x86/KASLR: Drop CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET
Currently CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET is used to limit the maximum
offset for kernel randomization. This limit doesn't need to be a CONFIG
since it is tied completely to KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE, and will make no sense
once physical and virtual offsets are randomized separately. This patch
removes CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET and consolidates the Kconfig
help text.
[kees: rewrote changelog, dropped KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT, rewrote help]
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1461185746-8017-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 2dc18605..5892d54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1932,54 +1932,38 @@
(CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START) is used as the minimum location.
config RANDOMIZE_BASE
- bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
+ bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR)"
depends on RELOCATABLE
default n
---help---
- Randomizes the physical and virtual address at which the
- kernel image is decompressed, as a security feature that
- deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location
- of kernel internals.
+ In support of Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR),
+ this randomizes the physical address at which the kernel image
+ is decompressed and the virtual address where the kernel
+ image is mapped, as a security feature that deters exploit
+ attempts relying on knowledge of the location of kernel
+ code internals.
- Entropy is generated using the RDRAND instruction if it is
- supported. If RDTSC is supported, it is used as well. If
- neither RDRAND nor RDTSC are supported, then randomness is
- read from the i8254 timer.
+ The kernel physical and virtual address can be randomized
+ from 16MB up to 1GB on 64-bit and 512MB on 32-bit. (Note that
+ using RANDOMIZE_BASE reduces the memory space available to
+ kernel modules from 1.5GB to 1GB.)
- The kernel will be offset by up to RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET,
- and aligned according to PHYSICAL_ALIGN. Since the kernel is
- built using 2GiB addressing, and PHYSICAL_ALGIN must be at a
- minimum of 2MiB, only 10 bits of entropy is theoretically
- possible. At best, due to page table layouts, 64-bit can use
- 9 bits of entropy and 32-bit uses 8 bits.
+ Entropy is generated using the RDRAND instruction if it is
+ supported. If RDTSC is supported, its value is mixed into
+ the entropy pool as well. If neither RDRAND nor RDTSC are
+ supported, then entropy is read from the i8254 timer.
- If unsure, say N.
+ Since the kernel is built using 2GB addressing, and
+ PHYSICAL_ALIGN must be at a minimum of 2MB, only 10 bits of
+ entropy is theoretically possible. Currently, with the
+ default value for PHYSICAL_ALIGN and due to page table
+ layouts, 64-bit uses 9 bits of entropy and 32-bit uses 8 bits.
-config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET
- hex "Maximum kASLR offset allowed" if EXPERT
- depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE
- range 0x0 0x20000000 if X86_32
- default "0x20000000" if X86_32
- range 0x0 0x40000000 if X86_64
- default "0x40000000" if X86_64
- ---help---
- The lesser of RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET and available physical
- memory is used to determine the maximal offset in bytes that will
- be applied to the kernel when kernel Address Space Layout
- Randomization (kASLR) is active. This must be a multiple of
- PHYSICAL_ALIGN.
+ If CONFIG_HIBERNATE is also enabled, KASLR is disabled at boot
+ time. To enable it, boot with "kaslr" on the kernel command
+ line (which will also disable hibernation).
- On 32-bit this is limited to 512MiB by page table layouts. The
- default is 512MiB.
-
- On 64-bit this is limited by how the kernel fixmap page table is
- positioned, so this cannot be larger than 1GiB currently. Without
- RANDOMIZE_BASE, there is a 512MiB to 1.5GiB split between kernel
- and modules. When RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET is above 512MiB, the
- modules area will shrink to compensate, up to the current maximum
- 1GiB to 1GiB split. The default is 1GiB.
-
- If unsure, leave at the default value.
+ If unsure, say N.
# Relocation on x86 needs some additional build support
config X86_NEED_RELOCS