apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro
The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch
to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended.
Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting
common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter
which will become useless.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 17754ee..bc63cf7b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -588,9 +588,9 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
- if (sa->aad->iface.ns) {
+ if (aad(sa)->iface.ns) {
audit_log_format(ab, " ns=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->iface.ns);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.ns);
}
}
@@ -606,22 +606,18 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
*
* Returns: the error to be returned after audit is done
*/
-static int audit_policy(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, gfp_t gfp,
+static int audit_policy(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
const char *nsname, const char *name,
const char *info, int error)
{
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.op = op;
- aad.iface.ns = nsname;
- aad.name = name;
- aad.info = info;
- aad.error = error;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, op);
- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, gfp,
- &sa, audit_cb);
+ aad(&sa)->iface.ns = nsname;
+ aad(&sa)->name = name;
+ aad(&sa)->info = info;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error;
+
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
}
/**
@@ -675,11 +671,11 @@ int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_ns *ns,
{
/* check if loading policy is locked out */
if (aa_g_lock_policy)
- return audit_policy(profile, op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, NULL,
+ return audit_policy(profile, op, NULL, NULL,
"policy_locked", -EACCES);
if (!policy_admin_capable(ns))
- return audit_policy(profile, op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, NULL,
+ return audit_policy(profile, op, NULL, NULL,
"not policy admin", -EACCES);
/* TODO: add fine grained mediation of policy loads */
@@ -937,8 +933,8 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *profile,
list_del_init(&ent->list);
op = (!ent->old && !ent->rename) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
- audit_policy(profile, op, GFP_ATOMIC, NULL,
- ent->new->base.hname, NULL, error);
+ audit_policy(profile, op, NULL, ent->new->base.hname,
+ NULL, error);
if (ent->old) {
__replace_profile(ent->old, ent->new, 1);
@@ -993,7 +989,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *profile,
/* audit cause of failure */
op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
fail:
- audit_policy(profile, op, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name, ent->new->base.hname,
+ audit_policy(profile, op, ns_name, ent->new->base.hname,
info, error);
/* audit status that rest of profiles in the atomic set failed too */
info = "valid profile in failed atomic policy load";
@@ -1004,7 +1000,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *profile,
continue;
}
op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
- audit_policy(profile, op, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name,
+ audit_policy(profile, op, ns_name,
tmp->new->base.hname, info, error);
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) {
@@ -1079,7 +1075,7 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *subj,
}
/* don't fail removal if audit fails */
- (void) audit_policy(subj, OP_PROF_RM, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name, name, info,
+ (void) audit_policy(subj, OP_PROF_RM, ns_name, name, info,
error);
aa_put_ns(ns);
aa_put_profile(profile);
@@ -1090,7 +1086,7 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *subj,
aa_put_ns(ns);
fail:
- (void) audit_policy(subj, OP_PROF_RM, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name, name, info,
+ (void) audit_policy(subj, OP_PROF_RM, ns_name, name, info,
error);
return error;
}