Merge "vdc: use libbase logging and log directly to kmsg on boot" am: 4f6c1ee19f am: e3a8a60024
am: 83f1551ecb
Change-Id: Ib6c575bbfd010e71cac509bee343a7be563e730a
diff --git a/Android.mk b/Android.mk
index d183a17..06d98eb 100644
--- a/Android.mk
+++ b/Android.mk
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
CheckBattery.cpp \
Ext4Crypt.cpp \
VoldUtil.c \
- cryptfs.c \
+ cryptfs.cpp \
Disk.cpp \
VolumeBase.cpp \
PublicVolume.cpp \
@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@
external/scrypt/lib/crypto \
frameworks/native/include \
system/security/keystore \
- hardware/libhardware/include/hardware \
- system/security/softkeymaster/include/keymaster
common_shared_libraries := \
libsysutils \
@@ -55,9 +53,11 @@
libselinux \
libutils \
libhardware \
- libsoftkeymaster \
libbase \
- libkeymaster_messages \
+ libhwbinder \
+ libhidlbase \
+ android.hardware.keymaster@3.0 \
+ libkeystore_binder
common_static_libraries := \
libbootloader_message \
@@ -143,3 +143,5 @@
LOCAL_CONLYFLAGS := $(vold_conlyflags)
include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
+
+include $(LOCAL_PATH)/tests/Android.mk
diff --git a/CommandListener.cpp b/CommandListener.cpp
index b548a91..c2b8310 100644
--- a/CommandListener.cpp
+++ b/CommandListener.cpp
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
+#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
#include <cutils/fs.h>
#include <sysutils/SocketClient.h>
@@ -54,6 +55,8 @@
#define DUMP_ARGS 0
#define DEBUG_APPFUSE 0
+using android::base::unique_fd;
+
CommandListener::CommandListener() :
FrameworkListener("vold", true) {
registerCmd(new DumpCmd());
@@ -120,7 +123,7 @@
cli->sendMsg(ResponseCode::CommandOkay, "Devmapper dump failed", true);
}
cli->sendMsg(0, "Dumping mounted filesystems", false);
- FILE *fp = fopen("/proc/mounts", "r");
+ FILE *fp = fopen("/proc/mounts", "re");
if (fp) {
char line[1024];
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) {
@@ -680,16 +683,16 @@
<< " in namespace " << uid;
}
- const android::vold::ScopedDir dir(opendir("/proc"));
- if (dir.get() == nullptr) {
+ unique_fd dir(open("/proc", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC));
+ if (dir.get() == -1) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open /proc";
return -errno;
}
// Obtains process file descriptor.
const std::string pid_str = android::base::StringPrintf("%d", pid);
- const android::vold::ScopedFd pid_fd(
- openat(dirfd(dir.get()), pid_str.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC));
+ const unique_fd pid_fd(
+ openat(dir.get(), pid_str.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC));
if (pid_fd.get() == -1) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open /proc/" << pid;
return -errno;
@@ -703,8 +706,9 @@
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to stat /proc/" << pid;
return -errno;
}
- if (sb.st_uid != uid) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Mismatch UID expected=" << uid << ", actual=" << sb.st_uid;
+ if (sb.st_uid != AID_SYSTEM) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Only system can mount appfuse. UID expected=" << AID_SYSTEM
+ << ", actual=" << sb.st_uid;
return -EPERM;
}
}
@@ -714,7 +718,7 @@
char rootName[PATH_MAX];
char pidName[PATH_MAX];
const int root_result =
- android::vold::SaneReadLinkAt(dirfd(dir.get()), "1/ns/mnt", rootName, PATH_MAX);
+ android::vold::SaneReadLinkAt(dir.get(), "1/ns/mnt", rootName, PATH_MAX);
const int pid_result =
android::vold::SaneReadLinkAt(pid_fd.get(), "ns/mnt", pidName, PATH_MAX);
if (root_result == -1) {
@@ -732,7 +736,7 @@
}
// We purposefully leave the namespace open across the fork
- android::vold::ScopedFd ns_fd(openat(pid_fd.get(), "ns/mnt", O_RDONLY));
+ unique_fd ns_fd(openat(pid_fd.get(), "ns/mnt", O_RDONLY)); // not O_CLOEXEC
if (ns_fd.get() < 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open namespace for /proc/" << pid << "/ns/mnt";
return -errno;
@@ -748,7 +752,17 @@
if (command == "mount") {
_exit(mountInNamespace(uid, device_fd, path));
} else if (command == "unmount") {
- android::vold::ForceUnmount(path);
+ // If it's just after all FD opened on mount point are closed, umount2 can fail with
+ // EBUSY. To avoid the case, specify MNT_DETACH.
+ if (umount2(path.c_str(), UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW | MNT_DETACH) != 0 &&
+ errno != EINVAL && errno != ENOENT) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unmount directory.";
+ _exit(-errno);
+ }
+ if (rmdir(path.c_str()) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to remove the mount directory.";
+ _exit(-errno);
+ }
_exit(android::OK);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown appfuse command " << command;
@@ -800,7 +814,7 @@
}
// Open device FD.
- android::vold::ScopedFd device_fd(open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR));
+ unique_fd device_fd(open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR)); // not O_CLOEXEC
if (device_fd.get() == -1) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open /dev/fuse";
return sendGenericOkFail(cli, -errno);
diff --git a/Disk.cpp b/Disk.cpp
index 6562d96..8e58be0 100644
--- a/Disk.cpp
+++ b/Disk.cpp
@@ -47,8 +47,10 @@
static const char* kSgdiskPath = "/system/bin/sgdisk";
static const char* kSgdiskToken = " \t\n";
+static const char* kSysfsLoopMaxMinors = "/sys/module/loop/parameters/max_part";
static const char* kSysfsMmcMaxMinors = "/sys/module/mmcblk/parameters/perdev_minors";
+static const unsigned int kMajorBlockLoop = 7;
static const unsigned int kMajorBlockScsiA = 8;
static const unsigned int kMajorBlockScsiB = 65;
static const unsigned int kMajorBlockScsiC = 66;
@@ -229,6 +231,10 @@
unsigned int majorId = major(mDevice);
switch (majorId) {
+ case kMajorBlockLoop: {
+ mLabel = "Virtual";
+ break;
+ }
case kMajorBlockScsiA: case kMajorBlockScsiB: case kMajorBlockScsiC: case kMajorBlockScsiD:
case kMajorBlockScsiE: case kMajorBlockScsiF: case kMajorBlockScsiG: case kMajorBlockScsiH:
case kMajorBlockScsiI: case kMajorBlockScsiJ: case kMajorBlockScsiK: case kMajorBlockScsiL:
@@ -534,6 +540,14 @@
// Figure out maximum partition devices supported
unsigned int majorId = major(mDevice);
switch (majorId) {
+ case kMajorBlockLoop: {
+ std::string tmp;
+ if (!ReadFileToString(kSysfsLoopMaxMinors, &tmp)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read max minors";
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ return atoi(tmp.c_str());
+ }
case kMajorBlockScsiA: case kMajorBlockScsiB: case kMajorBlockScsiC: case kMajorBlockScsiD:
case kMajorBlockScsiE: case kMajorBlockScsiF: case kMajorBlockScsiG: case kMajorBlockScsiH:
case kMajorBlockScsiI: case kMajorBlockScsiJ: case kMajorBlockScsiK: case kMajorBlockScsiL:
diff --git a/Ext4Crypt.cpp b/Ext4Crypt.cpp
index 969ab0b..59b76d6 100644
--- a/Ext4Crypt.cpp
+++ b/Ext4Crypt.cpp
@@ -20,11 +20,14 @@
#include "Utils.h"
#include <algorithm>
+#include <chrono>
#include <iomanip>
#include <map>
+#include <mutex>
#include <set>
#include <sstream>
#include <string>
+#include <thread>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
@@ -60,6 +63,8 @@
static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_CE = 1 << 1;
namespace {
+const std::chrono::seconds s_key_eviction_sleep_time(20);
+
const std::string device_key_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + e4crypt_unencrypted_folder;
const std::string device_key_path = device_key_dir + "/key";
const std::string device_key_temp = device_key_dir + "/temp";
@@ -72,6 +77,10 @@
// Some users are ephemeral, don't try to wipe their keys from disk
std::set<userid_t> s_ephemeral_users;
+// Allow evictions to be cancelled.
+std::map<std::string, std::thread::id> s_desired_eviction_threads;
+std::mutex s_desired_eviction_threads_mutex;
+
// Map user ids to key references
std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_de_key_raw_refs;
std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_ce_key_raw_refs;
@@ -158,6 +167,9 @@
ext4_encryption_key ext4_key;
if (!fill_key(key, &ext4_key)) return false;
*raw_ref = generate_key_ref(ext4_key.raw, ext4_key.size);
+ // Ensure that no thread is waiting to evict this ref
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(s_desired_eviction_threads_mutex);
+ s_desired_eviction_threads.erase(*raw_ref);
auto ref = keyname(*raw_ref);
key_serial_t device_keyring;
if (!e4crypt_keyring(&device_keyring)) return false;
@@ -373,9 +385,14 @@
}
static bool ensure_policy(const std::string& raw_ref, const std::string& path) {
+ const char *contents_mode;
+ const char *filenames_mode;
+
+ cryptfs_get_file_encryption_modes(&contents_mode, &filenames_mode);
+
if (e4crypt_policy_ensure(path.c_str(),
raw_ref.data(), raw_ref.size(),
- cryptfs_get_file_encryption_mode()) != 0) {
+ contents_mode, filenames_mode) != 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set policy on: " << path;
return false;
}
@@ -434,9 +451,13 @@
return true;
}
+ const char *contents_mode;
+ const char *filenames_mode;
+ cryptfs_get_file_encryption_modes(&contents_mode, &filenames_mode);
+ std::string modestring = std::string(contents_mode) + ":" + filenames_mode;
+
std::string mode_filename = std::string("/data") + e4crypt_key_mode;
- std::string mode = cryptfs_get_file_encryption_mode();
- if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(mode, mode_filename)) {
+ if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(modestring, mode_filename)) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot save type";
return false;
}
@@ -516,15 +537,66 @@
return true;
}
+static void evict_key_after_delay(const std::string raw_ref) {
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "Waiting to evict key in thread " << std::this_thread::get_id();
+ std::this_thread::sleep_for(s_key_eviction_sleep_time);
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "Done waiting to evict key in thread " << std::this_thread::get_id();
+
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(s_desired_eviction_threads_mutex);
+ // Check the key should be evicted by this thread
+ auto search = s_desired_eviction_threads.find(raw_ref);
+ if (search == s_desired_eviction_threads.end()) {
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "Not evicting renewed-desirability key";
+ return;
+ }
+ if (search->second != std::this_thread::get_id()) {
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "We are not the thread to evict this key";
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Remove the key from the keyring
+ auto ref = keyname(raw_ref);
+ key_serial_t device_keyring;
+ if (!e4crypt_keyring(&device_keyring)) return;
+ auto key_serial = keyctl_search(device_keyring, "logon", ref.c_str(), 0);
+ if (keyctl_revoke(key_serial) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to revoke key with serial " << key_serial;
+ return;
+ }
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "Revoked key with serial " << key_serial;
+}
+
+static bool evict_key(const std::string &raw_ref) {
+ // FIXME the use of a thread with delay is a work around for a kernel bug
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(s_desired_eviction_threads_mutex);
+ std::thread t(evict_key_after_delay, raw_ref);
+ s_desired_eviction_threads[raw_ref] = t.get_id();
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "Scheduled key eviction in thread " << t.get_id();
+ t.detach();
+ return true; // Sadly no way to know if we were successful :(
+}
+
+static bool evict_ce_key(userid_t user_id) {
+ s_ce_keys.erase(user_id);
+ bool success = true;
+ std::string raw_ref;
+ // If we haven't loaded the CE key, no need to evict it.
+ if (lookup_key_ref(s_ce_key_raw_refs, user_id, &raw_ref)) {
+ success &= evict_key(raw_ref);
+ }
+ s_ce_key_raw_refs.erase(user_id);
+ return success;
+}
+
bool e4crypt_destroy_user_key(userid_t user_id) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_destroy_user_key(" << user_id << ")";
if (!e4crypt_is_native()) {
return true;
}
bool success = true;
- s_ce_keys.erase(user_id);
std::string raw_ref;
- s_ce_key_raw_refs.erase(user_id);
+ success &= evict_ce_key(user_id);
+ success &= lookup_key_ref(s_de_key_raw_refs, user_id, &raw_ref) && evict_key(raw_ref);
s_de_key_raw_refs.erase(user_id);
auto it = s_ephemeral_users.find(user_id);
if (it != s_ephemeral_users.end()) {
@@ -659,8 +731,9 @@
// TODO: rename to 'evict' for consistency
bool e4crypt_lock_user_key(userid_t user_id) {
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_lock_user_key " << user_id;
if (e4crypt_is_native()) {
- // TODO: remove from kernel keyring
+ return evict_ce_key(user_id);
} else if (e4crypt_is_emulated()) {
// When in emulation mode, we just use chmod
if (!emulated_lock(android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id)) ||
diff --git a/KeyStorage.cpp b/KeyStorage.cpp
index 986f403..34dd6c0 100644
--- a/KeyStorage.cpp
+++ b/KeyStorage.cpp
@@ -23,11 +23,14 @@
#include <vector>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <android-base/file.h>
@@ -37,7 +40,8 @@
#include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
-#include <keymaster/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keystore/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keystore/keystore_hidl_support.h>
extern "C" {
@@ -46,6 +50,7 @@
namespace android {
namespace vold {
+using namespace keystore;
const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication{"", ""};
@@ -64,8 +69,11 @@
static const char* kStretch_none = "none";
static const char* kStretch_nopassword = "nopassword";
static const std::string kStretchPrefix_scrypt = "scrypt ";
+static const char* kHashPrefix_secdiscardable = "Android secdiscardable SHA512";
+static const char* kHashPrefix_keygen = "Android key wrapping key generation SHA512";
static const char* kFn_encrypted_key = "encrypted_key";
static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob = "keymaster_key_blob";
+static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded = "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded";
static const char* kFn_salt = "salt";
static const char* kFn_secdiscardable = "secdiscardable";
static const char* kFn_stretching = "stretching";
@@ -80,17 +88,17 @@
return true;
}
-static std::string hashSecdiscardable(const std::string& secdiscardable) {
+static std::string hashWithPrefix(char const* prefix, const std::string& tohash) {
SHA512_CTX c;
SHA512_Init(&c);
// Personalise the hashing by introducing a fixed prefix.
// Hashing applications should use personalization except when there is a
// specific reason not to; see section 4.11 of https://www.schneier.com/skein1.3.pdf
- std::string secdiscardableHashingPrefix = "Android secdiscardable SHA512";
- secdiscardableHashingPrefix.resize(SHA512_CBLOCK);
- SHA512_Update(&c, secdiscardableHashingPrefix.data(), secdiscardableHashingPrefix.size());
- SHA512_Update(&c, secdiscardable.data(), secdiscardable.size());
+ std::string hashingPrefix = prefix;
+ hashingPrefix.resize(SHA512_CBLOCK);
+ SHA512_Update(&c, hashingPrefix.data(), hashingPrefix.size());
+ SHA512_Update(&c, tohash.data(), tohash.size());
std::string res(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, '\0');
SHA512_Final(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&res[0]), &c);
return res;
@@ -98,15 +106,15 @@
static bool generateKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const KeyAuthentication& auth,
const std::string& appId, std::string* key) {
- auto paramBuilder = keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ auto paramBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_BLOCK_MODE, KM_MODE_GCM)
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE);
- addStringParam(¶mBuilder, keymaster::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, blob2hidlVec(appId));
if (auth.token.empty()) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "Creating key that doesn't need auth token";
- paramBuilder.Authorization(keymaster::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
+ paramBuilder.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
} else {
LOG(DEBUG) << "Auth token required for key";
if (auth.token.size() != sizeof(hw_auth_token_t)) {
@@ -115,65 +123,27 @@
return false;
}
const hw_auth_token_t* at = reinterpret_cast<const hw_auth_token_t*>(auth.token.data());
- paramBuilder.Authorization(keymaster::TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, at->user_id);
- paramBuilder.Authorization(keymaster::TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, HW_AUTH_PASSWORD);
- paramBuilder.Authorization(keymaster::TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, AUTH_TIMEOUT);
+ paramBuilder.Authorization(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, at->user_id);
+ paramBuilder.Authorization(TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD);
+ paramBuilder.Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, AUTH_TIMEOUT);
}
- return keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder.build(), key);
+ return keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder, key);
}
-static keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder beginParams(const KeyAuthentication& auth,
- const std::string& appId) {
- auto paramBuilder = keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_BLOCK_MODE, KM_MODE_GCM)
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_MAC_LENGTH, GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE);
- addStringParam(¶mBuilder, keymaster::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
+static AuthorizationSet beginParams(const KeyAuthentication& auth,
+ const std::string& appId) {
+ auto paramBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, blob2hidlVec(appId));
if (!auth.token.empty()) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "Supplying auth token to Keymaster";
- addStringParam(¶mBuilder, keymaster::TAG_AUTH_TOKEN, auth.token);
+ paramBuilder.Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TOKEN, blob2hidlVec(auth.token));
}
return paramBuilder;
}
-static bool encryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& key,
- const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& appId,
- const std::string& message, std::string* ciphertext) {
- auto params = beginParams(auth, appId).build();
- keymaster::AuthorizationSet outParams;
- auto opHandle = keymaster.begin(KM_PURPOSE_ENCRYPT, key, params, &outParams);
- if (!opHandle) return false;
- keymaster_blob_t nonceBlob;
- if (!outParams.GetTagValue(keymaster::TAG_NONCE, &nonceBlob)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM encryption but no nonce generated";
- return false;
- }
- // nonceBlob here is just a pointer into existing data, must not be freed
- std::string nonce(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(nonceBlob.data), nonceBlob.data_length);
- if (!checkSize("nonce", nonce.size(), GCM_NONCE_BYTES)) return false;
- std::string body;
- if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(message, &body)) return false;
-
- std::string mac;
- if (!opHandle.finishWithOutput(&mac)) return false;
- if (!checkSize("mac", mac.size(), GCM_MAC_BYTES)) return false;
- *ciphertext = nonce + body + mac;
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool decryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& key,
- const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& appId,
- const std::string& ciphertext, std::string* message) {
- auto nonce = ciphertext.substr(0, GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
- auto bodyAndMac = ciphertext.substr(GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
- auto params = addStringParam(beginParams(auth, appId), keymaster::TAG_NONCE, nonce).build();
- auto opHandle = keymaster.begin(KM_PURPOSE_DECRYPT, key, params);
- if (!opHandle) return false;
- if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(bodyAndMac, message)) return false;
- if (!opHandle.finish()) return false;
- return true;
-}
-
static bool readFileToString(const std::string& filename, std::string* result) {
if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(filename, result)) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read from " << filename;
@@ -190,11 +160,89 @@
return true;
}
-static std::string getStretching() {
- char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+static KeymasterOperation begin(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
+ KeyPurpose purpose,
+ const AuthorizationSet &keyParams,
+ const AuthorizationSet &opParams,
+ AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
+ auto kmKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob;
+ std::string kmKey;
+ if (!readFileToString(kmKeyPath, &kmKey)) return KeymasterOperation();
+ AuthorizationSet inParams(keyParams);
+ inParams.append(opParams.begin(), opParams.end());
+ for (;;) {
+ auto opHandle = keymaster.begin(purpose, kmKey, inParams, outParams);
+ if (opHandle) {
+ return opHandle;
+ }
+ if (opHandle.errorCode() != ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE) return opHandle;
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "Upgrading key: " << dir;
+ std::string newKey;
+ if (!keymaster.upgradeKey(kmKey, keyParams, &newKey)) return KeymasterOperation();
+ auto newKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded;
+ if (!writeStringToFile(newKey, newKeyPath)) return KeymasterOperation();
+ if (rename(newKeyPath.c_str(), kmKeyPath.c_str()) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move upgraded key to location: " << kmKeyPath;
+ return KeymasterOperation();
+ }
+ if (!keymaster.deleteKey(kmKey)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Key deletion failed during upgrade, continuing anyway: " << dir;
+ }
+ kmKey = newKey;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Key upgraded: " << dir;
+ }
+}
- property_get(SCRYPT_PROP, paramstr, SCRYPT_DEFAULTS);
- return std::string() + kStretchPrefix_scrypt + paramstr;
+static bool encryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
+ const AuthorizationSet &keyParams,
+ const std::string& message, std::string* ciphertext) {
+ AuthorizationSet opParams;
+ AuthorizationSet outParams;
+ auto opHandle = begin(keymaster, dir, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, keyParams, opParams, &outParams);
+ if (!opHandle) return false;
+ auto nonceBlob = outParams.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
+ if (!nonceBlob.isOk()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "GCM encryption but no nonce generated";
+ return false;
+ }
+ // nonceBlob here is just a pointer into existing data, must not be freed
+ std::string nonce(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&nonceBlob.value()[0]), nonceBlob.value().size());
+ if (!checkSize("nonce", nonce.size(), GCM_NONCE_BYTES)) return false;
+ std::string body;
+ if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(message, &body)) return false;
+
+ std::string mac;
+ if (!opHandle.finish(&mac)) return false;
+ if (!checkSize("mac", mac.size(), GCM_MAC_BYTES)) return false;
+ *ciphertext = nonce + body + mac;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool decryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
+ const AuthorizationSet &keyParams,
+ const std::string& ciphertext, std::string* message) {
+ auto nonce = ciphertext.substr(0, GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
+ auto bodyAndMac = ciphertext.substr(GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
+ auto opParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, blob2hidlVec(nonce));
+ auto opHandle = begin(keymaster, dir, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, keyParams, opParams, nullptr);
+ if (!opHandle) return false;
+ if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(bodyAndMac, message)) return false;
+ if (!opHandle.finish(nullptr)) return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static std::string getStretching(const KeyAuthentication& auth) {
+ if (!auth.usesKeymaster()) {
+ return kStretch_none;
+ } else if (auth.secret.empty()) {
+ return kStretch_nopassword;
+ } else {
+ char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+ property_get(SCRYPT_PROP, paramstr, SCRYPT_DEFAULTS);
+ return std::string() + kStretchPrefix_scrypt + paramstr;
+ }
}
static bool stretchingNeedsSalt(const std::string& stretching) {
@@ -239,7 +287,116 @@
std::string* appId) {
std::string stretched;
if (!stretchSecret(stretching, auth.secret, salt, &stretched)) return false;
- *appId = hashSecdiscardable(secdiscardable) + stretched;
+ *appId = hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_secdiscardable, secdiscardable) + stretched;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool readRandomBytesOrLog(size_t count, std::string* out) {
+ auto status = ReadRandomBytes(count, *out);
+ if (status != OK) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed with status: " << status;
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void logOpensslError() {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Openssl error: " << ERR_get_error();
+}
+
+static bool encryptWithoutKeymaster(const std::string& preKey,
+ const std::string& plaintext, std::string* ciphertext) {
+ auto key = hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_keygen, preKey);
+ key.resize(AES_KEY_BYTES);
+ if (!readRandomBytesOrLog(GCM_NONCE_BYTES, ciphertext)) return false;
+ auto ctx = std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&::EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)>(
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
+ if (!ctx) {
+ logOpensslError();
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL,
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()),
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext->data()))) {
+ logOpensslError();
+ return false;
+ }
+ ciphertext->resize(GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext.size() + GCM_MAC_BYTES);
+ int outlen;
+ if (1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(),
+ reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES), &outlen,
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(plaintext.data()), plaintext.size())) {
+ logOpensslError();
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (outlen != static_cast<int>(plaintext.size())) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "GCM ciphertext length should be " << plaintext.size() << " was " << outlen;
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(),
+ reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext.size()), &outlen)) {
+ logOpensslError();
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (outlen != 0) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "GCM EncryptFinal should be 0, was " << outlen;
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, GCM_MAC_BYTES,
+ reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext.size()))) {
+ logOpensslError();
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool decryptWithoutKeymaster(const std::string& preKey,
+ const std::string& ciphertext, std::string* plaintext) {
+ if (ciphertext.size() < GCM_NONCE_BYTES + GCM_MAC_BYTES) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "GCM ciphertext too small: " << ciphertext.size();
+ return false;
+ }
+ auto key = hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_keygen, preKey);
+ key.resize(AES_KEY_BYTES);
+ auto ctx = std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&::EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)>(
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
+ if (!ctx) {
+ logOpensslError();
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (1 != EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL,
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()),
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext.data()))) {
+ logOpensslError();
+ return false;
+ }
+ plaintext->resize(ciphertext.size() - GCM_NONCE_BYTES - GCM_MAC_BYTES);
+ int outlen;
+ if (1 != EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx.get(),
+ reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*plaintext)[0]), &outlen,
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext.data() + GCM_NONCE_BYTES), plaintext->size())) {
+ logOpensslError();
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (outlen != static_cast<int>(plaintext->size())) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "GCM plaintext length should be " << plaintext->size() << " was " << outlen;
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, GCM_MAC_BYTES,
+ const_cast<void *>(
+ reinterpret_cast<const void*>(ciphertext.data() + GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext->size())))) {
+ logOpensslError();
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (1 != EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(),
+ reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*plaintext)[0] + plaintext->size()), &outlen)) {
+ logOpensslError();
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (outlen != 0) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "GCM EncryptFinal should be 0, was " << outlen;
+ return false;
+ }
return true;
}
@@ -250,13 +407,9 @@
}
if (!writeStringToFile(kCurrentVersion, dir + "/" + kFn_version)) return false;
std::string secdiscardable;
- if (ReadRandomBytes(SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES, secdiscardable) != OK) {
- // TODO status_t plays badly with PLOG, fix it.
- LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed";
- return false;
- }
+ if (!readRandomBytesOrLog(SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES, &secdiscardable)) return false;
if (!writeStringToFile(secdiscardable, dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable)) return false;
- std::string stretching = auth.secret.empty() ? kStretch_nopassword : getStretching();
+ std::string stretching = getStretching(auth);
if (!writeStringToFile(stretching, dir + "/" + kFn_stretching)) return false;
std::string salt;
if (stretchingNeedsSalt(stretching)) {
@@ -268,13 +421,18 @@
}
std::string appId;
if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, salt, secdiscardable, &appId)) return false;
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!generateKeymasterKey(keymaster, auth, appId, &kmKey)) return false;
- if (!writeStringToFile(kmKey, dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob)) return false;
std::string encryptedKey;
- if (!encryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, kmKey, auth, appId, key, &encryptedKey)) return false;
+ if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
+ Keymaster keymaster;
+ if (!keymaster) return false;
+ std::string kmKey;
+ if (!generateKeymasterKey(keymaster, auth, appId, &kmKey)) return false;
+ if (!writeStringToFile(kmKey, dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob)) return false;
+ auto keyParams = beginParams(auth, appId);
+ if (!encryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, dir, keyParams, key, &encryptedKey)) return false;
+ } else {
+ if (!encryptWithoutKeymaster(appId, key, &encryptedKey)) return false;
+ }
if (!writeStringToFile(encryptedKey, dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key)) return false;
return true;
}
@@ -296,13 +454,17 @@
}
std::string appId;
if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, salt, secdiscardable, &appId)) return false;
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob, &kmKey)) return false;
std::string encryptedMessage;
if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key, &encryptedMessage)) return false;
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- return decryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, kmKey, auth, appId, encryptedMessage, key);
+ if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
+ Keymaster keymaster;
+ if (!keymaster) return false;
+ auto keyParams = beginParams(auth, appId);
+ if (!decryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, dir, keyParams, encryptedMessage, key)) return false;
+ } else {
+ if (!decryptWithoutKeymaster(appId, encryptedMessage, key)) return false;
+ }
+ return true;
}
static bool deleteKey(const std::string& dir) {
diff --git a/KeyStorage.h b/KeyStorage.h
index 10ed789..65458d4 100644
--- a/KeyStorage.h
+++ b/KeyStorage.h
@@ -24,11 +24,15 @@
// Represents the information needed to decrypt a disk encryption key.
// If "token" is nonempty, it is passed in as a required Gatekeeper auth token.
-// If "secret" is nonempty, it is appended to the application-specific
+// If "token" and "secret" are nonempty, "secret" is appended to the application-specific
// binary needed to unlock.
+// If only "secret" is nonempty, it is used to decrypt in a non-Keymaster process.
class KeyAuthentication {
public:
KeyAuthentication(std::string t, std::string s) : token{t}, secret{s} {};
+
+ bool usesKeymaster() const { return !token.empty() || secret.empty(); };
+
const std::string token;
const std::string secret;
};
diff --git a/Keymaster.cpp b/Keymaster.cpp
index d271b6a..ffa3a7a 100644
--- a/Keymaster.cpp
+++ b/Keymaster.cpp
@@ -17,121 +17,50 @@
#include "Keymaster.h"
#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <hardware/hardware.h>
-#include <hardware/keymaster1.h>
-#include <hardware/keymaster2.h>
+#include <keystore/keymaster_tags.h>
+#include <keystore/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keystore/keystore_hidl_support.h>
+
+using namespace ::keystore;
+using android::hardware::hidl_string;
namespace android {
namespace vold {
-class IKeymasterDevice {
- public:
- IKeymasterDevice() {}
- virtual ~IKeymasterDevice() {}
- virtual keymaster_error_t generate_key(const keymaster_key_param_set_t* params,
- keymaster_key_blob_t* key_blob) const = 0;
- virtual keymaster_error_t delete_key(const keymaster_key_blob_t* key) const = 0;
- virtual keymaster_error_t begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const keymaster_key_blob_t* key,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_operation_handle_t* operation_handle) const = 0;
- virtual keymaster_error_t update(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- const keymaster_blob_t* input, size_t* input_consumed,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_blob_t* output) const = 0;
- virtual keymaster_error_t finish(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- const keymaster_blob_t* signature,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_blob_t* output) const = 0;
- virtual keymaster_error_t abort(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle) const = 0;
-
- protected:
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(IKeymasterDevice);
-};
-
-template <typename T> class KeymasterDevice : public IKeymasterDevice {
- public:
- KeymasterDevice(T* d) : mDevice{d} {}
- keymaster_error_t generate_key(const keymaster_key_param_set_t* params,
- keymaster_key_blob_t* key_blob) const override final {
- return mDevice->generate_key(mDevice, params, key_blob, nullptr);
- }
- keymaster_error_t delete_key(const keymaster_key_blob_t* key) const override final {
- if (mDevice->delete_key == nullptr) return KM_ERROR_OK;
- return mDevice->delete_key(mDevice, key);
- }
- keymaster_error_t begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const keymaster_key_blob_t* key,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_operation_handle_t* operation_handle) const override final {
- return mDevice->begin(mDevice, purpose, key, in_params, out_params, operation_handle);
- }
- keymaster_error_t update(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- const keymaster_blob_t* input, size_t* input_consumed,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_blob_t* output) const override final {
- return mDevice->update(mDevice, operation_handle, in_params, input, input_consumed,
- out_params, output);
- }
- keymaster_error_t abort(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle) const override final {
- return mDevice->abort(mDevice, operation_handle);
- }
-
- protected:
- T* const mDevice;
-};
-
-class Keymaster1Device : public KeymasterDevice<keymaster1_device_t> {
- public:
- Keymaster1Device(keymaster1_device_t* d) : KeymasterDevice<keymaster1_device_t>{d} {}
- ~Keymaster1Device() override final { keymaster1_close(mDevice); }
- keymaster_error_t finish(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- const keymaster_blob_t* signature,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_blob_t* output) const override final {
- return mDevice->finish(mDevice, operation_handle, in_params, signature, out_params, output);
- }
-};
-
-class Keymaster2Device : public KeymasterDevice<keymaster2_device_t> {
- public:
- Keymaster2Device(keymaster2_device_t* d) : KeymasterDevice<keymaster2_device_t>{d} {}
- ~Keymaster2Device() override final { keymaster2_close(mDevice); }
- keymaster_error_t finish(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- const keymaster_blob_t* signature,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_blob_t* output) const override final {
- return mDevice->finish(mDevice, operation_handle, in_params, nullptr, signature, out_params,
- output);
- }
-};
-
KeymasterOperation::~KeymasterOperation() {
- if (mDevice) mDevice->abort(mOpHandle);
+ if (mDevice.get()) mDevice->abort(mOpHandle);
}
bool KeymasterOperation::updateCompletely(const std::string& input, std::string* output) {
- output->clear();
+ if (output)
+ output->clear();
auto it = input.begin();
+ uint32_t inputConsumed;
+
+ ErrorCode km_error;
+ auto hidlCB = [&] (ErrorCode ret, uint32_t _inputConsumed,
+ const hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& /*ignored*/, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& _output) {
+ km_error = ret;
+ if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) return;
+ inputConsumed = _inputConsumed;
+ if (output)
+ output->append(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&_output[0]), _output.size());
+ };
+
while (it != input.end()) {
size_t toRead = static_cast<size_t>(input.end() - it);
- keymaster_blob_t inputBlob{reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&*it), toRead};
- keymaster_blob_t outputBlob;
- size_t inputConsumed;
- auto error =
- mDevice->update(mOpHandle, nullptr, &inputBlob, &inputConsumed, nullptr, &outputBlob);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "update failed, code " << error;
+ auto inputBlob = blob2hidlVec(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&*it), toRead);
+ auto error = mDevice->update(mOpHandle, hidl_vec<KeyParameter>(), inputBlob, hidlCB);
+ if (!error.isOk()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "update failed: " << error.description();
mDevice = nullptr;
return false;
}
- output->append(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(outputBlob.data), outputBlob.data_length);
- free(const_cast<uint8_t*>(outputBlob.data));
+ if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "update failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
+ mDevice = nullptr;
+ return false;
+ }
if (inputConsumed > toRead) {
LOG(ERROR) << "update reported too much input consumed";
mDevice = nullptr;
@@ -142,109 +71,248 @@
return true;
}
-bool KeymasterOperation::finish() {
- auto error = mDevice->finish(mOpHandle, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
+bool KeymasterOperation::finish(std::string* output) {
+ ErrorCode km_error;
+ auto hidlCb = [&] (ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& /*ignored*/,
+ const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& _output) {
+ km_error = ret;
+ if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) return;
+ if (output)
+ output->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&_output[0]), _output.size());
+ };
+ auto error = mDevice->finish(mOpHandle, hidl_vec<KeyParameter>(), hidl_vec<uint8_t>(),
+ hidl_vec<uint8_t>(), hidlCb);
mDevice = nullptr;
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "finish failed, code " << error;
+ if (!error.isOk()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "finish failed: " << error.description();
return false;
}
- return true;
-}
-
-bool KeymasterOperation::finishWithOutput(std::string* output) {
- keymaster_blob_t outputBlob;
- auto error = mDevice->finish(mOpHandle, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, &outputBlob);
- mDevice = nullptr;
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "finish failed, code " << error;
+ if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "finish failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
return false;
}
- output->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(outputBlob.data), outputBlob.data_length);
- free(const_cast<uint8_t*>(outputBlob.data));
return true;
}
Keymaster::Keymaster() {
- mDevice = nullptr;
- const hw_module_t* module;
- int ret = hw_get_module_by_class(KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, NULL, &module);
- if (ret != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "hw_get_module_by_class returned " << ret;
- return;
- }
- if (module->module_api_version == KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_1_0) {
- keymaster1_device_t* device;
- ret = keymaster1_open(module, &device);
- if (ret != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "keymaster1_open returned " << ret;
- return;
- }
- mDevice = std::make_shared<Keymaster1Device>(device);
- } else if (module->module_api_version == KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_2_0) {
- keymaster2_device_t* device;
- ret = keymaster2_open(module, &device);
- if (ret != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "keymaster2_open returned " << ret;
- return;
- }
- mDevice = std::make_shared<Keymaster2Device>(device);
- } else {
- LOG(ERROR) << "module_api_version is " << module->module_api_version;
- return;
- }
+ mDevice = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V3_0::IKeymasterDevice::getService();
}
-bool Keymaster::generateKey(const keymaster::AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key) {
- keymaster_key_blob_t keyBlob;
- auto error = mDevice->generate_key(&inParams, &keyBlob);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "generate_key failed, code " << error;
+bool Keymaster::generateKey(const AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key) {
+ ErrorCode km_error;
+ auto hidlCb = [&] (ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& keyBlob,
+ const KeyCharacteristics& /*ignored*/) {
+ km_error = ret;
+ if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) return;
+ if (key)
+ key->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&keyBlob[0]), keyBlob.size());
+ };
+
+ auto error = mDevice->generateKey(inParams.hidl_data(), hidlCb);
+ if (!error.isOk()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "generate_key failed: " << error.description();
return false;
}
- key->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(keyBlob.key_material), keyBlob.key_material_size);
- free(const_cast<uint8_t*>(keyBlob.key_material));
+ if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "generate_key failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
+ return false;
+ }
return true;
}
bool Keymaster::deleteKey(const std::string& key) {
- keymaster_key_blob_t keyBlob{reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()), key.size()};
- auto error = mDevice->delete_key(&keyBlob);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "delete_key failed, code " << error;
+ auto keyBlob = blob2hidlVec(key);
+ auto error = mDevice->deleteKey(keyBlob);
+ if (!error.isOk()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "delete_key failed: " << error.description();
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (ErrorCode(error) != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "delete_key failed, code " << uint32_t(ErrorCode(error));
return false;
}
return true;
}
-KeymasterOperation Keymaster::begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const std::string& key,
- const keymaster::AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- keymaster::AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
- keymaster_key_blob_t keyBlob{reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()), key.size()};
- keymaster_operation_handle_t mOpHandle;
- keymaster_key_param_set_t outParams_set;
- auto error = mDevice->begin(purpose, &keyBlob, &inParams, &outParams_set, &mOpHandle);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "begin failed, code " << error;
- return KeymasterOperation(nullptr, mOpHandle);
+bool Keymaster::upgradeKey(const std::string& oldKey, const AuthorizationSet& inParams,
+ std::string* newKey) {
+ auto oldKeyBlob = blob2hidlVec(oldKey);
+ ErrorCode km_error;
+ auto hidlCb = [&] (ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& upgradedKeyBlob) {
+ km_error = ret;
+ if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) return;
+ if (newKey)
+ newKey->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&upgradedKeyBlob[0]),
+ upgradedKeyBlob.size());
+ };
+ auto error = mDevice->upgradeKey(oldKeyBlob, inParams.hidl_data(), hidlCb);
+ if (!error.isOk()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "upgrade_key failed: " << error.description();
+ return false;
}
- outParams->Clear();
- outParams->push_back(outParams_set);
- keymaster_free_param_set(&outParams_set);
- return KeymasterOperation(mDevice, mOpHandle);
+ if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "upgrade_key failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
}
-KeymasterOperation Keymaster::begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const std::string& key,
- const keymaster::AuthorizationSet& inParams) {
- keymaster_key_blob_t keyBlob{reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()), key.size()};
- keymaster_operation_handle_t mOpHandle;
- auto error = mDevice->begin(purpose, &keyBlob, &inParams, nullptr, &mOpHandle);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "begin failed, code " << error;
- return KeymasterOperation(nullptr, mOpHandle);
+KeymasterOperation Keymaster::begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const std::string& key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& inParams,
+ AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
+ auto keyBlob = blob2hidlVec(key);
+ uint64_t mOpHandle;
+ ErrorCode km_error;
+
+ auto hidlCb = [&] (ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& _outParams,
+ uint64_t operationHandle) {
+ km_error = ret;
+ if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) return;
+ if (outParams)
+ *outParams = _outParams;
+ mOpHandle = operationHandle;
+ };
+
+ auto error = mDevice->begin(purpose, keyBlob, inParams.hidl_data(), hidlCb);
+ if (!error.isOk()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "begin failed: " << error.description();
+ return KeymasterOperation(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
+ }
+ if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "begin failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
+ return KeymasterOperation(km_error);
}
return KeymasterOperation(mDevice, mOpHandle);
}
+bool Keymaster::isSecure() {
+ bool _isSecure = false;
+ auto rc = mDevice->getHardwareFeatures(
+ [&] (bool isSecure, bool, bool, bool, bool, const hidl_string&, const hidl_string&) {
+ _isSecure = isSecure; });
+ return rc.isOk() && _isSecure;
+}
} // namespace vold
} // namespace android
+
+using namespace ::android::vold;
+
+int keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt() {
+ Keymaster dev;
+ if (!dev) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return dev.isSecure();
+}
+
+int keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(uint32_t rsa_key_size,
+ uint64_t rsa_exponent,
+ uint32_t ratelimit,
+ uint8_t* key_buffer,
+ uint32_t key_buffer_size,
+ uint32_t* key_out_size)
+{
+ Keymaster dev;
+ std::string key;
+ if (!dev) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!key_buffer || !key_out_size) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << __FILE__ << ":" << __LINE__ << ":Invalid argument";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (key_out_size) {
+ *key_out_size = 0;
+ }
+
+ auto paramBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA)
+ .Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, rsa_key_size)
+ .Authorization(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, rsa_exponent)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS,
+ KeyBlobUsageRequirements::STANDALONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS, ratelimit);
+
+ if (!dev.generateKey(paramBuilder, &key)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (key_out_size) {
+ *key_out_size = key.size();
+ }
+
+ if (key_buffer_size < key.size()) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ std::copy(key.data(), key.data() + key.size(), key_buffer);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(const uint8_t* key_blob,
+ size_t key_blob_size,
+ uint32_t ratelimit,
+ const uint8_t* object,
+ const size_t object_size,
+ uint8_t** signature_buffer,
+ size_t* signature_buffer_size)
+{
+ Keymaster dev;
+ if (!dev) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!key_blob || !object || !signature_buffer || !signature_buffer_size) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << __FILE__ << ":" << __LINE__ << ":Invalid argument";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ AuthorizationSet outParams;
+ std::string key(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(key_blob), key_blob_size);
+ std::string input(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(object), object_size);
+ std::string output;
+ KeymasterOperation op;
+
+ auto paramBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::NONE);
+
+ while (true) {
+ op = dev.begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key, paramBuilder, &outParams);
+ if (op.errorCode() == ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED) {
+ sleep(ratelimit);
+ continue;
+ } else break;
+ }
+
+ if (op.errorCode() != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Error starting keymaster signature transaction: " << int32_t(op.errorCode());
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!op.updateCompletely(input, &output)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Error sending data to keymaster signature transaction: "
+ << uint32_t(op.errorCode());
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!op.finish(&output)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Error finalizing keymaster signature transaction: " << int32_t(op.errorCode());
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *signature_buffer = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(malloc(output.size()));
+ if (*signature_buffer == nullptr) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Error allocation buffer for keymaster signature";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *signature_buffer_size = output.size();
+ std::copy(output.data(), output.data() + output.size(), *signature_buffer);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/Keymaster.h b/Keymaster.h
index 412110c..e47b403 100644
--- a/Keymaster.h
+++ b/Keymaster.h
@@ -17,26 +17,27 @@
#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYMASTER_H
#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYMASTER_H
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+
#include <memory>
#include <string>
#include <utility>
-#include <keymaster/authorization_set.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymaster/3.0/IKeymasterDevice.h>
+#include <keystore/authorization_set.h>
namespace android {
namespace vold {
+using ::android::hardware::keymaster::V3_0::IKeymasterDevice;
+using ::keystore::ErrorCode;
+using ::keystore::KeyPurpose;
+using ::keystore::AuthorizationSet;
-using namespace keymaster;
-
-// C++ wrappers to the Keymaster C interface.
+// C++ wrappers to the Keymaster hidl interface.
// This is tailored to the needs of KeyStorage, but could be extended to be
// a more general interface.
-// Class that wraps a keymaster1_device_t or keymaster2_device_t and provides methods
-// they have in common. Also closes the device on destruction.
-class IKeymasterDevice;
-
-// Wrapper for a keymaster_operation_handle_t representing an
+// Wrapper for a Keymaster operation handle representing an
// ongoing Keymaster operation. Aborts the operation
// in the destructor if it is unfinished. Methods log failures
// to LOG(ERROR).
@@ -45,25 +46,42 @@
~KeymasterOperation();
// Is this instance valid? This is false if creation fails, and becomes
// false on finish or if an update fails.
- explicit operator bool() { return mDevice != nullptr; }
+ explicit operator bool() { return mError == ErrorCode::OK; }
+ ErrorCode errorCode() { return mError; }
// Call "update" repeatedly until all of the input is consumed, and
// concatenate the output. Return true on success.
bool updateCompletely(const std::string& input, std::string* output);
- // Finish; pass nullptr for the "output" param.
- bool finish();
- // Finish and write the output to this string.
- bool finishWithOutput(std::string* output);
+ // Finish and write the output to this string, unless pointer is null.
+ bool finish(std::string* output);
// Move constructor
KeymasterOperation(KeymasterOperation&& rhs) {
- mOpHandle = std::move(rhs.mOpHandle);
mDevice = std::move(rhs.mDevice);
+ mOpHandle = std::move(rhs.mOpHandle);
+ mError = std::move(rhs.mError);
+ }
+ // Construct an object in an error state for error returns
+ KeymasterOperation()
+ : mDevice{nullptr}, mOpHandle{0},
+ mError {ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR} {}
+ // Move Assignment
+ KeymasterOperation& operator= (KeymasterOperation&& rhs) {
+ mDevice = std::move(rhs.mDevice);
+ mOpHandle = std::move(rhs.mOpHandle);
+ mError = std::move(rhs.mError);
+ rhs.mError = ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+ rhs.mOpHandle = 0;
+ return *this;
}
private:
- KeymasterOperation(std::shared_ptr<IKeymasterDevice> d, keymaster_operation_handle_t h)
- : mDevice{d}, mOpHandle{h} {}
- std::shared_ptr<IKeymasterDevice> mDevice;
- keymaster_operation_handle_t mOpHandle;
+ KeymasterOperation(const sp<IKeymasterDevice>& d, uint64_t h)
+ : mDevice{d}, mOpHandle{h}, mError {ErrorCode::OK} {}
+ KeymasterOperation(ErrorCode error)
+ : mDevice{nullptr}, mOpHandle{0},
+ mError {error} {}
+ sp<IKeymasterDevice> mDevice;
+ uint64_t mOpHandle;
+ ErrorCode mError;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(KeymasterOperation);
friend class Keymaster;
};
@@ -74,37 +92,56 @@
public:
Keymaster();
// false if we failed to open the keymaster device.
- explicit operator bool() { return mDevice != nullptr; }
+ explicit operator bool() { return mDevice.get() != nullptr; }
// Generate a key in the keymaster from the given params.
bool generateKey(const AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key);
// If the keymaster supports it, permanently delete a key.
bool deleteKey(const std::string& key);
- // Begin a new cryptographic operation, collecting output parameters.
- KeymasterOperation begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const std::string& key,
+ // Replace stored key blob in response to KM_ERROR_KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.
+ bool upgradeKey(const std::string& oldKey, const AuthorizationSet& inParams,
+ std::string* newKey);
+ // Begin a new cryptographic operation, collecting output parameters if pointer is non-null
+ KeymasterOperation begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const std::string& key,
const AuthorizationSet& inParams, AuthorizationSet* outParams);
- // Begin a new cryptographic operation; don't collect output parameters.
- KeymasterOperation begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const std::string& key,
- const AuthorizationSet& inParams);
+ bool isSecure();
private:
- std::shared_ptr<IKeymasterDevice> mDevice;
+ sp<hardware::keymaster::V3_0::IKeymasterDevice> mDevice;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Keymaster);
};
-template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
-inline AuthorizationSetBuilder& addStringParam(AuthorizationSetBuilder&& params,
- TypedTag<KM_BYTES, Tag> tag,
- const std::string& val) {
- return params.Authorization(tag, val.data(), val.size());
-}
-
-template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
-inline void addStringParam(AuthorizationSetBuilder* params, TypedTag<KM_BYTES, Tag> tag,
- const std::string& val) {
- params->Authorization(tag, val.data(), val.size());
-}
-
} // namespace vold
} // namespace android
+#endif // __cplusplus
+
+
+/*
+ * The following functions provide C bindings to keymaster services
+ * needed by cryptfs scrypt. The compatibility check checks whether
+ * the keymaster implementation is considered secure, i.e., TEE backed.
+ * The create_key function generates an RSA key for signing.
+ * The sign_object function signes an object with the given keymaster
+ * key.
+ */
+__BEGIN_DECLS
+
+int keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt();
+int keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(uint32_t rsa_key_size,
+ uint64_t rsa_exponent,
+ uint32_t ratelimit,
+ uint8_t* key_buffer,
+ uint32_t key_buffer_size,
+ uint32_t* key_out_size);
+
+int keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(const uint8_t* key_blob,
+ size_t key_blob_size,
+ uint32_t ratelimit,
+ const uint8_t* object,
+ const size_t object_size,
+ uint8_t** signature_buffer,
+ size_t* signature_buffer_size);
+
+__END_DECLS
+
#endif
diff --git a/Loop.cpp b/Loop.cpp
index a5863b3..6ec5e6d 100644
--- a/Loop.cpp
+++ b/Loop.cpp
@@ -32,12 +32,19 @@
#include <cutils/log.h>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
+#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
+
#include <sysutils/SocketClient.h>
#include "Loop.h"
#include "Asec.h"
#include "VoldUtil.h"
#include "sehandle.h"
+using android::base::StringPrintf;
+using android::base::unique_fd;
+
int Loop::dumpState(SocketClient *c) {
int i;
int fd;
@@ -47,7 +54,7 @@
struct loop_info64 li;
int rc;
- sprintf(filename, "/dev/block/loop%d", i);
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "/dev/block/loop%d", i);
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
if (errno != ENOENT) {
@@ -91,7 +98,7 @@
struct loop_info64 li;
int rc;
- sprintf(filename, "/dev/block/loop%d", i);
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "/dev/block/loop%d", i);
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
if (errno != ENOENT) {
@@ -137,7 +144,7 @@
int rc;
char *secontext = NULL;
- sprintf(filename, "/dev/block/loop%d", i);
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "/dev/block/loop%d", i);
/*
* The kernel starts us off with 8 loop nodes, but more
@@ -229,6 +236,40 @@
return 0;
}
+int Loop::create(const std::string& target, std::string& out_device) {
+ unique_fd ctl_fd(open("/dev/loop-control", O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC));
+ if (ctl_fd.get() == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open loop-control";
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ int num = ioctl(ctl_fd.get(), LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE);
+ if (num == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE";
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ out_device = StringPrintf("/dev/block/loop%d", num);
+
+ unique_fd target_fd(open(target.c_str(), O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC));
+ if (target_fd.get() == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open " << target;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ unique_fd device_fd(open(out_device.c_str(), O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC));
+ if (device_fd.get() == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open " << out_device;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (ioctl(device_fd.get(), LOOP_SET_FD, target_fd.get()) == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to LOOP_SET_FD";
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int Loop::destroyByDevice(const char *loopDevice) {
int device_fd;
@@ -254,19 +295,18 @@
}
int Loop::createImageFile(const char *file, unsigned long numSectors) {
- int fd;
-
- if ((fd = creat(file, 0600)) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Error creating imagefile (%s)", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
+ unique_fd fd(open(file, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_CLOEXEC, 0600));
+ if (fd.get() == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create image " << file;
+ return -errno;
}
-
- if (ftruncate(fd, numSectors * 512) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Error truncating imagefile (%s)", strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- return -1;
+ if (fallocate(fd.get(), 0, 0, numSectors * 512) == -1) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to fallocate; falling back to ftruncate";
+ if (ftruncate(fd, numSectors * 512) == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to ftruncate";
+ return -errno;
+ }
}
- close(fd);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/Loop.h b/Loop.h
index 72130b0..5d8f427 100644
--- a/Loop.h
+++ b/Loop.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#ifndef _LOOP_H
#define _LOOP_H
+#include <string>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/loop.h>
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@
static int lookupActive(const char *id, char *buffer, size_t len);
static int lookupInfo(const char *loopDevice, struct asec_superblock *sb, unsigned long *nr_sec);
static int create(const char *id, const char *loopFile, char *loopDeviceBuffer, size_t len);
+ static int create(const std::string& file, std::string& out_device);
static int destroyByDevice(const char *loopDevice);
static int destroyByFile(const char *loopFile);
static int createImageFile(const char *file, unsigned long numSectors);
diff --git a/MoveTask.cpp b/MoveTask.cpp
index 0a60c4e..38cca04 100644
--- a/MoveTask.cpp
+++ b/MoveTask.cpp
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
#define CONSTRAIN(amount, low, high) ((amount) < (low) ? (low) : ((amount) > (high) ? (high) : (amount)))
+#define EXEC_BLOCKING 0
+
using android::base::StringPrintf;
namespace android {
@@ -93,6 +95,9 @@
return OK;
}
+#if EXEC_BLOCKING
+ return ForkExecvp(cmd);
+#else
pid_t pid = ForkExecvpAsync(cmd);
if (pid == -1) return -1;
@@ -113,6 +118,7 @@
((deltaFreeBytes * stepProgress) / expectedBytes), 0, stepProgress));
}
return -1;
+#endif
}
static status_t execCp(const std::string& fromPath, const std::string& toPath,
@@ -134,6 +140,9 @@
}
cmd.push_back(toPath.c_str());
+#if EXEC_BLOCKING
+ return ForkExecvp(cmd);
+#else
pid_t pid = ForkExecvpAsync(cmd);
if (pid == -1) return -1;
@@ -154,6 +163,7 @@
((deltaFreeBytes * stepProgress) / expectedBytes), 0, stepProgress));
}
return -1;
+#endif
}
static void bringOffline(const std::shared_ptr<VolumeBase>& vol) {
diff --git a/Process.cpp b/Process.cpp
index 962a460..fd757d5 100644
--- a/Process.cpp
+++ b/Process.cpp
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
// compute path to process's directory of open files
char path[PATH_MAX];
- sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/fd", pid);
+ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/fd", pid);
DIR *dir = opendir(path);
if (!dir)
return 0;
@@ -129,8 +129,8 @@
FILE *file;
char buffer[PATH_MAX + 100];
- sprintf(buffer, "/proc/%d/maps", pid);
- file = fopen(buffer, "r");
+ snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "/proc/%d/maps", pid);
+ file = fopen(buffer, "re");
if (!file)
return 0;
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@
char path[PATH_MAX];
char link[PATH_MAX];
- sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/%s", pid, name);
+ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/%s", pid, name);
if (readSymLink(path, link, sizeof(link)) && pathMatchesMountPoint(link, mountPoint))
return 1;
return 0;
diff --git a/Utils.cpp b/Utils.cpp
index cc30d5d..72d3801 100644
--- a/Utils.cpp
+++ b/Utils.cpp
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@
continue;
}
- subfd = openat(dfd, name, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
+ subfd = openat(dfd, name, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (subfd >= 0) {
size += calculate_dir_size(subfd);
}
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@
}
uint64_t GetTreeBytes(const std::string& path) {
- int dirfd = open(path.c_str(), O_DIRECTORY, O_RDONLY);
+ int dirfd = open(path.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (dirfd < 0) {
PLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to open " << path;
return -1;
@@ -668,20 +668,6 @@
}
}
-ScopedFd::ScopedFd(int fd) : fd_(fd) {}
-
-ScopedFd::~ScopedFd() {
- close(fd_);
-}
-
-ScopedDir::ScopedDir(DIR* dir) : dir_(dir) {}
-
-ScopedDir::~ScopedDir() {
- if (dir_ != nullptr) {
- closedir(dir_);
- }
-}
-
bool IsRunningInEmulator() {
return property_get_bool("ro.kernel.qemu", 0);
}
diff --git a/Utils.h b/Utils.h
index 78e4618..813ffac 100644
--- a/Utils.h
+++ b/Utils.h
@@ -115,26 +115,6 @@
status_t SaneReadLinkAt(int dirfd, const char* path, char* buf, size_t bufsiz);
-class ScopedFd {
- const int fd_;
-public:
- ScopedFd(int fd);
- ~ScopedFd();
- int get() const { return fd_; }
-
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ScopedFd);
-};
-
-class ScopedDir {
- DIR* const dir_;
-public:
- ScopedDir(DIR* dir);
- ~ScopedDir();
- DIR* get() const { return dir_; }
-
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ScopedDir);
-};
-
/* Checks if Android is running in QEMU */
bool IsRunningInEmulator();
diff --git a/VolumeManager.cpp b/VolumeManager.cpp
index 927c660..3b4c054 100644
--- a/VolumeManager.cpp
+++ b/VolumeManager.cpp
@@ -88,7 +88,13 @@
*/
const char *VolumeManager::LOOPDIR = "/mnt/obb";
-static const char* kUserMountPath = "/mnt/user";
+static const char* kPathUserMount = "/mnt/user";
+static const char* kPathVirtualDisk = "/data/misc/vold/virtual_disk";
+
+static const char* kPropVirtualDisk = "persist.sys.virtual_disk";
+
+/* 512MiB is large enough for testing purposes */
+static const unsigned int kSizeVirtualDisk = 536870912;
static const unsigned int kMajorBlockMmc = 179;
static const unsigned int kMajorBlockExperimentalMin = 240;
@@ -249,6 +255,55 @@
return buffer;
}
+int VolumeManager::updateVirtualDisk() {
+ if (property_get_bool(kPropVirtualDisk, false)) {
+ if (access(kPathVirtualDisk, F_OK) != 0) {
+ Loop::createImageFile(kPathVirtualDisk, kSizeVirtualDisk / 512);
+ }
+
+ if (mVirtualDisk == nullptr) {
+ if (Loop::create(kPathVirtualDisk, mVirtualDiskPath) != 0) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create virtual disk";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ struct stat buf;
+ if (stat(mVirtualDiskPath.c_str(), &buf) < 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to stat " << mVirtualDiskPath;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ auto disk = new android::vold::Disk("virtual", buf.st_rdev, "virtual",
+ android::vold::Disk::Flags::kAdoptable | android::vold::Disk::Flags::kSd);
+ disk->create();
+ mVirtualDisk = std::shared_ptr<android::vold::Disk>(disk);
+ mDisks.push_back(mVirtualDisk);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (mVirtualDisk != nullptr) {
+ dev_t device = mVirtualDisk->getDevice();
+
+ auto i = mDisks.begin();
+ while (i != mDisks.end()) {
+ if ((*i)->getDevice() == device) {
+ (*i)->destroy();
+ i = mDisks.erase(i);
+ } else {
+ ++i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ Loop::destroyByDevice(mVirtualDiskPath.c_str());
+ mVirtualDisk = nullptr;
+ }
+
+ if (access(kPathVirtualDisk, F_OK) == 0) {
+ unlink(kPathVirtualDisk);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
int VolumeManager::setDebug(bool enable) {
mDebug = enable;
return 0;
@@ -266,6 +321,9 @@
new android::vold::EmulatedVolume("/data/media"));
mInternalEmulated->create();
+ // Consider creating a virtual disk
+ updateVirtualDisk();
+
return 0;
}
@@ -455,7 +513,7 @@
// Note that sometimes the system will spin up processes from Zygote
// before actually starting the user, so we're okay if Zygote
// already created this directory.
- std::string path(StringPrintf("%s/%d", kUserMountPath, userId));
+ std::string path(StringPrintf("%s/%d", kPathUserMount, userId));
fs_prepare_dir(path.c_str(), 0755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT);
mStartedUsers.insert(userId);
@@ -559,7 +617,7 @@
}
// We purposefully leave the namespace open across the fork
- nsFd = openat(pidFd, "ns/mnt", O_RDONLY);
+ nsFd = openat(pidFd, "ns/mnt", O_RDONLY); // not O_CLOEXEC
if (nsFd < 0) {
PLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to open namespace for " << de->d_name;
goto next;
@@ -585,11 +643,17 @@
_exit(0);
}
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(mount(storageSource.c_str(), "/storage",
- NULL, MS_BIND | MS_REC | MS_SLAVE, NULL)) == -1) {
+ NULL, MS_BIND | MS_REC, NULL)) == -1) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to mount " << storageSource << " for "
<< de->d_name;
_exit(1);
}
+ if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(mount(NULL, "/storage", NULL,
+ MS_REC | MS_SLAVE, NULL)) == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set MS_SLAVE to /storage for "
+ << de->d_name;
+ _exit(1);
+ }
// Mount user-specific symlink helper into place
userid_t user_id = multiuser_get_user_id(uid);
@@ -628,6 +692,7 @@
disk->destroy();
disk->create();
}
+ updateVirtualDisk();
mAddedUsers.clear();
mStartedUsers.clear();
return 0;
@@ -1007,24 +1072,6 @@
oldNumSec = info.st_size / 512;
- unsigned long numImgSectors;
- if (sb.c_opts & ASEC_SB_C_OPTS_EXT4)
- numImgSectors = adjustSectorNumExt4(numSectors);
- else
- numImgSectors = adjustSectorNumFAT(numSectors);
- /*
- * add one block for the superblock
- */
- SLOGD("Resizing from %lu sectors to %lu sectors", oldNumSec, numImgSectors + 1);
- if (oldNumSec == numImgSectors + 1) {
- SLOGW("Size unchanged; ignoring resize request");
- return 0;
- } else if (oldNumSec > numImgSectors + 1) {
- SLOGE("Only growing is currently supported.");
- close(fd);
- return -1;
- }
-
/*
* Try to read superblock.
*/
@@ -1050,10 +1097,26 @@
return -1;
}
+ unsigned long numImgSectors;
if (!(sb.c_opts & ASEC_SB_C_OPTS_EXT4)) {
SLOGE("Only ext4 partitions are supported for resize");
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
+ } else {
+ numImgSectors = adjustSectorNumExt4(numSectors);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * add one block for the superblock
+ */
+ SLOGD("Resizing from %lu sectors to %lu sectors", oldNumSec, numImgSectors + 1);
+ if (oldNumSec == numImgSectors + 1) {
+ SLOGW("Size unchanged; ignoring resize request");
+ return 0;
+ } else if (oldNumSec > numImgSectors + 1) {
+ SLOGE("Only growing is currently supported.");
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
}
if (Loop::resizeImageFile(asecFileName, numImgSectors + 1)) {
diff --git a/VolumeManager.h b/VolumeManager.h
index dd9f09d..796a91d 100644
--- a/VolumeManager.h
+++ b/VolumeManager.h
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@
int unmountLoopImage(const char *containerId, const char *loopId,
const char *fileName, const char *mountPoint, bool force);
+ int updateVirtualDisk();
int setDebug(bool enable);
void setBroadcaster(SocketListener *sl) { mBroadcaster = sl; }
@@ -211,6 +212,8 @@
std::unordered_map<userid_t, int> mAddedUsers;
std::unordered_set<userid_t> mStartedUsers;
+ std::string mVirtualDiskPath;
+ std::shared_ptr<android::vold::Disk> mVirtualDisk;
std::shared_ptr<android::vold::VolumeBase> mInternalEmulated;
std::shared_ptr<android::vold::VolumeBase> mPrimary;
};
diff --git a/cryptfs.c b/cryptfs.cpp
similarity index 90%
rename from cryptfs.c
rename to cryptfs.cpp
index b1d1fc7..f2f0f18 100644
--- a/cryptfs.c
+++ b/cryptfs.cpp
@@ -56,17 +56,16 @@
#include "ScryptParameters.h"
#include "VolumeManager.h"
#include "VoldUtil.h"
-#include "crypto_scrypt.h"
#include "Ext4Crypt.h"
#include "f2fs_sparseblock.h"
#include "CheckBattery.h"
#include "Process.h"
-
+#include "Keymaster.h"
+#include "android-base/properties.h"
#include <bootloader_message/bootloader_message.h>
-#include <hardware/keymaster0.h>
-#include <hardware/keymaster1.h>
-
-#define UNUSED __attribute__((unused))
+extern "C" {
+#include <crypto_scrypt.h>
+}
#define UNUSED __attribute__((unused))
@@ -97,188 +96,37 @@
#define RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS 10
#define RETRY_MOUNT_DELAY_SECONDS 1
-char *me = "cryptfs";
-
static unsigned char saved_master_key[KEY_LEN_BYTES];
static char *saved_mount_point;
static int master_key_saved = 0;
static struct crypt_persist_data *persist_data = NULL;
-static int keymaster_init(keymaster0_device_t **keymaster0_dev,
- keymaster1_device_t **keymaster1_dev)
-{
- int rc;
-
- const hw_module_t* mod;
- rc = hw_get_module_by_class(KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, NULL, &mod);
- if (rc) {
- ALOGE("could not find any keystore module");
- goto err;
- }
-
- SLOGI("keymaster module name is %s", mod->name);
- SLOGI("keymaster version is %d", mod->module_api_version);
-
- *keymaster0_dev = NULL;
- *keymaster1_dev = NULL;
- if (mod->module_api_version == KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_1_0) {
- SLOGI("Found keymaster1 module, using keymaster1 API.");
- rc = keymaster1_open(mod, keymaster1_dev);
- } else {
- SLOGI("Found keymaster0 module, using keymaster0 API.");
- rc = keymaster0_open(mod, keymaster0_dev);
- }
-
- if (rc) {
- ALOGE("could not open keymaster device in %s (%s)",
- KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, strerror(-rc));
- goto err;
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-err:
- *keymaster0_dev = NULL;
- *keymaster1_dev = NULL;
- return rc;
-}
-
/* Should we use keymaster? */
static int keymaster_check_compatibility()
{
- keymaster0_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0;
- keymaster1_device_t *keymaster1_dev = 0;
- int rc = 0;
-
- if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev, &keymaster1_dev)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to init keymaster");
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (keymaster1_dev) {
- rc = 1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (!keymaster0_dev || !keymaster0_dev->common.module) {
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- // TODO(swillden): Check to see if there's any reason to require v0.3. I think v0.1 and v0.2
- // should work.
- if (keymaster0_dev->common.module->module_api_version
- < KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_0_3) {
- rc = 0;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (!(keymaster0_dev->flags & KEYMASTER_SOFTWARE_ONLY) &&
- (keymaster0_dev->flags & KEYMASTER_BLOBS_ARE_STANDALONE)) {
- rc = 1;
- }
-
-out:
- if (keymaster1_dev) {
- keymaster1_close(keymaster1_dev);
- }
- if (keymaster0_dev) {
- keymaster0_close(keymaster0_dev);
- }
- return rc;
+ return keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt();
}
/* Create a new keymaster key and store it in this footer */
static int keymaster_create_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr)
{
- uint8_t* key = 0;
- keymaster0_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0;
- keymaster1_device_t *keymaster1_dev = 0;
-
if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size) {
SLOGI("Already have key");
return 0;
}
- if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev, &keymaster1_dev)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to init keymaster");
+ int rc = keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(RSA_KEY_SIZE, RSA_EXPONENT,
+ KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, ftr->keymaster_blob, KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE,
+ &ftr->keymaster_blob_size);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size > KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE) {
+ SLOGE("Keymaster key blob to large)");
+ ftr->keymaster_blob_size = 0;
+ }
+ SLOGE("Failed to generate keypair");
return -1;
}
-
- int rc = 0;
- size_t key_size = 0;
- if (keymaster1_dev) {
- keymaster_key_param_t params[] = {
- /* Algorithm & size specifications. Stick with RSA for now. Switch to AES later. */
- keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_RSA),
- keymaster_param_int(KM_TAG_KEY_SIZE, RSA_KEY_SIZE),
- keymaster_param_long(KM_TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, RSA_EXPONENT),
-
- /* The only allowed purpose for this key is signing. */
- keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN),
-
- /* Padding & digest specifications. */
- keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE),
- keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE),
-
- /* Require that the key be usable in standalone mode. File system isn't available. */
- keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS, KM_BLOB_STANDALONE),
-
- /* No auth requirements, because cryptfs is not yet integrated with gatekeeper. */
- keymaster_param_bool(KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
-
- /* Rate-limit key usage attempts, to rate-limit brute force */
- keymaster_param_int(KM_TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT),
- };
- keymaster_key_param_set_t param_set = { params, sizeof(params)/sizeof(*params) };
- keymaster_key_blob_t key_blob;
- keymaster_error_t error = keymaster1_dev->generate_key(keymaster1_dev, ¶m_set,
- &key_blob,
- NULL /* characteristics */);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- SLOGE("Failed to generate keymaster1 key, error %d", error);
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- key = (uint8_t*)key_blob.key_material;
- key_size = key_blob.key_material_size;
- }
- else if (keymaster0_dev) {
- keymaster_rsa_keygen_params_t params;
- memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
- params.public_exponent = RSA_EXPONENT;
- params.modulus_size = RSA_KEY_SIZE;
-
- if (keymaster0_dev->generate_keypair(keymaster0_dev, TYPE_RSA, ¶ms,
- &key, &key_size)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to generate keypair");
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
- } else {
- SLOGE("Cryptfs bug: keymaster_init succeeded but didn't initialize a device");
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (key_size > KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE) {
- SLOGE("Keymaster key too large for crypto footer");
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- memcpy(ftr->keymaster_blob, key, key_size);
- ftr->keymaster_blob_size = key_size;
-
-out:
- if (keymaster0_dev)
- keymaster0_close(keymaster0_dev);
- if (keymaster1_dev)
- keymaster1_close(keymaster1_dev);
- free(key);
- return rc;
+ return 0;
}
/* This signs the given object using the keymaster key. */
@@ -288,15 +136,6 @@
unsigned char **signature,
size_t *signature_size)
{
- int rc = 0;
- keymaster0_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0;
- keymaster1_device_t *keymaster1_dev = 0;
- if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev, &keymaster1_dev)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to init keymaster");
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
unsigned char to_sign[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
size_t to_sign_size = sizeof(to_sign);
memset(to_sign, 0, RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES);
@@ -323,96 +162,15 @@
// object size. However, it's still broken (but not unusably
// so) because we really should be using a proper deterministic
// RSA padding function, such as PKCS1.
- memcpy(to_sign + 1, object, min(RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES - 1, object_size));
+ memcpy(to_sign + 1, object, std::min((size_t)RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES - 1, object_size));
SLOGI("Signing safely-padded object");
break;
default:
SLOGE("Unknown KDF type %d", ftr->kdf_type);
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
+ return -1;
}
-
- if (keymaster0_dev) {
- keymaster_rsa_sign_params_t params;
- params.digest_type = DIGEST_NONE;
- params.padding_type = PADDING_NONE;
-
- rc = keymaster0_dev->sign_data(keymaster0_dev,
- ¶ms,
- ftr->keymaster_blob,
- ftr->keymaster_blob_size,
- to_sign,
- to_sign_size,
- signature,
- signature_size);
- goto out;
- } else if (keymaster1_dev) {
- keymaster_key_blob_t key = { ftr->keymaster_blob, ftr->keymaster_blob_size };
- keymaster_key_param_t params[] = {
- keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE),
- keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE),
- };
- keymaster_key_param_set_t param_set = { params, sizeof(params)/sizeof(*params) };
- keymaster_operation_handle_t op_handle;
- keymaster_error_t error = keymaster1_dev->begin(keymaster1_dev, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN, &key,
- ¶m_set, NULL /* out_params */,
- &op_handle);
- if (error == KM_ERROR_KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED) {
- // Key usage has been rate-limited. Wait a bit and try again.
- sleep(KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT);
- error = keymaster1_dev->begin(keymaster1_dev, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN, &key,
- ¶m_set, NULL /* out_params */,
- &op_handle);
- }
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- SLOGE("Error starting keymaster signature transaction: %d", error);
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- keymaster_blob_t input = { to_sign, to_sign_size };
- size_t input_consumed;
- error = keymaster1_dev->update(keymaster1_dev, op_handle, NULL /* in_params */,
- &input, &input_consumed, NULL /* out_params */,
- NULL /* output */);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- SLOGE("Error sending data to keymaster signature transaction: %d", error);
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
- if (input_consumed != to_sign_size) {
- // This should never happen. If it does, it's a bug in the keymaster implementation.
- SLOGE("Keymaster update() did not consume all data.");
- keymaster1_dev->abort(keymaster1_dev, op_handle);
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- keymaster_blob_t tmp_sig;
- error = keymaster1_dev->finish(keymaster1_dev, op_handle, NULL /* in_params */,
- NULL /* verify signature */, NULL /* out_params */,
- &tmp_sig);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- SLOGE("Error finishing keymaster signature transaction: %d", error);
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- *signature = (uint8_t*)tmp_sig.data;
- *signature_size = tmp_sig.data_length;
- } else {
- SLOGE("Cryptfs bug: keymaster_init succeded but didn't initialize a device.");
- rc = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- out:
- if (keymaster1_dev)
- keymaster1_close(keymaster1_dev);
- if (keymaster0_dev)
- keymaster0_close(keymaster0_dev);
-
- return rc;
+ return keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(ftr->keymaster_blob, ftr->keymaster_blob_size,
+ KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, to_sign, to_sign_size, signature, signature_size);
}
/* Store password when userdata is successfully decrypted and mounted.
@@ -689,7 +447,7 @@
SLOGW("upgrading crypto footer to 1.1");
- pdata = malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+ pdata = (crypt_persist_data *)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
if (pdata == NULL) {
SLOGE("Cannot allocate persisent data\n");
return;
@@ -857,7 +615,7 @@
/* If not encrypted, just allocate an empty table and initialize it */
property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") ) {
- pdata = malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+ pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
if (pdata) {
init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
persist_data = pdata;
@@ -891,7 +649,7 @@
return -1;
}
- pdata = malloc(crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
+ pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
if (pdata == NULL) {
SLOGE("Cannot allocate memory for persistent data");
goto err;
@@ -970,7 +728,7 @@
return -1;
}
- pdata = malloc(crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
+ pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
if (pdata == NULL) {
SLOGE("Cannot allocate persistant data");
goto err;
@@ -1059,11 +817,12 @@
static int load_crypto_mapping_table(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr,
const unsigned char *master_key, const char *real_blk_name,
const char *name, int fd, const char *extra_params) {
- _Alignas(struct dm_ioctl) char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
+ alignas(struct dm_ioctl) char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
struct dm_ioctl *io;
struct dm_target_spec *tgt;
char *crypt_params;
char master_key_ascii[129]; /* Large enough to hold 512 bit key and null */
+ size_t buff_offset;
int i;
io = (struct dm_ioctl *) buffer;
@@ -1080,8 +839,11 @@
crypt_params = buffer + sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) + sizeof(struct dm_target_spec);
convert_key_to_hex_ascii(master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize, master_key_ascii);
- sprintf(crypt_params, "%s %s 0 %s 0 %s", crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name,
- master_key_ascii, real_blk_name, extra_params);
+
+ buff_offset = crypt_params - buffer;
+ snprintf(crypt_params, sizeof(buffer) - buff_offset, "%s %s 0 %s 0 %s",
+ crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name, master_key_ascii, real_blk_name,
+ extra_params);
crypt_params += strlen(crypt_params) + 1;
crypt_params = (char *) (((unsigned long)crypt_params + 7) & ~8); /* Align to an 8 byte boundary */
tgt->next = crypt_params - buffer;
@@ -1144,7 +906,7 @@
int err;
int retval = -1;
int version[3];
- char *extra_params;
+ const char *extra_params;
int load_count;
if ((fd = open("/dev/device-mapper", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC)) < 0 ) {
@@ -1206,7 +968,7 @@
return retval;
}
-static int delete_crypto_blk_dev(char *name)
+static int delete_crypto_blk_dev(const char *name)
{
int fd;
char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
@@ -1388,6 +1150,8 @@
SLOGE("encrypt_master_key: crypto_scrypt failed");
}
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&e_ctx);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1431,12 +1195,14 @@
/* Copy intermediate key if needed by params */
if (intermediate_key && intermediate_key_size) {
*intermediate_key = (unsigned char*) malloc(KEY_LEN_BYTES);
- if (intermediate_key) {
+ if (*intermediate_key) {
memcpy(*intermediate_key, ikey, KEY_LEN_BYTES);
*intermediate_key_size = KEY_LEN_BYTES;
}
}
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&d_ctx);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1474,7 +1240,7 @@
return ret;
}
-static int create_encrypted_random_key(char *passwd, unsigned char *master_key, unsigned char *salt,
+static int create_encrypted_random_key(const char *passwd, unsigned char *master_key, unsigned char *salt,
struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr) {
int fd;
unsigned char key_buf[KEY_LEN_BYTES];
@@ -1535,7 +1301,6 @@
return rc;
}
-#define DATA_PREP_TIMEOUT 1000
static int prep_data_fs(void)
{
int i;
@@ -1549,17 +1314,9 @@
SLOGD("Just triggered post_fs_data\n");
/* Wait a max of 50 seconds, hopefully it takes much less */
- for (i=0; i<DATA_PREP_TIMEOUT; i++) {
- char p[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-
- property_get("vold.post_fs_data_done", p, "0");
- if (*p == '1') {
- break;
- } else {
- usleep(50000);
- }
- }
- if (i == DATA_PREP_TIMEOUT) {
+ if (!android::base::WaitForProperty("vold.post_fs_data_done",
+ "1",
+ std::chrono::seconds(50))) {
/* Ugh, we failed to prep /data in time. Bail. */
SLOGE("post_fs_data timed out!\n");
return -1;
@@ -1716,11 +1473,11 @@
return -1;
}
- property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_load_persist_props");
/* Create necessary paths on /data */
if (prep_data_fs()) {
return -1;
}
+ property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_load_persist_props");
/* startup service classes main and late_start */
property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_framework");
@@ -1749,7 +1506,7 @@
return cryptfs_restart_internal(1);
}
-static int do_crypto_complete(char *mount_point)
+static int do_crypto_complete(const char *mount_point)
{
struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
@@ -1806,7 +1563,7 @@
}
static int test_mount_encrypted_fs(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr,
- char *passwd, char *mount_point, char *label)
+ const char *passwd, const char *mount_point, const char *label)
{
/* Allocate enough space for a 256 bit key, but we may use less */
unsigned char decrypted_master_key[32];
@@ -1819,6 +1576,9 @@
int upgrade = 0;
unsigned char* intermediate_key = 0;
size_t intermediate_key_size = 0;
+ int N = 1 << crypt_ftr->N_factor;
+ int r = 1 << crypt_ftr->r_factor;
+ int p = 1 << crypt_ftr->p_factor;
SLOGD("crypt_ftr->fs_size = %lld\n", crypt_ftr->fs_size);
orig_failed_decrypt_count = crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
@@ -1846,9 +1606,6 @@
/* Work out if the problem is the password or the data */
unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[sizeof(crypt_ftr->
scrypted_intermediate_key)];
- int N = 1 << crypt_ftr->N_factor;
- int r = 1 << crypt_ftr->r_factor;
- int p = 1 << crypt_ftr->p_factor;
rc = crypto_scrypt(intermediate_key, intermediate_key_size,
crypt_ftr->salt, sizeof(crypt_ftr->salt),
@@ -1864,7 +1621,8 @@
} else {
/* Try mounting the file system anyway, just in case the problem's with
* the footer, not the key. */
- sprintf(tmp_mount_point, "%s/tmp_mnt", mount_point);
+ snprintf(tmp_mount_point, sizeof(tmp_mount_point), "%s/tmp_mnt",
+ mount_point);
mkdir(tmp_mount_point, 0755);
if (fs_mgr_do_mount(fstab, DATA_MNT_POINT, crypto_blkdev, tmp_mount_point)) {
SLOGE("Error temp mounting decrypted block device\n");
@@ -2004,7 +1762,7 @@
return 0;
}
-int cryptfs_check_passwd(char *passwd)
+int cryptfs_check_passwd(const char *passwd)
{
SLOGI("cryptfs_check_passwd");
if (e4crypt_is_native()) {
@@ -2358,13 +2116,13 @@
off64_t ret;
int rc = -1;
- data->buffer = malloc(info.block_size * BLOCKS_AT_A_TIME);
+ data->buffer = (char *)malloc(info.block_size * BLOCKS_AT_A_TIME);
if (!data->buffer) {
SLOGE("Failed to allocate crypto buffer");
goto errout;
}
- block_bitmap = malloc(info.block_size);
+ block_bitmap = (u8 *)malloc(info.block_size);
if (!block_bitmap) {
SLOGE("failed to allocate block bitmap");
goto errout;
@@ -2374,8 +2132,8 @@
SLOGI("Encrypting group %d", i);
u32 first_block = aux_info.first_data_block + i * info.blocks_per_group;
- u32 block_count = min(info.blocks_per_group,
- aux_info.len_blocks - first_block);
+ u32 block_count = std::min(info.blocks_per_group,
+ (u32)(aux_info.len_blocks - first_block));
off64_t offset = (u64)info.block_size
* aux_info.bg_desc[i].bg_block_bitmap;
@@ -2447,6 +2205,8 @@
u32 i;
struct encryptGroupsData data;
int rc; // Can't initialize without causing warning -Wclobbered
+ struct timespec time_started = {0};
+ int retries = RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS;
if (previously_encrypted_upto > *size_already_done) {
SLOGD("Not fast encrypting since resuming part way through");
@@ -2465,7 +2225,6 @@
}
// Wait until the block device appears. Re-use the mount retry values since it is reasonable.
- int retries = RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS;
while ((data.cryptofd = open(crypto_blkdev, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
if (--retries) {
SLOGE("Error opening crypto_blkdev %s for ext4 inplace encrypt. err=%d(%s), retrying\n",
@@ -2505,7 +2264,6 @@
data.one_pct = data.tot_used_blocks / 100;
data.cur_pct = 0;
- struct timespec time_started = {0};
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &time_started)) {
SLOGW("Error getting time at start");
// Note - continue anyway - we'll run with 0
@@ -2623,7 +2381,7 @@
data.time_started = time(NULL);
data.remaining_time = -1;
- data.buffer = malloc(f2fs_info->block_size);
+ data.buffer = (char *)malloc(f2fs_info->block_size);
if (!data.buffer) {
SLOGE("Failed to allocate crypto buffer");
goto errout;
@@ -2919,7 +2677,7 @@
return rc;
}
-int cryptfs_enable_internal(char *howarg, int crypt_type, char *passwd,
+int cryptfs_enable_internal(char *howarg, int crypt_type, const char *passwd,
int no_ui)
{
int how = 0;
@@ -2934,6 +2692,8 @@
int num_vols;
off64_t previously_encrypted_upto = 0;
bool rebootEncryption = false;
+ bool onlyCreateHeader = false;
+ int fd = -1;
if (!strcmp(howarg, "wipe")) {
how = CRYPTO_ENABLE_WIPE;
@@ -2984,7 +2744,7 @@
fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(fstab, 0, real_blkdev, sizeof(real_blkdev));
/* Get the size of the real block device */
- int fd = open(real_blkdev, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
+ fd = open(real_blkdev, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd == -1) {
SLOGE("Cannot open block device %s\n", real_blkdev);
goto error_unencrypted;
@@ -3033,7 +2793,6 @@
/* no_ui means we are being called from init, not settings.
Now we always reboot from settings, so !no_ui means reboot
*/
- bool onlyCreateHeader = false;
if (!no_ui) {
/* Try fallback, which is to reboot and try there */
onlyCreateHeader = true;
@@ -3119,7 +2878,7 @@
* If none, create a valid empty table and save that.
*/
if (!persist_data) {
- pdata = malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+ pdata = (crypt_persist_data *)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
if (pdata) {
init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
persist_data = pdata;
@@ -3232,8 +2991,12 @@
if (!strcmp(value, "1")) {
/* wipe data if encryption failed */
SLOGE("encryption failed - rebooting into recovery to wipe data\n");
- if (!write_bootloader_message("--wipe_data\n--reason=cryptfs_enable_internal\n")) {
- SLOGE("could not write bootloader message\n");
+ std::string err;
+ const std::vector<std::string> options = {
+ "--wipe_data\n--reason=cryptfs_enable_internal\n"
+ };
+ if (!write_bootloader_message(options, &err)) {
+ SLOGE("could not write bootloader message: %s", err.c_str());
}
cryptfs_reboot(recovery);
} else {
@@ -3810,8 +3573,9 @@
ftr);
}
-const char* cryptfs_get_file_encryption_mode()
+void cryptfs_get_file_encryption_modes(const char **contents_mode_ret,
+ const char **filenames_mode_ret)
{
struct fstab_rec* rec = fs_mgr_get_entry_for_mount_point(fstab, DATA_MNT_POINT);
- return fs_mgr_get_file_encryption_mode(rec);
+ fs_mgr_get_file_encryption_modes(rec, contents_mode_ret, filenames_mode_ret);
}
diff --git a/cryptfs.h b/cryptfs.h
index bf158de..352a576 100644
--- a/cryptfs.h
+++ b/cryptfs.h
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@
unsigned char *ikey, void *params);
int cryptfs_crypto_complete(void);
- int cryptfs_check_passwd(char *pw);
+ int cryptfs_check_passwd(const char *pw);
int cryptfs_verify_passwd(char *newpw);
int cryptfs_restart(void);
int cryptfs_enable(char *flag, int type, char *passwd, int no_ui);
@@ -252,7 +252,8 @@
unsigned char* master_key);
int cryptfs_set_password(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, const char* password,
const unsigned char* master_key);
- const char* cryptfs_get_file_encryption_mode();
+ void cryptfs_get_file_encryption_modes(const char **contents_mode_ret,
+ const char **filenames_mode_ret);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
diff --git a/fs/Vfat.cpp b/fs/Vfat.cpp
index 38681c9..1803c4b 100644
--- a/fs/Vfat.cpp
+++ b/fs/Vfat.cpp
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
flags |= (ro ? MS_RDONLY : 0);
flags |= (remount ? MS_REMOUNT : 0);
- sprintf(mountData,
+ snprintf(mountData, sizeof(mountData),
"utf8,uid=%d,gid=%d,fmask=%o,dmask=%o,shortname=mixed",
ownerUid, ownerGid, permMask, permMask);
diff --git a/main.cpp b/main.cpp
index c106af9..4657377 100644
--- a/main.cpp
+++ b/main.cpp
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@
if (de->d_type != DT_DIR && lvl > 0)
continue;
- fd = openat(dfd, de->d_name, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
+ fd = openat(dfd, de->d_name, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
if(fd < 0)
continue;
diff --git a/tests/Android.mk b/tests/Android.mk
index f974e7f..416e621 100644
--- a/tests/Android.mk
+++ b/tests/Android.mk
@@ -7,11 +7,7 @@
LOCAL_C_INCLUDES := \
system/core/fs_mgr/include
-LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := \
- liblog \
- libcrypto \
-
-LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := libvold
+LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := libselinux libvold liblog libcrypto
LOCAL_SRC_FILES := VolumeManager_test.cpp
LOCAL_MODULE := vold_tests
LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := eng tests