ipv6: make exception cache less predictible
Even after commit 4785305c05b2 ("ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()"),
an attacker can still use brute force to learn some secrets from a victim
linux host.
One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
table bucket a random value.
Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
could contain 6 items under attack.
After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.
This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
we do not expect this to be a problem.
Following patch is dealing with the same issue in IPv4.
Fixes: 35732d01fe31 ("ipv6: introduce a hash table to store dst cache")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index f34137d..dbc2240 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1657,6 +1657,7 @@ static int rt6_insert_exception(struct rt6_info *nrt,
struct in6_addr *src_key = NULL;
struct rt6_exception *rt6_ex;
struct fib6_nh *nh = res->nh;
+ int max_depth;
int err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&rt6_exception_lock);
@@ -1711,7 +1712,9 @@ static int rt6_insert_exception(struct rt6_info *nrt,
bucket->depth++;
net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_rt_cache++;
- if (bucket->depth > FIB6_MAX_DEPTH)
+ /* Randomize max depth to avoid some side channels attacks. */
+ max_depth = FIB6_MAX_DEPTH + prandom_u32_max(FIB6_MAX_DEPTH);
+ while (bucket->depth > max_depth)
rt6_exception_remove_oldest(bucket);
out: