adb: Check sender's socket id when receiving packets.
handle_packet() in adb.c didn't check that when an A_WRTE packet is
received, the sender's local-id matches the socket's peer id.
This meant that a compromised adbd server could sent packets to
the host adb server, spoofing the identity of another connected
device if it could "guess" the right host socket id.
This patch gets rid of the issue by enforcing even more checks
to ensure that all packets comply with the description in
protocol.txt.
+ Fix a bug where closing a local socket associated with a
remote one would always send an A_CLSE(0, remote-id, "")
message, though protocol.txt says that should only happen
for failed opens.
The issue was that local_socket_close() called
remote_socket_close() after clearing the remote socket's
'peer' field.
The fix introduces a new asocket optional callback,
named 'shutdown' that is called before that, and is
used to send the A_CLSE() message with the right ID
in remote_socket_shutdown().
Also add some code in handle_packet() to detect
invalid close commands.
Change-Id: I9098bc8c6e81f8809334b060e5dca4fc92e6fbc9
diff --git a/adb.c b/adb.c
index 72b7484..41270f9 100644
--- a/adb.c
+++ b/adb.c
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@
break;
case A_OPEN: /* OPEN(local-id, 0, "destination") */
- if (t->online) {
+ if (t->online && p->msg.arg0 != 0 && p->msg.arg1 == 0) {
char *name = (char*) p->data;
name[p->msg.data_length > 0 ? p->msg.data_length - 1 : 0] = 0;
s = create_local_service_socket(name);
@@ -578,28 +578,50 @@
break;
case A_OKAY: /* READY(local-id, remote-id, "") */
- if (t->online) {
- if((s = find_local_socket(p->msg.arg1))) {
+ if (t->online && p->msg.arg0 != 0 && p->msg.arg1 != 0) {
+ if((s = find_local_socket(p->msg.arg1, 0))) {
if(s->peer == 0) {
+ /* On first READY message, create the connection. */
s->peer = create_remote_socket(p->msg.arg0, t);
s->peer->peer = s;
+ s->ready(s);
+ } else if (s->peer->id == p->msg.arg0) {
+ /* Other READY messages must use the same local-id */
+ s->ready(s);
+ } else {
+ D("Invalid A_OKAY(%d,%d), expected A_OKAY(%d,%d) on transport %s\n",
+ p->msg.arg0, p->msg.arg1, s->peer->id, p->msg.arg1, t->serial);
}
- s->ready(s);
}
}
break;
- case A_CLSE: /* CLOSE(local-id, remote-id, "") */
- if (t->online) {
- if((s = find_local_socket(p->msg.arg1))) {
- s->close(s);
+ case A_CLSE: /* CLOSE(local-id, remote-id, "") or CLOSE(0, remote-id, "") */
+ if (t->online && p->msg.arg1 != 0) {
+ if((s = find_local_socket(p->msg.arg1, p->msg.arg0))) {
+ /* According to protocol.txt, p->msg.arg0 might be 0 to indicate
+ * a failed OPEN only. However, due to a bug in previous ADB
+ * versions, CLOSE(0, remote-id, "") was also used for normal
+ * CLOSE() operations.
+ *
+ * This is bad because it means a compromised adbd could
+ * send packets to close connections between the host and
+ * other devices. To avoid this, only allow this if the local
+ * socket has a peer on the same transport.
+ */
+ if (p->msg.arg0 == 0 && s->peer && s->peer->transport != t) {
+ D("Invalid A_CLSE(0, %u) from transport %s, expected transport %s\n",
+ p->msg.arg1, t->serial, s->peer->transport->serial);
+ } else {
+ s->close(s);
+ }
}
}
break;
- case A_WRTE:
- if (t->online) {
- if((s = find_local_socket(p->msg.arg1))) {
+ case A_WRTE: /* WRITE(local-id, remote-id, <data>) */
+ if (t->online && p->msg.arg0 != 0 && p->msg.arg1 != 0) {
+ if((s = find_local_socket(p->msg.arg1, p->msg.arg0))) {
unsigned rid = p->msg.arg0;
p->len = p->msg.data_length;