apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro
The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch
to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended.
Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting
common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter
which will become useless.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index bcd28d8..0c81ff64 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -62,23 +62,23 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
if (aa_g_audit_header) {
audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
- audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad->type]);
+ audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[aad(sa)->type]);
}
- if (sa->aad->op) {
+ if (aad(sa)->op) {
audit_log_format(ab, " operation=");
- audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad->op);
+ audit_log_string(ab, aad(sa)->op);
}
- if (sa->aad->info) {
+ if (aad(sa)->info) {
audit_log_format(ab, " info=");
- audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad->info);
- if (sa->aad->error)
- audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad->error);
+ audit_log_string(ab, aad(sa)->info);
+ if (aad(sa)->error)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", aad(sa)->error);
}
- if (sa->aad->profile) {
- struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad->profile;
+ if (aad(sa)->profile) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile = aad(sa)->profile;
if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.hname);
@@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname);
}
- if (sa->aad->name) {
+ if (aad(sa)->name) {
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name);
}
}
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
{
- sa->aad->type = type;
+ aad(sa)->type = type;
common_lsm_audit(sa, audit_pre, cb);
}
@@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
* aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem
* @type: audit type for the message
* @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL)
- * @gfp: allocation flags to use
* @sa: audit event (NOT NULL)
* @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
*
@@ -117,14 +116,13 @@ void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
*
* Returns: error on failure
*/
-int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
- struct common_audit_data *sa,
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
{
BUG_ON(!profile);
if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
- if (likely(!sa->aad->error)) {
+ if (likely(!aad(sa)->error)) {
if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
return 0;
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
@@ -136,23 +134,23 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
(type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET))
- return sa->aad->error;
+ return aad(sa)->error;
if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
if (!unconfined(profile))
- sa->aad->profile = profile;
+ aad(sa)->profile = profile;
aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb);
- if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
+ if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ?
sa->u.tsk : current);
- if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
- return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
+ if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
+ return complain_error(aad(sa)->error);
- return sa->aad->error;
+ return aad(sa)->error;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 1101c6f..1d2e2de 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -66,13 +66,9 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error)
{
struct audit_cache *ent;
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
- sa.aad = &aad;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
sa.u.cap = cap;
- sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE;
- sa.aad->error = error;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error;
if (likely(!error)) {
/* test if auditing is being forced */
@@ -104,7 +100,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error)
}
put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
- return aa_audit(type, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa, audit_cb);
+ return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index c2f1d651..d18b3f0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -508,8 +508,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
audit:
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
- name,
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name,
new_profile ? new_profile->base.hname : NULL,
cond.uid, info, error);
@@ -714,9 +713,9 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
audit:
if (!permtest)
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL,
- OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL,
- target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+ AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, target,
+ GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
out:
aa_put_profile(hat);
@@ -842,8 +841,8 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
audit:
if (!permtest)
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request,
- name, hname, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, name,
+ hname, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
aa_put_ns(ns);
aa_put_profile(target);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index e04f044..750564c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -67,24 +67,24 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
- if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ if (aad(sa)->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
- audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.request);
+ audit_file_mask(ab, aad(sa)->fs.request);
}
- if (sa->aad->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ if (aad(sa)->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
- audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied);
+ audit_file_mask(ab, aad(sa)->fs.denied);
}
- if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ if (aad(sa)->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid));
audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d",
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, sa->aad->fs.ouid));
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, aad(sa)->fs.ouid));
}
- if (sa->aad->fs.target) {
+ if (aad(sa)->fs.target) {
audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->fs.target);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->fs.target);
}
}
@@ -104,54 +104,53 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
* Returns: %0 or error on failure
*/
int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
- gfp_t gfp, const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
+ const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
{
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK;
- sa.u.tsk = NULL;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.op = op,
- aad.fs.request = request;
- aad.name = name;
- aad.fs.target = target;
- aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
- aad.info = info;
- aad.error = error;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, op);
- if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
+ sa.u.tsk = NULL;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.request = request;
+ aad(&sa)->name = name;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.target = target;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.ouid = ouid;
+ aad(&sa)->info = info;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error;
+ sa.u.tsk = NULL;
+
+ if (likely(!aad(&sa)->error)) {
u32 mask = perms->audit;
if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
mask = 0xffff;
/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
- sa.aad->fs.request &= mask;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.request &= mask;
- if (likely(!sa.aad->fs.request))
+ if (likely(!aad(&sa)->fs.request))
return 0;
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
} else {
/* only report permissions that were denied */
- sa.aad->fs.request = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.request = aad(&sa)->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+ AA_BUG(!aad(&sa)->fs.request);
- if (sa.aad->fs.request & perms->kill)
+ if (aad(&sa)->fs.request & perms->kill)
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
- if ((sa.aad->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
+ if ((aad(&sa)->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
- sa.aad->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
- if (!sa.aad->fs.request)
- return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
+ if (!aad(&sa)->fs.request)
+ return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : aad(&sa)->error;
}
- sa.aad->fs.denied = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
- return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb);
+ aad(&sa)->fs.denied = aad(&sa)->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+ return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, file_audit_cb);
}
/**
@@ -302,8 +301,8 @@ int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
if (request & ~perms.allow)
error = -EACCES;
}
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, name,
- NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, name, NULL,
+ cond->uid, info, error);
kfree(buffer);
return error;
@@ -430,7 +429,7 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
error = 0;
audit:
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_LINK, request,
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request,
lname, tname, cond.uid, info, error);
kfree(buffer);
kfree(buffer2);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 956c0b1..fdc4774 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -108,34 +108,53 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
const char *name;
const char *info;
union {
- void *target;
+ /* these entries require a custom callback fn */
struct {
+ struct aa_profile *peer;
+ struct {
+ const char *target;
+ u32 request;
+ u32 denied;
+ kuid_t ouid;
+ } fs;
+ };
+ struct {
+ const char *name;
long pos;
const char *ns;
- void *target;
} iface;
struct {
int rlim;
unsigned long max;
} rlim;
- struct {
- const char *target;
- u32 request;
- u32 denied;
- kuid_t ouid;
- } fs;
};
};
-/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data structure */
-#define aad apparmor_audit_data
+/* macros for dealing with apparmor_audit_data structure */
+#define aad(SA) ((SA)->apparmor_audit_data)
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, T, X) \
+ /* TODO: cleanup audit init so we don't need _aad = {0,} */ \
+ struct apparmor_audit_data NAME ## _aad = { .op = (X), }; \
+ struct common_audit_data NAME = \
+ { \
+ .type = (T), \
+ .u.tsk = NULL, \
+ }; \
+ NAME.apparmor_audit_data = &(NAME ## _aad)
void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
-int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
- struct common_audit_data *sa,
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
+#define aa_audit_error(ERROR, SA, CB) \
+({ \
+ aad((SA))->error = (ERROR); \
+ aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, (SA), (CB)); \
+ aad((SA))->error; \
+})
+
+
static inline int complain_error(int error)
{
if (error == -EPERM || error == -EACCES)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index 0eb5436..38f821b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
dfa_map_xindex((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] >> 14) & 0x3fff)
int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
- gfp_t gfp, const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
+ const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error);
/**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index 777ac1c..edac790 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@
static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
- audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->target);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->peer->base.hname);
}
/**
@@ -40,16 +40,12 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct aa_profile *target, int error)
{
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.op = OP_PTRACE;
- aad.target = target;
- aad.error = error;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa,
- audit_cb);
+ aad(&sa)->peer = target;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error;
+
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 5d8ef31..66475bd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -120,11 +120,9 @@ const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name,
void aa_info_message(const char *str)
{
if (audit_enabled) {
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.info = str;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, NULL);
+
+ aad(&sa)->info = str;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL);
}
printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index c751b03..c4bae8a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -504,11 +504,10 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR);
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -568,12 +567,9 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
return error;
fail:
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
- aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
- aad.info = name;
- aad.error = error = -EINVAL;
+ aad(&sa)->profile = aa_current_profile();
+ aad(&sa)->info = name;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
goto out;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 17754ee..bc63cf7b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -588,9 +588,9 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
- if (sa->aad->iface.ns) {
+ if (aad(sa)->iface.ns) {
audit_log_format(ab, " ns=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->iface.ns);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.ns);
}
}
@@ -606,22 +606,18 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
*
* Returns: the error to be returned after audit is done
*/
-static int audit_policy(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, gfp_t gfp,
+static int audit_policy(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
const char *nsname, const char *name,
const char *info, int error)
{
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.op = op;
- aad.iface.ns = nsname;
- aad.name = name;
- aad.info = info;
- aad.error = error;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, op);
- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, gfp,
- &sa, audit_cb);
+ aad(&sa)->iface.ns = nsname;
+ aad(&sa)->name = name;
+ aad(&sa)->info = info;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error;
+
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
}
/**
@@ -675,11 +671,11 @@ int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_ns *ns,
{
/* check if loading policy is locked out */
if (aa_g_lock_policy)
- return audit_policy(profile, op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, NULL,
+ return audit_policy(profile, op, NULL, NULL,
"policy_locked", -EACCES);
if (!policy_admin_capable(ns))
- return audit_policy(profile, op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, NULL,
+ return audit_policy(profile, op, NULL, NULL,
"not policy admin", -EACCES);
/* TODO: add fine grained mediation of policy loads */
@@ -937,8 +933,8 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *profile,
list_del_init(&ent->list);
op = (!ent->old && !ent->rename) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
- audit_policy(profile, op, GFP_ATOMIC, NULL,
- ent->new->base.hname, NULL, error);
+ audit_policy(profile, op, NULL, ent->new->base.hname,
+ NULL, error);
if (ent->old) {
__replace_profile(ent->old, ent->new, 1);
@@ -993,7 +989,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *profile,
/* audit cause of failure */
op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
fail:
- audit_policy(profile, op, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name, ent->new->base.hname,
+ audit_policy(profile, op, ns_name, ent->new->base.hname,
info, error);
/* audit status that rest of profiles in the atomic set failed too */
info = "valid profile in failed atomic policy load";
@@ -1004,7 +1000,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *profile,
continue;
}
op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
- audit_policy(profile, op, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name,
+ audit_policy(profile, op, ns_name,
tmp->new->base.hname, info, error);
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) {
@@ -1079,7 +1075,7 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *subj,
}
/* don't fail removal if audit fails */
- (void) audit_policy(subj, OP_PROF_RM, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name, name, info,
+ (void) audit_policy(subj, OP_PROF_RM, ns_name, name, info,
error);
aa_put_ns(ns);
aa_put_profile(profile);
@@ -1090,7 +1086,7 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *subj,
aa_put_ns(ns);
fail:
- (void) audit_policy(subj, OP_PROF_RM, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name, name, info,
+ (void) audit_policy(subj, OP_PROF_RM, ns_name, name, info,
error);
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 38c148f..441efc9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -79,13 +79,17 @@ struct aa_ext {
static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
- if (sa->aad->iface.target) {
- struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad->iface.target;
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name->base.hname);
+
+ if (aad(sa)->iface.ns) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ns=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.ns);
}
- if (sa->aad->iface.pos)
- audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad->iface.pos);
+ if (aad(sa)->iface.name) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.name);
+ }
+ if (aad(sa)->iface.pos)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", aad(sa)->iface.pos);
}
/**
@@ -104,20 +108,18 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *ns_name,
int error)
{
struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.iface.ns = ns_name;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, NULL);
if (e)
- aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
- aad.iface.target = new;
- aad.name = name;
- aad.info = info;
- aad.error = error;
+ aad(&sa)->iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
+ aad(&sa)->iface.ns = ns_name;
+ if (new)
+ aad(&sa)->iface.name = new->base.hname;
+ else
+ aad(&sa)->iface.name = name;
+ aad(&sa)->info = info;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error;
- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa,
- audit_cb);
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
}
void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index 67a6072..86a941a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu",
- rlim_names[sa->aad->rlim.rlim], sa->aad->rlim.max);
+ rlim_names[aad(sa)->rlim.rlim], aad(sa)->rlim.max);
}
/**
@@ -50,17 +50,12 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
unsigned long value, int error)
{
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETRLIMIT);
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT,
- aad.rlim.rlim = resource;
- aad.rlim.max = value;
- aad.error = error;
- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa,
- audit_cb);
+ aad(&sa)->rlim.rlim = resource;
+ aad(&sa)->rlim.max = value;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error;
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
}
/**