CRED: Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against ptrace
Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign
intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace(). The
attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new
credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 639177b..998e856 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@
commit_creds(bprm->cred);
bprm->cred = NULL;
- /* cred_exec_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
+ /* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
* ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
* credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked */
@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@
/*
* determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
- * - the caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex to protect against
+ * - the caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
* PTRACE_ATTACH
*/
int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@
if (!bprm)
goto out_files;
- retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
+ retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_guard_mutex);
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
current->in_execve = 1;
@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@
/* execve succeeded */
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
current->in_execve = 0;
- mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_guard_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
free_bprm(bprm);
if (displaced)
@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@
out_unlock:
current->in_execve = 0;
- mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_guard_mutex);
out_free:
free_bprm(bprm);