client MUST ignore EncryptionKeyLength if CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY is set
[MS-SMB] 2.2.4.5.2.1 states:
"ChallengeLength (1 byte): When the CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY bit is set,
the server MUST set this value to zero and clients MUST ignore this
value."
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
index f26ffbf..672ef35 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
@@ -625,9 +625,8 @@
server->negflavor = CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_UNENCAP;
memcpy(ses->server->cryptkey, pSMBr->u.EncryptionKey,
CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
- } else if ((pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC ||
- server->capabilities & CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY) &&
- (pSMBr->EncryptionKeyLength == 0)) {
+ } else if (pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC ||
+ server->capabilities & CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY) {
server->negflavor = CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED;
rc = decode_ext_sec_blob(ses, pSMBr);
} else if (server->sec_mode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT) {