KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR

Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).

Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD.  To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.

Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:

According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."

According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers.  If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."

This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 65510f6..00bed2c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -3251,7 +3251,7 @@
 	msr.host_initiated = false;
 
 	svm->next_rip = kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) + 2;
-	if (svm_set_msr(&svm->vcpu, &msr)) {
+	if (kvm_set_msr(&svm->vcpu, &msr)) {
 		trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
 		kvm_inject_gp(&svm->vcpu, 0);
 	} else {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 0acac81..148020a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -5291,7 +5291,7 @@
 	msr.data = data;
 	msr.index = ecx;
 	msr.host_initiated = false;
-	if (vmx_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
+	if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
 		trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
 		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
 		return 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 34c8f94..5a71955 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -987,7 +987,6 @@
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_enable_efer_bits);
 
-
 /*
  * Writes msr value into into the appropriate "register".
  * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
@@ -995,8 +994,34 @@
  */
 int kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 {
+	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_FS_BASE:
+	case MSR_GS_BASE:
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+	case MSR_CSTAR:
+	case MSR_LSTAR:
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(msr->data))
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+		/*
+		 * IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
+		 * non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on
+		 * AMD (which ignores the top 32-bits, because it does
+		 * not implement 64-bit SYSENTER).
+		 *
+		 * 64-bit code should hence be able to write a non-canonical
+		 * value on AMD.  Making the address canonical ensures that
+		 * vmentry does not fail on Intel after writing a non-canonical
+		 * value, and that something deterministic happens if the guest
+		 * invokes 64-bit SYSENTER.
+		 */
+		msr->data = get_canonical(msr->data);
+	}
 	return kvm_x86_ops->set_msr(vcpu, msr);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_msr);
 
 /*
  * Adapt set_msr() to msr_io()'s calling convention