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Thomas Gleixner25763b32019-05-28 10:10:09 -07001/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003 */
4#ifndef _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H
5#define _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H 1
6
7#include <linux/bpf.h> /* for enum bpf_reg_type */
8#include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +01009#include <linux/tnum.h>
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +010010
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +010011/* Maximum variable offset umax_value permitted when resolving memory accesses.
12 * In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit
13 * ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64.
14 */
Alexei Starovoitovbb7f0f92017-12-18 20:12:00 -080015#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1 << 29)
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +010016/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO]. This ensures
17 * that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow.
18 */
Alexei Starovoitovbb7f0f92017-12-18 20:12:00 -080019#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ (1 << 29)
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -040020
Edward Cree8e9cd9c2017-08-23 15:11:21 +010021/* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots).
22 * Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that
23 * "one of this state's descendants read this reg" (and therefore the reg is
24 * relevant for states_equal() checks).
25 * Write marks collect downwards and do not propagate; they record that "the
26 * straight-line code that reached this state (from its parent) wrote this reg"
27 * (and therefore that reads propagated from this state or its descendants
28 * should not propagate to its parent).
29 * A state with a write mark can receive read marks; it just won't propagate
30 * them to its parent, since the write mark is a property, not of the state,
31 * but of the link between it and its parent. See mark_reg_read() and
32 * mark_stack_slot_read() in kernel/bpf/verifier.c.
33 */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +010034enum bpf_reg_liveness {
35 REG_LIVE_NONE = 0, /* reg hasn't been read or written this branch */
Jiong Wang5327ed32019-05-24 23:25:12 +010036 REG_LIVE_READ32 = 0x1, /* reg was read, so we're sensitive to initial value */
37 REG_LIVE_READ64 = 0x2, /* likewise, but full 64-bit content matters */
38 REG_LIVE_READ = REG_LIVE_READ32 | REG_LIVE_READ64,
39 REG_LIVE_WRITTEN = 0x4, /* reg was written first, screening off later reads */
40 REG_LIVE_DONE = 0x8, /* liveness won't be updating this register anymore */
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +010041};
42
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +010043struct bpf_reg_state {
Edward Cree679c7822018-08-22 20:02:19 +010044 /* Ordering of fields matters. See states_equal() */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +010045 enum bpf_reg_type type;
46 union {
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +010047 /* valid when type == PTR_TO_PACKET */
48 u16 range;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +010049
50 /* valid when type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE |
51 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
52 */
53 struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
Daniel Borkmann09625902018-11-01 00:05:52 +010054
Alexei Starovoitov9e15db62019-10-15 20:25:00 -070055 u32 btf_id; /* for PTR_TO_BTF_ID */
56
Daniel Borkmann09625902018-11-01 00:05:52 +010057 /* Max size from any of the above. */
58 unsigned long raw;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +010059 };
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +010060 /* Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only */
61 s32 off;
62 /* For PTR_TO_PACKET, used to find other pointers with the same variable
63 * offset, so they can share range knowledge.
64 * For PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL this is used to share which map value we
65 * came from, when one is tested for != NULL.
Joe Stringerc64b7982018-10-02 13:35:33 -070066 * For PTR_TO_SOCKET this is used to share which pointers retain the
67 * same reference to the socket, to determine proper reference freeing.
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +010068 */
Alexei Starovoitovd2a4dd32016-12-07 10:57:59 -080069 u32 id;
Martin KaFai Lau1b986582019-03-12 10:23:02 -070070 /* PTR_TO_SOCKET and PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK could be a ptr returned
71 * from a pointer-cast helper, bpf_sk_fullsock() and
72 * bpf_tcp_sock().
73 *
74 * Consider the following where "sk" is a reference counted
75 * pointer returned from "sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp();":
76 *
77 * 1: sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp();
78 * 2: if (!sk) { return 0; }
79 * 3: fullsock = bpf_sk_fullsock(sk);
80 * 4: if (!fullsock) { bpf_sk_release(sk); return 0; }
81 * 5: tp = bpf_tcp_sock(fullsock);
82 * 6: if (!tp) { bpf_sk_release(sk); return 0; }
83 * 7: bpf_sk_release(sk);
84 * 8: snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd; // verifier will complain
85 *
86 * After bpf_sk_release(sk) at line 7, both "fullsock" ptr and
87 * "tp" ptr should be invalidated also. In order to do that,
88 * the reg holding "fullsock" and "sk" need to remember
89 * the original refcounted ptr id (i.e. sk_reg->id) in ref_obj_id
90 * such that the verifier can reset all regs which have
91 * ref_obj_id matching the sk_reg->id.
92 *
93 * sk_reg->ref_obj_id is set to sk_reg->id at line 1.
94 * sk_reg->id will stay as NULL-marking purpose only.
95 * After NULL-marking is done, sk_reg->id can be reset to 0.
96 *
97 * After "fullsock = bpf_sk_fullsock(sk);" at line 3,
98 * fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id is set to sk_reg->ref_obj_id.
99 *
100 * After "tp = bpf_tcp_sock(fullsock);" at line 5,
101 * tp_reg->ref_obj_id is set to fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id
102 * which is the same as sk_reg->ref_obj_id.
103 *
104 * From the verifier perspective, if sk, fullsock and tp
105 * are not NULL, they are the same ptr with different
106 * reg->type. In particular, bpf_sk_release(tp) is also
107 * allowed and has the same effect as bpf_sk_release(sk).
108 */
109 u32 ref_obj_id;
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100110 /* For scalar types (SCALAR_VALUE), this represents our knowledge of
111 * the actual value.
112 * For pointer types, this represents the variable part of the offset
113 * from the pointed-to object, and is shared with all bpf_reg_states
114 * with the same id as us.
115 */
116 struct tnum var_off;
Alexei Starovoitovd2a4dd32016-12-07 10:57:59 -0800117 /* Used to determine if any memory access using this register will
Edward Creef1174f72017-08-07 15:26:19 +0100118 * result in a bad access.
119 * These refer to the same value as var_off, not necessarily the actual
120 * contents of the register.
Alexei Starovoitovd2a4dd32016-12-07 10:57:59 -0800121 */
Edward Creeb03c9f92017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100122 s64 smin_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */
123 s64 smax_value; /* maximum possible (s64)value */
124 u64 umin_value; /* minimum possible (u64)value */
125 u64 umax_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */
John Fastabend3f50f132020-03-30 14:36:39 -0700126 s32 s32_min_value; /* minimum possible (s32)value */
127 s32 s32_max_value; /* maximum possible (s32)value */
128 u32 u32_min_value; /* minimum possible (u32)value */
129 u32 u32_max_value; /* maximum possible (u32)value */
Edward Cree679c7822018-08-22 20:02:19 +0100130 /* parentage chain for liveness checking */
131 struct bpf_reg_state *parent;
Alexei Starovoitovf4d7e402017-12-14 17:55:06 -0800132 /* Inside the callee two registers can be both PTR_TO_STACK like
133 * R1=fp-8 and R2=fp-8, but one of them points to this function stack
134 * while another to the caller's stack. To differentiate them 'frameno'
135 * is used which is an index in bpf_verifier_state->frame[] array
136 * pointing to bpf_func_state.
Alexei Starovoitovf4d7e402017-12-14 17:55:06 -0800137 */
138 u32 frameno;
Jiong Wang5327ed32019-05-24 23:25:12 +0100139 /* Tracks subreg definition. The stored value is the insn_idx of the
140 * writing insn. This is safe because subreg_def is used before any insn
141 * patching which only happens after main verification finished.
142 */
143 s32 subreg_def;
Edward Creedc503a82017-08-15 20:34:35 +0100144 enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
Alexei Starovoitovb5dc0162019-06-15 12:12:25 -0700145 /* if (!precise && SCALAR_VALUE) min/max/tnum don't affect safety */
146 bool precise;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100147};
148
149enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
150 STACK_INVALID, /* nothing was stored in this stack slot */
151 STACK_SPILL, /* register spilled into stack */
Alexei Starovoitovcc2b14d2017-12-14 17:55:08 -0800152 STACK_MISC, /* BPF program wrote some data into this slot */
153 STACK_ZERO, /* BPF program wrote constant zero */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100154};
155
156#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8 /* size of eBPF register in bytes */
157
Alexei Starovoitov638f5b92017-10-31 18:16:05 -0700158struct bpf_stack_state {
159 struct bpf_reg_state spilled_ptr;
160 u8 slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE];
161};
162
Joe Stringerfd978bf72018-10-02 13:35:35 -0700163struct bpf_reference_state {
164 /* Track each reference created with a unique id, even if the same
165 * instruction creates the reference multiple times (eg, via CALL).
166 */
167 int id;
168 /* Instruction where the allocation of this reference occurred. This
169 * is used purely to inform the user of a reference leak.
170 */
171 int insn_idx;
172};
173
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100174/* state of the program:
175 * type of all registers and stack info
176 */
Alexei Starovoitovf4d7e402017-12-14 17:55:06 -0800177struct bpf_func_state {
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100178 struct bpf_reg_state regs[MAX_BPF_REG];
Alexei Starovoitovf4d7e402017-12-14 17:55:06 -0800179 /* index of call instruction that called into this func */
180 int callsite;
181 /* stack frame number of this function state from pov of
182 * enclosing bpf_verifier_state.
183 * 0 = main function, 1 = first callee.
184 */
185 u32 frameno;
186 /* subprog number == index within subprog_stack_depth
187 * zero == main subprog
188 */
189 u32 subprogno;
190
Joe Stringerfd978bf72018-10-02 13:35:35 -0700191 /* The following fields should be last. See copy_func_state() */
192 int acquired_refs;
193 struct bpf_reference_state *refs;
Alexei Starovoitov638f5b92017-10-31 18:16:05 -0700194 int allocated_stack;
195 struct bpf_stack_state *stack;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100196};
197
Alexei Starovoitovb5dc0162019-06-15 12:12:25 -0700198struct bpf_idx_pair {
199 u32 prev_idx;
200 u32 idx;
201};
202
Alexei Starovoitovf4d7e402017-12-14 17:55:06 -0800203#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8
204struct bpf_verifier_state {
205 /* call stack tracking */
206 struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
Alexei Starovoitov2589726d2019-06-15 12:12:20 -0700207 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent;
208 /*
209 * 'branches' field is the number of branches left to explore:
210 * 0 - all possible paths from this state reached bpf_exit or
211 * were safely pruned
212 * 1 - at least one path is being explored.
213 * This state hasn't reached bpf_exit
214 * 2 - at least two paths are being explored.
215 * This state is an immediate parent of two children.
216 * One is fallthrough branch with branches==1 and another
217 * state is pushed into stack (to be explored later) also with
218 * branches==1. The parent of this state has branches==1.
219 * The verifier state tree connected via 'parent' pointer looks like:
220 * 1
221 * 1
222 * 2 -> 1 (first 'if' pushed into stack)
223 * 1
224 * 2 -> 1 (second 'if' pushed into stack)
225 * 1
226 * 1
227 * 1 bpf_exit.
228 *
229 * Once do_check() reaches bpf_exit, it calls update_branch_counts()
230 * and the verifier state tree will look:
231 * 1
232 * 1
233 * 2 -> 1 (first 'if' pushed into stack)
234 * 1
235 * 1 -> 1 (second 'if' pushed into stack)
236 * 0
237 * 0
238 * 0 bpf_exit.
239 * After pop_stack() the do_check() will resume at second 'if'.
240 *
241 * If is_state_visited() sees a state with branches > 0 it means
242 * there is a loop. If such state is exactly equal to the current state
243 * it's an infinite loop. Note states_equal() checks for states
244 * equvalency, so two states being 'states_equal' does not mean
245 * infinite loop. The exact comparison is provided by
246 * states_maybe_looping() function. It's a stronger pre-check and
247 * much faster than states_equal().
248 *
249 * This algorithm may not find all possible infinite loops or
250 * loop iteration count may be too high.
251 * In such cases BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS limit kicks in.
252 */
253 u32 branches;
Alexei Starovoitovdc2a4eb2019-05-21 20:17:07 -0700254 u32 insn_idx;
Alexei Starovoitovf4d7e402017-12-14 17:55:06 -0800255 u32 curframe;
Alexei Starovoitovd83525c2019-01-31 15:40:04 -0800256 u32 active_spin_lock;
Daniel Borkmann979d63d2019-01-03 00:58:34 +0100257 bool speculative;
Alexei Starovoitovb5dc0162019-06-15 12:12:25 -0700258
259 /* first and last insn idx of this verifier state */
260 u32 first_insn_idx;
261 u32 last_insn_idx;
262 /* jmp history recorded from first to last.
263 * backtracking is using it to go from last to first.
264 * For most states jmp_history_cnt is [0-3].
265 * For loops can go up to ~40.
266 */
267 struct bpf_idx_pair *jmp_history;
268 u32 jmp_history_cnt;
Alexei Starovoitovf4d7e402017-12-14 17:55:06 -0800269};
270
Joe Stringerf3709f62018-10-02 13:35:29 -0700271#define bpf_get_spilled_reg(slot, frame) \
272 (((slot < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) && \
273 (frame->stack[slot].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL)) \
274 ? &frame->stack[slot].spilled_ptr : NULL)
275
276/* Iterate over 'frame', setting 'reg' to either NULL or a spilled register. */
277#define bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(iter, frame, reg) \
278 for (iter = 0, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame); \
279 iter < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; \
280 iter++, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame))
281
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100282/* linked list of verifier states used to prune search */
283struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
284 struct bpf_verifier_state state;
285 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *next;
Alexei Starovoitov9f4686c2019-04-01 21:27:41 -0700286 int miss_cnt, hit_cnt;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100287};
288
Daniel Borkmann979d63d2019-01-03 00:58:34 +0100289/* Possible states for alu_state member. */
290#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC 1U
291#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST 2U
292#define BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE (1U << 2)
Daniel Borkmannd3bd7412019-01-06 00:54:37 +0100293#define BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER (1U << 3)
Daniel Borkmann979d63d2019-01-03 00:58:34 +0100294#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE (BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC | \
295 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST)
296
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100297struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -0700298 union {
299 enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
Daniel Borkmannd2e4c1e2019-11-22 21:07:59 +0100300 unsigned long map_ptr_state; /* pointer/poison value for maps */
Alexei Starovoitov1c2a0882017-12-14 17:55:15 -0800301 s32 call_imm; /* saved imm field of call insn */
Daniel Borkmann979d63d2019-01-03 00:58:34 +0100302 u32 alu_limit; /* limit for add/sub register with pointer */
Daniel Borkmannd8eca5b2019-04-09 23:20:03 +0200303 struct {
304 u32 map_index; /* index into used_maps[] */
305 u32 map_off; /* offset from value base address */
306 };
Alexei Starovoitov81ed18a2017-03-15 18:26:42 -0700307 };
Daniel Borkmannd2e4c1e2019-11-22 21:07:59 +0100308 u64 map_key_state; /* constant (32 bit) key tracking for maps */
Yonghong Song23994632017-06-22 15:07:39 -0700309 int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
Alexei Starovoitovaf86ca42018-05-15 09:27:05 -0700310 int sanitize_stack_off; /* stack slot to be cleared */
Alexei Starovoitov51c39bb2020-01-09 22:41:20 -0800311 u32 seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier at env->pass_cnt */
Jiong Wang5327ed32019-05-24 23:25:12 +0100312 bool zext_dst; /* this insn zero extends dst reg */
Daniel Borkmann979d63d2019-01-03 00:58:34 +0100313 u8 alu_state; /* used in combination with alu_limit */
Alexei Starovoitov51c39bb2020-01-09 22:41:20 -0800314
315 /* below fields are initialized once */
Jakub Kicinski9e4c24e2019-01-22 22:45:23 -0800316 unsigned int orig_idx; /* original instruction index */
Alexei Starovoitov51c39bb2020-01-09 22:41:20 -0800317 bool prune_point;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100318};
319
320#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
321
Jakub Kicinskia2a7d572017-10-09 10:30:15 -0700322#define BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE 1024
323
Martin KaFai Laub9193c12018-03-24 11:44:22 -0700324struct bpf_verifier_log {
Jakub Kicinskie7bf8242017-10-09 10:30:10 -0700325 u32 level;
Jakub Kicinskia2a7d572017-10-09 10:30:15 -0700326 char kbuf[BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE];
Jakub Kicinskie7bf8242017-10-09 10:30:10 -0700327 char __user *ubuf;
328 u32 len_used;
329 u32 len_total;
330};
331
Martin KaFai Laub9193c12018-03-24 11:44:22 -0700332static inline bool bpf_verifier_log_full(const struct bpf_verifier_log *log)
Jakub Kicinskie7bf8242017-10-09 10:30:10 -0700333{
334 return log->len_used >= log->len_total - 1;
335}
336
Alexei Starovoitov06ee7112019-04-01 21:27:40 -0700337#define BPF_LOG_LEVEL1 1
338#define BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 2
339#define BPF_LOG_STATS 4
340#define BPF_LOG_LEVEL (BPF_LOG_LEVEL1 | BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
341#define BPF_LOG_MASK (BPF_LOG_LEVEL | BPF_LOG_STATS)
Alexei Starovoitov8580ac92019-10-15 20:24:57 -0700342#define BPF_LOG_KERNEL (BPF_LOG_MASK + 1) /* kernel internal flag */
Alexei Starovoitov06ee7112019-04-01 21:27:40 -0700343
Martin KaFai Lau77d2e052018-03-24 11:44:23 -0700344static inline bool bpf_verifier_log_needed(const struct bpf_verifier_log *log)
345{
Alexei Starovoitov8580ac92019-10-15 20:24:57 -0700346 return (log->level && log->ubuf && !bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) ||
347 log->level == BPF_LOG_KERNEL;
Martin KaFai Lau77d2e052018-03-24 11:44:23 -0700348}
349
Alexei Starovoitovcc8b0b92017-12-14 17:55:05 -0800350#define BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS 256
351
Jiong Wang9c8105b2018-05-02 16:17:18 -0400352struct bpf_subprog_info {
Alexei Starovoitov8c1b6e62019-11-14 10:57:16 -0800353 /* 'start' has to be the first field otherwise find_subprog() won't work */
Jiong Wang9c8105b2018-05-02 16:17:18 -0400354 u32 start; /* insn idx of function entry point */
Martin KaFai Lauc454a462018-12-07 16:42:25 -0800355 u32 linfo_idx; /* The idx to the main_prog->aux->linfo */
Jiong Wang9c8105b2018-05-02 16:17:18 -0400356 u16 stack_depth; /* max. stack depth used by this function */
357};
358
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100359/* single container for all structs
360 * one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
361 */
362struct bpf_verifier_env {
Daniel Borkmannc08435e2019-01-03 00:58:27 +0100363 u32 insn_idx;
364 u32 prev_insn_idx;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100365 struct bpf_prog *prog; /* eBPF program being verified */
Jakub Kicinski00176a32017-10-16 16:40:54 -0700366 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100367 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *head; /* stack of verifier states to be processed */
368 int stack_size; /* number of states to be processed */
David S. Millere07b98d2017-05-10 11:38:07 -0700369 bool strict_alignment; /* perform strict pointer alignment checks */
Alexei Starovoitov10d274e2019-08-22 22:52:12 -0700370 bool test_state_freq; /* test verifier with different pruning frequency */
Alexei Starovoitov638f5b92017-10-31 18:16:05 -0700371 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_state; /* current verifier state */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100372 struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_states; /* search pruning optimization */
Alexei Starovoitov9f4686c2019-04-01 21:27:41 -0700373 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *free_list;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100374 struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */
375 u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */
376 u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */
377 bool allow_ptr_leaks;
378 bool seen_direct_write;
379 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
Martin KaFai Laud9762e82018-12-13 10:41:48 -0800380 const struct bpf_line_info *prev_linfo;
Martin KaFai Laub9193c12018-03-24 11:44:22 -0700381 struct bpf_verifier_log log;
Jiong Wang9c8105b2018-05-02 16:17:18 -0400382 struct bpf_subprog_info subprog_info[BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS + 1];
Alexei Starovoitov7df737e2019-04-19 07:44:54 -0700383 struct {
384 int *insn_state;
385 int *insn_stack;
386 int cur_stack;
387 } cfg;
Alexei Starovoitov51c39bb2020-01-09 22:41:20 -0800388 u32 pass_cnt; /* number of times do_check() was called */
Alexei Starovoitovcc8b0b92017-12-14 17:55:05 -0800389 u32 subprog_cnt;
Alexei Starovoitov06ee7112019-04-01 21:27:40 -0700390 /* number of instructions analyzed by the verifier */
Alexei Starovoitov2589726d2019-06-15 12:12:20 -0700391 u32 prev_insn_processed, insn_processed;
392 /* number of jmps, calls, exits analyzed so far */
393 u32 prev_jmps_processed, jmps_processed;
Alexei Starovoitov06ee7112019-04-01 21:27:40 -0700394 /* total verification time */
395 u64 verification_time;
396 /* maximum number of verifier states kept in 'branching' instructions */
397 u32 max_states_per_insn;
398 /* total number of allocated verifier states */
399 u32 total_states;
400 /* some states are freed during program analysis.
401 * this is peak number of states. this number dominates kernel
402 * memory consumption during verification
403 */
404 u32 peak_states;
405 /* longest register parentage chain walked for liveness marking */
406 u32 longest_mark_read_walk;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100407};
408
Mathieu Malaterrebe2d04d2018-05-16 22:27:41 +0200409__printf(2, 0) void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
410 const char *fmt, va_list args);
Quentin Monnet430e68d2018-01-10 12:26:06 +0000411__printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
412 const char *fmt, ...);
Alexei Starovoitov9e15db62019-10-15 20:25:00 -0700413__printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
414 const char *fmt, ...);
Quentin Monnet430e68d2018-01-10 12:26:06 +0000415
Joe Stringerfd978bf72018-10-02 13:35:35 -0700416static inline struct bpf_func_state *cur_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov638f5b92017-10-31 18:16:05 -0700417{
Alexei Starovoitovf4d7e402017-12-14 17:55:06 -0800418 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
419
Joe Stringerfd978bf72018-10-02 13:35:35 -0700420 return cur->frame[cur->curframe];
421}
422
423static inline struct bpf_reg_state *cur_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
424{
425 return cur_func(env)->regs;
Alexei Starovoitov638f5b92017-10-31 18:16:05 -0700426}
427
Quentin Monneta40a2632018-11-09 13:03:31 +0000428int bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(struct bpf_prog *prog);
Jakub Kicinskicae19272017-12-27 18:39:05 -0800429int bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
430 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx);
Quentin Monnetc941ce92018-10-07 12:56:47 +0100431int bpf_prog_offload_finalize(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
Jakub Kicinski08ca90a2019-01-22 22:45:24 -0800432void
433bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
434 struct bpf_insn *insn);
435void
436bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt);
Jakub Kicinskiab3f0062017-11-03 13:56:17 -0700437
Alexei Starovoitov51c39bb2020-01-09 22:41:20 -0800438int check_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
439 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno);
440
Jakub Kicinski58e2af8b2016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100441#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H */