[IPV4] ip_fragment: Always compute hash with ipfrag_lock held.
Otherwise we could compute an inaccurate hash due to the
random seed changing.
Noticed by Zach Brown and patch is based upon some feedback
from Herbert Xu.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
index 2a8adda..da734c4 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
@@ -304,13 +304,17 @@
/* Creation primitives. */
-static struct ipq *ip_frag_intern(unsigned int hash, struct ipq *qp_in)
+static struct ipq *ip_frag_intern(struct ipq *qp_in)
{
struct ipq *qp;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
struct hlist_node *n;
#endif
+ unsigned int hash;
+
write_lock(&ipfrag_lock);
+ hash = ipqhashfn(qp_in->id, qp_in->saddr, qp_in->daddr,
+ qp_in->protocol);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/* With SMP race we have to recheck hash table, because
* such entry could be created on other cpu, while we
@@ -345,7 +349,7 @@
}
/* Add an entry to the 'ipq' queue for a newly received IP datagram. */
-static struct ipq *ip_frag_create(unsigned hash, struct iphdr *iph, u32 user)
+static struct ipq *ip_frag_create(struct iphdr *iph, u32 user)
{
struct ipq *qp;
@@ -371,7 +375,7 @@
spin_lock_init(&qp->lock);
atomic_set(&qp->refcnt, 1);
- return ip_frag_intern(hash, qp);
+ return ip_frag_intern(qp);
out_nomem:
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_ERR "ip_frag_create: no memory left !\n");
@@ -387,11 +391,12 @@
__u32 saddr = iph->saddr;
__u32 daddr = iph->daddr;
__u8 protocol = iph->protocol;
- unsigned int hash = ipqhashfn(id, saddr, daddr, protocol);
+ unsigned int hash;
struct ipq *qp;
struct hlist_node *n;
read_lock(&ipfrag_lock);
+ hash = ipqhashfn(id, saddr, daddr, protocol);
hlist_for_each_entry(qp, n, &ipq_hash[hash], list) {
if(qp->id == id &&
qp->saddr == saddr &&
@@ -405,7 +410,7 @@
}
read_unlock(&ipfrag_lock);
- return ip_frag_create(hash, iph, user);
+ return ip_frag_create(iph, user);
}
/* Is the fragment too far ahead to be part of ipq? */