |
| pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode); |
| } |
| |
| if (pred >= 0) { |
| /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because |
| * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. |
| */ |
| if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) |
| err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && |
| !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) |
| err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| if (pred == 1) { |
| /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push |
| * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative |
| * execution. |
| */ |
| if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && |
| !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, |
| *insn_idx)) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| *insn_idx += insn->off; |
| return 0; |
| } else if (pred == 0) { |
| /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the |
| * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for |
| * simulation under speculative execution. |
| */ |
| if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && |
| !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, |
| *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, |
| *insn_idx)) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, |
| false); |
| if (!other_branch) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; |
| |
| /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust |
| * our min/max values for our dst register. |
| * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same |
| * object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because |
| * otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't |
| * comparable. |
| */ |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; |
| |
| if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && |
| src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) || |
| (is_jmp32 && |
| tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off)))) |
| reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], |
| dst_reg, |
| src_reg->var_off.value, |
| tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, |
| opcode, is_jmp32); |
| else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) || |
| (is_jmp32 && |
| tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off)))) |
| reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], |
| src_reg, |
| dst_reg->var_off.value, |
| tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, |
| opcode, is_jmp32); |
| else if (!is_jmp32 && |
| (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)) |
| /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ |
| reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], |
| &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], |
| src_reg, dst_reg, opcode); |
| if (src_reg->id && |
| !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { |
| find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg); |
| find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); |
| } |
| |
| } |
| } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], |
| dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm, |
| opcode, is_jmp32); |
| } |
| |
| if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && |
| !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { |
| find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg); |
| find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); |
| } |
| |
| /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). |
| * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison |
| * which will never be JMP32. |
| */ |
| if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && |
| insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && |
| reg_type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { |
| /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either |
| * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. |
| */ |
| mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, |
| opcode == BPF_JNE); |
| mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, |
| opcode == BPF_JEQ); |
| } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], |
| this_branch, other_branch) && |
| is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { |
| verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", |
| insn->dst_reg); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) |
| print_verifier_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ |
| static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
| struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; |
| struct bpf_map *map; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (insn->off != 0) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; |
| if (insn->src_reg == 0) { |
| u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; |
| |
| dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
| __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
| |
| dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; |
| switch (dst_reg->type) { |
| case PTR_TO_MEM: |
| dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: |
| case PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: |
| dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf; |
| dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; |
| break; |
| default: |
| verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { |
| struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; |
| u32 subprogno = insn[1].imm; |
| |
| if (!aux->func_info) { |
| verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { |
| verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; |
| dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
| dst_reg->map_ptr = map; |
| |
| if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE || |
| insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) { |
| dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; |
| dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; |
| if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) |
| dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; |
| } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || |
| insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { |
| dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; |
| } else { |
| verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) |
| { |
| switch (type) { |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: |
| return true; |
| default: |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: |
| * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb |
| * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, |
| * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 |
| * |
| * Implicit input: |
| * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX |
| * |
| * Explicit input: |
| * SRC == any register |
| * IMM == 32-bit immediate |
| * |
| * Output: |
| * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness |
| */ |
| static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
| static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; |
| u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); |
| int i, err; |
| |
| if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || |
| BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || |
| (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as |
| * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to |
| * reference leak. |
| */ |
| err = check_reference_leak(env); |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n"); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (mode == BPF_IND) { |
| /* check explicit source operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| err = check_ctx_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| |
| /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ |
| for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { |
| mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); |
| check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); |
| } |
| |
| /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains |
| * the value fetched from the packet. |
| * Already marked as written above. |
| */ |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
| /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ |
| regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; |
| const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg; |
| struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); |
| enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); |
| int err; |
| const bool is_subprog = env->cur_state->frame[0]->subprogno; |
| |
| /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ |
| if (!is_subprog && |
| (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS || |
| prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) && |
| !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used |
| * to return the value from eBPF program. |
| * Make sure that it's readable at this time |
| * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote |
| * something into it earlier |
| */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { |
| verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0; |
| if (is_subprog) { |
| if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n", |
| reg_type_str[reg->type]); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| switch (prog_type) { |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: |
| if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || |
| env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || |
| env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || |
| env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || |
| env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || |
| env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME) |
| range = tnum_range(1, 1); |
| if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND || |
| env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) |
| range = tnum_range(0, 3); |
| break; |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: |
| if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { |
| range = tnum_range(0, 3); |
| enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); |
| } |
| break; |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: |
| break; |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: |
| if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) |
| return 0; |
| range = tnum_const(0); |
| break; |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: |
| switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { |
| case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: |
| case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: |
| range = tnum_const(0); |
| break; |
| case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: |
| case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: |
| return 0; |
| case BPF_TRACE_ITER: |
| break; |
| default: |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| } |
| break; |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: |
| range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); |
| break; |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: |
| /* freplace program can return anything as its return value |
| * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. |
| */ |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", |
| reg_type_str[reg->type]); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { |
| verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && |
| tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) |
| env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code |
| * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): |
| * 2 label v as discovered |
| * 3 let S be a stack |
| * 4 S.push(v) |
| * 5 while S is not empty |
| * 6 t <- S.pop() |
| * 7 if t is what we're looking for: |
| * 8 return t |
| * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do |
| * 10 if edge e is already labelled |
| * 11 continue with the next edge |
| * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) |
| * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored |
| * 14 label e as tree-edge |
| * 15 label w as discovered |
| * 16 S.push(w) |
| * 17 continue at 5 |
| * 18 else if vertex w is discovered |
| * 19 label e as back-edge |
| * 20 else |
| * 21 // vertex w is explored |
| * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge |
| * 23 label t as explored |
| * 24 S.pop() |
| * |
| * convention: |
| * 0x10 - discovered |
| * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled |
| * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled |
| * 0x20 - explored |
| */ |
| |
| enum { |
| DISCOVERED = 0x10, |
| EXPLORED = 0x20, |
| FALLTHROUGH = 1, |
| BRANCH = 2, |
| }; |
| |
| static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| return env->prog->len; |
| } |
| |
| static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state( |
| struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| int idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; |
| |
| return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; |
| } |
| |
| static void init_explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) |
| { |
| env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; |
| } |
| |
| enum { |
| DONE_EXPLORING = 0, |
| KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, |
| }; |
| |
| /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: |
| * t - index of current instruction |
| * w - next instruction |
| * e - edge |
| */ |
| static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| bool loop_ok) |
| { |
| int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; |
| int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; |
| |
| if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) |
| return DONE_EXPLORING; |
| |
| if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) |
| return DONE_EXPLORING; |
| |
| if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { |
| verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); |
| verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (e == BRANCH) |
| /* mark branch target for state pruning */ |
| init_explored_state(env, w); |
| |
| if (insn_state[w] == 0) { |
| /* tree-edge */ |
| insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; |
| insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; |
| if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) |
| return -E2BIG; |
| insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; |
| return KEEP_EXPLORING; |
| } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { |
| if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable) |
| return DONE_EXPLORING; |
| verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); |
| verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); |
| verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { |
| /* forward- or cross-edge */ |
| insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; |
| } else { |
| verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| return DONE_EXPLORING; |
| } |
| |
| static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, |
| struct bpf_insn *insns, |
| struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| bool visit_callee) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| |
| if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) |
| init_explored_state(env, t + 1); |
| if (visit_callee) { |
| init_explored_state(env, t); |
| ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, |
| env, false); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: |
| * < 0 - an error occurred |
| * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored |
| * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored |
| */ |
| static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t)) |
| return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, true); |
| |
| /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ |
| if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP && |
| BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP32) |
| return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); |
| |
| switch (BPF_OP(insns[t].code)) { |
| case BPF_EXIT: |
| return DONE_EXPLORING; |
| |
| case BPF_CALL: |
| return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, |
| insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); |
| |
| case BPF_JA: |
| if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| /* unconditional jump with single edge */ |
| ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, |
| true); |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| |
| /* unconditional jmp is not a good pruning point, |
| * but it's marked, since backtracking needs |
| * to record jmp history in is_state_visited(). |
| */ |
| init_explored_state(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); |
| /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states |
| * after every call and jump |
| */ |
| if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) |
| init_explored_state(env, t + 1); |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| default: |
| /* conditional jump with two edges */ |
| init_explored_state(env, t); |
| ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true); |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| |
| return push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program |
| * loop == back-edge in directed graph |
| */ |
| static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| int *insn_stack, *insn_state; |
| int ret = 0; |
| int i; |
| |
| insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!insn_state) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!insn_stack) { |
| kvfree(insn_state); |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| |
| insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ |
| insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ |
| env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; |
| |
| while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { |
| int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; |
| |
| ret = visit_insn(t, insn_cnt, env); |
| switch (ret) { |
| case DONE_EXPLORING: |
| insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; |
| env->cfg.cur_stack--; |
| break; |
| case KEEP_EXPLORING: |
| break; |
| default: |
| if (ret > 0) { |
| verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n"); |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| } |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { |
| verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { |
| if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { |
| verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| } |
| ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ |
| |
| err_free: |
| kvfree(insn_state); |
| kvfree(insn_stack); |
| env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
| if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { |
| verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { |
| verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ |
| #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 |
| #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 |
| |
| static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const union bpf_attr *attr, |
| bpfptr_t uattr) |
| { |
| const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; |
| u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; |
| u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); |
| struct bpf_func_info *krecord; |
| struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; |
| struct bpf_prog *prog; |
| const struct btf *btf; |
| bpfptr_t urecord; |
| u32 prev_offset = 0; |
| bool scalar_return; |
| int ret = -ENOMEM; |
| |
| nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; |
| if (!nfuncs) { |
| if (check_abnormal_return(env)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { |
| verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; |
| if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || |
| urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || |
| urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| prog = env->prog; |
| btf = prog->aux->btf; |
| |
| urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); |
| min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); |
| |
| krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
| if (!krecord) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
| if (!info_aux) |
| goto err_free; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { |
| ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); |
| if (ret) { |
| if (ret == -E2BIG) { |
| verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); |
| /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero |
| * out the rest of the record. |
| */ |
| if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, |
| offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size), |
| &min_size, sizeof(min_size))) |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| } |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| /* check insn_off */ |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| if (i == 0) { |
| if (krecord[i].insn_off) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", |
| krecord[i].insn_off); |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", |
| krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { |
| verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| /* check type_id */ |
| type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); |
| if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", |
| krecord[i].type_id); |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); |
| |
| func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); |
| if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) |
| /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ |
| goto err_free; |
| ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); |
| scalar_return = |
| btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_type_is_enum(ret_type); |
| if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { |
| verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { |
| verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; |
| bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); |
| } |
| |
| prog->aux->func_info = krecord; |
| prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; |
| prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; |
| return 0; |
| |
| err_free: |
| kvfree(krecord); |
| kfree(info_aux); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!aux->func_info) |
| return; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) |
| aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; |
| } |
| |
| #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE (offsetof(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) + \ |
| sizeof(((struct bpf_line_info *)(0))->line_col)) |
| #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE |
| |
| static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const union bpf_attr *attr, |
| bpfptr_t uattr) |
| { |
| u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; |
| struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; |
| struct bpf_line_info *linfo; |
| struct bpf_prog *prog; |
| const struct btf *btf; |
| bpfptr_t ulinfo; |
| int err; |
| |
| nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; |
| if (!nr_linfo) |
| return 0; |
| |
| rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; |
| if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || |
| rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || |
| rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may |
| * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. |
| */ |
| linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), |
| GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
| if (!linfo) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| prog = env->prog; |
| btf = prog->aux->btf; |
| |
| s = 0; |
| sub = env->subprog_info; |
| ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel); |
| expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); |
| ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); |
| for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { |
| err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); |
| if (err) { |
| if (err == -E2BIG) { |
| verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); |
| if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, |
| offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size), |
| &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) |
| err = -EFAULT; |
| } |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { |
| err = -EFAULT; |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check insn_off to ensure |
| * 1) strictly increasing AND |
| * 2) bounded by prog->len |
| * |
| * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into |
| * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case |
| * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the |
| * first sub also and the first sub must have |
| * subprog_info[0].start == 0. |
| */ |
| if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || |
| linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { |
| verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", |
| i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, |
| prog->len); |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", |
| i); |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || |
| !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { |
| verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { |
| if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { |
| sub[s].linfo_idx = i; |
| s++; |
| } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { |
| verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; |
| bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size); |
| } |
| |
| if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { |
| verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", |
| env->subprog_cnt - s, s); |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto err_free; |
| } |
| |
| prog->aux->linfo = linfo; |
| prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; |
| |
| return 0; |
| |
| err_free: |
| kvfree(linfo); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const union bpf_attr *attr, |
| bpfptr_t uattr) |
| { |
| struct btf *btf; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { |
| if (check_abnormal_return(env)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); |
| if (IS_ERR(btf)) |
| return PTR_ERR(btf); |
| if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) { |
| btf_put(btf); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| env->prog->aux->btf = btf; |
| |
| err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ |
| static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *cur) |
| { |
| return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && |
| old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && |
| old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && |
| old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value && |
| old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value && |
| old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value && |
| old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value && |
| old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value; |
| } |
| |
| /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have |
| * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from |
| * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. |
| * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent |
| * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But |
| * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about |
| * that. |
| * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If |
| * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. |
| */ |
| static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) |
| { |
| unsigned int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { |
| if (!idmap[i].old) { |
| /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ |
| idmap[i].old = old_id; |
| idmap[i].cur = cur_id; |
| return true; |
| } |
| if (idmap[i].old == old_id) |
| return idmap[i].cur == cur_id; |
| } |
| /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(1); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_func_state *st) |
| { |
| enum bpf_reg_liveness live; |
| int i, j; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { |
| live = st->regs[i].live; |
| /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ |
| st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; |
| if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) |
| /* since the register is unused, clear its state |
| * to make further comparison simpler |
| */ |
| __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { |
| live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live; |
| /* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */ |
| st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; |
| if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { |
| __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); |
| for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) |
| st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *st) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) |
| /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ |
| return; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) |
| clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]); |
| } |
| |
| /* the parentage chains form a tree. |
| * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and |
| * pushed into state stack for future exploration. |
| * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states |
| * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, |
| * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when |
| * the verifier explores other branches. |
| * Example: |
| * 1: r0 = 1 |
| * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 |
| * 3: r0 = 2 |
| * 4: exit |
| * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of |
| * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch |
| * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the |
| * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ. |
| * |
| * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring |
| * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second |
| * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and |
| * their final liveness marks are already propagated. |
| * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() |
| * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states |
| * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state' |
| * will not be used. |
| * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ |
| * to simplify state merging. |
| * |
| * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee |
| * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare |
| * the callsites |
| */ |
| static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; |
| int i; |
| |
| sl = *explored_state(env, insn); |
| while (sl) { |
| if (sl->state.branches) |
| goto next; |
| if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || |
| sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe) |
| goto next; |
| for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++) |
| if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) |
| goto next; |
| clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); |
| next: |
| sl = sl->next; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ |
| static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, |
| struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) |
| { |
| bool equal; |
| |
| if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) |
| /* explored state didn't use this */ |
| return true; |
| |
| equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0; |
| |
| if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK) |
| /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to |
| * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar |
| */ |
| return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; |
| |
| if (equal) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) |
| /* explored state can't have used this */ |
| return true; |
| if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) |
| return false; |
| switch (rold->type) { |
| case SCALAR_VALUE: |
| if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { |
| if (!rold->precise && !rcur->precise) |
| return true; |
| /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ |
| return range_within(rold, rcur) && |
| tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); |
| } else { |
| /* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar. |
| * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to |
| * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak |
| * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in |
| * special cases if root is calling us, but it's |
| * probably not worth the hassle. |
| */ |
| return false; |
| } |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: |
| /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and |
| * everything else matches, we are OK. |
| * 'id' is not compared, since it's only used for maps with |
| * bpf_spin_lock inside map element and in such cases if |
| * the rest of the prog is valid for one map element then |
| * it's valid for all map elements regardless of the key |
| * used in bpf_map_lookup() |
| */ |
| return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && |
| range_within(rold, rcur) && |
| tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); |
| case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: |
| /* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a |
| * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map. |
| * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL- |
| * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same |
| * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when |
| * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. |
| */ |
| if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) |
| return false; |
| if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id))) |
| return false; |
| /* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */ |
| return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET: |
| if (rcur->type != rold->type) |
| return false; |
| /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr |
| * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are |
| * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, |
| * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or |
| * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. |
| */ |
| if (rold->range > rcur->range) |
| return false; |
| /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; |
| * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. |
| */ |
| if (rold->off != rcur->off) |
| return false; |
| /* id relations must be preserved */ |
| if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) |
| return false; |
| /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ |
| return range_within(rold, rcur) && |
| tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); |
| case PTR_TO_CTX: |
| case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: |
| case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: |
| case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: |
| /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above |
| * would have accepted |
| */ |
| default: |
| /* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */ |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */ |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(1); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, |
| struct bpf_func_state *cur, |
| struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) |
| { |
| int i, spi; |
| |
| /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional |
| * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state |
| * didn't use them |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { |
| spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; |
| |
| if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { |
| i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; |
| /* explored state didn't use this */ |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack |
| * and these slots were used |
| */ |
| if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack |
| * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. |
| * The opposite is not true |
| */ |
| if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && |
| cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) |
| continue; |
| if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != |
| cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) |
| /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in |
| * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> |
| * this verifier states are not equivalent, |
| * return false to continue verification of this path |
| */ |
| return false; |
| if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE) |
| continue; |
| if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) |
| continue; |
| if (!regsafe(&old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, |
| &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, |
| idmap)) |
| /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing |
| * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types |
| * are the same as well. |
| * Ex: explored safe path could have stored |
| * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} |
| * but current path has stored: |
| * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} |
| * such verifier states are not equivalent. |
| * return false to continue verification of this path |
| */ |
| return false; |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur) |
| { |
| if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) |
| return false; |
| return !memcmp(old->refs, cur->refs, |
| sizeof(*old->refs) * old->acquired_refs); |
| } |
| |
| /* compare two verifier states |
| * |
| * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since |
| * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them |
| * |
| * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of |
| * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has |
| * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution |
| * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already |
| * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. |
| * |
| * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative |
| * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. |
| * Example: |
| * explored current |
| * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) |
| * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) |
| * |
| * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more |
| * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means |
| * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too |
| * |
| * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid |
| * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that |
| * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely |
| */ |
| static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, |
| struct bpf_func_state *cur) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch)); |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) |
| if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], env->idmap_scratch)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!stacksafe(old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!refsafe(old, cur)) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *old, |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation |
| * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. |
| */ |
| if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (old->active_spin_lock != cur->active_spin_lock) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same |
| * and all frame states need to be equivalent |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { |
| if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) |
| return false; |
| if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i])) |
| return false; |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error |
| * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit. |
| */ |
| static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *reg, |
| struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg) |
| { |
| u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; |
| u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; |
| int err; |
| |
| /* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of |
| * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need |
| * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64. |
| */ |
| if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 || |
| /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */ |
| !flag || |
| /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */ |
| parent_flag == flag) |
| return 0; |
| |
| err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| return flag; |
| } |
| |
| /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the |
| * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at an |
| * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line |
| * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless |
| * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison |
| * in mark_reg_read() is for. |
| */ |
| static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; |
| int i, frame, err = 0; |
| |
| if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { |
| WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", |
| vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); |
| for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) { |
| parent = vparent->frame[frame]; |
| state = vstate->frame[frame]; |
| parent_reg = parent->regs; |
| state_reg = state->regs; |
| /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */ |
| for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { |
| err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i], |
| &parent_reg[i]); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64) |
| mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]); |
| } |
| |
| /* Propagate stack slots. */ |
| for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE && |
| i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { |
| parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr; |
| state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; |
| err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg, |
| parent_reg); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and |
| * propagate them into the current state |
| */ |
| static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) |
| { |
| struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; |
| struct bpf_func_state *state; |
| int i, err = 0; |
| |
| state = old->frame[old->curframe]; |
| state_reg = state->regs; |
| for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { |
| if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || |
| !state_reg->precise) |
| continue; |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) |
| verbose(env, "propagating r%d\n", i); |
| err = mark_chain_precision(env, i); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { |
| if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) |
| continue; |
| state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; |
| if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || |
| !state_reg->precise) |
| continue; |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) |
| verbose(env, "propagating fp%d\n", |
| (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); |
| err = mark_chain_precision_stack(env, i); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) |
| { |
| struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; |
| int i, fr = cur->curframe; |
| |
| if (old->curframe != fr) |
| return false; |
| |
| fold = old->frame[fr]; |
| fcur = cur->frame[fr]; |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) |
| if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], |
| offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent))) |
| return false; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; |
| struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev; |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; |
| int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0; |
| bool add_new_state = env->test_state_freq ? true : false; |
| |
| cur->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; |
| if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point) |
| /* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not |
| * be doing state search here |
| */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions |
| * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 |
| * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen |
| * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. |
| * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. |
| * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier |
| * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. |
| */ |
| if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && |
| env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) |
| add_new_state = true; |
| |
| pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx); |
| sl = *pprev; |
| |
| clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); |
| |
| while (sl) { |
| states_cnt++; |
| if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) |
| goto next; |
| if (sl->state.branches) { |
| if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && |
| states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { |
| verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); |
| verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state |
| * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct |
| * states and may not help future pruning. |
| * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that |
| * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. |
| * The most abusive loop will be: |
| * r1 += 1 |
| * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 |
| * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. |
| * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states |
| * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. |
| */ |
| if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && |
| env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) |
| add_new_state = false; |
| goto miss; |
| } |
| if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { |
| sl->hit_cnt++; |
| /* reached equivalent register/stack state, |
| * prune the search. |
| * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. |
| * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they |
| * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation |
| * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our |
| * own state will get the read marks recorded, but |
| * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning |
| * this state and will pop a new one. |
| */ |
| err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); |
| |
| /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and |
| * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks) |
| * the precision needs to be propagated back in |
| * the current state. |
| */ |
| err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); |
| err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| miss: |
| /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. |
| * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state |
| * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have |
| * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning |
| * and some at the end) to help pruning. |
| */ |
| if (add_new_state) |
| sl->miss_cnt++; |
| /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial |
| * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. |
| * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, |
| * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. |
| */ |
| if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) { |
| /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to |
| * speed up verification |
| */ |
| *pprev = sl->next; |
| if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { |
| u32 br = sl->state.branches; |
| |
| WARN_ONCE(br, |
| "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n", |
| br); |
| free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); |
| kfree(sl); |
| env->peak_states--; |
| } else { |
| /* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may |
| * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to |
| * be freed at the end of verification |
| */ |
| sl->next = env->free_list; |
| env->free_list = sl; |
| } |
| sl = *pprev; |
| continue; |
| } |
| next: |
| pprev = &sl->next; |
| sl = *pprev; |
| } |
| |
| if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) |
| env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; |
| |
| if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) |
| return push_jmp_history(env, cur); |
| |
| if (!add_new_state) |
| return push_jmp_history(env, cur); |
| |
| /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. |
| * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, |
| * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) |
| * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be |
| * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) |
| * again on the way to bpf_exit. |
| * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state |
| * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. |
| */ |
| new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!new_sl) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| env->total_states++; |
| env->peak_states++; |
| env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; |
| env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; |
| |
| /* add new state to the head of linked list */ |
| new = &new_sl->state; |
| err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); |
| if (err) { |
| free_verifier_state(new, false); |
| kfree(new_sl); |
| return err; |
| } |
| new->insn_idx = insn_idx; |
| WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, |
| "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); |
| |
| cur->parent = new; |
| cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; |
| clear_jmp_history(cur); |
| new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); |
| *explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl; |
| /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all |
| * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed |
| * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just |
| * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to |
| * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes |
| * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway. |
| */ |
| /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes |
| * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. |
| * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark |
| * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only |
| * explored_states can get read marks.) |
| */ |
| for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { |
| for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) |
| cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; |
| for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) |
| cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; |
| } |
| |
| /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ |
| for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { |
| struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; |
| struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j]; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { |
| frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; |
| frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent = |
| &newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ |
| static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) |
| { |
| switch (type) { |
| case PTR_TO_CTX: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: |
| case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: |
| case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: |
| case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL: |
| return false; |
| default: |
| return true; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we |
| * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok |
| * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: |
| * |
| * R1 = sock_ptr |
| * goto X; |
| * ... |
| * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; |
| * goto X; |
| * ... |
| * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); |
| */ |
| static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) |
| { |
| return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || |
| !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); |
| } |
| |
| static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; |
| struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs; |
| int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| bool do_print_state = false; |
| int prev_insn_idx = -1; |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| struct bpf_insn *insn; |
| u8 class; |
| int err; |
| |
| env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; |
| if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", |
| env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| |
| insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; |
| class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); |
| |
| if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", |
| env->insn_processed); |
| return -E2BIG; |
| } |
| |
| err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); |
| if (err < 0) |
| return err; |
| if (err == 1) { |
| /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { |
| if (do_print_state) |
| verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", |
| env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, |
| env->cur_state->speculative ? |
| " (speculative execution)" : ""); |
| else |
| verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); |
| } |
| goto process_bpf_exit; |
| } |
| |
| if (signal_pending(current)) |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| |
| if (need_resched()) |
| cond_resched(); |
| |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 || |
| (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL && do_print_state)) { |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) |
| verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx); |
| else |
| verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", |
| env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, |
| env->cur_state->speculative ? |
| " (speculative execution)" : ""); |
| print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]); |
| do_print_state = false; |
| } |
| |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { |
| const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { |
| .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, |
| .cb_print = verbose, |
| .private_data = env, |
| }; |
| |
| verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); |
| verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); |
| print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); |
| } |
| |
| if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { |
| err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, |
| env->prev_insn_idx); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| regs = cur_regs(env); |
| sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); |
| prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; |
| |
| if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { |
| err = check_alu_op(env, insn); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { |
| enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type; |
| |
| /* check for reserved fields is already done */ |
| |
| /* check src operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; |
| |
| /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, |
| * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func |
| */ |
| err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, |
| insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), |
| BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; |
| |
| if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) { |
| /* saw a valid insn |
| * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) |
| * save type to validate intersecting paths |
| */ |
| *prev_src_type = src_reg_type; |
| |
| } else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) { |
| /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn |
| * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) |
| * with different pointer types: |
| * src_reg == ctx in one branch and |
| * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. |
| * Reject it. |
| */ |
| verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| } else if (class == BPF_STX) { |
| enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type; |
| |
| if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { |
| err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| env->insn_idx++; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* check src1 operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| /* check src2 operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; |
| |
| /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ |
| err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, |
| insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), |
| BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; |
| |
| if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) { |
| *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type; |
| } else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) { |
| verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| } else if (class == BPF_ST) { |
| if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || |
| insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| /* check src operand */ |
| err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", |
| insn->dst_reg, |
| reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]); |
| return -EACCES; |
| } |
| |
| /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ |
| err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, |
| insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), |
| BPF_WRITE, -1, false); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { |
| u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
| |
| env->jmps_processed++; |
| if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || |
| insn->off != 0 || |
| (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && |
| insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && |
| insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || |
| insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || |
| class == BPF_JMP32) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock && |
| (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL || |
| insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock)) { |
| verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) |
| err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); |
| else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) |
| err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn); |
| else |
| err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || |
| insn->imm != 0 || |
| insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || |
| insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || |
| class == BPF_JMP32) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; |
| continue; |
| |
| } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { |
| if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || |
| insn->imm != 0 || |
| insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || |
| insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || |
| class == BPF_JMP32) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (state->curframe) { |
| /* exit from nested function */ |
| err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| do_print_state = true; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| err = check_reference_leak(env); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| err = check_return_code(env); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| process_bpf_exit: |
| update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); |
| err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, |
| &env->insn_idx, pop_log); |
| if (err < 0) { |
| if (err != -ENOENT) |
| return err; |
| break; |
| } else { |
| do_print_state = true; |
| continue; |
| } |
| } else { |
| err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| } |
| } else if (class == BPF_LD) { |
| u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); |
| |
| if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { |
| err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { |
| err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| env->insn_idx++; |
| sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); |
| } else { |
| verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } else { |
| verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| env->insn_idx++; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf) |
| { |
| const struct btf_type *t; |
| const char *tname; |
| int i, n; |
| |
| /* |
| * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu" |
| * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF |
| * types to look at only module's own BTF types. |
| */ |
| n = btf_nr_types(btf); |
| if (btf_is_module(btf)) |
| i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux); |
| else |
| i = 1; |
| |
| for(; i < n; i++) { |
| t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i); |
| if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC) |
| continue; |
| |
| tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); |
| if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu")) |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| return -ENOENT; |
| } |
| |
| /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ |
| static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_insn *insn, |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) |
| { |
| const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; |
| const struct btf_type *datasec; |
| struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod; |
| const struct btf_type *t; |
| const char *sym_name; |
| bool percpu = false; |
| u32 type, id = insn->imm; |
| struct btf *btf; |
| s32 datasec_id; |
| u64 addr; |
| int i, btf_fd, err; |
| |
| btf_fd = insn[1].imm; |
| if (btf_fd) { |
| btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); |
| if (IS_ERR(btf)) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (!btf_vmlinux) { |
| verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| btf = btf_vmlinux; |
| btf_get(btf); |
| } |
| |
| t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); |
| if (!t) { |
| verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); |
| err = -ENOENT; |
| goto err_put; |
| } |
| |
| if (!btf_type_is_var(t)) { |
| verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR.\n", id); |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto err_put; |
| } |
| |
| sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); |
| addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); |
| if (!addr) { |
| verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", |
| sym_name); |
| err = -ENOENT; |
| goto err_put; |
| } |
| |
| datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf); |
| if (datasec_id > 0) { |
| datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id); |
| for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { |
| if (vsi->type == id) { |
| percpu = true; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; |
| insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; |
| |
| type = t->type; |
| t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL); |
| if (percpu) { |
| aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID; |
| aux->btf_var.btf = btf; |
| aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; |
| } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { |
| const struct btf_type *ret; |
| const char *tname; |
| u32 tsize; |
| |
| /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ |
| ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize); |
| if (IS_ERR(ret)) { |
| tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); |
| verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", |
| tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto err_put; |
| } |
| aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM; |
| aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; |
| } else { |
| aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; |
| aux->btf_var.btf = btf; |
| aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; |
| } |
| |
| /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */ |
| for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) { |
| if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) { |
| btf_put(btf); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) { |
| err = -E2BIG; |
| goto err_put; |
| } |
| |
| btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt]; |
| btf_mod->btf = btf; |
| btf_mod->module = NULL; |
| |
| /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */ |
| if (btf_is_module(btf)) { |
| btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf); |
| if (!btf_mod->module) { |
| err = -ENXIO; |
| goto err_put; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| env->used_btf_cnt++; |
| |
| return 0; |
| err_put: |
| btf_put(btf); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map) |
| { |
| return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH && |
| map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && |
| map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) || |
| !(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC); |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) |
| { |
| switch (type) { |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: |
| return true; |
| default: |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_preallocated_map(struct bpf_map *map) |
| { |
| if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) |
| return false; |
| if (map->inner_map_meta && !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) |
| return false; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_map *map, |
| struct bpf_prog *prog) |
| |
| { |
| enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); |
| /* |
| * Validate that trace type programs use preallocated hash maps. |
| * |
| * For programs attached to PERF events this is mandatory as the |
| * perf NMI can hit any arbitrary code sequence. |
| * |
| * All other trace types using preallocated hash maps are unsafe as |
| * well because tracepoint or kprobes can be inside locked regions |
| * of the memory allocator or at a place where a recursion into the |
| * memory allocator would see inconsistent state. |
| * |
| * On RT enabled kernels run-time allocation of all trace type |
| * programs is strictly prohibited due to lock type constraints. On |
| * !RT kernels it is allowed for backwards compatibility reasons for |
| * now, but warnings are emitted so developers are made aware of |
| * the unsafety and can fix their programs before this is enforced. |
| */ |
| if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type) && !is_preallocated_map(map)) { |
| if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) { |
| verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT)) { |
| verbose(env, "trace type programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| WARN_ONCE(1, "trace type BPF program uses run-time allocation\n"); |
| verbose(env, "trace type programs with run-time allocated hash maps are unsafe. Switch to preallocated hash maps.\n"); |
| } |
| |
| if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { |
| if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { |
| verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { |
| verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (prog->aux->sleepable) { |
| verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) && |
| !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { |
| verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (prog->aux->sleepable) |
| switch (map->map_type) { |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: |
| if (!is_preallocated_map(map)) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "Sleepable programs can only use preallocated maps\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| break; |
| case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: |
| break; |
| default: |
| verbose(env, |
| "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, and ringbuf maps\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) |
| { |
| return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || |
| map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); |
| } |
| |
| /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: |
| * |
| * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. |
| * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. |
| * |
| * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. |
| */ |
| static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
| int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| int i, j, err; |
| |
| err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { |
| if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && |
| (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) { |
| verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; |
| struct bpf_map *map; |
| struct fd f; |
| u64 addr; |
| u32 fd; |
| |
| if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || |
| insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || |
| insn[1].off != 0) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) |
| /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ |
| goto next_insn; |
| |
| if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { |
| aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; |
| err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| goto next_insn; |
| } |
| |
| if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { |
| aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; |
| aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; |
| goto next_insn; |
| } |
| |
| /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is |
| * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. |
| */ |
| switch (insn[0].src_reg) { |
| case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE: |
| case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: |
| break; |
| case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD: |
| case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: |
| if (insn[1].imm == 0) |
| break; |
| fallthrough; |
| default: |
| verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| switch (insn[0].src_reg) { |
| case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: |
| case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: |
| if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { |
| verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n"); |
| return -EPROTO; |
| } |
| if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, |
| insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd), |
| sizeof(fd))) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| break; |
| default: |
| fd = insn[0].imm; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| f = fdget(fd); |
| map = __bpf_map_get(f); |
| if (IS_ERR(map)) { |
| verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", |
| insn[0].imm); |
| return PTR_ERR(map); |
| } |
| |
| err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); |
| if (err) { |
| fdput(f); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; |
| if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || |
| insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { |
| addr = (unsigned long)map; |
| } else { |
| u32 off = insn[1].imm; |
| |
| if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { |
| verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off); |
| fdput(f); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { |
| verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); |
| fdput(f); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", |
| map->value_size, off); |
| fdput(f); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| aux->map_off = off; |
| addr += off; |
| } |
| |
| insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; |
| insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; |
| |
| /* check whether we recorded this map already */ |
| for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) { |
| if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { |
| aux->map_index = j; |
| fdput(f); |
| goto next_insn; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { |
| fdput(f); |
| return -E2BIG; |
| } |
| |
| /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, |
| * the map will be released by release_maps() or it |
| * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded |
| * and all maps are released in free_used_maps() |
| */ |
| bpf_map_inc(map); |
| |
| aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt; |
| env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; |
| |
| if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && |
| bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { |
| verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); |
| fdput(f); |
| return -EBUSY; |
| } |
| |
| fdput(f); |
| next_insn: |
| insn++; |
| i++; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ |
| if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { |
| verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid |
| * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. |
| * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. |
| */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ |
| static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, |
| env->used_map_cnt); |
| } |
| |
| /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ |
| static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs, |
| env->used_btf_cnt); |
| } |
| |
| /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ |
| static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
| int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { |
| if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) |
| continue; |
| if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) |
| continue; |
| insn->src_reg = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range |
| * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying |
| * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero |
| */ |
| static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; |
| u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen; |
| u32 prog_len; |
| int i; |
| |
| /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path |
| * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the |
| * original insn at old prog. |
| */ |
| old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1); |
| |
| if (cnt == 1) |
| return 0; |
| prog_len = new_prog->len; |
| new_data = vzalloc(array_size(prog_len, |
| sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data))); |
| if (!new_data) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); |
| memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, |
| sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); |
| for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { |
| /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */ |
| new_data[i].seen = old_seen; |
| new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i); |
| } |
| env->insn_aux_data = new_data; |
| vfree(old_data); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (len == 1) |
| return; |
| /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ |
| for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
| if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) |
| continue; |
| env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len) |
| { |
| struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; |
| int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; |
| struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { |
| desc = &tab[i]; |
| if (desc->insn_idx <= off) |
| continue; |
| desc->insn_idx += len - 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, |
| const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) |
| { |
| struct bpf_prog *new_prog; |
| |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); |
| if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { |
| if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) |
| verbose(env, |
| "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", |
| env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog, off, len)) |
| return NULL; |
| adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); |
| adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len); |
| return new_prog; |
| } |
| |
| static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| u32 off, u32 cnt) |
| { |
| int i, j; |
| |
| /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ |
| for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) |
| if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) |
| break; |
| /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ |
| for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) |
| if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) |
| break; |
| /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing |
| * the front of previous prog |
| */ |
| if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) |
| j--; |
| |
| if (j > i) { |
| struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; |
| int move; |
| |
| /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ |
| move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; |
| |
| memmove(env->subprog_info + i, |
| env->subprog_info + j, |
| sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); |
| env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; |
| |
| /* remove func_info */ |
| if (aux->func_info) { |
| move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; |
| |
| memmove(aux->func_info + i, |
| aux->func_info + j, |
| sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); |
| aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; |
| /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, |
| * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust |
| */ |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ |
| if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) |
| i++; |
| } |
| |
| /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ |
| for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) |
| env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, |
| u32 cnt) |
| { |
| struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; |
| u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; |
| struct bpf_line_info *linfo; |
| |
| nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; |
| if (!nr_linfo) |
| return 0; |
| |
| linfo = prog->aux->linfo; |
| |
| /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ |
| for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) |
| if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) |
| break; |
| |
| l_off = i; |
| l_cnt = 0; |
| for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) |
| if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) |
| l_cnt++; |
| else |
| break; |
| |
| /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" |
| * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off |
| * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). |
| */ |
| if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && |
| (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { |
| l_cnt--; |
| linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; |
| } |
| |
| /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ |
| if (l_cnt) { |
| memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, |
| sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); |
| |
| prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; |
| nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; |
| } |
| |
| /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ |
| for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) |
| linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; |
| |
| /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ |
| for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) |
| if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { |
| /* program may have started in the removed region but |
| * may not be fully removed |
| */ |
| if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) |
| env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; |
| else |
| env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; |
| unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) |
| bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); |
| |
| err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, |
| sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not |
| * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can |
| * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code |
| * with 'ja -1'. |
| * |
| * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the |
| * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then |
| * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception |
| * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead |
| * code could be located. |
| */ |
| static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; |
| struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
| const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { |
| if (aux_data[i].seen) |
| continue; |
| memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) |
| { |
| u8 op; |
| |
| if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) |
| return false; |
| |
| op = BPF_OP(code); |
| return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; |
| } |
| |
| static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; |
| struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
| const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { |
| if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) |
| ja.off = insn->off; |
| else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) |
| ja.off = 0; |
| else |
| continue; |
| |
| if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) |
| bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); |
| |
| memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; |
| int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| int i, err; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { |
| int j; |
| |
| j = 0; |
| while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) |
| j++; |
| if (!j) |
| continue; |
| |
| err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
| int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| int i, err; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { |
| if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja))) |
| continue; |
| |
| err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| insn_cnt--; |
| i--; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| const union bpf_attr *attr) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4]; |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; |
| int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; |
| struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; |
| struct bpf_prog *new_prog; |
| bool rnd_hi32; |
| |
| rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; |
| zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); |
| rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); |
| rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); |
| rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); |
| for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { |
| int adj_idx = i + delta; |
| struct bpf_insn insn; |
| int load_reg; |
| |
| insn = insns[adj_idx]; |
| load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn); |
| if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { |
| u8 code, class; |
| u32 imm_rnd; |
| |
| if (!rnd_hi32) |
| continue; |
| |
| code = insn.code; |
| class = BPF_CLASS(code); |
| if (load_reg == -1) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for |
| * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL |
| * here. |
| */ |
| if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { |
| if (class == BPF_LD && |
| BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) |
| i++; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ |
| if (class == BPF_LDX && |
| aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) |
| continue; |
| |
| imm_rnd = get_random_int(); |
| rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; |
| rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; |
| rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg; |
| patch = rnd_hi32_patch; |
| patch_len = 4; |
| goto apply_patch_buffer; |
| } |
| |
| /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested |
| * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG. |
| * |
| * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into |
| * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs' |
| * equivalent instruction only does this load when the |
| * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is |
| * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the |
| * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext. |
| */ |
| if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn)) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) { |
| verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n"); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| |
| zext_patch[0] = insn; |
| zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg; |
| zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg; |
| patch = zext_patch; |
| patch_len = 2; |
| apply_patch_buffer: |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); |
| if (!new_prog) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| env->prog = new_prog; |
| insns = new_prog->insnsi; |
| aux = env->insn_aux_data; |
| delta += patch_len - 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a |
| * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: |
| * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff |
| * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock |
| */ |
| static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; |
| int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; |
| const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
| struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; |
| u32 target_size, size_default, off; |
| struct bpf_prog *new_prog; |
| enum bpf_access_type type; |
| bool is_narrower_load; |
| |
| if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { |
| if (!ops->gen_prologue) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, |
| env->prog); |
| if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } else if (cnt) { |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); |
| if (!new_prog) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| env->prog = new_prog; |
| delta += cnt - 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { |
| bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; |
| |
| if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || |
| insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || |
| insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || |
| insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) |
| type = BPF_READ; |
| else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || |
| insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || |
| insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || |
| insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) |
| type = BPF_WRITE; |
| else |
| continue; |
| |
| if (type == BPF_WRITE && |
| env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off) { |
| struct bpf_insn patch[] = { |
| /* Sanitize suspicious stack slot with zero. |
| * There are no memory dependencies for this store, |
| * since it's only using frame pointer and immediate |
| * constant of zero |
| */ |
| BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, |
| env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off, |
| 0), |
| /* the original STX instruction will immediately |
| * overwrite the same stack slot with appropriate value |
| */ |
| *insn, |
| }; |
| |
| cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); |
| if (!new_prog) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| delta += cnt - 1; |
| env->prog = new_prog; |
| insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| switch (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { |
| case PTR_TO_CTX: |
| if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) |
| continue; |
| convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_SOCKET: |
| case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: |
| convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: |
| convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: |
| convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; |
| break; |
| case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: |
| if (type == BPF_READ) { |
| insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | |
| BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); |
| env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; |
| } else if (resolve_prog_type(env->prog) != BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { |
| verbose(env, "Writes through BTF pointers are not allowed\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| continue; |
| default: |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; |
| size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); |
| |
| /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, |
| * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific |
| * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, |
| * we will apply proper mask to the result. |
| */ |
| is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; |
| size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); |
| off = insn->off; |
| if (is_narrower_load) { |
| u8 size_code; |
| |
| if (type == BPF_WRITE) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| size_code = BPF_H; |
| if (ctx_field_size == 4) |
| size_code = BPF_W; |
| else if (ctx_field_size == 8) |
| size_code = BPF_DW; |
| |
| insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); |
| insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; |
| } |
| |
| target_size = 0; |
| cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, |
| &target_size); |
| if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || |
| (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { |
| u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( |
| off, size, size_default) * 8; |
| if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { |
| if (shift) |
| insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, |
| insn->dst_reg, |
| shift); |
| insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, |
| (1 << size * 8) - 1); |
| } else { |
| if (shift) |
| insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, |
| insn->dst_reg, |
| shift); |
| insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, |
| (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); |
| if (!new_prog) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| delta += cnt - 1; |
| |
| /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ |
| env->prog = new_prog; |
| insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; |
| int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; |
| struct bpf_map *map_ptr; |
| struct bpf_insn *insn; |
| void *old_bpf_func; |
| int err, num_exentries; |
| |
| if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) |
| return 0; |
| |
| for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { |
| if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { |
| env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; |
| /* subprog is encoded in insn[1].imm */ |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) |
| continue; |
| /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but |
| * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is |
| * propagated in any case. |
| */ |
| subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); |
| if (subprog < 0) { |
| WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", |
| i + insn->imm + 1); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of |
| * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs |
| */ |
| insn->off = subprog; |
| /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback |
| * to interpreter will be needed |
| */ |
| env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; |
| /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ |
| insn->imm = 1; |
| } |
| |
| err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); |
| if (err) |
| goto out_undo_insn; |
| |
| err = -ENOMEM; |
| func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!func) |
| goto out_undo_insn; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
| subprog_start = subprog_end; |
| subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; |
| |
| len = subprog_end - subprog_start; |
| /* BPF_PROG_RUN doesn't call subprogs directly, |
| * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. |
| * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id |
| * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL |
| */ |
| func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); |
| if (!func[i]) |
| goto out_free; |
| memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], |
| len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); |
| func[i]->type = prog->type; |
| func[i]->len = len; |
| if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) |
| goto out_free; |
| func[i]->is_func = 1; |
| func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; |
| /* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */ |
| func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; |
| func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; |
| func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; |
| func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; |
| |
| for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { |
| struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke; |
| |
| poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]; |
| if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end && |
| poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start) |
| poke->aux = func[i]->aux; |
| } |
| |
| /* Use bpf_prog_F_tag to indicate functions in stack traces. |
| * Long term would need debug info to populate names |
| */ |
| func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; |
| func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; |
| func[i]->jit_requested = 1; |
| func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; |
| func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; |
| func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; |
| func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; |
| func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; |
| num_exentries = 0; |
| insn = func[i]->insnsi; |
| for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { |
| if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && |
| BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM) |
| num_exentries++; |
| } |
| func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; |
| func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; |
| func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); |
| if (!func[i]->jited) { |
| err = -ENOTSUPP; |
| goto out_free; |
| } |
| cond_resched(); |
| } |
| |
| /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed |
| * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and |
| * run last pass of JIT |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
| insn = func[i]->insnsi; |
| for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { |
| if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { |
| subprog = insn[1].imm; |
| insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; |
| insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) |
| continue; |
| subprog = insn->off; |
| insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(func[subprog]->bpf_func) - |
| __bpf_call_base; |
| } |
| |
| /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses |
| * of the JITed images for each function in the program |
| * |
| * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field |
| * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start |
| * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base |
| * |
| * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee |
| * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of |
| * the call instruction, as an index for this list |
| */ |
| func[i]->aux->func = func; |
| func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
| old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; |
| tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); |
| if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { |
| verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); |
| err = -ENOTSUPP; |
| goto out_free; |
| } |
| cond_resched(); |
| } |
| |
| /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and |
| * populate kallsysm |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
| bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); |
| bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); |
| } |
| |
| /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main |
| * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can |
| * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { |
| if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { |
| insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; |
| insn[1].imm = find_subprog(env, i + insn[0].imm + 1); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) |
| continue; |
| insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; |
| subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); |
| insn->imm = subprog; |
| } |
| |
| prog->jited = 1; |
| prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; |
| prog->aux->func = func; |
| prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; |
| bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); |
| return 0; |
| out_free: |
| /* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke |
| * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to |
| * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { |
| map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; |
| map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); |
| } |
| /* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not |
| * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's |
| * released with the main prog. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
| if (!func[i]) |
| continue; |
| func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL; |
| bpf_jit_free(func[i]); |
| } |
| kfree(func); |
| out_undo_insn: |
| /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ |
| prog->jit_requested = 0; |
| for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { |
| if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) |
| continue; |
| insn->off = 0; |
| insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; |
| } |
| bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON |
| struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; |
| bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog); |
| int i, depth; |
| #endif |
| int err = 0; |
| |
| if (env->prog->jit_requested && |
| !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { |
| err = jit_subprogs(env); |
| if (err == 0) |
| return 0; |
| if (err == -EFAULT) |
| return err; |
| } |
| #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON |
| if (has_kfunc_call) { |
| verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { |
| /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls |
| * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. |
| */ |
| verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { |
| if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { |
| /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls |
| * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. |
| */ |
| verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) |
| continue; |
| depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); |
| if (depth < 0) |
| return depth; |
| bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); |
| } |
| err = 0; |
| #endif |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
| struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| { |
| const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; |
| |
| /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with |
| * an address (relative to __bpf_base_call). |
| */ |
| desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm); |
| if (!desc) { |
| verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n", |
| insn->imm); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| |
| insn->imm = desc->imm; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass. |
| * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations. |
| */ |
| static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; |
| bool expect_blinding = bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(prog); |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; |
| const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; |
| const int insn_cnt = prog->len; |
| const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; |
| struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; |
| struct bpf_prog *new_prog; |
| struct bpf_map *map_ptr; |
| int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { |
| /* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */ |
| if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || |
| insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || |
| insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || |
| insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { |
| bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; |
| bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; |
| struct bpf_insn *patchlet; |
| struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = { |
| /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ |
| BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | |
| BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, |
| 0, 2, 0), |
| BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), |
| BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), |
| *insn, |
| }; |
| struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = { |
| /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ |
| BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | |
| BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, |
| 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0), |
| *insn, |
| BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), |
| BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), |
| }; |
| |
| patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod; |
| cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) : |
| ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0); |
| |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); |
| if (!new_prog) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| delta += cnt - 1; |
| env->prog = prog = new_prog; |
| insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ |
| if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && |
| (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || |
| BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { |
| cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); |
| if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); |
| if (!new_prog) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| delta += cnt - 1; |
| env->prog = prog = new_prog; |
| insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ |
| if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || |
| insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { |
| const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; |
| const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; |
| struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; |
| bool issrc, isneg, isimm; |
| u32 off_reg; |
| |
| aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; |
| if (!aux->alu_state || |
| aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) |
| continue; |
| |
| isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; |
| issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == |
| BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; |
| isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE; |
| |
| off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; |
| if (isimm) { |
| *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); |
| } else { |
| if (isneg) |
| *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); |
| *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); |
| *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); |
| *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); |
| *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); |
| *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); |
| *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); |
| } |
| if (!issrc) |
| *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg); |
| insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; |
| if (isneg) |
| insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? |
| code_sub : code_add; |
| *patch++ = *insn; |
| if (issrc && isneg && !isimm) |
| *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); |
| cnt = patch - insn_buf; |
| |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); |
| if (!new_prog) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| delta += cnt - 1; |
| env->prog = prog = new_prog; |
| insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) |
| continue; |
| if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) |
| continue; |
| if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { |
| ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn); |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) |
| prog->dst_needed = 1; |
| if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) |
| bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); |
| if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) |
| prog->kprobe_override = 1; |
| if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { |
| /* If we tail call into other programs, we |
| * cannot make any assumptions since they can |
| * be replaced dynamically during runtime in |
| * the program array. |
| */ |
| prog->cb_access = 1; |
| if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) |
| prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; |
| prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; |
| |
| /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid |
| * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal |
| * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler |
| * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet |
| */ |
| insn->imm = 0; |
| insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; |
| |
| aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; |
| if (env->bpf_capable && !expect_blinding && |
| prog->jit_requested && |
| !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && |
| !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && |
| !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { |
| struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { |
| .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, |
| .tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state), |
| .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), |
| .insn_idx = i + delta, |
| }; |
| |
| ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| insn->imm = ret + 1; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call |
| * emit two extra insns: |
| * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; |
| * index &= array->index_mask; |
| * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation |
| */ |
| if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { |
| verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); |
| insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, |
| map_ptr->max_entries, 2); |
| insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, |
| container_of(map_ptr, |
| struct bpf_array, |
| map)->index_mask); |
| insn_buf[2] = *insn; |
| cnt = 3; |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); |
| if (!new_prog) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| delta += cnt - 1; |
| env->prog = prog = new_prog; |
| insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup |
| * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit |
| * only. |
| */ |
| if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && |
| (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || |
| insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || |
| insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || |
| insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || |
| insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || |
| insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem || |
| insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)) { |
| aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; |
| if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) |
| goto patch_call_imm; |
| |
| map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); |
| ops = map_ptr->ops; |
| if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && |
| ops->map_gen_lookup) { |
| cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); |
| if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
| goto patch_map_ops_generic; |
| if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, |
| insn_buf, cnt); |
| if (!new_prog) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| delta += cnt - 1; |
| env->prog = prog = new_prog; |
| insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, |
| (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, |
| (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, |
| (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, |
| u64 flags))NULL)); |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, |
| (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, |
| u64 flags))NULL)); |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, |
| (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, |
| (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect, |
| (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u32 ifindex, u64 flags))NULL)); |
| |
| patch_map_ops_generic: |
| switch (insn->imm) { |
| case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: |
| insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_lookup_elem) - |
| __bpf_call_base; |
| continue; |
| case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: |
| insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_update_elem) - |
| __bpf_call_base; |
| continue; |
| case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: |
| insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_delete_elem) - |
| __bpf_call_base; |
| continue; |
| case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: |
| insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_push_elem) - |
| __bpf_call_base; |
| continue; |
| case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: |
| insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_pop_elem) - |
| __bpf_call_base; |
| continue; |
| case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: |
| insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_peek_elem) - |
| __bpf_call_base; |
| continue; |
| case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: |
| insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_redirect) - |
| __bpf_call_base; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| goto patch_call_imm; |
| } |
| |
| /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */ |
| if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && |
| insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { |
| struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { |
| BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, |
| (unsigned long)&jiffies), |
| }; |
| |
| insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; |
| insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; |
| insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, |
| BPF_REG_0, 0); |
| cnt = 3; |
| |
| new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, |
| cnt); |
| if (!new_prog) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| delta += cnt - 1; |
| env->prog = prog = new_prog; |
| insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| patch_call_imm: |
| fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); |
| /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed |
| * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions |
| */ |
| if (!fn->func) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", |
| func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; |
| } |
| |
| /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ |
| for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { |
| map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; |
| if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || |
| !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || |
| !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { |
| verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(env->prog); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; |
| int i; |
| |
| sl = env->free_list; |
| while (sl) { |
| sln = sl->next; |
| free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); |
| kfree(sl); |
| sl = sln; |
| } |
| env->free_list = NULL; |
| |
| if (!env->explored_states) |
| return; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { |
| sl = env->explored_states[i]; |
| |
| while (sl) { |
| sln = sl->next; |
| free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); |
| kfree(sl); |
| sl = sln; |
| } |
| env->explored_states[i] = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* The verifier is using insn_aux_data[] to store temporary data during |
| * verification and to store information for passes that run after the |
| * verification like dead code sanitization. do_check_common() for subprogram N |
| * may analyze many other subprograms. sanitize_insn_aux_data() clears all |
| * temporary data after do_check_common() finds that subprogram N cannot be |
| * verified independently. pass_cnt counts the number of times |
| * do_check_common() was run and insn->aux->seen tells the pass number |
| * insn_aux_data was touched. These variables are compared to clear temporary |
| * data from failed pass. For testing and experiments do_check_common() can be |
| * run multiple times even when prior attempt to verify is unsuccessful. |
| * |
| * Note that special handling is needed on !env->bypass_spec_v1 if this is |
| * ever called outside of error path with subsequent program rejection. |
| */ |
| static void sanitize_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
| struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; |
| int i, class; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) { |
| class = BPF_CLASS(insn[i].code); |
| if (class != BPF_LDX && class != BPF_STX) |
| continue; |
| aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; |
| if (aux->seen != env->pass_cnt) |
| continue; |
| memset(aux, 0, offsetof(typeof(*aux), orig_idx)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) |
| { |
| bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); |
| struct bpf_verifier_state *state; |
| struct bpf_reg_state *regs; |
| int ret, i; |
| |
| env->prev_linfo = NULL; |
| env->pass_cnt++; |
| |
| state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!state) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| state->curframe = 0; |
| state->speculative = false; |
| state->branches = 1; |
| state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!state->frame[0]) { |
| kfree(state); |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| env->cur_state = state; |
| init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], |
| BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, |
| 0 /* frameno */, |
| subprog); |
| |
| regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; |
| if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { |
| ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs); |
| if (ret) |
| goto out; |
| for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { |
| if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX) |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); |
| else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE) |
| mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); |
| else if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL) { |
| const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size; |
| |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); |
| regs[i].mem_size = mem_size; |
| regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen; |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* 1st arg to a function */ |
| regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; |
| mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); |
| ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs); |
| if (ret == -EFAULT) |
| /* unlikely verifier bug. abort. |
| * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for |
| * main() function due to backward compatibility. |
| * Like socket filter program may be written as: |
| * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) |
| * and never dereference that ctx in the program. |
| * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket |
| * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'. |
| */ |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| ret = do_check(env); |
| out: |
| /* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside |
| * do_check() under memory pressure. |
| */ |
| if (env->cur_state) { |
| free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); |
| env->cur_state = NULL; |
| } |
| while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); |
| if (!ret && pop_log) |
| bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); |
| free_states(env); |
| if (ret) |
| /* clean aux data in case subprog was rejected */ |
| sanitize_insn_aux_data(env); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF. |
| * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected. |
| * Consider: |
| * int bar(int); |
| * int foo(int f) |
| * { |
| * return bar(f); |
| * } |
| * int bar(int b) |
| * { |
| * ... |
| * } |
| * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it |
| * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() |
| * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified |
| * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. |
| */ |
| static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; |
| int i, ret; |
| |
| if (!aux->func_info) |
| return 0; |
| |
| for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
| if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) |
| continue; |
| env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); |
| ret = do_check_common(env, i); |
| if (ret) { |
| return ret; |
| } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { |
| verbose(env, |
| "Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", |
| i); |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| env->insn_idx = 0; |
| ret = do_check_common(env, 0); |
| if (!ret) |
| env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { |
| verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", |
| div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); |
| verbose(env, "stack depth "); |
| for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
| u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; |
| |
| verbose(env, "%d", depth); |
| if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) |
| verbose(env, "+"); |
| } |
| verbose(env, "\n"); |
| } |
| verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " |
| "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", |
| env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, |
| env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, |
| env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); |
| } |
| |
| static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; |
| const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; |
| const struct btf_member *member; |
| struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; |
| u32 btf_id, member_idx; |
| const char *mname; |
| |
| if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { |
| verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; |
| st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id); |
| if (!st_ops) { |
| verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", |
| btf_id); |
| return -ENOTSUPP; |
| } |
| |
| t = st_ops->type; |
| member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; |
| if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { |
| verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", |
| member_idx, st_ops->name); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; |
| mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off); |
| func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type, |
| NULL); |
| if (!func_proto) { |
| verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", |
| mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (st_ops->check_member) { |
| int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member); |
| |
| if (err) { |
| verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", |
| mname, st_ops->name); |
| return err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; |
| prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; |
| env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" |
| |
| static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) |
| { |
| if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || |
| !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on |
| * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list |
| */ |
| BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) |
| /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. |
| * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. |
| */ |
| BTF_ID(func, __add_to_page_cache_locked) |
| BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) |
| BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) |
| BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) |
| |
| static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) |
| { |
| return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); |
| } |
| |
| int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, |
| const struct bpf_prog *prog, |
| const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, |
| u32 btf_id, |
| struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) |
| { |
| bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; |
| const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; |
| int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; |
| const struct btf_type *t; |
| bool conservative = true; |
| const char *tname; |
| struct btf *btf; |
| long addr = 0; |
| |
| if (!btf_id) { |
| bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf; |
| if (!btf) { |
| bpf_log(log, |
| "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); |
| if (!t) { |
| bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); |
| if (!tname) { |
| bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (tgt_prog) { |
| struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) |
| if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { |
| subprog = i; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (subprog == -1) { |
| bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; |
| if (prog_extension) { |
| if (conservative) { |
| bpf_log(log, |
| "Cannot replace static functions\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (!prog->jit_requested) { |
| bpf_log(log, |
| "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!tgt_prog->jited) { |
| bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { |
| /* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program. |
| * Cannot attach program extension to another extension. |
| * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program. |
| */ |
| bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && |
| prog_extension && |
| (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || |
| tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { |
| /* Program extensions can extend all program types |
| * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. |
| * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance |
| * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program |
| * type except themselves. When extension program is |
| * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow |
| * performance analysis of all functions. Both original |
| * XDP program and its program extension. Hence |
| * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is |
| * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it |
| * would be possible to create long call chain |
| * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond |
| * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not |
| * allowed. |
| */ |
| bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (prog_extension) { |
| bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { |
| case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: |
| if (tgt_prog) { |
| bpf_log(log, |
| "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { |
| bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", |
| btf_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { |
| bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", |
| btf_id, tname); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; |
| t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); |
| if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) |
| /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ |
| return -EINVAL; |
| t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); |
| if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) |
| /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| break; |
| case BPF_TRACE_ITER: |
| if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { |
| bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", |
| btf_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); |
| if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| break; |
| default: |
| if (!prog_extension) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| fallthrough; |
| case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: |
| case BPF_LSM_MAC: |
| case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: |
| case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: |
| if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { |
| bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", |
| btf_id); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| if (prog_extension && |
| btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); |
| if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && |
| (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || |
| prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| if (tgt_prog && conservative) |
| t = NULL; |
| |
| ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return ret; |
| |
| if (tgt_prog) { |
| if (subprog == 0) |
| addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; |
| else |
| addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; |
| } else { |
| addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); |
| if (!addr) { |
| bpf_log(log, |
| "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", |
| tname); |
| return -ENOENT; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (prog->aux->sleepable) { |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| switch (prog->type) { |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: |
| /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable only if they are |
| * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. |
| */ |
| if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && |
| within_error_injection_list(addr)) |
| ret = 0; |
| break; |
| case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: |
| /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. |
| * Only some of them are sleepable. |
| */ |
| if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id)) |
| ret = 0; |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| if (ret) { |
| bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { |
| if (tgt_prog) { |
| bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| ret = check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname); |
| if (ret) { |
| bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| } |
| tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; |
| tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; |
| tgt_info->tgt_type = t; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny) |
| BTF_ID_UNUSED |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SMP |
| BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable) |
| BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable) |
| #endif |
| #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU |
| BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict) |
| #endif |
| BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny) |
| |
| static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
| { |
| struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; |
| struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; |
| struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; |
| u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; |
| struct bpf_trampoline *tr; |
| int ret; |
| u64 key; |
| |
| if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) { |
| if (prog->aux->sleepable) |
| /* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */ |
| return 0; |
| verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (prog->aux->sleepable && prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && |
| prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { |
| verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret and lsm programs can be sleepable\n"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) |
| return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); |
| |
| if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && |
| prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && |
| prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) |
| return 0; |
| |
| ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| |
| if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { |
| /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to |
| * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the |
| * verification |
| */ |
| env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; |
| prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; |
| } |
| |
| /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ |
| prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; |
| prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; |
| |
| if (tgt_prog) { |
| prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; |
| prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; |
| } |
| |
| if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { |
| prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; |
| return 0; |
| } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { |
| if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { |
| ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return ret; |
| } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && |
| btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) { |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id); |
| tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); |
| if (!tr) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) |
| { |
| if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { |
| mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); |
| if (!btf_vmlinux) |
| btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); |
| mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); |
| } |
| return btf_vmlinux; |
| } |
| |
| int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) |
| { |
| u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); |
| struct bpf_verifier_env *env; |
| struct bpf_verifier_log *log; |
| int i, len, ret = -EINVAL; |
| bool is_priv; |
| |
| /* no program is valid */ |
| if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, |
| * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called |
| */ |
| env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!env) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| log = &env->log; |
| |
| len = (*prog)->len; |
| env->insn_aux_data = |
| vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| if (!env->insn_aux_data) |
| goto err_free_env; |
| for (i = 0; i < len; i++) |
| env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; |
| env->prog = *prog; |
| env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; |
| env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel); |
| is_priv = bpf_capable(); |
| |
| bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); |
| |
| /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ |
| if (!is_priv) |
| mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); |
| |
| if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) { |
| /* user requested verbose verifier output |
| * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace |
| */ |
| log->level = attr->log_level; |
| log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; |
| log->len_total = attr->log_size; |
| |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| /* log attributes have to be sane */ |
| if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 2 || |
| !log->level || !log->ubuf || log->level & ~BPF_LOG_MASK) |
| goto err_unlock; |
| } |
| |
| if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { |
| /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ |
| verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); |
| ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); |
| goto skip_full_check; |
| } |
| |
| env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); |
| if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) |
| env->strict_alignment = true; |
| if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) |
| env->strict_alignment = false; |
| |
| env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); |
| env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(); |
| env->allow_ptr_to_map_access = bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access(); |
| env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); |
| env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); |
| env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); |
| |
| if (is_priv) |
| env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; |
| |
| env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), |
| sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), |
| GFP_USER); |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| if (!env->explored_states) |
| goto skip_full_check; |
| |
| ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto skip_full_check; |
| |
| ret = check_subprogs(env); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto skip_full_check; |
| |
| ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto skip_full_check; |
| |
| ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); |
| if (ret) |
| goto skip_full_check; |
| |
| ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto skip_full_check; |
| |
| if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { |
| ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); |
| if (ret) |
| goto skip_full_check; |
| } |
| |
| ret = check_cfg(env); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto skip_full_check; |
| |
| ret = do_check_subprogs(env); |
| ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env); |
| |
| if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) |
| ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); |
| |
| skip_full_check: |
| kvfree(env->explored_states); |
| |
| if (ret == 0) |
| ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); |
| |
| /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ |
| if (is_priv) { |
| if (ret == 0) |
| opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); |
| if (ret == 0) |
| ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); |
| if (ret == 0) |
| ret = opt_remove_nops(env); |
| } else { |
| if (ret == 0) |
| sanitize_dead_code(env); |
| } |
| |
| if (ret == 0) |
| /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ |
| ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); |
| |
| if (ret == 0) |
| ret = do_misc_fixups(env); |
| |
| /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched |
| * insns could be handled correctly. |
| */ |
| if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { |
| ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); |
| env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret |
| : false; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret == 0) |
| ret = fixup_call_args(env); |
| |
| env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; |
| print_verification_stats(env); |
| |
| if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) |
| ret = -ENOSPC; |
| if (log->level && !log->ubuf) { |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| goto err_release_maps; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret) |
| goto err_release_maps; |
| |
| if (env->used_map_cnt) { |
| /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ |
| env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, |
| sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), |
| GFP_KERNEL); |
| |
| if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| goto err_release_maps; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, |
| sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); |
| env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; |
| } |
| if (env->used_btf_cnt) { |
| /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ |
| env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, |
| sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), |
| GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| goto err_release_maps; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs, |
| sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt); |
| env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt; |
| } |
| if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) { |
| /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic |
| * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions |
| */ |
| convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); |
| } |
| |
| adjust_btf_func(env); |
| |
| err_release_maps: |
| if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) |
| /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release |
| * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. |
| */ |
| release_maps(env); |
| if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) |
| release_btfs(env); |
| |
| /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets |
| for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning |
| */ |
| if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) |
| env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; |
| |
| *prog = env->prog; |
| err_unlock: |
| if (!is_priv) |
| mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); |
| vfree(env->insn_aux_data); |
| err_free_env: |
| kfree(env); |
| return ret; |
| } |