s390/crypto: cleanup and move the header with the cpacf definitions
The CPACF instructions are going be used in KVM as well, move the
defines and the inline functions from arch/s390/crypt/crypt_s390.h
to arch/s390/include/asm. Rename the header to cpacf.h and replace
the crypt_s390_xxx names with cpacf_xxx.
While we are at it, cleanup the header as well. The encoding for
the CPACF operations is odd, there is an enum for each of the CPACF
instructions with the hardware function code in the lower 8 bits of
each entry and a software defined number for the CPACF instruction
in the upper 8 bits. Remove the superfluous software number and
replace the enums with simple defines.
The crypt_s390_func_available() function tests for the presence
of a specific CPACF operations. The new name of the function is
cpacf_query and it works slightly different than before. It gets
passed an opcode of an CPACF instruction and a function code for
this instruction. The facility_mask parameter is gone, the opcode
is used to find the correct MSA facility bit to check if the CPACF
instruction itself is available. If it is the query function of the
given instruction is used to test if the requested CPACF operation
is present.
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
index d750cc0..41527b1 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
@@ -23,8 +23,7 @@
#include <asm/debug.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/timex.h>
-
-#include "crypt_s390.h"
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM Corporation");
@@ -136,8 +135,8 @@
else
h = ebuf;
/* generate sha256 from this page */
- if (crypt_s390_kimd(KIMD_SHA_256, h,
- pg, PAGE_SIZE) != PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256, h,
+ pg, PAGE_SIZE) != PAGE_SIZE) {
prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_ENTROPY_FAILED;
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
@@ -164,9 +163,9 @@
int ret;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
- ret = crypt_s390_kmc(KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block,
- (char *)entropy, (char *)entropy,
- sizeof(entropy));
+ ret = cpacf_kmc(CPACF_KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block,
+ (char *)entropy, (char *)entropy,
+ sizeof(entropy));
BUG_ON(ret < 0 || ret != sizeof(entropy));
memcpy(prng_data->prngws.parm_block, entropy, sizeof(entropy));
}
@@ -311,9 +310,8 @@
memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
/* initial seed */
- ret = crypt_s390_ppno(PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
- &ws, NULL, 0,
- seed, sizeof(seed));
+ ret = cpacf_ppno(CPACF_PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED, &ws, NULL, 0,
+ seed, sizeof(seed));
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("The prng self test seed operation for the "
"SHA-512 mode failed with rc=%d\n", ret);
@@ -331,18 +329,16 @@
}
/* generate random bytes */
- ret = crypt_s390_ppno(PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
- &ws, buf, sizeof(buf),
- NULL, 0);
+ ret = cpacf_ppno(CPACF_PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+ &ws, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("The prng self test generate operation for "
"the SHA-512 mode failed with rc=%d\n", ret);
prng_errorflag = PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED;
return -EIO;
}
- ret = crypt_s390_ppno(PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
- &ws, buf, sizeof(buf),
- NULL, 0);
+ ret = cpacf_ppno(CPACF_PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+ &ws, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("The prng self test generate operation for "
"the SHA-512 mode failed with rc=%d\n", ret);
@@ -396,9 +392,8 @@
get_tod_clock_ext(seed + 48);
/* initial seed of the ppno drng */
- ret = crypt_s390_ppno(PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
- &prng_data->ppnows, NULL, 0,
- seed, sizeof(seed));
+ ret = cpacf_ppno(CPACF_PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+ &prng_data->ppnows, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
if (ret < 0) {
prng_errorflag = PRNG_SEED_FAILED;
ret = -EIO;
@@ -409,11 +404,9 @@
bytes for the FIPS 140-2 Conditional Self Test */
if (fips_enabled) {
prng_data->prev = prng_data->buf + prng_chunk_size;
- ret = crypt_s390_ppno(PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
- &prng_data->ppnows,
- prng_data->prev,
- prng_chunk_size,
- NULL, 0);
+ ret = cpacf_ppno(CPACF_PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+ &prng_data->ppnows,
+ prng_data->prev, prng_chunk_size, NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0 || ret != prng_chunk_size) {
prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_FAILED;
ret = -EIO;
@@ -447,9 +440,8 @@
return ret;
/* do a reseed of the ppno drng with this bytestring */
- ret = crypt_s390_ppno(PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
- &prng_data->ppnows, NULL, 0,
- seed, sizeof(seed));
+ ret = cpacf_ppno(CPACF_PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+ &prng_data->ppnows, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
if (ret) {
prng_errorflag = PRNG_RESEED_FAILED;
return -EIO;
@@ -471,9 +463,8 @@
}
/* PPNO generate */
- ret = crypt_s390_ppno(PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
- &prng_data->ppnows, buf, nbytes,
- NULL, 0);
+ ret = cpacf_ppno(CPACF_PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+ &prng_data->ppnows, buf, nbytes, NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0 || ret != nbytes) {
prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_FAILED;
return -EIO;
@@ -555,8 +546,8 @@
* Note: you can still get strict X9.17 conformity by setting
* prng_chunk_size to 8 bytes.
*/
- tmp = crypt_s390_kmc(KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block,
- prng_data->buf, prng_data->buf, n);
+ tmp = cpacf_kmc(CPACF_KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block,
+ prng_data->buf, prng_data->buf, n);
if (tmp < 0 || tmp != n) {
ret = -EIO;
break;
@@ -815,14 +806,13 @@
int ret;
/* check if the CPU has a PRNG */
- if (!crypt_s390_func_available(KMC_PRNG, CRYPT_S390_MSA))
+ if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, CPACF_KMC_PRNG))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* choose prng mode */
if (prng_mode != PRNG_MODE_TDES) {
/* check for MSA5 support for PPNO operations */
- if (!crypt_s390_func_available(PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
- CRYPT_S390_MSA5)) {
+ if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_PPNO, CPACF_PPNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) {
if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
pr_err("The prng module cannot "
"start in SHA-512 mode\n");