| /* |
| ** |
| ** Copyright 2017, The Android Open Source Project |
| ** |
| ** Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| ** you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| ** You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| ** |
| ** http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| ** |
| ** Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| ** distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| ** WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| ** See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| ** limitations under the License. |
| */ |
| |
| #define LOG_TAG "scrypt_test" |
| #include <log/log.h> |
| |
| #include <hardware/keymaster0.h> |
| #include <hardware/keymaster1.h> |
| #include <cstring> |
| #include <gtest/gtest.h> |
| |
| #include "../cryptfs.h" |
| #include "../Keymaster.h" |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION |
| #include "cryptfs_hw.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #define min(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b)) |
| |
| /* Maximum allowed keymaster blob size. */ |
| #define KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE 2048 |
| |
| /* Key Derivation Function algorithms */ |
| #define KDF_PBKDF2 1 |
| #define KDF_SCRYPT 2 |
| /* Algorithms 3 & 4 deprecated before shipping outside of google, so removed */ |
| #define KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER 5 |
| |
| #define KEY_LEN_BYTES 16 |
| |
| #define DEFAULT_PASSWORD "default_password" |
| |
| #define RSA_KEY_SIZE 2048 |
| #define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES (RSA_KEY_SIZE / 8) |
| #define RSA_EXPONENT 0x10001 |
| #define KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT 1 // Maximum one try per second |
| |
| static int keymaster_init(keymaster0_device_t **keymaster0_dev, |
| keymaster1_device_t **keymaster1_dev) |
| { |
| int rc; |
| |
| const hw_module_t* mod; |
| rc = hw_get_module_by_class(KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, NULL, &mod); |
| if (rc) { |
| ALOGE("could not find any keystore module"); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| SLOGI("keymaster module name is %s", mod->name); |
| SLOGI("keymaster version is %d", mod->module_api_version); |
| |
| *keymaster0_dev = NULL; |
| *keymaster1_dev = NULL; |
| if (mod->module_api_version == KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_1_0) { |
| SLOGI("Found keymaster1 module, using keymaster1 API."); |
| rc = keymaster1_open(mod, keymaster1_dev); |
| } else { |
| SLOGI("Found keymaster0 module, using keymaster0 API."); |
| rc = keymaster0_open(mod, keymaster0_dev); |
| } |
| |
| if (rc) { |
| ALOGE("could not open keymaster device in %s (%s)", |
| KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, strerror(-rc)); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| |
| err: |
| *keymaster0_dev = NULL; |
| *keymaster1_dev = NULL; |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* Should we use keymaster? */ |
| static int keymaster_check_compatibility_old() |
| { |
| keymaster0_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0; |
| keymaster1_device_t *keymaster1_dev = 0; |
| int rc = 0; |
| |
| if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev, &keymaster1_dev)) { |
| SLOGE("Failed to init keymaster"); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (keymaster1_dev) { |
| rc = 1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (!keymaster0_dev || !keymaster0_dev->common.module) { |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(swillden): Check to see if there's any reason to require v0.3. I think v0.1 and v0.2 |
| // should work. |
| if (keymaster0_dev->common.module->module_api_version |
| < KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_0_3) { |
| rc = 0; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(keymaster0_dev->flags & KEYMASTER_SOFTWARE_ONLY) && |
| (keymaster0_dev->flags & KEYMASTER_BLOBS_ARE_STANDALONE)) { |
| rc = 1; |
| } |
| |
| out: |
| if (keymaster1_dev) { |
| keymaster1_close(keymaster1_dev); |
| } |
| if (keymaster0_dev) { |
| keymaster0_close(keymaster0_dev); |
| } |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* Create a new keymaster key and store it in this footer */ |
| static int keymaster_create_key_old(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr) |
| { |
| uint8_t* key = 0; |
| keymaster0_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0; |
| keymaster1_device_t *keymaster1_dev = 0; |
| |
| if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size) { |
| SLOGI("Already have key"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev, &keymaster1_dev)) { |
| SLOGE("Failed to init keymaster"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int rc = 0; |
| size_t key_size = 0; |
| if (keymaster1_dev) { |
| keymaster_key_param_t params[] = { |
| /* Algorithm & size specifications. Stick with RSA for now. Switch to AES later. */ |
| keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_RSA), |
| keymaster_param_int(KM_TAG_KEY_SIZE, RSA_KEY_SIZE), |
| keymaster_param_long(KM_TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, RSA_EXPONENT), |
| |
| /* The only allowed purpose for this key is signing. */ |
| keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN), |
| |
| /* Padding & digest specifications. */ |
| keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE), |
| keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE), |
| |
| /* Require that the key be usable in standalone mode. File system isn't available. */ |
| keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS, KM_BLOB_STANDALONE), |
| |
| /* No auth requirements, because cryptfs is not yet integrated with gatekeeper. */ |
| keymaster_param_bool(KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED), |
| |
| /* Rate-limit key usage attempts, to rate-limit brute force */ |
| keymaster_param_int(KM_TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT), |
| }; |
| keymaster_key_param_set_t param_set = { params, sizeof(params)/sizeof(*params) }; |
| keymaster_key_blob_t key_blob; |
| keymaster_error_t error = keymaster1_dev->generate_key(keymaster1_dev, ¶m_set, |
| &key_blob, |
| NULL /* characteristics */); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) { |
| SLOGE("Failed to generate keymaster1 key, error %d", error); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| key = (uint8_t*)key_blob.key_material; |
| key_size = key_blob.key_material_size; |
| } |
| else if (keymaster0_dev) { |
| keymaster_rsa_keygen_params_t params; |
| memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params)); |
| params.public_exponent = RSA_EXPONENT; |
| params.modulus_size = RSA_KEY_SIZE; |
| |
| if (keymaster0_dev->generate_keypair(keymaster0_dev, TYPE_RSA, ¶ms, |
| &key, &key_size)) { |
| SLOGE("Failed to generate keypair"); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } else { |
| SLOGE("Cryptfs bug: keymaster_init succeeded but didn't initialize a device"); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (key_size > KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE) { |
| SLOGE("Keymaster key too large for crypto footer"); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(ftr->keymaster_blob, key, key_size); |
| ftr->keymaster_blob_size = key_size; |
| |
| out: |
| if (keymaster0_dev) |
| keymaster0_close(keymaster0_dev); |
| if (keymaster1_dev) |
| keymaster1_close(keymaster1_dev); |
| free(key); |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* This signs the given object using the keymaster key. */ |
| static int keymaster_sign_object_old(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr, |
| const unsigned char *object, |
| const size_t object_size, |
| unsigned char **signature, |
| size_t *signature_size) |
| { |
| int rc = 0; |
| keymaster0_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0; |
| keymaster1_device_t *keymaster1_dev = 0; |
| |
| unsigned char to_sign[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; |
| size_t to_sign_size = sizeof(to_sign); |
| memset(to_sign, 0, RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES); |
| |
| if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev, &keymaster1_dev)) { |
| SLOGE("Failed to init keymaster"); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| // To sign a message with RSA, the message must satisfy two |
| // constraints: |
| // |
| // 1. The message, when interpreted as a big-endian numeric value, must |
| // be strictly less than the public modulus of the RSA key. Note |
| // that because the most significant bit of the public modulus is |
| // guaranteed to be 1 (else it's an (n-1)-bit key, not an n-bit |
| // key), an n-bit message with most significant bit 0 always |
| // satisfies this requirement. |
| // |
| // 2. The message must have the same length in bits as the public |
| // modulus of the RSA key. This requirement isn't mathematically |
| // necessary, but is necessary to ensure consistency in |
| // implementations. |
| switch (ftr->kdf_type) { |
| case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER: |
| // This ensures the most significant byte of the signed message |
| // is zero. We could have zero-padded to the left instead, but |
| // this approach is slightly more robust against changes in |
| // object size. However, it's still broken (but not unusably |
| // so) because we really should be using a proper deterministic |
| // RSA padding function, such as PKCS1. |
| memcpy(to_sign + 1, object, min(RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES - 1, object_size)); |
| SLOGI("Signing safely-padded object"); |
| break; |
| default: |
| SLOGE("Unknown KDF type %d", ftr->kdf_type); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (keymaster0_dev) { |
| keymaster_rsa_sign_params_t params; |
| params.digest_type = DIGEST_NONE; |
| params.padding_type = PADDING_NONE; |
| |
| rc = keymaster0_dev->sign_data(keymaster0_dev, |
| ¶ms, |
| ftr->keymaster_blob, |
| ftr->keymaster_blob_size, |
| to_sign, |
| to_sign_size, |
| signature, |
| signature_size); |
| goto out; |
| } else if (keymaster1_dev) { |
| keymaster_key_blob_t key = { ftr->keymaster_blob, ftr->keymaster_blob_size }; |
| keymaster_key_param_t params[] = { |
| keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE), |
| keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE), |
| }; |
| keymaster_key_param_set_t param_set = { params, sizeof(params)/sizeof(*params) }; |
| keymaster_operation_handle_t op_handle; |
| keymaster_error_t error = keymaster1_dev->begin(keymaster1_dev, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN, &key, |
| ¶m_set, NULL /* out_params */, |
| &op_handle); |
| if (error == KM_ERROR_KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED) { |
| // Key usage has been rate-limited. Wait a bit and try again. |
| sleep(KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT); |
| error = keymaster1_dev->begin(keymaster1_dev, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN, &key, |
| ¶m_set, NULL /* out_params */, |
| &op_handle); |
| } |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) { |
| SLOGE("Error starting keymaster signature transaction: %d", error); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_blob_t input = { to_sign, to_sign_size }; |
| size_t input_consumed; |
| error = keymaster1_dev->update(keymaster1_dev, op_handle, NULL /* in_params */, |
| &input, &input_consumed, NULL /* out_params */, |
| NULL /* output */); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) { |
| SLOGE("Error sending data to keymaster signature transaction: %d", error); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (input_consumed != to_sign_size) { |
| // This should never happen. If it does, it's a bug in the keymaster implementation. |
| SLOGE("Keymaster update() did not consume all data."); |
| keymaster1_dev->abort(keymaster1_dev, op_handle); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_blob_t tmp_sig; |
| error = keymaster1_dev->finish(keymaster1_dev, op_handle, NULL /* in_params */, |
| NULL /* verify signature */, NULL /* out_params */, |
| &tmp_sig); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) { |
| SLOGE("Error finishing keymaster signature transaction: %d", error); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| *signature = (uint8_t*)tmp_sig.data; |
| *signature_size = tmp_sig.data_length; |
| } else { |
| SLOGE("Cryptfs bug: keymaster_init succeded but didn't initialize a device."); |
| rc = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| out: |
| if (keymaster1_dev) |
| keymaster1_close(keymaster1_dev); |
| if (keymaster0_dev) |
| keymaster0_close(keymaster0_dev); |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Should we use keymaster? */ |
| static int keymaster_check_compatibility_new() |
| { |
| return keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt(); |
| } |
| |
| #if 0 |
| /* Create a new keymaster key and store it in this footer */ |
| static int keymaster_create_key_new(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr) |
| { |
| if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size) { |
| SLOGI("Already have key"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int rc = keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(RSA_KEY_SIZE, RSA_EXPONENT, |
| KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, ftr->keymaster_blob, KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE, |
| &ftr->keymaster_blob_size); |
| if (rc) { |
| if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size > KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE) { |
| SLOGE("Keymaster key blob to large)"); |
| ftr->keymaster_blob_size = 0; |
| } |
| SLOGE("Failed to generate keypair"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* This signs the given object using the keymaster key. */ |
| static int keymaster_sign_object_new(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr, |
| const unsigned char *object, |
| const size_t object_size, |
| unsigned char **signature, |
| size_t *signature_size) |
| { |
| unsigned char to_sign[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; |
| size_t to_sign_size = sizeof(to_sign); |
| memset(to_sign, 0, RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES); |
| |
| // To sign a message with RSA, the message must satisfy two |
| // constraints: |
| // |
| // 1. The message, when interpreted as a big-endian numeric value, must |
| // be strictly less than the public modulus of the RSA key. Note |
| // that because the most significant bit of the public modulus is |
| // guaranteed to be 1 (else it's an (n-1)-bit key, not an n-bit |
| // key), an n-bit message with most significant bit 0 always |
| // satisfies this requirement. |
| // |
| // 2. The message must have the same length in bits as the public |
| // modulus of the RSA key. This requirement isn't mathematically |
| // necessary, but is necessary to ensure consistency in |
| // implementations. |
| switch (ftr->kdf_type) { |
| case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER: |
| // This ensures the most significant byte of the signed message |
| // is zero. We could have zero-padded to the left instead, but |
| // this approach is slightly more robust against changes in |
| // object size. However, it's still broken (but not unusably |
| // so) because we really should be using a proper deterministic |
| // RSA padding function, such as PKCS1. |
| memcpy(to_sign + 1, object, min(RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES - 1, object_size)); |
| SLOGI("Signing safely-padded object"); |
| break; |
| default: |
| SLOGE("Unknown KDF type %d", ftr->kdf_type); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt( |
| ftr->keymaster_blob, ftr->keymaster_blob_size, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, to_sign, |
| to_sign_size, signature, signature_size) != KeymasterSignResult::ok) |
| return -1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| namespace android { |
| |
| class CryptFsTest : public testing::Test { |
| protected: |
| virtual void SetUp() { |
| } |
| |
| virtual void TearDown() { |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| TEST_F(CryptFsTest, ScryptHidlizationEquivalenceTest) { |
| crypt_mnt_ftr ftr; |
| ftr.kdf_type = KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER; |
| ftr.keymaster_blob_size = 0; |
| |
| ASSERT_EQ(0, keymaster_create_key_old(&ftr)); |
| |
| uint8_t *sig1 = nullptr; |
| uint8_t *sig2 = nullptr; |
| size_t sig_size1 = 123456789; |
| size_t sig_size2 = 123456789; |
| uint8_t object[] = "the object"; |
| |
| ASSERT_EQ(1, keymaster_check_compatibility_old()); |
| ASSERT_EQ(1, keymaster_check_compatibility_new()); |
| ASSERT_EQ(0, keymaster_sign_object_old(&ftr, object, 10, &sig1, &sig_size1)); |
| ASSERT_EQ(0, keymaster_sign_object_new(&ftr, object, 10, &sig2, &sig_size2)); |
| |
| ASSERT_EQ(sig_size1, sig_size2); |
| ASSERT_NE(nullptr, sig1); |
| ASSERT_NE(nullptr, sig2); |
| EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(sig1, sig2, sig_size1)); |
| free(sig1); |
| free(sig2); |
| } |
| |
| } |