tree f6af49eeac1812c0d3c1fb563dab67571857bd62
parent 53ecde0b9126ff140abe3aefd7f0ec64d6fa36b0
author Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> 1502966546 +1000
committer Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> 1507288336 +1100

powerpc/64s: Use emergency stack for kernel TM Bad Thing program checks

When using transactional memory (TM), the CPU can be in one of six
states as far as TM is concerned, encoded in the Machine State
Register (MSR). Certain state transitions are illegal and if attempted
trigger a "TM Bad Thing" type program check exception.

If we ever hit one of these exceptions it's treated as a bug, ie. we
oops, and kill the process and/or panic, depending on configuration.

One case where we can trigger a TM Bad Thing, is when returning to
userspace after a system call or interrupt, using RFID. When this
happens the CPU first restores the user register state, in particular
r1 (the stack pointer) and then attempts to update the MSR. However
the MSR update is not allowed and so we take the program check with
the user register state, but the kernel MSR.

This tricks the exception entry code into thinking we have a bad
kernel stack pointer, because the MSR says we're coming from the
kernel, but r1 is pointing to userspace.

To avoid this we instead always switch to the emergency stack if we
take a TM Bad Thing from the kernel. That way none of the user
register values are used, other than for printing in the oops message.

This is the fix for CVE-2017-1000255.

Fixes: 5d176f751ee3 ("powerpc: tm: Enable transactional memory (TM) lazily for userspace")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
[mpe: Rewrite change log & comments, tweak asm slightly]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>