macsec: fix error codes when a SA is created
preserve the return value of AEAD functions that are called when a SA is
created, to avoid inappropriate display of "RTNETLINK answers: Cannot
allocate memory" message.
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c
index 18cfb46..0045108 100644
--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
@@ -1270,22 +1270,22 @@
int ret;
tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
- if (!tfm || IS_ERR(tfm))
- return NULL;
+
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return tfm;
ret = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- crypto_free_aead(tfm);
- return NULL;
- }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto fail;
ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, icv_len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- crypto_free_aead(tfm);
- return NULL;
- }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto fail;
return tfm;
+fail:
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
static int init_rx_sa(struct macsec_rx_sa *rx_sa, char *sak, int key_len,
@@ -1293,12 +1293,12 @@
{
rx_sa->stats = alloc_percpu(struct macsec_rx_sa_stats);
if (!rx_sa->stats)
- return -1;
+ return -ENOMEM;
rx_sa->key.tfm = macsec_alloc_tfm(sak, key_len, icv_len);
- if (!rx_sa->key.tfm) {
+ if (IS_ERR(rx_sa->key.tfm)) {
free_percpu(rx_sa->stats);
- return -1;
+ return PTR_ERR(rx_sa->key.tfm);
}
rx_sa->active = false;
@@ -1391,12 +1391,12 @@
{
tx_sa->stats = alloc_percpu(struct macsec_tx_sa_stats);
if (!tx_sa->stats)
- return -1;
+ return -ENOMEM;
tx_sa->key.tfm = macsec_alloc_tfm(sak, key_len, icv_len);
- if (!tx_sa->key.tfm) {
+ if (IS_ERR(tx_sa->key.tfm)) {
free_percpu(tx_sa->stats);
- return -1;
+ return PTR_ERR(tx_sa->key.tfm);
}
tx_sa->active = false;
@@ -1629,6 +1629,7 @@
unsigned char assoc_num;
struct nlattr *tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
+ int err;
if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1665,13 +1666,19 @@
}
rx_sa = kmalloc(sizeof(*rx_sa), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!rx_sa || init_rx_sa(rx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]),
- secy->key_len, secy->icv_len)) {
- kfree(rx_sa);
+ if (!rx_sa) {
rtnl_unlock();
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ err = init_rx_sa(rx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]),
+ secy->key_len, secy->icv_len);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ kfree(rx_sa);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return err;
+ }
+
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
@@ -1777,6 +1784,7 @@
struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa;
unsigned char assoc_num;
struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
+ int err;
if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1813,13 +1821,19 @@
}
tx_sa = kmalloc(sizeof(*tx_sa), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tx_sa || init_tx_sa(tx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]),
- secy->key_len, secy->icv_len)) {
- kfree(tx_sa);
+ if (!tx_sa) {
rtnl_unlock();
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ err = init_tx_sa(tx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]),
+ secy->key_len, secy->icv_len);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ kfree(tx_sa);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return err;
+ }
+
nla_memcpy(tx_sa->key.id, tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID], MACSEC_KEYID_LEN);
spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);