blob: 44c17f47d94cd9bea41bdc2e3b65c414cfbc3f5c [file] [log] [blame]
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07001/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07003 *
4 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
7 *
8 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
9 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
10 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
11 * General Public License for more details.
12 */
13#include <linux/kernel.h>
14#include <linux/types.h>
15#include <linux/slab.h>
16#include <linux/bpf.h>
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +010017#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -070018#include <linux/filter.h>
19#include <net/netlink.h>
20#include <linux/file.h>
21#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
22
23/* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
24 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
25 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
26 *
27 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG.
28 * It rejects the following programs:
29 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns
30 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge)
31 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
32 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps
33 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
34 * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
35 * analysis is limited to 32k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
36 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
37 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
38 *
39 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction
40 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics.
41 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is
42 * copied to R1.
43 *
44 * All registers are 64-bit.
45 * R0 - return register
46 * R1-R5 argument passing registers
47 * R6-R9 callee saved registers
48 * R10 - frame pointer read-only
49 *
50 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context
51 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
52 *
53 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case:
54 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
55 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20),
56 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1
57 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize
58 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack.
59 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK
60 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking).
61 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant.
62 *
63 * Most of the time the registers have UNKNOWN_VALUE type, which
64 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer.
65 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes UNKNOWN_VALUE type)
66 *
67 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register
68 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, FRAME_PTR. These are three pointer
69 * types recognized by check_mem_access() function.
70 *
71 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value'
72 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible.
73 *
74 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against
75 * function argument constraints.
76 *
77 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints.
78 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be
79 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as
80 * 'pointer to map element key'
81 *
82 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem():
83 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,
84 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
85 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
86 *
87 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null'
88 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and
89 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside
90 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key.
91 *
92 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like:
93 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
94 * {
95 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1;
96 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2;
97 * void *value;
98 *
99 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that
100 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on
101 * the stack of eBPF program.
102 * }
103 *
104 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like:
105 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR
106 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK
107 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
108 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
109 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees:
110 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok,
111 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes
112 *
113 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far,
114 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits
115 * and were initialized prior to this call.
116 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
117 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
118 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
119 * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL.
120 *
121 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
122 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
123 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false
124 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op().
125 *
126 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5
127 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
128 */
129
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700130/* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100131struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700132 /* verifer state is 'st'
133 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
134 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
135 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100136 struct bpf_verifier_state st;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700137 int insn_idx;
138 int prev_insn_idx;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100139 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700140};
141
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +0200142#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 65536
143#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024
144
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +0200145struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
146 struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +0200147 bool raw_mode;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200148 bool pkt_access;
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +0200149 int regno;
150 int access_size;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +0200151};
152
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700153/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
154 * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars
155 */
156static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len;
157static char *log_buf;
158
159static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
160
161/* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
162 * verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user
163 * can figure out what's wrong with the program
164 */
Daniel Borkmann1d056d92015-11-03 11:39:20 +0100165static __printf(1, 2) void verbose(const char *fmt, ...)
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700166{
167 va_list args;
168
169 if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1)
170 return;
171
172 va_start(args, fmt);
173 log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args);
174 va_end(args);
175}
176
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700177/* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */
178static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
179 [NOT_INIT] = "?",
180 [UNKNOWN_VALUE] = "inv",
181 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx",
182 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr",
183 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value",
184 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null",
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400185 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ] = "map_value_adj",
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700186 [FRAME_PTR] = "fp",
187 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp",
188 [CONST_IMM] = "imm",
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700189 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt",
190 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end",
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700191};
192
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100193static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700194{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100195 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700196 enum bpf_reg_type t;
197 int i;
198
199 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700200 reg = &state->regs[i];
201 t = reg->type;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700202 if (t == NOT_INIT)
203 continue;
204 verbose(" R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]);
205 if (t == CONST_IMM || t == PTR_TO_STACK)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700206 verbose("%lld", reg->imm);
207 else if (t == PTR_TO_PACKET)
208 verbose("(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)",
209 reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
210 else if (t == UNKNOWN_VALUE && reg->imm)
211 verbose("%lld", reg->imm);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700212 else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400213 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL ||
214 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ)
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +0200215 verbose("(ks=%d,vs=%d,id=%u)",
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700216 reg->map_ptr->key_size,
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +0200217 reg->map_ptr->value_size,
218 reg->id);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400219 if (reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -0500220 verbose(",min_value=%lld",
221 (long long)reg->min_value);
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400222 if (reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
223 verbose(",max_value=%llu",
224 (unsigned long long)reg->max_value);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700225 }
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700226 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700227 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_SPILL)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700228 verbose(" fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i,
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700229 reg_type_str[state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE].type]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700230 }
231 verbose("\n");
232}
233
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700234static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = {
235 [BPF_LD] = "ld",
236 [BPF_LDX] = "ldx",
237 [BPF_ST] = "st",
238 [BPF_STX] = "stx",
239 [BPF_ALU] = "alu",
240 [BPF_JMP] = "jmp",
241 [BPF_RET] = "BUG",
242 [BPF_ALU64] = "alu64",
243};
244
Alexei Starovoitov687f0712015-09-08 13:40:01 -0700245static const char *const bpf_alu_string[16] = {
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700246 [BPF_ADD >> 4] = "+=",
247 [BPF_SUB >> 4] = "-=",
248 [BPF_MUL >> 4] = "*=",
249 [BPF_DIV >> 4] = "/=",
250 [BPF_OR >> 4] = "|=",
251 [BPF_AND >> 4] = "&=",
252 [BPF_LSH >> 4] = "<<=",
253 [BPF_RSH >> 4] = ">>=",
254 [BPF_NEG >> 4] = "neg",
255 [BPF_MOD >> 4] = "%=",
256 [BPF_XOR >> 4] = "^=",
257 [BPF_MOV >> 4] = "=",
258 [BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=",
259 [BPF_END >> 4] = "endian",
260};
261
262static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = {
263 [BPF_W >> 3] = "u32",
264 [BPF_H >> 3] = "u16",
265 [BPF_B >> 3] = "u8",
266 [BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64",
267};
268
Alexei Starovoitov687f0712015-09-08 13:40:01 -0700269static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = {
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700270 [BPF_JA >> 4] = "jmp",
271 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = "==",
272 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = ">",
273 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = ">=",
274 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&",
275 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = "!=",
276 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>",
277 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=",
278 [BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call",
279 [BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit",
280};
281
Daniel Borkmannced0a312017-05-08 00:04:09 +0200282static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
283 const struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700284{
285 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
286
287 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
288 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
289 verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
290 insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
291 insn->dst_reg,
292 bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
293 class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
294 insn->src_reg);
295 else
296 verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
297 insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
298 insn->dst_reg,
299 bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
300 class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
301 insn->imm);
302 } else if (class == BPF_STX) {
303 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
304 verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
305 insn->code,
306 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
307 insn->dst_reg,
308 insn->off, insn->src_reg);
309 else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
310 verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
311 insn->code,
312 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
313 insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
314 insn->src_reg);
315 else
316 verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
317 } else if (class == BPF_ST) {
318 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
319 verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
320 return;
321 }
322 verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
323 insn->code,
324 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
325 insn->dst_reg,
326 insn->off, insn->imm);
327 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
328 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
329 verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
330 return;
331 }
332 verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
333 insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
334 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
335 insn->src_reg, insn->off);
336 } else if (class == BPF_LD) {
337 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
338 verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
339 insn->code,
340 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
341 insn->imm);
342 } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
343 verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
344 insn->code,
345 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
346 insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
Daniel Borkmannced0a312017-05-08 00:04:09 +0200347 } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM &&
348 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) {
349 /* At this point, we already made sure that the second
350 * part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible.
351 */
352 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
353 bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD;
354
355 if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks)
356 imm = 0;
357
358 verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
359 insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700360 } else {
361 verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
362 return;
363 }
364 } else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
365 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
366
367 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
368 verbose("(%02x) call %d\n", insn->code, insn->imm);
369 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
370 verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
371 insn->code, insn->off);
372 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
373 verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
374 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
375 verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
376 insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
377 bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
378 insn->src_reg, insn->off);
379 } else {
380 verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
381 insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
382 bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
383 insn->imm, insn->off);
384 }
385 } else {
386 verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
387 }
388}
389
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100390static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700391{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100392 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700393 int insn_idx;
394
395 if (env->head == NULL)
396 return -1;
397
398 memcpy(&env->cur_state, &env->head->st, sizeof(env->cur_state));
399 insn_idx = env->head->insn_idx;
400 if (prev_insn_idx)
401 *prev_insn_idx = env->head->prev_insn_idx;
402 elem = env->head->next;
403 kfree(env->head);
404 env->head = elem;
405 env->stack_size--;
406 return insn_idx;
407}
408
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100409static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
410 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700411{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100412 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700413
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100414 elem = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700415 if (!elem)
416 goto err;
417
418 memcpy(&elem->st, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
419 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
420 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
421 elem->next = env->head;
422 env->head = elem;
423 env->stack_size++;
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +0200424 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700425 verbose("BPF program is too complex\n");
426 goto err;
427 }
428 return &elem->st;
429err:
430 /* pop all elements and return */
431 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
432 return NULL;
433}
434
435#define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
436static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
437 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
438};
439
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100440static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700441{
442 int i;
443
444 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
445 regs[i].type = NOT_INIT;
446 regs[i].imm = 0;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400447 regs[i].min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
448 regs[i].max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700449 }
450
451 /* frame pointer */
452 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = FRAME_PTR;
453
454 /* 1st arg to a function */
455 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
456}
457
Daniel Borkmann0e0f1d62016-12-18 01:52:59 +0100458static void __mark_reg_unknown_value(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700459{
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700460 regs[regno].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +0200461 regs[regno].id = 0;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700462 regs[regno].imm = 0;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700463}
464
Daniel Borkmann0e0f1d62016-12-18 01:52:59 +0100465static void mark_reg_unknown_value(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
466{
467 BUG_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG);
468 __mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
469}
470
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400471static void reset_reg_range_values(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
472{
473 regs[regno].min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
474 regs[regno].max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
475}
476
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700477enum reg_arg_type {
478 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */
479 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */
480 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */
481};
482
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100483static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700484 enum reg_arg_type t)
485{
486 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
487 verbose("R%d is invalid\n", regno);
488 return -EINVAL;
489 }
490
491 if (t == SRC_OP) {
492 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
493 if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) {
494 verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
495 return -EACCES;
496 }
497 } else {
498 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
499 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
500 verbose("frame pointer is read only\n");
501 return -EACCES;
502 }
503 if (t == DST_OP)
504 mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
505 }
506 return 0;
507}
508
509static int bpf_size_to_bytes(int bpf_size)
510{
511 if (bpf_size == BPF_W)
512 return 4;
513 else if (bpf_size == BPF_H)
514 return 2;
515 else if (bpf_size == BPF_B)
516 return 1;
517 else if (bpf_size == BPF_DW)
518 return 8;
519 else
520 return -EINVAL;
521}
522
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700523static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
524{
525 switch (type) {
526 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
527 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
528 case PTR_TO_STACK:
529 case PTR_TO_CTX:
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700530 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
531 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700532 case FRAME_PTR:
533 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
534 return true;
535 default:
536 return false;
537 }
538}
539
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700540/* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
541 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
542 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100543static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
544 int size, int value_regno)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700545{
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700546 int i;
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700547 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
548 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
549 */
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700550
551 if (value_regno >= 0 &&
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700552 is_spillable_regtype(state->regs[value_regno].type)) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700553
554 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700555 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700556 verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
557 return -EACCES;
558 }
559
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700560 /* save register state */
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700561 state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
562 state->regs[value_regno];
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700563
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700564 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
565 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL;
566 } else {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700567 /* regular write of data into stack */
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700568 state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100569 (struct bpf_reg_state) {};
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700570
571 for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
572 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_MISC;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700573 }
574 return 0;
575}
576
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100577static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700578 int value_regno)
579{
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700580 u8 *slot_type;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700581 int i;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700582
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700583 slot_type = &state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off];
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700584
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700585 if (slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
586 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700587 verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
588 return -EACCES;
589 }
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700590 for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
591 if (slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700592 verbose("corrupted spill memory\n");
593 return -EACCES;
594 }
595 }
596
597 if (value_regno >= 0)
598 /* restore register state from stack */
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700599 state->regs[value_regno] =
600 state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE];
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700601 return 0;
602 } else {
603 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700604 if (slot_type[i] != STACK_MISC) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700605 verbose("invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
606 off, i, size);
607 return -EACCES;
608 }
609 }
610 if (value_regno >= 0)
611 /* have read misc data from the stack */
612 mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
613 return 0;
614 }
615}
616
617/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100618static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700619 int size)
620{
621 struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr;
622
623 if (off < 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
624 verbose("invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
625 map->value_size, off, size);
626 return -EACCES;
627 }
628 return 0;
629}
630
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700631#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
632
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100633static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200634 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -0700635{
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200636 switch (env->prog->type) {
637 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
638 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -0700639 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200640 if (meta)
641 return meta->pkt_access;
642
643 env->seen_direct_write = true;
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -0700644 return true;
645 default:
646 return false;
647 }
648}
649
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100650static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700651 int size)
652{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100653 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
654 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700655
Alexei Starovoitovd91b28e2016-05-19 18:17:13 -0700656 off += reg->off;
Daniel Borkmannb399cf62016-09-20 00:26:12 +0200657 if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > reg->range) {
Alexei Starovoitovd91b28e2016-05-19 18:17:13 -0700658 verbose("invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
659 off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700660 return -EACCES;
661 }
662 return 0;
663}
664
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700665/* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100666static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, int size,
Alexei Starovoitov19de99f2016-06-15 18:25:38 -0700667 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700668{
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +0100669 /* for analyzer ctx accesses are already validated and converted */
670 if (env->analyzer_ops)
671 return 0;
672
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700673 if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access &&
Alexei Starovoitov19de99f2016-06-15 18:25:38 -0700674 env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, reg_type)) {
Alexei Starovoitov32bbe002016-04-06 18:43:28 -0700675 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
676 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
677 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700678 return 0;
Alexei Starovoitov32bbe002016-04-06 18:43:28 -0700679 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700680
681 verbose("invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
682 return -EACCES;
683}
684
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100685static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700686{
687 if (env->allow_ptr_leaks)
688 return false;
689
690 switch (env->cur_state.regs[regno].type) {
691 case UNKNOWN_VALUE:
692 case CONST_IMM:
693 return false;
694 default:
695 return true;
696 }
697}
698
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100699static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
700 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700701{
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400702 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) {
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700703 if (off % size != 0) {
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100704 verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n",
705 off, size);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700706 return -EACCES;
707 } else {
708 return 0;
709 }
710 }
711
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700712 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
713 /* misaligned access to packet is ok on x86,arm,arm64 */
714 return 0;
715
716 if (reg->id && size != 1) {
717 verbose("Unknown packet alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed\n");
718 return -EACCES;
719 }
720
721 /* skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGN-ed */
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400722 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
723 (NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off + off) % size != 0) {
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700724 verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%d+%d size %d\n",
725 NET_IP_ALIGN, reg->off, off, size);
726 return -EACCES;
727 }
728 return 0;
729}
730
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700731/* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
732 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
733 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
734 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
735 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
736 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100737static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700738 int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
739 int value_regno)
740{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100741 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
742 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700743 int size, err = 0;
744
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700745 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK)
746 off += reg->imm;
Alex Gartrell24b4d2a2015-07-23 14:24:40 -0700747
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700748 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size);
749 if (size < 0)
750 return size;
751
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700752 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size);
753 if (err)
754 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700755
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400756 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
757 reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) {
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700758 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
759 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
760 verbose("R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
761 return -EACCES;
762 }
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400763
764 /* If we adjusted the register to this map value at all then we
765 * need to change off and size to min_value and max_value
766 * respectively to make sure our theoretical access will be
767 * safe.
768 */
769 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) {
770 if (log_level)
771 print_verifier_state(state);
772 env->varlen_map_value_access = true;
773 /* The minimum value is only important with signed
774 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
775 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
776 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
777 * will have a set floor within our range.
778 */
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -0500779 if (reg->min_value < 0) {
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400780 verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
781 regno);
782 return -EACCES;
783 }
784 err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->min_value + off,
785 size);
786 if (err) {
787 verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n",
788 regno);
789 return err;
790 }
791
792 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail
793 * since we can't be sure we won't do bad things.
794 */
795 if (reg->max_value == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
796 verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
797 regno);
798 return -EACCES;
799 }
800 off += reg->max_value;
801 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700802 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
803 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
804 mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
805
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700806 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
Alexei Starovoitov19de99f2016-06-15 18:25:38 -0700807 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
808
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700809 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
810 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
811 verbose("R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
812 return -EACCES;
813 }
Alexei Starovoitov19de99f2016-06-15 18:25:38 -0700814 err = check_ctx_access(env, off, size, t, &reg_type);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700815 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700816 mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
Mickaël Salaün19553512016-09-24 20:01:50 +0200817 /* note that reg.[id|off|range] == 0 */
818 state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700819 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700820
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700821 } else if (reg->type == FRAME_PTR || reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700822 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
823 verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
824 return -EACCES;
825 }
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700826 if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
827 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
828 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off] == STACK_SPILL &&
829 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
830 verbose("attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
831 return -EACCES;
832 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700833 err = check_stack_write(state, off, size, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700834 } else {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700835 err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700836 }
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700837 } else if (state->regs[regno].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200838 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL)) {
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700839 verbose("cannot write into packet\n");
840 return -EACCES;
841 }
Brenden Blanco4acf6c02016-07-19 12:16:56 -0700842 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
843 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
844 verbose("R%d leaks addr into packet\n", value_regno);
845 return -EACCES;
846 }
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700847 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
848 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
849 mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700850 } else {
851 verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n",
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -0700852 regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700853 return -EACCES;
854 }
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -0700855
856 if (!err && size <= 2 && value_regno >= 0 && env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
857 state->regs[value_regno].type == UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
858 /* 1 or 2 byte load zero-extends, determine the number of
859 * zero upper bits. Not doing it fo 4 byte load, since
860 * such values cannot be added to ptr_to_packet anyway.
861 */
862 state->regs[value_regno].imm = 64 - size * 8;
863 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700864 return err;
865}
866
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100867static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700868{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100869 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700870 int err;
871
872 if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) ||
873 insn->imm != 0) {
874 verbose("BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
875 return -EINVAL;
876 }
877
878 /* check src1 operand */
879 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
880 if (err)
881 return err;
882
883 /* check src2 operand */
884 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
885 if (err)
886 return err;
887
888 /* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
889 err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
890 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1);
891 if (err)
892 return err;
893
894 /* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */
895 return check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
896 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1);
897}
898
899/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
900 * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
901 * and all elements of stack are initialized
902 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100903static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +0200904 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
905 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700906{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100907 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
908 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700909 int off, i;
910
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +0100911 if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
912 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
913 regs[regno].type == CONST_IMM &&
914 regs[regno].imm == 0)
915 return 0;
916
917 verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
918 reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
919 reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700920 return -EACCES;
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +0100921 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700922
923 off = regs[regno].imm;
924 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
925 access_size <= 0) {
926 verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
927 regno, off, access_size);
928 return -EACCES;
929 }
930
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +0200931 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
932 meta->access_size = access_size;
933 meta->regno = regno;
934 return 0;
935 }
936
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700937 for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -0700938 if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700939 verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
940 off, i, access_size);
941 return -EACCES;
942 }
943 }
944 return 0;
945}
946
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100947static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +0200948 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
949 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700950{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +0100951 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = &regs[regno];
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -0700952 enum bpf_reg_type expected_type, type = reg->type;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700953 int err = 0;
954
Daniel Borkmann80f1d682015-03-12 17:21:42 +0100955 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700956 return 0;
957
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -0700958 if (type == NOT_INIT) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700959 verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
960 return -EACCES;
961 }
962
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700963 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
964 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
965 verbose("R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", regno);
966 return -EACCES;
967 }
Daniel Borkmann80f1d682015-03-12 17:21:42 +0100968 return 0;
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -0700969 }
Daniel Borkmann80f1d682015-03-12 17:21:42 +0100970
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +0200971 if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta)) {
972 verbose("helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -0700973 return -EACCES;
974 }
975
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +0100976 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700977 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
978 expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -0700979 if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
980 goto err_type;
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +0100981 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE ||
982 arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700983 expected_type = CONST_IMM;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -0700984 if (type != expected_type)
985 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -0700986 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
987 expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -0700988 if (type != expected_type)
989 goto err_type;
Alexei Starovoitov608cd712015-03-26 19:53:57 -0700990 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
991 expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -0700992 if (type != expected_type)
993 goto err_type;
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +0200994 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_STACK ||
995 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK) {
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +0100996 expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
997 /* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be
998 * passed in as argument, it's a CONST_IMM type. Final test
999 * happens during stack boundary checking.
1000 */
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001001 if (type == CONST_IMM && reg->imm == 0)
1002 /* final test in check_stack_boundary() */;
1003 else if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
1004 goto err_type;
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001005 meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001006 } else {
1007 verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type);
1008 return -EFAULT;
1009 }
1010
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001011 if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
1012 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001013 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001014 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
1015 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call:
1016 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within
1017 * stack limits and initialized
1018 */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001019 if (!meta->map_ptr) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001020 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before
1021 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before
1022 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
1023 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
1024 */
1025 verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
1026 return -EACCES;
1027 }
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001028 if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
1029 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, 0,
1030 meta->map_ptr->key_size);
1031 else
1032 err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
1033 meta->map_ptr->key_size,
1034 false, NULL);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001035 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
1036 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call:
1037 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity
1038 */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001039 if (!meta->map_ptr) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001040 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
1041 verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
1042 return -EACCES;
1043 }
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001044 if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
1045 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, 0,
1046 meta->map_ptr->value_size);
1047 else
1048 err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
1049 meta->map_ptr->value_size,
1050 false, NULL);
Daniel Borkmann8e2fe1d92016-02-19 23:05:22 +01001051 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE ||
1052 arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
1053 bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001054
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001055 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' bytes
1056 * from stack pointer 'buf'. Check it
1057 * note: regno == len, regno - 1 == buf
1058 */
1059 if (regno == 0) {
1060 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
1061 verbose("ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
1062 return -EACCES;
1063 }
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001064 if (regs[regno - 1].type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
1065 err = check_packet_access(env, regno - 1, 0, reg->imm);
1066 else
1067 err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno - 1, reg->imm,
1068 zero_size_allowed, meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001069 }
1070
1071 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov6841de82016-08-11 18:17:16 -07001072err_type:
1073 verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
1074 reg_type_str[type], reg_type_str[expected_type]);
1075 return -EACCES;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001076}
1077
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001078static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
1079{
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001080 if (!map)
1081 return 0;
1082
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001083 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
1084 switch (map->map_type) {
1085 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
1086 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
1087 goto error;
1088 break;
1089 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
1090 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
1091 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output)
1092 goto error;
1093 break;
1094 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
1095 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
1096 goto error;
1097 break;
Martin KaFai Lau4ed8ec52016-06-30 10:28:43 -07001098 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
David S. Miller60747ef2016-08-18 01:17:32 -04001099 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
Sargun Dhillon60d20f92016-08-12 08:56:52 -07001100 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
Martin KaFai Lau4a482f32016-06-30 10:28:44 -07001101 goto error;
1102 break;
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001103 default:
1104 break;
1105 }
1106
1107 /* ... and second from the function itself. */
1108 switch (func_id) {
1109 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
1110 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
1111 goto error;
1112 break;
1113 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
1114 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
1115 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
1116 goto error;
1117 break;
1118 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
1119 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
1120 goto error;
1121 break;
Sargun Dhillon60d20f92016-08-12 08:56:52 -07001122 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
Daniel Borkmann747ea552016-08-12 22:17:17 +02001123 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
Martin KaFai Lau4a482f32016-06-30 10:28:44 -07001124 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
1125 goto error;
1126 break;
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001127 default:
1128 break;
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001129 }
1130
1131 return 0;
Alexei Starovoitov6aff67c2016-04-27 18:56:21 -07001132error:
1133 verbose("cannot pass map_type %d into func %d\n",
1134 map->map_type, func_id);
1135 return -EINVAL;
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001136}
1137
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001138static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
1139{
1140 int count = 0;
1141
1142 if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
1143 count++;
1144 if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
1145 count++;
1146 if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
1147 count++;
1148 if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
1149 count++;
1150 if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
1151 count++;
1152
1153 return count > 1 ? -EINVAL : 0;
1154}
1155
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001156static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001157{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001158 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
1159 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001160 int i;
1161
1162 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
1163 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
1164 regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END)
1165 mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, i);
1166
1167 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
1168 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
1169 continue;
1170 reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
1171 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET &&
1172 reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET_END)
1173 continue;
1174 reg->type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
1175 reg->imm = 0;
1176 }
1177}
1178
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001179static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001180{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001181 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001182 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001183 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
1184 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001185 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001186 bool changes_data;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001187 int i, err;
1188
1189 /* find function prototype */
1190 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
1191 verbose("invalid func %d\n", func_id);
1192 return -EINVAL;
1193 }
1194
1195 if (env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto)
1196 fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);
1197
1198 if (!fn) {
1199 verbose("unknown func %d\n", func_id);
1200 return -EINVAL;
1201 }
1202
1203 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
Daniel Borkmann24701ec2015-03-01 12:31:47 +01001204 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001205 verbose("cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
1206 return -EINVAL;
1207 }
1208
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001209 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_skb_data(fn->func);
1210
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001211 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02001212 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001213
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001214 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, which
1215 * is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
1216 */
1217 err = check_raw_mode(fn);
1218 if (err) {
1219 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %d\n", func_id);
1220 return err;
1221 }
1222
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001223 /* check args */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001224 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001225 if (err)
1226 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001227 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001228 if (err)
1229 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001230 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001231 if (err)
1232 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001233 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001234 if (err)
1235 return err;
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001236 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001237 if (err)
1238 return err;
1239
Daniel Borkmann435faee12016-04-13 00:10:51 +02001240 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
1241 * is inferred from register state.
1242 */
1243 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
1244 err = check_mem_access(env, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
1245 if (err)
1246 return err;
1247 }
1248
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001249 /* reset caller saved regs */
1250 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
1251 reg = regs + caller_saved[i];
1252 reg->type = NOT_INIT;
1253 reg->imm = 0;
1254 }
1255
1256 /* update return register */
1257 if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
1258 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
1259 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
1260 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
1261 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
1262 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001263 regs[BPF_REG_0].max_value = regs[BPF_REG_0].min_value = 0;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001264 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
1265 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
1266 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
1267 */
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001268 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001269 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
1270 return -EINVAL;
1271 }
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001272 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +02001273 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001274 } else {
1275 verbose("unknown return type %d of func %d\n",
1276 fn->ret_type, func_id);
1277 return -EINVAL;
1278 }
Alexei Starovoitov04fd61a2015-05-19 16:59:03 -07001279
Daniel Borkmann33ff9822016-04-13 00:10:50 +02001280 err = check_map_func_compatibility(meta.map_ptr, func_id);
Kaixu Xia35578d72015-08-06 07:02:35 +00001281 if (err)
1282 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov04fd61a2015-05-19 16:59:03 -07001283
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001284 if (changes_data)
1285 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
1286 return 0;
1287}
1288
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001289static int check_packet_ptr_add(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1290 struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001291{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001292 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
1293 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
1294 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
1295 struct bpf_reg_state tmp_reg;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001296 s32 imm;
1297
1298 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
1299 /* pkt_ptr += imm */
1300 imm = insn->imm;
1301
1302add_imm:
1303 if (imm <= 0) {
1304 verbose("addition of negative constant to packet pointer is not allowed\n");
1305 return -EACCES;
1306 }
1307 if (imm >= MAX_PACKET_OFF ||
1308 imm + dst_reg->off >= MAX_PACKET_OFF) {
1309 verbose("constant %d is too large to add to packet pointer\n",
1310 imm);
1311 return -EACCES;
1312 }
1313 /* a constant was added to pkt_ptr.
1314 * Remember it while keeping the same 'id'
1315 */
1316 dst_reg->off += imm;
1317 } else {
Alexei Starovoitov1b9b69e2016-05-19 18:17:14 -07001318 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
1319 /* R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=imm22; r7 += r6 */
1320 tmp_reg = *dst_reg; /* save r7 state */
1321 *dst_reg = *src_reg; /* copy pkt_ptr state r6 into r7 */
1322 src_reg = &tmp_reg; /* pretend it's src_reg state */
1323 /* if the checks below reject it, the copy won't matter,
1324 * since we're rejecting the whole program. If all ok,
1325 * then imm22 state will be added to r7
1326 * and r7 will be pkt(id=0,off=22,r=62) while
1327 * r6 will stay as pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62)
1328 */
1329 }
1330
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001331 if (src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
1332 /* pkt_ptr += reg where reg is known constant */
1333 imm = src_reg->imm;
1334 goto add_imm;
1335 }
1336 /* disallow pkt_ptr += reg
1337 * if reg is not uknown_value with guaranteed zero upper bits
1338 * otherwise pkt_ptr may overflow and addition will become
1339 * subtraction which is not allowed
1340 */
1341 if (src_reg->type != UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
1342 verbose("cannot add '%s' to ptr_to_packet\n",
1343 reg_type_str[src_reg->type]);
1344 return -EACCES;
1345 }
1346 if (src_reg->imm < 48) {
1347 verbose("cannot add integer value with %lld upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet\n",
1348 src_reg->imm);
1349 return -EACCES;
1350 }
1351 /* dst_reg stays as pkt_ptr type and since some positive
1352 * integer value was added to the pointer, increment its 'id'
1353 */
Jakub Kicinski1f415a72016-08-02 16:12:14 +01001354 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001355
1356 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range and off to zero */
1357 dst_reg->off = 0;
1358 dst_reg->range = 0;
1359 }
1360 return 0;
1361}
1362
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001363static int evaluate_reg_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001364{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001365 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
1366 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001367 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
1368 s64 imm_log2;
1369
1370 /* for type == UNKNOWN_VALUE:
1371 * imm > 0 -> number of zero upper bits
1372 * imm == 0 -> don't track which is the same as all bits can be non-zero
1373 */
1374
1375 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001376 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001377
1378 if (src_reg->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE && src_reg->imm > 0 &&
1379 dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_ADD) {
1380 /* dreg += sreg
1381 * where both have zero upper bits. Adding them
1382 * can only result making one more bit non-zero
1383 * in the larger value.
1384 * Ex. 0xffff (imm=48) + 1 (imm=63) = 0x10000 (imm=47)
1385 * 0xffff (imm=48) + 0xffff = 0x1fffe (imm=47)
1386 */
1387 dst_reg->imm = min(dst_reg->imm, src_reg->imm);
1388 dst_reg->imm--;
1389 return 0;
1390 }
1391 if (src_reg->type == CONST_IMM && src_reg->imm > 0 &&
1392 dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_ADD) {
1393 /* dreg += sreg
1394 * where dreg has zero upper bits and sreg is const.
1395 * Adding them can only result making one more bit
1396 * non-zero in the larger value.
1397 */
1398 imm_log2 = __ilog2_u64((long long)src_reg->imm);
1399 dst_reg->imm = min(dst_reg->imm, 63 - imm_log2);
1400 dst_reg->imm--;
1401 return 0;
1402 }
1403 /* all other cases non supported yet, just mark dst_reg */
1404 dst_reg->imm = 0;
1405 return 0;
1406 }
1407
1408 /* sign extend 32-bit imm into 64-bit to make sure that
1409 * negative values occupy bit 63. Note ilog2() would have
1410 * been incorrect, since sizeof(insn->imm) == 4
1411 */
1412 imm_log2 = __ilog2_u64((long long)insn->imm);
1413
1414 if (dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_LSH) {
1415 /* reg <<= imm
1416 * if reg was a result of 2 byte load, then its imm == 48
1417 * which means that upper 48 bits are zero and shifting this reg
1418 * left by 4 would mean that upper 44 bits are still zero
1419 */
1420 dst_reg->imm -= insn->imm;
1421 } else if (dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_MUL) {
1422 /* reg *= imm
1423 * if multiplying by 14 subtract 4
1424 * This is conservative calculation of upper zero bits.
1425 * It's not trying to special case insn->imm == 1 or 0 cases
1426 */
1427 dst_reg->imm -= imm_log2 + 1;
1428 } else if (opcode == BPF_AND) {
1429 /* reg &= imm */
1430 dst_reg->imm = 63 - imm_log2;
1431 } else if (dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_ADD) {
1432 /* reg += imm */
1433 dst_reg->imm = min(dst_reg->imm, 63 - imm_log2);
1434 dst_reg->imm--;
1435 } else if (opcode == BPF_RSH) {
1436 /* reg >>= imm
1437 * which means that after right shift, upper bits will be zero
1438 * note that verifier already checked that
1439 * 0 <= imm < 64 for shift insn
1440 */
1441 dst_reg->imm += insn->imm;
1442 if (unlikely(dst_reg->imm > 64))
1443 /* some dumb code did:
1444 * r2 = *(u32 *)mem;
1445 * r2 >>= 32;
1446 * and all bits are zero now */
1447 dst_reg->imm = 64;
1448 } else {
1449 /* all other alu ops, means that we don't know what will
1450 * happen to the value, mark it with unknown number of zero bits
1451 */
1452 dst_reg->imm = 0;
1453 }
1454
1455 if (dst_reg->imm < 0) {
1456 /* all 64 bits of the register can contain non-zero bits
1457 * and such value cannot be added to ptr_to_packet, since it
1458 * may overflow, mark it as unknown to avoid further eval
1459 */
1460 dst_reg->imm = 0;
1461 }
1462 return 0;
1463}
1464
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001465static int evaluate_reg_imm_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1466 struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001467{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001468 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
1469 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
1470 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001471 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
1472
1473 /* dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM here, simulate execution of 'add' insn.
1474 * Don't care about overflow or negative values, just add them
1475 */
1476 if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
1477 dst_reg->imm += insn->imm;
1478 else if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
1479 src_reg->type == CONST_IMM)
1480 dst_reg->imm += src_reg->imm;
1481 else
1482 mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001483 return 0;
1484}
1485
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001486static void check_reg_overflow(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1487{
1488 if (reg->max_value > BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
1489 reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001490 if (reg->min_value < BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE ||
1491 reg->min_value > BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001492 reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
1493}
1494
1495static void adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1496 struct bpf_insn *insn)
1497{
1498 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg;
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001499 s64 min_val = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
1500 u64 max_val = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001501 bool min_set = false, max_set = false;
1502 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
1503
1504 dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
1505 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
1506 check_reg_overflow(&regs[insn->src_reg]);
1507 min_val = regs[insn->src_reg].min_value;
1508 max_val = regs[insn->src_reg].max_value;
1509
1510 /* If the source register is a random pointer then the
1511 * min_value/max_value values represent the range of the known
1512 * accesses into that value, not the actual min/max value of the
1513 * register itself. In this case we have to reset the reg range
1514 * values so we know it is not safe to look at.
1515 */
1516 if (regs[insn->src_reg].type != CONST_IMM &&
1517 regs[insn->src_reg].type != UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
1518 min_val = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
1519 max_val = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
1520 }
1521 } else if (insn->imm < BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE &&
1522 (s64)insn->imm > BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE) {
1523 min_val = max_val = insn->imm;
1524 min_set = max_set = true;
1525 }
1526
1527 /* We don't know anything about what was done to this register, mark it
1528 * as unknown.
1529 */
1530 if (min_val == BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE &&
1531 max_val == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
1532 reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
1533 return;
1534 }
1535
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001536 /* If one of our values was at the end of our ranges then we can't just
1537 * do our normal operations to the register, we need to set the values
1538 * to the min/max since they are undefined.
1539 */
1540 if (min_val == BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
1541 dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
1542 if (max_val == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
1543 dst_reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
1544
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001545 switch (opcode) {
1546 case BPF_ADD:
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001547 if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
1548 dst_reg->min_value += min_val;
1549 if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
1550 dst_reg->max_value += max_val;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001551 break;
1552 case BPF_SUB:
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001553 if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
1554 dst_reg->min_value -= min_val;
1555 if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
1556 dst_reg->max_value -= max_val;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001557 break;
1558 case BPF_MUL:
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001559 if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
1560 dst_reg->min_value *= min_val;
1561 if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
1562 dst_reg->max_value *= max_val;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001563 break;
1564 case BPF_AND:
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001565 /* Disallow AND'ing of negative numbers, ain't nobody got time
1566 * for that. Otherwise the minimum is 0 and the max is the max
1567 * value we could AND against.
1568 */
1569 if (min_val < 0)
1570 dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
1571 else
1572 dst_reg->min_value = 0;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001573 dst_reg->max_value = max_val;
1574 break;
1575 case BPF_LSH:
1576 /* Gotta have special overflow logic here, if we're shifting
1577 * more than MAX_RANGE then just assume we have an invalid
1578 * range.
1579 */
1580 if (min_val > ilog2(BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE))
1581 dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001582 else if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001583 dst_reg->min_value <<= min_val;
1584
1585 if (max_val > ilog2(BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE))
1586 dst_reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001587 else if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001588 dst_reg->max_value <<= max_val;
1589 break;
1590 case BPF_RSH:
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001591 /* RSH by a negative number is undefined, and the BPF_RSH is an
1592 * unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts.
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001593 */
Josef Bacikf23cc642016-11-14 15:45:36 -05001594 if (min_val < 0 || dst_reg->min_value < 0)
1595 dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
1596 else
1597 dst_reg->min_value =
1598 (u64)(dst_reg->min_value) >> min_val;
1599 if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
1600 dst_reg->max_value >>= max_val;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001601 break;
1602 default:
1603 reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
1604 break;
1605 }
1606
1607 check_reg_overflow(dst_reg);
1608}
1609
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001610/* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001611static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001612{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001613 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001614 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
1615 int err;
1616
1617 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
1618 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
1619 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
1620 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
1621 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
1622 verbose("BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
1623 return -EINVAL;
1624 }
1625 } else {
1626 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
1627 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64)) {
1628 verbose("BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
1629 return -EINVAL;
1630 }
1631 }
1632
1633 /* check src operand */
1634 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
1635 if (err)
1636 return err;
1637
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001638 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
1639 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
1640 insn->dst_reg);
1641 return -EACCES;
1642 }
1643
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001644 /* check dest operand */
1645 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
1646 if (err)
1647 return err;
1648
1649 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
1650
1651 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
1652 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
1653 verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
1654 return -EINVAL;
1655 }
1656
1657 /* check src operand */
1658 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
1659 if (err)
1660 return err;
1661 } else {
1662 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
1663 verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
1664 return -EINVAL;
1665 }
1666 }
1667
1668 /* check dest operand */
1669 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
1670 if (err)
1671 return err;
1672
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001673 /* we are setting our register to something new, we need to
1674 * reset its range values.
1675 */
1676 reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
1677
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001678 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
1679 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
1680 /* case: R1 = R2
1681 * copy register state to dest reg
1682 */
1683 regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
1684 } else {
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001685 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
1686 verbose("R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
1687 insn->src_reg);
1688 return -EACCES;
1689 }
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +02001690 mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001691 }
1692 } else {
1693 /* case: R = imm
1694 * remember the value we stored into this reg
1695 */
1696 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_IMM;
1697 regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = insn->imm;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001698 regs[insn->dst_reg].max_value = insn->imm;
1699 regs[insn->dst_reg].min_value = insn->imm;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001700 }
1701
1702 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
1703 verbose("invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
1704 return -EINVAL;
1705
1706 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
1707
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001708 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
1709 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
1710 verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
1711 return -EINVAL;
1712 }
1713 /* check src1 operand */
1714 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
1715 if (err)
1716 return err;
1717 } else {
1718 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
1719 verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
1720 return -EINVAL;
1721 }
1722 }
1723
1724 /* check src2 operand */
1725 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
1726 if (err)
1727 return err;
1728
1729 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
1730 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
1731 verbose("div by zero\n");
1732 return -EINVAL;
1733 }
1734
Rabin Vincent229394e2016-01-12 20:17:08 +01001735 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
1736 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
1737 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
1738
1739 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
1740 verbose("invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
1741 return -EINVAL;
1742 }
1743 }
1744
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07001745 /* check dest operand */
1746 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
1747 if (err)
1748 return err;
1749
1750 dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
1751
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001752 /* first we want to adjust our ranges. */
1753 adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
1754
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001755 /* pattern match 'bpf_add Rx, imm' instruction */
1756 if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07001757 dst_reg->type == FRAME_PTR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
1758 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_STACK;
1759 dst_reg->imm = insn->imm;
1760 return 0;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001761 } else if (opcode == BPF_ADD &&
1762 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
Yonghong Song7bca0a92017-04-29 22:52:42 -07001763 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
1764 ((BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
1765 regs[insn->src_reg].type == CONST_IMM) ||
1766 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)) {
1767 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
1768 dst_reg->imm += regs[insn->src_reg].imm;
1769 else
1770 dst_reg->imm += insn->imm;
1771 return 0;
1772 } else if (opcode == BPF_ADD &&
1773 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
Alexei Starovoitov1b9b69e2016-05-19 18:17:14 -07001774 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
1775 (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
1776 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001777 /* ptr_to_packet += K|X */
1778 return check_packet_ptr_add(env, insn);
1779 } else if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
1780 dst_reg->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE &&
1781 env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
1782 /* unknown += K|X */
1783 return evaluate_reg_alu(env, insn);
1784 } else if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
1785 dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM &&
1786 env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
1787 /* reg_imm += K|X */
1788 return evaluate_reg_imm_alu(env, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07001789 } else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
1790 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
1791 insn->dst_reg);
1792 return -EACCES;
1793 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
1794 is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
1795 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
1796 insn->src_reg);
1797 return -EACCES;
1798 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001799
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001800 /* If we did pointer math on a map value then just set it to our
1801 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ type so we can deal with any stores or
1802 * loads to this register appropriately, otherwise just mark the
1803 * register as unknown.
1804 */
1805 if (env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
1806 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
1807 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ))
1808 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ;
1809 else
1810 mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07001811 }
1812
1813 return 0;
1814}
1815
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001816static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
1817 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001818{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01001819 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001820 int i;
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02001821
1822 /* LLVM can generate two kind of checks:
1823 *
1824 * Type 1:
1825 *
1826 * r2 = r3;
1827 * r2 += 8;
1828 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception>
1829 * <access okay>
1830 *
1831 * Where:
1832 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg
1833 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
1834 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
1835 *
1836 * Type 2:
1837 *
1838 * r2 = r3;
1839 * r2 += 8;
1840 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay>
1841 * <handle exception>
1842 *
1843 * Where:
1844 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg
1845 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
1846 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
1847 *
1848 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
1849 * so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) is safe to access.
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001850 */
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02001851
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001852 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
1853 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id)
Alexei Starovoitov0ea3c232017-03-24 15:57:33 -07001854 /* keep the maximum range already checked */
1855 regs[i].range = max(regs[i].range, dst_reg->off);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001856
1857 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
1858 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
1859 continue;
1860 reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
1861 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
Alexei Starovoitov0ea3c232017-03-24 15:57:33 -07001862 reg->range = max(reg->range, dst_reg->off);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07001863 }
1864}
1865
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04001866/* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
1867 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
1868 * simply doing a BPF_K check.
1869 */
1870static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
1871 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
1872 u8 opcode)
1873{
1874 switch (opcode) {
1875 case BPF_JEQ:
1876 /* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
1877 * true then we know for sure.
1878 */
1879 true_reg->max_value = true_reg->min_value = val;
1880 break;
1881 case BPF_JNE:
1882 /* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
1883 * we know the value for sure;
1884 */
1885 false_reg->max_value = false_reg->min_value = val;
1886 break;
1887 case BPF_JGT:
1888 /* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
1889 false_reg->min_value = 0;
1890 case BPF_JSGT:
1891 /* If this is false then we know the maximum val is val,
1892 * otherwise we know the min val is val+1.
1893 */
1894 false_reg->max_value = val;
1895 true_reg->min_value = val + 1;
1896 break;
1897 case BPF_JGE:
1898 /* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
1899 false_reg->min_value = 0;
1900 case BPF_JSGE:
1901 /* If this is false then we know the maximum value is val - 1,
1902 * otherwise we know the mimimum value is val.
1903 */
1904 false_reg->max_value = val - 1;
1905 true_reg->min_value = val;
1906 break;
1907 default:
1908 break;
1909 }
1910
1911 check_reg_overflow(false_reg);
1912 check_reg_overflow(true_reg);
1913}
1914
1915/* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg is a CONST_IMM reg and src_reg
1916 * is the variable reg.
1917 */
1918static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
1919 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
1920 u8 opcode)
1921{
1922 switch (opcode) {
1923 case BPF_JEQ:
1924 /* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
1925 * true then we know for sure.
1926 */
1927 true_reg->max_value = true_reg->min_value = val;
1928 break;
1929 case BPF_JNE:
1930 /* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
1931 * we know the value for sure;
1932 */
1933 false_reg->max_value = false_reg->min_value = val;
1934 break;
1935 case BPF_JGT:
1936 /* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
1937 true_reg->min_value = 0;
1938 case BPF_JSGT:
1939 /*
1940 * If this is false, then the val is <= the register, if it is
1941 * true the register <= to the val.
1942 */
1943 false_reg->min_value = val;
1944 true_reg->max_value = val - 1;
1945 break;
1946 case BPF_JGE:
1947 /* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
1948 true_reg->min_value = 0;
1949 case BPF_JSGE:
1950 /* If this is false then constant < register, if it is true then
1951 * the register < constant.
1952 */
1953 false_reg->min_value = val + 1;
1954 true_reg->max_value = val;
1955 break;
1956 default:
1957 break;
1958 }
1959
1960 check_reg_overflow(false_reg);
1961 check_reg_overflow(true_reg);
1962}
1963
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +02001964static void mark_map_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, u32 id,
1965 enum bpf_reg_type type)
1966{
1967 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
1968
1969 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && reg->id == id) {
1970 reg->type = type;
Daniel Borkmann1889d6d2016-12-15 01:30:06 +01001971 /* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore, thus we
1972 * should better reset it, so that state pruning has chances
1973 * to take effect.
1974 */
1975 reg->id = 0;
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +02001976 if (type == UNKNOWN_VALUE)
Daniel Borkmann0e0f1d62016-12-18 01:52:59 +01001977 __mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +02001978 }
1979}
1980
1981/* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
1982 * be folded together at some point.
1983 */
1984static void mark_map_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno,
1985 enum bpf_reg_type type)
1986{
1987 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Daniel Borkmann1889d6d2016-12-15 01:30:06 +01001988 u32 id = regs[regno].id;
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +02001989 int i;
1990
1991 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
Daniel Borkmann1889d6d2016-12-15 01:30:06 +01001992 mark_map_reg(regs, i, id, type);
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +02001993
1994 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
1995 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
1996 continue;
Daniel Borkmann1889d6d2016-12-15 01:30:06 +01001997 mark_map_reg(state->spilled_regs, i / BPF_REG_SIZE, id, type);
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +02001998 }
1999}
2000
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002001static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002002 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
2003{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002004 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch, *this_branch = &env->cur_state;
2005 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->regs, *dst_reg;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002006 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
2007 int err;
2008
2009 if (opcode > BPF_EXIT) {
2010 verbose("invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode);
2011 return -EINVAL;
2012 }
2013
2014 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2015 if (insn->imm != 0) {
2016 verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
2017 return -EINVAL;
2018 }
2019
2020 /* check src1 operand */
2021 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
2022 if (err)
2023 return err;
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002024
2025 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
2026 verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
2027 insn->src_reg);
2028 return -EACCES;
2029 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002030 } else {
2031 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
2032 verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
2033 return -EINVAL;
2034 }
2035 }
2036
2037 /* check src2 operand */
2038 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
2039 if (err)
2040 return err;
2041
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002042 dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
2043
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002044 /* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */
2045 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
2046 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002047 dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM && dst_reg->imm == insn->imm) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002048 if (opcode == BPF_JEQ) {
2049 /* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off;
2050 * only follow the goto, ignore fall-through
2051 */
2052 *insn_idx += insn->off;
2053 return 0;
2054 } else {
2055 /* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off;
2056 * only follow fall-through branch, since
2057 * that's where the program will go
2058 */
2059 return 0;
2060 }
2061 }
2062
2063 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx);
2064 if (!other_branch)
2065 return -EFAULT;
2066
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002067 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
2068 * our min/max values for our dst register.
2069 */
2070 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2071 if (regs[insn->src_reg].type == CONST_IMM)
2072 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
2073 dst_reg, regs[insn->src_reg].imm,
2074 opcode);
2075 else if (dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM)
2076 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg],
2077 &regs[insn->src_reg], dst_reg->imm,
2078 opcode);
2079 } else {
2080 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
2081 dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
2082 }
2083
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002084 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002085 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002086 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
2087 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
Thomas Graf14117072016-10-18 19:51:19 +02002088 /* Mark all identical map registers in each branch as either
2089 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
2090 */
2091 mark_map_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg,
2092 opcode == BPF_JEQ ? PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE : UNKNOWN_VALUE);
2093 mark_map_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
2094 opcode == BPF_JEQ ? UNKNOWN_VALUE : PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE);
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002095 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT &&
2096 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
2097 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002098 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg);
2099 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE &&
2100 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
2101 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
2102 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg]);
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002103 } else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
2104 verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg);
2105 return -EACCES;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002106 }
2107 if (log_level)
Daniel Borkmann2d2be8c2016-09-08 01:03:42 +02002108 print_verifier_state(this_branch);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002109 return 0;
2110}
2111
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002112/* return the map pointer stored inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
2113static struct bpf_map *ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(struct bpf_insn *insn)
2114{
2115 u64 imm64 = ((u64) (u32) insn[0].imm) | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32;
2116
2117 return (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) imm64;
2118}
2119
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002120/* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002121static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002122{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002123 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002124 int err;
2125
2126 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
2127 verbose("invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
2128 return -EINVAL;
2129 }
2130 if (insn->off != 0) {
2131 verbose("BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
2132 return -EINVAL;
2133 }
2134
2135 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
2136 if (err)
2137 return err;
2138
Jakub Kicinski6b173872016-09-21 11:43:59 +01002139 if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
2140 /* generic move 64-bit immediate into a register,
2141 * only analyzer needs to collect the ld_imm value.
2142 */
2143 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
2144
2145 if (!env->analyzer_ops)
2146 return 0;
2147
2148 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_IMM;
2149 regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = imm;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002150 return 0;
Jakub Kicinski6b173872016-09-21 11:43:59 +01002151 }
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002152
2153 /* replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() should have caught bad ld_imm64 */
2154 BUG_ON(insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD);
2155
2156 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
2157 regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(insn);
2158 return 0;
2159}
2160
Daniel Borkmann96be4322015-03-01 12:31:46 +01002161static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)
2162{
2163 switch (type) {
2164 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
2165 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
Daniel Borkmann94caee82015-03-20 15:11:11 +01002166 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
Daniel Borkmann96be4322015-03-01 12:31:46 +01002167 return true;
2168 default:
2169 return false;
2170 }
2171}
2172
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002173/* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
2174 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
2175 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
2176 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
2177 *
2178 * Implicit input:
2179 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
2180 *
2181 * Explicit input:
2182 * SRC == any register
2183 * IMM == 32-bit immediate
2184 *
2185 * Output:
2186 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
2187 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002188static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002189{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002190 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002191 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002192 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002193 int i, err;
2194
Daniel Borkmann24701ec2015-03-01 12:31:47 +01002195 if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002196 verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002197 return -EINVAL;
2198 }
2199
2200 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
Alexei Starovoitovd82bccc2016-04-12 10:26:19 -07002201 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002202 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002203 verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002204 return -EINVAL;
2205 }
2206
2207 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
2208 err = check_reg_arg(regs, BPF_REG_6, SRC_OP);
2209 if (err)
2210 return err;
2211
2212 if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
2213 verbose("at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
2214 return -EINVAL;
2215 }
2216
2217 if (mode == BPF_IND) {
2218 /* check explicit source operand */
2219 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
2220 if (err)
2221 return err;
2222 }
2223
2224 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
2225 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
2226 reg = regs + caller_saved[i];
2227 reg->type = NOT_INIT;
2228 reg->imm = 0;
2229 }
2230
2231 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
2232 * the value fetched from the packet
2233 */
2234 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
2235 return 0;
2236}
2237
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07002238/* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
2239 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
2240 * 2 label v as discovered
2241 * 3 let S be a stack
2242 * 4 S.push(v)
2243 * 5 while S is not empty
2244 * 6 t <- S.pop()
2245 * 7 if t is what we're looking for:
2246 * 8 return t
2247 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do
2248 * 10 if edge e is already labelled
2249 * 11 continue with the next edge
2250 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e)
2251 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored
2252 * 14 label e as tree-edge
2253 * 15 label w as discovered
2254 * 16 S.push(w)
2255 * 17 continue at 5
2256 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered
2257 * 19 label e as back-edge
2258 * 20 else
2259 * 21 // vertex w is explored
2260 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge
2261 * 23 label t as explored
2262 * 24 S.pop()
2263 *
2264 * convention:
2265 * 0x10 - discovered
2266 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled
2267 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled
2268 * 0x20 - explored
2269 */
2270
2271enum {
2272 DISCOVERED = 0x10,
2273 EXPLORED = 0x20,
2274 FALLTHROUGH = 1,
2275 BRANCH = 2,
2276};
2277
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002278#define STATE_LIST_MARK ((struct bpf_verifier_state_list *) -1L)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002279
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07002280static int *insn_stack; /* stack of insns to process */
2281static int cur_stack; /* current stack index */
2282static int *insn_state;
2283
2284/* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above:
2285 * t - index of current instruction
2286 * w - next instruction
2287 * e - edge
2288 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002289static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07002290{
2291 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
2292 return 0;
2293
2294 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
2295 return 0;
2296
2297 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
2298 verbose("jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
2299 return -EINVAL;
2300 }
2301
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002302 if (e == BRANCH)
2303 /* mark branch target for state pruning */
2304 env->explored_states[w] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
2305
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07002306 if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
2307 /* tree-edge */
2308 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
2309 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
2310 if (cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
2311 return -E2BIG;
2312 insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w;
2313 return 1;
2314 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
2315 verbose("back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
2316 return -EINVAL;
2317 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
2318 /* forward- or cross-edge */
2319 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
2320 } else {
2321 verbose("insn state internal bug\n");
2322 return -EFAULT;
2323 }
2324 return 0;
2325}
2326
2327/* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program
2328 * loop == back-edge in directed graph
2329 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002330static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07002331{
2332 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
2333 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
2334 int ret = 0;
2335 int i, t;
2336
2337 insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
2338 if (!insn_state)
2339 return -ENOMEM;
2340
2341 insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
2342 if (!insn_stack) {
2343 kfree(insn_state);
2344 return -ENOMEM;
2345 }
2346
2347 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
2348 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
2349 cur_stack = 1;
2350
2351peek_stack:
2352 if (cur_stack == 0)
2353 goto check_state;
2354 t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1];
2355
2356 if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) {
2357 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code);
2358
2359 if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
2360 goto mark_explored;
2361 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
2362 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
2363 if (ret == 1)
2364 goto peek_stack;
2365 else if (ret < 0)
2366 goto err_free;
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +02002367 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
2368 env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07002369 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
2370 if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) {
2371 ret = -EINVAL;
2372 goto err_free;
2373 }
2374 /* unconditional jump with single edge */
2375 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1,
2376 FALLTHROUGH, env);
2377 if (ret == 1)
2378 goto peek_stack;
2379 else if (ret < 0)
2380 goto err_free;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002381 /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
2382 * after every call and jump
2383 */
Alexei Starovoitovc3de6312015-04-14 15:57:13 -07002384 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
2385 env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07002386 } else {
2387 /* conditional jump with two edges */
2388 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
2389 if (ret == 1)
2390 goto peek_stack;
2391 else if (ret < 0)
2392 goto err_free;
2393
2394 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env);
2395 if (ret == 1)
2396 goto peek_stack;
2397 else if (ret < 0)
2398 goto err_free;
2399 }
2400 } else {
2401 /* all other non-branch instructions with single
2402 * fall-through edge
2403 */
2404 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
2405 if (ret == 1)
2406 goto peek_stack;
2407 else if (ret < 0)
2408 goto err_free;
2409 }
2410
2411mark_explored:
2412 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
2413 if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
2414 verbose("pop stack internal bug\n");
2415 ret = -EFAULT;
2416 goto err_free;
2417 }
2418 goto peek_stack;
2419
2420check_state:
2421 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
2422 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
2423 verbose("unreachable insn %d\n", i);
2424 ret = -EINVAL;
2425 goto err_free;
2426 }
2427 }
2428 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
2429
2430err_free:
2431 kfree(insn_state);
2432 kfree(insn_stack);
2433 return ret;
2434}
2435
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002436/* the following conditions reduce the number of explored insns
2437 * from ~140k to ~80k for ultra large programs that use a lot of ptr_to_packet
2438 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002439static bool compare_ptrs_to_packet(struct bpf_reg_state *old,
2440 struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002441{
2442 if (old->id != cur->id)
2443 return false;
2444
2445 /* old ptr_to_packet is more conservative, since it allows smaller
2446 * range. Ex:
2447 * old(off=0,r=10) is equal to cur(off=0,r=20), because
2448 * old(off=0,r=10) means that with range=10 the verifier proceeded
2449 * further and found no issues with the program. Now we're in the same
2450 * spot with cur(off=0,r=20), so we're safe too, since anything further
2451 * will only be looking at most 10 bytes after this pointer.
2452 */
2453 if (old->off == cur->off && old->range < cur->range)
2454 return true;
2455
2456 /* old(off=20,r=10) is equal to cur(off=22,re=22 or 5 or 0)
2457 * since both cannot be used for packet access and safe(old)
2458 * pointer has smaller off that could be used for further
2459 * 'if (ptr > data_end)' check
2460 * Ex:
2461 * old(off=20,r=10) and cur(off=22,r=22) and cur(off=22,r=0) mean
2462 * that we cannot access the packet.
2463 * The safe range is:
2464 * [ptr, ptr + range - off)
2465 * so whenever off >=range, it means no safe bytes from this pointer.
2466 * When comparing old->off <= cur->off, it means that older code
2467 * went with smaller offset and that offset was later
2468 * used to figure out the safe range after 'if (ptr > data_end)' check
2469 * Say, 'old' state was explored like:
2470 * ... R3(off=0, r=0)
2471 * R4 = R3 + 20
2472 * ... now R4(off=20,r=0) <-- here
2473 * if (R4 > data_end)
2474 * ... R4(off=20,r=20), R3(off=0,r=20) and R3 can be used to access.
2475 * ... the code further went all the way to bpf_exit.
2476 * Now the 'cur' state at the mark 'here' has R4(off=30,r=0).
2477 * old_R4(off=20,r=0) equal to cur_R4(off=30,r=0), since if the verifier
2478 * goes further, such cur_R4 will give larger safe packet range after
2479 * 'if (R4 > data_end)' and all further insn were already good with r=20,
2480 * so they will be good with r=30 and we can prune the search.
2481 */
2482 if (old->off <= cur->off &&
2483 old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range)
2484 return true;
2485
2486 return false;
2487}
2488
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002489/* compare two verifier states
2490 *
2491 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since
2492 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them
2493 *
2494 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of
2495 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has
2496 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution
2497 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already
2498 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish.
2499 *
2500 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative
2501 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one.
2502 * Example:
2503 * explored current
2504 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC)
2505 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC)
2506 *
2507 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more
2508 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means
2509 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too
2510 *
2511 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid
2512 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that
2513 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
2514 */
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002515static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2516 struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002517 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002518{
Josef Bacike2d2afe2016-11-29 12:27:09 -05002519 bool varlen_map_access = env->varlen_map_value_access;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002520 struct bpf_reg_state *rold, *rcur;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002521 int i;
2522
2523 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002524 rold = &old->regs[i];
2525 rcur = &cur->regs[i];
2526
2527 if (memcmp(rold, rcur, sizeof(*rold)) == 0)
2528 continue;
2529
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002530 /* If the ranges were not the same, but everything else was and
2531 * we didn't do a variable access into a map then we are a-ok.
2532 */
Josef Bacike2d2afe2016-11-29 12:27:09 -05002533 if (!varlen_map_access &&
Alexei Starovoitovb7f5aa12016-12-07 10:57:59 -08002534 memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetofend(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0)
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002535 continue;
2536
Josef Bacike2d2afe2016-11-29 12:27:09 -05002537 /* If we didn't map access then again we don't care about the
2538 * mismatched range values and it's ok if our old type was
2539 * UNKNOWN and we didn't go to a NOT_INIT'ed reg.
2540 */
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002541 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT ||
Josef Bacike2d2afe2016-11-29 12:27:09 -05002542 (!varlen_map_access && rold->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE &&
2543 rcur->type != NOT_INIT))
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002544 continue;
2545
Alexei Starovoitov969bf052016-05-05 19:49:10 -07002546 if (rold->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && rcur->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
2547 compare_ptrs_to_packet(rold, rcur))
2548 continue;
2549
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002550 return false;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002551 }
2552
2553 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07002554 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID)
2555 continue;
2556 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != cur->stack_slot_type[i])
2557 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
2558 * this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC ->
2559 * this verifier states are not equivalent,
2560 * return false to continue verification of this path
2561 */
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002562 return false;
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07002563 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
2564 continue;
2565 if (memcmp(&old->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
2566 &cur->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
2567 sizeof(old->spilled_regs[0])))
2568 /* when explored and current stack slot types are
2569 * the same, check that stored pointers types
2570 * are the same as well.
2571 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002572 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .imm = -8}
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07002573 * but current path has stored:
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002574 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .imm = -16}
Alexei Starovoitov9c3997602014-10-28 15:11:41 -07002575 * such verifier states are not equivalent.
2576 * return false to continue verification of this path
2577 */
2578 return false;
2579 else
2580 continue;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002581 }
2582 return true;
2583}
2584
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002585static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002586{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002587 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
2588 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002589
2590 sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
2591 if (!sl)
2592 /* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
2593 * be doing state search here
2594 */
2595 return 0;
2596
2597 while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002598 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, &env->cur_state))
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002599 /* reached equivalent register/stack state,
2600 * prune the search
2601 */
2602 return 1;
2603 sl = sl->next;
2604 }
2605
2606 /* there were no equivalent states, remember current one.
2607 * technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
2608 * but it will either reach bpf_exit (which means it's safe) or
2609 * it will be rejected. Since there are no loops, we won't be
2610 * seeing this 'insn_idx' instruction again on the way to bpf_exit
2611 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002612 new_sl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_USER);
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002613 if (!new_sl)
2614 return -ENOMEM;
2615
2616 /* add new state to the head of linked list */
2617 memcpy(&new_sl->state, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
2618 new_sl->next = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
2619 env->explored_states[insn_idx] = new_sl;
2620 return 0;
2621}
2622
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01002623static int ext_analyzer_insn_hook(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2624 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
2625{
2626 if (!env->analyzer_ops || !env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook)
2627 return 0;
2628
2629 return env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
2630}
2631
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002632static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002633{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002634 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002635 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002636 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002637 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
2638 int insn_idx, prev_insn_idx = 0;
2639 int insn_processed = 0;
2640 bool do_print_state = false;
2641
2642 init_reg_state(regs);
2643 insn_idx = 0;
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002644 env->varlen_map_value_access = false;
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002645 for (;;) {
2646 struct bpf_insn *insn;
2647 u8 class;
2648 int err;
2649
2650 if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
2651 verbose("invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
2652 insn_idx, insn_cnt);
2653 return -EFAULT;
2654 }
2655
2656 insn = &insns[insn_idx];
2657 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
2658
Daniel Borkmann07016152016-04-05 22:33:17 +02002659 if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002660 verbose("BPF program is too large. Proccessed %d insn\n",
2661 insn_processed);
2662 return -E2BIG;
2663 }
2664
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002665 err = is_state_visited(env, insn_idx);
2666 if (err < 0)
2667 return err;
2668 if (err == 1) {
2669 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
2670 if (log_level) {
2671 if (do_print_state)
2672 verbose("\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
2673 prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
2674 else
2675 verbose("%d: safe\n", insn_idx);
2676 }
2677 goto process_bpf_exit;
2678 }
2679
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002680 if (log_level && do_print_state) {
2681 verbose("\nfrom %d to %d:", prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002682 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002683 do_print_state = false;
2684 }
2685
2686 if (log_level) {
2687 verbose("%d: ", insn_idx);
Daniel Borkmannced0a312017-05-08 00:04:09 +02002688 print_bpf_insn(env, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002689 }
2690
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01002691 err = ext_analyzer_insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
2692 if (err)
2693 return err;
2694
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002695 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002696 err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002697 if (err)
2698 return err;
2699
2700 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01002701 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07002702
2703 /* check for reserved fields is already done */
2704
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002705 /* check src operand */
2706 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
2707 if (err)
2708 return err;
2709
2710 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
2711 if (err)
2712 return err;
2713
Alexei Starovoitov725f9dc2015-04-15 16:19:33 -07002714 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
2715
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002716 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
2717 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
2718 */
2719 err = check_mem_access(env, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
2720 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ,
2721 insn->dst_reg);
2722 if (err)
2723 return err;
2724
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002725 reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
Alexei Starovoitovea2e7ce2016-09-01 18:37:21 -07002726 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W &&
2727 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
Alexei Starovoitov725f9dc2015-04-15 16:19:33 -07002728 insn_idx++;
2729 continue;
2730 }
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07002731
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01002732 prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
2733
2734 if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07002735 /* saw a valid insn
2736 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01002737 * save type to validate intersecting paths
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07002738 */
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01002739 *prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07002740
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01002741 } else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type &&
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07002742 (src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01002743 *prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07002744 /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
2745 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
2746 * with different pointer types:
2747 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and
2748 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
2749 * Reject it.
2750 */
2751 verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
2752 return -EINVAL;
2753 }
2754
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002755 } else if (class == BPF_STX) {
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01002756 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07002757
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002758 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
2759 err = check_xadd(env, insn);
2760 if (err)
2761 return err;
2762 insn_idx++;
2763 continue;
2764 }
2765
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002766 /* check src1 operand */
2767 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
2768 if (err)
2769 return err;
2770 /* check src2 operand */
2771 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
2772 if (err)
2773 return err;
2774
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07002775 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
2776
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002777 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
2778 err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
2779 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
2780 insn->src_reg);
2781 if (err)
2782 return err;
2783
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01002784 prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
2785
2786 if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
2787 *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
2788 } else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type &&
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07002789 (dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01002790 *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07002791 verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
2792 return -EINVAL;
2793 }
2794
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002795 } else if (class == BPF_ST) {
2796 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
2797 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
2798 verbose("BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
2799 return -EINVAL;
2800 }
2801 /* check src operand */
2802 err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
2803 if (err)
2804 return err;
2805
2806 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
2807 err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
2808 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
2809 -1);
2810 if (err)
2811 return err;
2812
2813 } else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
2814 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
2815
2816 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
2817 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
2818 insn->off != 0 ||
2819 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
2820 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
2821 verbose("BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
2822 return -EINVAL;
2823 }
2824
2825 err = check_call(env, insn->imm);
2826 if (err)
2827 return err;
2828
2829 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
2830 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
2831 insn->imm != 0 ||
2832 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
2833 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
2834 verbose("BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
2835 return -EINVAL;
2836 }
2837
2838 insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
2839 continue;
2840
2841 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
2842 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
2843 insn->imm != 0 ||
2844 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
2845 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
2846 verbose("BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
2847 return -EINVAL;
2848 }
2849
2850 /* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
2851 * to return the value from eBPF program.
2852 * Make sure that it's readable at this time
2853 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
2854 * something into it earlier
2855 */
2856 err = check_reg_arg(regs, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
2857 if (err)
2858 return err;
2859
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07002860 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
2861 verbose("R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
2862 return -EACCES;
2863 }
2864
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07002865process_bpf_exit:
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002866 insn_idx = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx);
2867 if (insn_idx < 0) {
2868 break;
2869 } else {
2870 do_print_state = true;
2871 continue;
2872 }
2873 } else {
2874 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &insn_idx);
2875 if (err)
2876 return err;
2877 }
2878 } else if (class == BPF_LD) {
2879 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
2880
2881 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
Alexei Starovoitovddd872b2014-12-01 15:06:34 -08002882 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
2883 if (err)
2884 return err;
2885
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002886 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
2887 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
2888 if (err)
2889 return err;
2890
2891 insn_idx++;
2892 } else {
2893 verbose("invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
2894 return -EINVAL;
2895 }
Josef Bacik48461132016-09-28 10:54:32 -04002896 reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002897 } else {
2898 verbose("unknown insn class %d\n", class);
2899 return -EINVAL;
2900 }
2901
2902 insn_idx++;
2903 }
2904
Alexei Starovoitov1a0dc1a2016-05-05 19:49:09 -07002905 verbose("processed %d insns\n", insn_processed);
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07002906 return 0;
2907}
2908
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07002909static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map,
2910 struct bpf_prog *prog)
2911
2912{
2913 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
2914 (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH ||
2915 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH) &&
2916 (map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC)) {
2917 verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
2918 return -EINVAL;
2919 }
2920 return 0;
2921}
2922
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002923/* look for pseudo eBPF instructions that access map FDs and
2924 * replace them with actual map pointers
2925 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01002926static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002927{
2928 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
2929 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07002930 int i, j, err;
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002931
2932 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07002933 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07002934 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07002935 verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
2936 return -EINVAL;
2937 }
2938
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07002939 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
2940 ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
2941 BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
2942 verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
2943 return -EINVAL;
2944 }
2945
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002946 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
2947 struct bpf_map *map;
2948 struct fd f;
2949
2950 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
2951 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
2952 insn[1].off != 0) {
2953 verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
2954 return -EINVAL;
2955 }
2956
2957 if (insn->src_reg == 0)
2958 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
2959 goto next_insn;
2960
2961 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
2962 verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
2963 return -EINVAL;
2964 }
2965
2966 f = fdget(insn->imm);
Daniel Borkmannc2101292015-10-29 14:58:07 +01002967 map = __bpf_map_get(f);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002968 if (IS_ERR(map)) {
2969 verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
2970 insn->imm);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002971 return PTR_ERR(map);
2972 }
2973
Alexei Starovoitovfdc15d32016-09-01 18:37:23 -07002974 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(map, env->prog);
2975 if (err) {
2976 fdput(f);
2977 return err;
2978 }
2979
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002980 /* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
2981 insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
2982 insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
2983
2984 /* check whether we recorded this map already */
2985 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
2986 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
2987 fdput(f);
2988 goto next_insn;
2989 }
2990
2991 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
2992 fdput(f);
2993 return -E2BIG;
2994 }
2995
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07002996 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
2997 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it
2998 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
2999 * and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
3000 */
Alexei Starovoitov92117d82016-04-27 18:56:20 -07003001 map = bpf_map_inc(map, false);
3002 if (IS_ERR(map)) {
3003 fdput(f);
3004 return PTR_ERR(map);
3005 }
3006 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
3007
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003008 fdput(f);
3009next_insn:
3010 insn++;
3011 i++;
3012 }
3013 }
3014
3015 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
3016 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
3017 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
3018 */
3019 return 0;
3020}
3021
3022/* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003023static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003024{
3025 int i;
3026
3027 for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++)
3028 bpf_map_put(env->used_maps[i]);
3029}
3030
3031/* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003032static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003033{
3034 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
3035 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
3036 int i;
3037
3038 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++)
3039 if (insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
3040 insn->src_reg = 0;
3041}
3042
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003043/* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff'
3044 * into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff'
3045 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003046static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003047{
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02003048 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->prog->aux->ops;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003049 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02003050 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003051 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003052 enum bpf_access_type type;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003053 int i, cnt, delta = 0;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003054
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02003055 if (ops->gen_prologue) {
3056 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
3057 env->prog);
3058 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
3059 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
3060 return -EINVAL;
3061 } else if (cnt) {
3062 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, 0,
3063 insn_buf, cnt);
3064 if (!new_prog)
3065 return -ENOMEM;
3066 env->prog = new_prog;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003067 delta += cnt - 1;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02003068 }
3069 }
3070
3071 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003072 return 0;
3073
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003074 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02003075
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003076 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
Alexei Starovoitovea2e7ce2016-09-01 18:37:21 -07003077 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
3078 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003079 type = BPF_READ;
Alexei Starovoitovea2e7ce2016-09-01 18:37:21 -07003080 else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
3081 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
Alexei Starovoitovd691f9e2015-06-04 10:11:54 -07003082 type = BPF_WRITE;
3083 else
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003084 continue;
3085
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003086 if (env->insn_aux_data[i].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003087 continue;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003088
Daniel Borkmann36bbef52016-09-20 00:26:13 +02003089 cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg,
3090 insn->off, insn_buf, env->prog);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003091 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
3092 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
3093 return -EINVAL;
3094 }
3095
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003096 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, i + delta, insn_buf,
3097 cnt);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003098 if (!new_prog)
3099 return -ENOMEM;
3100
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003101 delta += cnt - 1;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003102
3103 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
3104 env->prog = new_prog;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003105 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003106 }
3107
3108 return 0;
3109}
3110
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003111static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003112{
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003113 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003114 int i;
3115
3116 if (!env->explored_states)
3117 return;
3118
3119 for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) {
3120 sl = env->explored_states[i];
3121
3122 if (sl)
3123 while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
3124 sln = sl->next;
3125 kfree(sl);
3126 sl = sln;
3127 }
3128 }
3129
3130 kfree(env->explored_states);
3131}
3132
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003133int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07003134{
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003135 char __user *log_ubuf = NULL;
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003136 struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07003137 int ret = -EINVAL;
3138
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003139 if ((*prog)->len <= 0 || (*prog)->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003140 return -E2BIG;
3141
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003142 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003143 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
3144 */
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003145 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003146 if (!env)
3147 return -ENOMEM;
3148
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003149 env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
3150 (*prog)->len);
3151 ret = -ENOMEM;
3152 if (!env->insn_aux_data)
3153 goto err_free_env;
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003154 env->prog = *prog;
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003155
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003156 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
3157 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
3158
3159 if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
3160 /* user requested verbose verifier output
3161 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
3162 */
3163 log_level = attr->log_level;
3164 log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
3165 log_size = attr->log_size;
3166 log_len = 0;
3167
3168 ret = -EINVAL;
3169 /* log_* values have to be sane */
3170 if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
3171 log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003172 goto err_unlock;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003173
3174 ret = -ENOMEM;
3175 log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
3176 if (!log_buf)
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003177 goto err_unlock;
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003178 } else {
3179 log_level = 0;
3180 }
3181
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003182 ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env);
3183 if (ret < 0)
3184 goto skip_full_check;
3185
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003186 env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
Jakub Kicinski58e2af82016-09-21 11:43:57 +01003187 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003188 GFP_USER);
3189 ret = -ENOMEM;
3190 if (!env->explored_states)
3191 goto skip_full_check;
3192
Alexei Starovoitov475fb782014-09-26 00:17:05 -07003193 ret = check_cfg(env);
3194 if (ret < 0)
3195 goto skip_full_check;
3196
Alexei Starovoitov1be7f752015-10-07 22:23:21 -07003197 env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
3198
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003199 ret = do_check(env);
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003200
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003201skip_full_check:
Alexei Starovoitov17a52672014-09-26 00:17:06 -07003202 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
Alexei Starovoitovf1bca822014-09-29 18:50:01 -07003203 free_states(env);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003204
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003205 if (ret == 0)
3206 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
3207 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
3208
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003209 if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
3210 BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
3211 /* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
3212 ret = -ENOSPC;
3213 /* fall through to return what was recorded */
3214 }
3215
3216 /* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */
3217 if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) {
3218 ret = -EFAULT;
3219 goto free_log_buf;
3220 }
3221
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003222 if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) {
3223 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003224 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt,
3225 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]),
3226 GFP_KERNEL);
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003227
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003228 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003229 ret = -ENOMEM;
3230 goto free_log_buf;
3231 }
3232
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003233 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003234 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003235 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003236
3237 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
3238 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
3239 */
3240 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
3241 }
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003242
3243free_log_buf:
3244 if (log_level)
3245 vfree(log_buf);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003246 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
Alexei Starovoitov0246e642014-09-26 00:17:04 -07003247 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
3248 * them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
3249 */
3250 release_maps(env);
Alexei Starovoitov9bac3d62015-03-13 11:57:42 -07003251 *prog = env->prog;
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003252err_unlock:
Alexei Starovoitovcbd35702014-09-26 00:17:03 -07003253 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
Jakub Kicinski3df126f2016-09-21 11:43:56 +01003254 vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
3255err_free_env:
3256 kfree(env);
Alexei Starovoitov51580e72014-09-26 00:17:02 -07003257 return ret;
3258}
Jakub Kicinski13a27df2016-09-21 11:43:58 +01003259
3260int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
3261 void *priv)
3262{
3263 struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
3264 int ret;
3265
3266 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
3267 if (!env)
3268 return -ENOMEM;
3269
3270 env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
3271 prog->len);
3272 ret = -ENOMEM;
3273 if (!env->insn_aux_data)
3274 goto err_free_env;
3275 env->prog = prog;
3276 env->analyzer_ops = ops;
3277 env->analyzer_priv = priv;
3278
3279 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
3280 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
3281
3282 log_level = 0;
3283
3284 env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
3285 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
3286 GFP_KERNEL);
3287 ret = -ENOMEM;
3288 if (!env->explored_states)
3289 goto skip_full_check;
3290
3291 ret = check_cfg(env);
3292 if (ret < 0)
3293 goto skip_full_check;
3294
3295 env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
3296
3297 ret = do_check(env);
3298
3299skip_full_check:
3300 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
3301 free_states(env);
3302
3303 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
3304 vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
3305err_free_env:
3306 kfree(env);
3307 return ret;
3308}
3309EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_analyzer);