| .. _perf_security: |
| |
| Perf Events and tool security |
| ============================= |
| |
| Overview |
| -------- |
| |
| Usage of Performance Counters for Linux (perf_events) [1]_ , [2]_ , [3]_ can |
| impose a considerable risk of leaking sensitive data accessed by monitored |
| processes. The data leakage is possible both in scenarios of direct usage of |
| perf_events system call API [2]_ and over data files generated by Perf tool user |
| mode utility (Perf) [3]_ , [4]_ . The risk depends on the nature of data that |
| perf_events performance monitoring units (PMU) [2]_ and Perf collect and expose |
| for performance analysis. Collected system and performance data may be split into |
| several categories: |
| |
| 1. System hardware and software configuration data, for example: a CPU model and |
| its cache configuration, an amount of available memory and its topology, used |
| kernel and Perf versions, performance monitoring setup including experiment |
| time, events configuration, Perf command line parameters, etc. |
| |
| 2. User and kernel module paths and their load addresses with sizes, process and |
| thread names with their PIDs and TIDs, timestamps for captured hardware and |
| software events. |
| |
| 3. Content of kernel software counters (e.g., for context switches, page faults, |
| CPU migrations), architectural hardware performance counters (PMC) [8]_ and |
| machine specific registers (MSR) [9]_ that provide execution metrics for |
| various monitored parts of the system (e.g., memory controller (IMC), interconnect |
| (QPI/UPI) or peripheral (PCIe) uncore counters) without direct attribution to any |
| execution context state. |
| |
| 4. Content of architectural execution context registers (e.g., RIP, RSP, RBP on |
| x86_64), process user and kernel space memory addresses and data, content of |
| various architectural MSRs that capture data from this category. |
| |
| Data that belong to the fourth category can potentially contain sensitive process |
| data. If PMUs in some monitoring modes capture values of execution context registers |
| or data from process memory then access to such monitoring capabilities requires |
| to be ordered and secured properly. So, perf_events/Perf performance monitoring |
| is the subject for security access control management [5]_ . |
| |
| perf_events/Perf access control |
| ------------------------------- |
| |
| To perform security checks, the Linux implementation splits processes into two |
| categories [6]_ : a) privileged processes (whose effective user ID is 0, referred |
| to as superuser or root), and b) unprivileged processes (whose effective UID is |
| nonzero). Privileged processes bypass all kernel security permission checks so |
| perf_events performance monitoring is fully available to privileged processes |
| without access, scope and resource restrictions. |
| |
| Unprivileged processes are subject to a full security permission check based on |
| the process's credentials [5]_ (usually: effective UID, effective GID, and |
| supplementary group list). |
| |
| Linux divides the privileges traditionally associated with superuser into |
| distinct units, known as capabilities [6]_ , which can be independently enabled |
| and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and files of unprivileged users. |
| |
| Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability are treated as |
| privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance monitoring and |
| bypass *scope* permissions checks in the kernel. |
| |
| Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call API is also subject for |
| PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS ptrace access mode check [7]_ , whose outcome |
| determines whether monitoring is permitted. So unprivileged processes provided |
| with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are effectively permitted to pass the check. |
| |
| Other capabilities being granted to unprivileged processes can effectively |
| enable capturing of additional data required for later performance analysis of |
| monitored processes or a system. For example, CAP_SYSLOG capability permits |
| reading kernel space memory addresses from /proc/kallsyms file. |
| |
| perf_events/Perf privileged users |
| --------------------------------- |
| |
| Mechanisms of capabilities, privileged capability-dumb files [6]_ and file system |
| ACLs [10]_ can be used to create a dedicated group of perf_events/Perf privileged |
| users who are permitted to execute performance monitoring without scope limits. |
| The following steps can be taken to create such a group of privileged Perf users. |
| |
| 1. Create perf_users group of privileged Perf users, assign perf_users group to |
| Perf tool executable and limit access to the executable for other users in the |
| system who are not in the perf_users group: |
| |
| :: |
| |
| # groupadd perf_users |
| # ls -alhF |
| -rwxr-xr-x 2 root root 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf |
| # chgrp perf_users perf |
| # ls -alhF |
| -rwxr-xr-x 2 root perf_users 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf |
| # chmod o-rwx perf |
| # ls -alhF |
| -rwxr-x--- 2 root perf_users 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf |
| |
| 2. Assign the required capabilities to the Perf tool executable file and enable |
| members of perf_users group with performance monitoring privileges [6]_ : |
| |
| :: |
| |
| # setcap "cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf |
| # setcap -v "cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf |
| perf: OK |
| # getcap perf |
| perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_sys_admin,cap_syslog+ep |
| |
| As a result, members of perf_users group are capable of conducting performance |
| monitoring by using functionality of the configured Perf tool executable that, |
| when executes, passes perf_events subsystem scope checks. |
| |
| This specific access control management is only available to superuser or root |
| running processes with CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_SETFCAP [6]_ capabilities. |
| |
| perf_events/Perf unprivileged users |
| ----------------------------------- |
| |
| perf_events/Perf *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes is |
| governed by perf_event_paranoid [2]_ setting: |
| |
| -1: |
| Impose no *scope* and *access* restrictions on using perf_events performance |
| monitoring. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_ locking limit is |
| ignored when allocating memory buffers for storing performance data. |
| This is the least secure mode since allowed monitored *scope* is |
| maximized and no perf_events specific limits are imposed on *resources* |
| allocated for performance monitoring. |
| |
| >=0: |
| *scope* includes per-process and system wide performance monitoring |
| but excludes raw tracepoints and ftrace function tracepoints monitoring. |
| CPU and system events happened when executing either in user or |
| in kernel space can be monitored and captured for later analysis. |
| Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but |
| ignored for unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK [6]_ capability. |
| |
| >=1: |
| *scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only and excludes |
| system wide performance monitoring. CPU and system events happened when |
| executing either in user or in kernel space can be monitored and |
| captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb |
| locking limit is imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with |
| CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. |
| |
| >=2: |
| *scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only. CPU and system |
| events happened when executing in user space only can be monitored and |
| captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb |
| locking limit is imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with |
| CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. |
| |
| perf_events/Perf resource control |
| --------------------------------- |
| |
| Open file descriptors |
| +++++++++++++++++++++ |
| |
| The perf_events system call API [2]_ allocates file descriptors for every configured |
| PMU event. Open file descriptors are a per-process accountable resource governed |
| by the RLIMIT_NOFILE [11]_ limit (ulimit -n), which is usually derived from the login |
| shell process. When configuring Perf collection for a long list of events on a |
| large server system, this limit can be easily hit preventing required monitoring |
| configuration. RLIMIT_NOFILE limit can be increased on per-user basis modifying |
| content of the limits.conf file [12]_ . Ordinarily, a Perf sampling session |
| (perf record) requires an amount of open perf_event file descriptors that is not |
| less than the number of monitored events multiplied by the number of monitored CPUs. |
| |
| Memory allocation |
| +++++++++++++++++ |
| |
| The amount of memory available to user processes for capturing performance monitoring |
| data is governed by the perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_ setting. This perf_event specific |
| resource setting defines overall per-cpu limits of memory allowed for mapping |
| by the user processes to execute performance monitoring. The setting essentially |
| extends the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK [11]_ limit, but only for memory regions mapped specifically |
| for capturing monitored performance events and related data. |
| |
| For example, if a machine has eight cores and perf_event_mlock_kb limit is set |
| to 516 KiB, then a user process is provided with 516 KiB * 8 = 4128 KiB of memory |
| above the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit (ulimit -l) for perf_event mmap buffers. In particular, |
| this means that, if the user wants to start two or more performance monitoring |
| processes, the user is required to manually distribute the available 4128 KiB between the |
| monitoring processes, for example, using the --mmap-pages Perf record mode option. |
| Otherwise, the first started performance monitoring process allocates all available |
| 4128 KiB and the other processes will fail to proceed due to the lack of memory. |
| |
| RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and perf_event_mlock_kb resource constraints are ignored for |
| processes with the CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. Thus, perf_events/Perf privileged users |
| can be provided with memory above the constraints for perf_events/Perf performance |
| monitoring purpose by providing the Perf executable with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. |
| |
| Bibliography |
| ------------ |
| |
| .. [1] `<https://lwn.net/Articles/337493/>`_ |
| .. [2] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html>`_ |
| .. [3] `<http://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver/projects/perf_events/>`_ |
| .. [4] `<https://perf.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/Main_Page>`_ |
| .. [5] `<https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html>`_ |
| .. [6] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html>`_ |
| .. [7] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html>`_ |
| .. [8] `<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_performance_counter>`_ |
| .. [9] `<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-specific_register>`_ |
| .. [10] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/acl.5.html>`_ |
| .. [11] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrlimit.2.html>`_ |
| .. [12] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/limits.conf.5.html>`_ |
| |